Core & Main, Inc. (CNM): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $43.02, Core & Main, Inc. (CNM) is priced for +4.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CNM

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCNM
CompanyCore & Main, Inc.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$43.02/sh
CompositionPipes, valves & fittings products 67% / Storm drainage products 16% / Fire protection products 8% / Meter products 9%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)2.0%
Operating margin today9.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-7.5pp
Implied growth4.1%
Multiple paid15x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.67σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)24

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.73x5expensive
Earnings1.73x5expensive
Relative1.00x5justifies
Growth1.30x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Relative Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$33.141.30xyesFCF base $0.6B, growth 0% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 7.4%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$42.781.01xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 9.7x / 11.7x / 13.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$43.021.00xyesP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.2x / 18.0x / 20.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$24.811.73xyesBV/sh $10.43, ROE (TTM) 22.0%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$38.051.13xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$27.851.54xyesRev $7.6B, growth 0% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.9x / 1.1x / 1.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$28.321.52xyesEPS $2.36, growth 9% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.00 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$24.801.73xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.70B × (1−25%) / WACC 7.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$35.721.20xyesBV $10.43 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 22.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$23.531.83xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.36 × BVPS $10.43) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$44.630.96xyesEBITDA $0.92B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$21.871.97xyesFCF $608.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$21.042.04xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.59B (FCF $0.61B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$53.940.80xyesEPS $2.36 × (8.5 + 2×9.4%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$4.369.87xyesBV $10.43 × (ROIC 3.1% / WACC 7.4%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$97.680.44xyesRevenue $7.65B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$33.221.30xyesEPS $2.36 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 9.4% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 14.1x
Earnings YieldEarnings$25.511.69xyesEPS $2.36 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Waterworks Distribution (whole company)operatingenterprise7.4B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.0b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)3.64x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.74x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-5.6%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Gross margin has been moving in the right direction, which in distribution is the hard one to move. The quarterly filing reported that "Gross profit as a percentage of net sales for the three months ended November 2, 2025 was 27.2% compared with 26.6% for the three months ended October 27, 2024", and credited the company's own margin program rather than product prices. That distinction carries weight. Any distributor can post a better gross margin by selling into a price spike, and every distributor hands the gain back when prices fall. Margin earned from how a company buys and what it chooses to sell is the kind that survives the next cycle.

The mechanism sits in plain language in the annual report: "We are expanding our direct sourcing and distribution capabilities through the addition of private label products and incremental warehouse capacity in order to drive further margin". Private label is a distributor's version of making the product instead of moving it. It converts a purchasing relationship into a line whose economics the company controls, and it is only available at scale, because no supplier runs a private label program for a customer that cannot fill the trucks.

Scale is the asset here. Core & Main estimates "that our net sales accounted for approximately 17% of our $44 billion addressable market in fiscal 2025", in a field it describes as having "only one major national competitor, but we also face competition from regional and local competitors and a limited number of manufacturers who sell directly to large customers". Everything else is hundreds of regional and local houses. That structure feeds on itself, because the annual report notes the company believes it is "one of the largest volume customers for many of our suppliers, leading to favorable purchasing arrangements regarding product availability, payment terms and pricing". In a business running gross margins in the high twenties, buying two points better than the local competitor is most of the operating margin.

The cash trajectory follows the margin trajectory. Trailing operating income of 781 million dollars turns into free cash flow of roughly 608 million dollars, and a growing share of that has gone into retiring stock. Share count has fallen about 5.6% a year over the four years to May 2026, which is buyback deployment showing up in the one place it cannot be dressed up. On December 1, 2025 the board raised the authorization by 500 million dollars, taking the program to 1 billion dollars, after completing "$155 million and $176 million, respectively, of repurchases of Class A common stock" in the two prior fiscal years.

The cyclical objection is real and the bull case does not need to argue with it. It needs the mix. Municipal work took 44% of net sales, and the filing's own description of that demand is that it "has been relatively steady over the long-term due to the consistent and immediate need to replace broken infrastructure". A recession postpones a subdivision. It does not postpone a broken main under a street.

Bear Case

Reduce the price to the thing it actually depends on and the number is unremarkable: operating profit growing about 2.9% a year, held for five years. Nothing in that requires a construction boom. The fragility lies elsewhere. The price needs that growth to be positive at all, and lately the cost of running the business has been growing faster than the business.

Selling and administrative expense ran "14.7% for the nine months ended November 2, 2025 compared with 13.9%" of net sales a year earlier. Set that against a company guiding to low single digit sales growth and the arithmetic gets uncomfortable: eight tenths of a point of expense drift is enough to hold operating profit flat, or send it lower, while the revenue line still rises. Growth in a distributor's sales is not the same event as growth in its profit, and the price is underwriting the second one.

The demand base is also more cyclical than the water infrastructure framing implies. Fiscal 2025 net sales split "44% municipal, 38% non-residential and 18% residential", and the filing is blunt about the latter two: "Our business is largely dependent on activity in the U.S. residential and non-residential construction markets, which are volatile and subject to cyclical market pressures". The municipal half is steadier rather than immune, and the annual report names the channel through which it weakens, noting that "municipal budget processes and conditions in the municipal bond market can impact municipal spending". Tax receipts fall in the same downturns that stop the subdivisions, and a city that cannot issue debt defers the pipe replacement it knows it needs.

