CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC (CNP): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC (CNP) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CNP

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCNP
CompanyCENTERPOINT ENERGY INC
Sector / IndustryUtilities
Current price$39.24/sh
CompositionElectric 52% / Natural Gas 48% / Corporate and Other 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Multiple paid23x operating income

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 5.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 5.5% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 5.1% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.85σ
cohort percentile (of 70 peers)69

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.20x5expensive
Earnings2.23x3expensive
Relative1.67x2expensive
Growth1.71x1expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthnoReference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $2.4B
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.7x / 20.0x / 23.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$17.702.22xyesBV/sh $17.50, ROE (TTM) 9.4%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$17.802.20xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$22.971.71xyesRev $9.4B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.3x / 2.7x / 3.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$19.602.00xyesEPS $1.63, growth 12% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.99 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$4.738.30xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.80B × (1−23%) / WACC 5.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$17.812.20xyesBV $17.50 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 9.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 6.1%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$25.341.55xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.63 × BVPS $17.50) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $3.71B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$44.470.88xyesEPS $1.63 × (8.5 + 2×12.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$4.977.90xyesBV $17.50 × (ROIC 1.5% / WACC 5.4%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $9.38B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$29.411.33xyesEPS $1.63 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 12.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 18.0x
Earnings YieldEarnings$17.622.23xyesEPS $1.63 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Electricoperatingenterprise$4.9bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Natural Gasoperatingenterprise$4.5bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$23.7b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)14.47x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)11.18x
Interest coverage2.2x
Share count CAGR (dilution)1.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Spending is the product. A regulated utility earns a return on the capital its commissions allow it to put in the ground, so an approved investment program reads closer to a revenue forecast than to a cost. CenterPoint's is large. The company describes making "significant capital investments in our service territories under our 10-year capital plan to help operate and maintain safer, more reliable and growing electric and natural gas systems and support the electric demand growth that management is forecasting over the next decade", and sizes that plan at $65.5 billion in its annual report. For a company with a $29.4 billion market value, the pipeline of rate-earning assets is more than twice what the equity is worth today.

The demand behind it is specific rather than aspirational. The filing says the company anticipates "a high level of load growth and an increase in demand for electric power in certain of our service territories, including from the expansion of data centers (associated with, among other things, increasing demand for AI), energy refining and exports, advanced manufacturing and logistics", and separately that it "expects residential meter growth for Houston Electric to remain in line with long-term trends at approximately 2% annually". Two per cent more meters a year compounds quietly. It is also the least glamorous and most reliable form of growth a wires business can have, because a new house connects whether or not anyone is excited about the sector.

Management has been reshaping the portfolio to point at that. The Louisiana and Mississippi gas distribution businesses have already been sold, and the Ohio gas distribution business is now classified as held for sale, with the transaction "expected to close in the fourth quarter of 2026, subject to the satisfaction of customary closing conditions". Selling slower gas territories to fund a Texas electric build is capital recycling with a clear direction: out of businesses where volumes are flat and into ones where the company is forecasting load it has to build for.

Here is why the conventional arithmetic looks unkind. Methods that capitalize what a company earns today, crediting no growth at all, cannot see an investment plan that has been filed but not yet built. They value the asset base as it stands. A utility's asset base is scheduled to grow, and the return on the increment is set by regulation rather than by competition. That does not make those methods wrong; it makes them a poor instrument for a business whose earnings power is contractual and forward-dated.

The first quarter of 2026 showed the mechanism working. Net income rose $19 million against the prior year, with the Electric segment up $32 million and Natural Gas up $22 million, the ordinary result of rate relief and new investment entering rates. Management also raised the quarterly dividend to 24 cents a share from 23 cents in July 2026. Neither number is dramatic. In this business the absence of drama is the product.

Bear Case

Among the utilities competing for the same investor dollar, this one turns less of its revenue into operating profit than most of them. EIX converts 30.8%, DUK 27.2%, EVRG 25.9% and AEP 24.2%, while CenterPoint manages 22.7% on a trailing basis. On the gas side the distance is wider still, with ATO at 35.9%. Mid pack profitability is survivable on its own. Mid pack profitability alongside the thinnest interest cover in the comparison and the largest relative spending commitment is a different proposition, because the spending has to be financed before it earns.

The regulator is where that finance either gets returned or does not, and the recent evidence points the wrong way. The annual report discloses that in the "2024 Houston Electric general rate case, Houston Electric filed a base rate case seeking approval for revenue increases of approximately $60 million and a 10.4% ROE", and the settlement filed with the Texas commission delivered an overall revenue requirement decrease rather than an increase. Asking for more and receiving less is not a rounding error in a business whose entire earnings stream is set by that process. The filing is candid about why it can keep happening, noting that "concerns about customer affordability could cause regulators to approve lesser amounts in ratemaking or cost recovery" and that appeals "could further exacerbate regulatory lag". Every dollar of the ten year plan has to survive that gauntlet one proceeding at a time.

The load growth the plan is built around is not guaranteed either. The company states plainly that there is "significant uncertainty with respect to the forecasted load growth". If the data center demand arrives later or smaller than modelled, the assets still get built, the customers still get billed, and the affordability objection the filing already flags gets louder. A utility that spends into demand that does not show up ends up asking a commission to charge existing customers for capacity nobody needed.

