Comcast Corporation (CMCSA): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers Comcast Corporation (CMCSA) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CMCSA

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCMCSA
CompanyComcast Corporation
Sector / IndustryCommunication Services
Current price$27.06/sh
CompositionDomestic broadband 21% / Domestic wireless 4% / International connectivity 4% / Video 21% / Advertising (Residential Connectivity & Platforms) 3% / Other (Residential Connectivity & Platforms) 4% / Total Business Services Connectivity Segment 8% / Domestic advertising (Media) 7% / Domestic distribution (Media) 9% / International networks (Media) 4% / Other (Media) 2% / Content licensing (Studios) 7% / Theatrical (Studios) 1% / Other (Studios) 1% / Total Theme Parks Segment 8% / Other revenue 3% / Eliminations -7%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)12.7%
Operating margin today14.7%
Margin compression (value-band)-2.0pp
Multiple paid10x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.1% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-1.15σ
cohort percentile (of 34 peers)18

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.70x5justifies
Earnings0.61x5justifies
Relative0
Growth1.09x4expensive

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$64.930.42xyesFCF base $20.4B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.6%, WACC 9.5%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$41.570.65xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 4.0x / 2.8x / 4.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.5x / 10.0x / 11.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 5.31x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$2.979.11xyesStage 1: -38% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$33.700.80xyesBV/sh $24.98, ROE (TTM) 12.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$38.860.70xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$17.801.52xyesRev $124.9B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.8x / 0.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$44.440.61xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $20.18B × (1−26%) / WACC 9.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$39.930.68xyesBV $24.98 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 12.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.1%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$41.810.65xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.11 × BVPS $24.98) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $34.59B × sector EV/EBITDA 7.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$61.940.44xyesFCF $20444.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$57.820.47xyesSBC-adj FCF $19.07B (FCF $20.44B − SBC $1.37B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$2.6110.37xyesEPS $3.11 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$11.452.36xyesBV $24.98 × (ROIC 4.3% / WACC 9.5%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $124.90B × sector P/S 1.2x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$33.620.80xyesEPS $3.11 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Material operating units span distinct economics, so a single sector multiple or target margin is not representative. Consolidated cash-flow lenses may remain as secondary checks, while segment SOTP is primary.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Residential Connectivity & Platformsoperatingenterprise$70.6b$210.6b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Business Services Connectivityoperatingenterprise$10.2b$45.2b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Mediaoperatingenterprise$22.2b$68.4b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Studiosoperatingenterprise$8.1b$23.5b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Theme Parksoperatingenterprise$9.8b$51.4b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$88.8b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)6.54x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)4.85x
Interest coverage4.2x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-5.5%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Cable systems are strange things to value, because the expensive part is already finished. The plant is buried, the homes are passed, and the yearly capital bill is mostly customer equipment and maintenance rather than construction. That inverts the usual question. For most companies you ask what growth would justify the spending; here you ask how much cash a completed asset throws off and how long it keeps throwing it. Over the trailing year the answer was 125.3 billion dollars of revenue, 21.3 billion dollars of operating income at a 17.4% margin, and 20.4 billion dollars of free cash flow. Nothing in that requires a new idea to work.

The mix inside the connectivity business is also moving in a direction the headline subscriber count hides. The FY2025 annual report describes the segment's revenue as having "decreased due to decreases in video, other and advertising revenue, partially offset by increases in domestic wireless". Wireless is only about 4% of company revenue today, which is precisely the point: it is being sold to households the company already serves, over a network it already owns, with the airtime leased rather than built. Every line added there is revenue on top of a fixed cost base, and it also gives the company something to bundle when a fiber competitor knocks on the door. Meanwhile programming expenses fell in 2025 alongside the video subscriber decline, so a shrinking video business takes a chunk of its own cost structure with it as it goes.