The capital structure narrows the room to absorb that. Net debt sits at about 2.55 times operating profit, and the borrowings are priced off floating benchmarks, since "Our credit facilities bear interest at a floating rate". The June notes offering pushes part of that to a fixed 6.000% coupon running to 2034, which buys rate certainty at a slightly higher running cost. The term loan also carries a sweep: it "may require accelerated repayment based upon cash flows generated in excess of operating and investing requirements" once secured leverage crosses a defined level. In a trough, the lenders get first call on the free cash flow that would otherwise fund acquisitions and buybacks, which are precisely the two levers the growth assumption leans on.

If that modest growth requirement is missed, the support under the price thins fast. The methods that capitalize what the company earns today, crediting no growth at all, sit far under the stock: the price is roughly 77% above where the earnings-power methods land. Only peer multiples reach it. Put plainly, the price is currently defended by what comparable distributors trade at rather than by the profit stream underneath it, and comparable multiples are the first thing a cyclical downturn withdraws.

None of this is a solvency case. Operating income covers the interest bill about 6.6 times over, the company generates cash rather than consuming it, and 150 million dollars of liquid assets alongside an asset-backed facility is normal plumbing for a distributor. The bear argument is about the earnings the price is capitalizing, not about whether the company gets through.

Valuation

Today's price works out to roughly 14 times company-wide operating income. Turned around, that multiple embeds operating profit growing about 2.9% a year across a five year stage, computed at an 8.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth. Measured against what the company has recently delivered, the rate itself is ordinary. The demand is duration, not pace: the price needs that growth held for the whole stretch rather than hit once. The result is also unusually sensitive to the discount rate, since each additional percentage point of cost of capital moves the required operating growth by about 5.9 points. A valuation like this is a statement about interest rates nearly as much as about pipe.

The methods used to triangulate the price disagree in a readable pattern. Peer multiples land essentially where the stock trades. The forward cash flow methods sit lower, with the price about 32% above them. The earnings-power methods sit lower still, the price standing roughly 77% above where they reach. One of those takes a five year average of operating income, adds back one time charges, applies tax, capitalizes the result at a fixed discount rate and credits no growth whatsoever. That is a deliberately austere construction, and the distance from it up to the price is the growth and the multiple the market is prepared to extend. Read as a whole, this is a value lens rather than an optionality one: nothing here requires a new business to work, only the existing one to keep compounding slowly.

Within its cohort the multiple sits in the lower half of the range, and profitability explains part of why it can. On a trailing basis Core & Main earns a 9.8% operating margin, which places it mid pack among listed distributors: POOL runs 10.9% and WSO 9.9%, FERG sits at 9.2%, while SITE at 5.1% and WCC at 5.3% are materially thinner. Mid pack profitability priced in the cheaper half of the cohort is roughly where a business with "38% non-residential" exposure in its sales mix tends to be marked.

The balance sheet is neither the argument for the stock nor the argument against it. Net debt runs just under 2 billion dollars, or about 2.55 times operating profit, against a revenue base of 7.65 billion dollars and 150 million dollars of liquid assets, with operating income covering interest about 6.6 times over. The 2031 term loan was carrying a floating rate, disclosed as "The weighted average interest rate, excluding the effect of the interest rate swap, of Core & Main LP's outstanding borrowings under the 2031 Senior Term Loan as of February 1, 2026 was 5.69%". What that structure constrains is pace. Acquisitions, buybacks and debt paydown all draw on the same free cash flow, and the board has signalled it intends to keep buying, authorizing a program under which "the Company may purchase up to $1 billion of the Company's Class A common stock". At today's cash generation the company can fund all three at once. In a trough it would have to rank them.

Catalysts

The most recent quarterly report landed on June 10, 2026, with net sales of $1.91 billion, and management reaffirmed its outlook for the current fiscal year at $7.8 billion to $7.9 billion of net sales, growth of 2% to 3%. That reaffirmation is the cleanest available read on the assumption the price depends on. The company still expects low single digit top line growth, which is close to the pace the price requires from operating profit. Whether the two travel together is a cost question rather than a demand question, and the answer shows up in the operating expense line.

Two weeks later the company reworked its debt. On June 25, 2026 it priced $750 million of 6.000% Senior Notes due 2034, with proceeds earmarked to prepay part of the existing senior term loan due July 2028. The trade is straightforward: a floating rate that was disclosed near 5.7% at the last fiscal year end becomes a fixed 6.000% for eight more years. The company is paying a modest premium to stop guessing about short rates and to move a 2028 maturity out to 2034, which is a defensive move rather than an expansionary one, though the release also lists acquisitions and share repurchases among the uses of the remaining proceeds.

Sell side coverage widened on July 22, 2026, when William Blair began coverage at Market Perform. The next scheduled report is September 8, 2026. That print covers the summer construction season, which is when the residential and non-residential half of the sales mix either shows up or does not.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Waterworks Distribution (whole company) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company 8-K, June 25, 2026 · Q1 earnings release, June 10, 2026 · William Blair initiation, July 22, 2026 · company earnings calendar

View the full interactive CNM report on boothcheck