Financing is the pressure point today. Operating income covers the interest bill about 2.3 times over, against roughly 23.7 billion dollars of net borrowings. That coverage is what constrains the plan, because a company at that level funds new investment partly with new shares, and it has been doing so: the share count has risen about 1.1% a year over the four years to March 2026, the company maintains an equity distribution agreement for the sale of "shares of Common Stock, having an aggregate gross sales price of up to $ 500 million", and it has convertible notes outstanding that add more shares if the stock performs. Existing holders fund the growth and then split the returns with the new holders who funded it alongside them.

The usual downside cushion is also less of one than it appears. The company holds a portfolio of marketable equity worth roughly 1.2 billion dollars, but the annual report explains what it is for: "Shares of AT&T Common, Charter Common and WBD Common are expected to be held to facilitate" the company's obligation under an exchangeable debt security whose payoff tracks those same shares. It is a matched position, not a spare asset. If the shares fall, so does the liability, and neither outcome puts cash in a shareholder's hands.

None of the standard valuation frames reach today's price. The methods that capitalize current earnings sit roughly 153% below it, and even peer multiples land about 25% under. The bull's answer is that those frames cannot price a filed investment plan, which is fair. The bear's answer is that the plan only becomes earnings after a commission agrees, a lender funds it and a customer pays for it, and this company's recent record on the first of those three is a revenue requirement that went down.

Valuation

Every standard family of method lands below today's price, which for a regulated utility is unusual. Peer multiples come closest: the price sits about 25% above where the peer-multiple methods land. The single forward growth method is further off, with the price roughly 71% above it. The earnings-power methods are furthest, the price standing about 153% above them, and one of those is instructive about why. It takes a five year average of operating income, applies tax and capitalizes the result at a fixed discount rate with no growth credited, then deducts the debt. On a company carrying this much borrowing, that subtraction leaves very little equity, which is less a verdict on the business than a demonstration of how leveraged a regulated balance sheet is when you stop crediting future rate base.

Across the whole company the price works out to roughly 23 times operating income. Read against the low blended cost of capital a rate-regulated cash stream normally carries, that is undemanding, and on that basis the price sits below what even a slowly shrinking profit stream would warrant. Read against the roughly 9.3% return an equity investor is conventionally assumed to require, none of the methods above get there. Both readings are arithmetically fine. They differ only in what the money costs, and for a company carrying 23.7 billion dollars of net debt against a market value not much larger than that, the choice is not a technicality. It is the argument, and the numbers alone do not settle it.

The peer set puts the operating performance in context without needing a multiple. CenterPoint earns a 22.7% trailing operating margin. Among the electric names that places it between PNW at 20.9% and OGE at 23.9%, below DUK at 27.2% and AEP at 24.2%, and well below EIX at 30.8%. Its earned return on book equity runs about 9.4%, against the 10.4% allowed return the company asked the Texas commission for in the 2024 Houston Electric case and did not get. The gap between an allowed return and an earned return is the single most useful number in utility analysis, and here it points to a company earning under what it believes it is entitled to.

The composition of what is being valued is also moving. The Louisiana and Mississippi gas distribution businesses are gone and the Ohio gas distribution business is classified as held for sale, with the pre-tax income of the Ohio operation still running through the reported numbers until the transaction closes, "expected to close in the fourth quarter of 2026". The trailing profit figures therefore include a business the company has agreed to sell.

The balance sheet sets the pace of everything above. Operating income covers interest about 2.3 times over, liquid assets run near 1.2 billion dollars, and the share count has been rising about 1.1% a year rather than falling. That combination means the ten year plan gets funded from three sources at once, retained earnings, new debt and new equity, and the third of those dilutes the holder who is being asked to underwrite the growth in the first place.

Catalysts

The next scheduled report is July 28, 2026, three days from this writing. It follows a first quarter reported on April 23, 2026 in which net income rose $19 million against the prior year, split between a $32 million improvement in the Electric segment and $22 million in Natural Gas. Those are rate-driven gains rather than volume-driven ones, so the line to read in the next print is whether the second quarter carried the same pattern into the Texas summer, when Houston load peaks and storm exposure is highest.

The portfolio transaction is the larger dated event. The Ohio natural gas distribution business is under agreement and "expected to close in the fourth quarter of 2026, subject to the satisfaction of customary closing conditions", including antitrust clearance. Until it closes the earnings of that business still run through the consolidated numbers, so a close in the fourth quarter resets the reported base and hands the company proceeds to point at the Texas electric plan. A delay does the opposite and leaves the funding gap where it is.

Capital return moved in July, with the board lifting the quarterly dividend to 24 cents a share from 23 cents. Broker opinion moved in both directions in the same stretch: JPMorgan raised its target to $47 while Morgan Stanley raised its own to $40, and BofA, BMO and KeyBanc each trimmed theirs by a dollar. The spread of those views straddles the current quote, which is a reasonable description of a stock whose outcome depends on regulatory decisions nobody outside the process can time.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Electric (reported)

Natural Gas (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company dividend declaration, July 2026 · company earnings calendar · Q1 2026 Form 10-Q, filed April 23, 2026 · JPMorgan research note, July 2026 · Morgan Stanley research note, July 2026 · broker research notes, July 2026

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