The parks are the part of the company that behaves least like a utility. The FY2025 filing reports that "Theme park segment revenue increased in 2025 primarily driven by our domestic theme parks", which included the May 2025 opening of Epic Universe in Orlando. That is a physical asset with a long payback and no fiber overbuilder, and the pipeline behind it is disclosed rather than hoped for: the March 2026 quarterly report describes investment in "a Universal theme park and resort in the United Kingdom with a projected opening date in 2031, subject to various approvals". Theme parks and studios together account for roughly a sixth of revenue, and they are the pieces of the business whose competition is other leisure spending rather than another network in the same trench.

What the company does with the cash is the clearest signal in the file. The share count has come down about 5.6% a year over the four years to March 2026, which is buyback deployment showing up in the one place it cannot be faked. On top of that, the board approved a dividend of $1.32 per share on an annualized basis in January 2026 and a first-quarter dividend of $0.33 per share paid in April 2026, against dividend payments of $4.9 billion during 2025. Operating income covered the interest bill 4.9 times over the trailing year, so none of this is being funded by stretching the balance sheet.

Put those pieces together and the bull case does not depend on Comcast winning back broadband customers. It depends on the network continuing to produce roughly what it produces now while the share count keeps falling. At about 8 times operating income, every dollar the company spends buying its own stock retires an unusually large slice of that operating income. The bet is arithmetic, not narrative.

Bear Case

The number of American households is close to fixed, and the industry keeps building more capacity to serve them. That is the whole bear case in one sentence, and the FY2025 annual report names both sources of it without flinching. Broadband, it says, competes "primarily against wireline telecommunications companies, including many that are increasing deployment of fiber-based networks", and separately notes that "some companies and U.S. municipalities are building advanced fiber-based networks that provide very fast internet access speeds, and some providers offer newer satellite broadband services". T describes its own program as building "increasing broadband revenues, inclusive of impact of integrating recent acquisitions of spectrum and fiber assets". VZ describes a second front entirely, telling investors that "FWA enables fixed broadband access using radio frequencies instead of cables". New supply into a market with no new demand has one usual outcome, and it is not higher prices.

The company has already conceded the price half of that. Its March 2026 quarterly report says the simplified pricing structure "will negatively impact average domestic broadband revenue per customer", offered as the cost of better retention. So the bear does not need a collapse in customer counts. It needs only what management has described: flat-to-declining homes at a lower revenue per home. The FY2025 report is equally direct that "Our customer relationship additions/(losses) continue to be negatively impacted by an increasingly competitive environment."

Then there is video, which carries about 21% of revenue, the same share as domestic broadband. Management expects "continued declines in video revenue as a result of domestic customer net losses due to shifting video consumption patterns and the competitive environment". A fifth of the top line is disclosed as being in structural decline, and advertising, another 10% across the residential and media businesses, moves with the same audience. The trailing 17.4% operating margin is therefore not obviously the middle of a cycle. It may be the high end of one, earned while the declining lines are still large enough to carry their share of a fixed cost base.

The balance sheet is what makes that mix uncomfortable rather than merely disappointing. Net debt sits near 90.5 billion dollars, about 4.25 times operating profit, against 9.5 billion dollars of liquid assets. Debt does not shrink when revenue does. Interest was covered 4.9 times over the trailing year, which is adequate rather than generous, and the fixed commitments keep arriving: a park in the United Kingdom targeted for 2031, and a contractual obligation tied to Universal Beijing that the FY2025 report carried at 1.1 billion dollars against an estimated 1.9 billion dollars as of December 31, 2025. Capital returns and construction both compete for the same cash flow, and the construction has dates attached.

The floor under all of this is real but modest. The company holds roughly 7.7 billion dollars of equity stakes that sit outside the operating businesses, close to 9.5% of today's market value. That is a genuine boundary on the downside, not a source of upside, and it is small next to the operating value that would have to impair before it mattered. The honest bear here is not that the price is too high. It is that a market pricing this at a heavy discount to every conventional method may simply be doing arithmetic on a business whose largest lines are shrinking, and be right.

Valuation

Start with what today's price is willing to assume, because it is unusually undemanding. At $22.29 the market is paying roughly 8 times company-wide operating income. Work out what that multiple embeds and you arrive at a business in permanent decline: operating profit shrinking about 5% a year, every year, with no recovery assumed anywhere in the arithmetic. That is a floor on the assumption rather than a forecast. Today's price does not require the business to grow. It does not require it to hold flat either.

The methods used to triangulate the business agree with each other more than they usually do, and all of them land above the price. The peer-multiple lens and the earnings-power lens sit furthest above it; the cash-flow methods sit above it; even the asset-value lens, normally the most conservative of the four, sits above it. Two of those are worth naming because of how little they assume. One capitalizes a five-year average of operating income with one-time charges added back, taxes it, and assumes no growth at all, forever. The other simply capitalizes the 20.4 billion dollars of free cash flow as a perpetuity with zero growth. Neither method credits the company with a single new customer, a single price increase, or a single park, and both still land above today's price. The one model that lands below it works off a return on invested capital of 3.6%, which sits oddly against a return on equity of 10.4% on the same trailing basis, and is best treated as a denominator problem rather than a finding.

The concrete version of what has to be true runs the other way from most reports. Comcast earned a 17.4% operating margin over the trailing year. The price is consistent with that margin falling to roughly 11% and staying there. That is a decline of more than a third in profitability, and it is the base case embedded in the shares today, not the bear case. The same reading shows up on the balance sheet. Stated book value per share is $24.41. The equity is being valued at slightly less than that, while the trailing return on equity of 10.4% runs above the roughly 9.3% cost of that equity. A company earning a little more than its cost of capital does not usually sit below its own stated book.

The peer set explains part of the discount and not all of it. CHTR faces the same fiber and fixed-wireless entrants in overlapping territory and describes the same pivot, telling investors its residential customers "are offered Internet, mobile, video and voice services primarily on a subscription basis" with mobile sold on unlimited or by-the-gig plans. The whole domestic cable cohort is being priced as a melting asset. Comcast sits in the lower half of that multiple range, which is a statement about how the market ranks its mix rather than about its scale.

Solvency sets the boundary on all of it. Roughly 90.5 billion dollars of net debt against 100.0 billion dollars of gross borrowings is a lot of leverage on a business whose largest lines are declining, and at about 4.25 times operating profit it is a level that requires the cash flow to keep showing up. The offset is that the cash flow does keep showing up: the company is not burning cash, interest was covered 4.9 times, and the January 2026 dividend of $1.32 per share on an annualized basis was raised from earnings rather than borrowings. What the price is charging for is not the risk that the network stops producing cash. It is the risk that the cash it produces gets smaller every year.

Catalysts

The corporate structure changed at the start of 2026. Comcast separated a group of cable networks into Versant, which took CNBC International and the other separated channels with it; Versant funded a $1.0 billion Term B Loan Facility due January 2031 on January 2, 2026, before the distribution, and used loan proceeds to make a cash distribution of $2.25 billion back to Comcast. Comcast's own reported figures now reflect a smaller media portfolio than they did a year ago, which matters when reading year-over-year segment comparisons through 2026.

A second portfolio move is still pending. The company agreed in 2025 to sell its Sky operations in Germany to RTL Group and expects the sale to be completed in 2026, subject to conditions and approvals. That transaction and the Versant separation point the same direction: fewer content assets, more weight on domestic connectivity and the parks.

On the capital side, the board approved a dividend of $1.32 per share on an annualized basis in January 2026 and a first-quarter dividend of $0.33 per share paid in April 2026. The spending side is longer dated. Epic Universe opened in Orlando in May 2025 and lifted domestic park revenue in that year, and the next major build is a Universal park and resort in the United Kingdom with a projected 2031 opening, still subject to approvals. Between now and then, the quarterly broadband customer and revenue-per-customer figures are the numbers that will settle the argument about whether the discount is deserved.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Residential Connectivity & Platforms / Business Services Connectivity (reported)

Media / Studios (reported)

Theme Parks (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2025 Form 10-K · FY2025 Form 10-K, filed February 2026 · Q1 FY2026 Form 10-Q, filed April 2026 · Q1 FY2026 Form 10-Q

View the full interactive CMCSA report on boothcheck