CLARIVATE PLC (CLVT): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $2.07, CLARIVATE PLC (CLVT) is priced for +21.9% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CLVT

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCLVT
CompanyCLARIVATE PLC
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$2.07/sh
CompositionSubscription 65% / Re-occurring 18% / Transactional 17%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)12.2%
Operating margin today5.0%
Margin expansion (value-band)+7.2pp
Implied growth21.9%
Multiple paid45x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.9% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 190 peers)78

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.31x3justifies
Earnings0
Relative0
Growth0

Families that justify the price: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=3)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$3.440.60xnoFCF base $0.3B, growth -3% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 5.2%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$3.030.68xnoExit EV/EBITDA: 4.2x / 6.2x / 8.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 8.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$7.490.28xyesReference only (book value floor): BV/sh $7.49, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$6.740.31xyesReference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $7.49, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$1.191.74xnoRev $2.4B, growth -3% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.5x / 0.5x / 0.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.88B × sector EV/EBITDA 25.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.01207.00xyesFCF $333.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.01207.00xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.27B (FCF $0.33B − SBC $0.07B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.395.31xyesBV $7.49 × (ROIC 0.3% / WACC 5.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.45B × sector P/S 8.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Academia & Governmentoperatingenterprise$1.3bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Intellectual Propertyoperatingenterprise$799.4mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Life Sciences & Healthcareoperatingenterprise$389.8mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$4.2b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)43.20x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)34.13x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.8%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Information-services roll-ups are among the harder things in public markets to value honestly, because the accounting for how they were built swamps the accounting for how they perform. Clarivate was assembled by acquisition, and the price paid for each database and workflow tool now runs back through the income statement as amortization. Depreciation and amortization came to 757.2 million dollars in 2025, against reported operating profit of about 60 million dollars on roughly 2.45 billion dollars of revenue. Read the operating line alone and this looks like a business that barely functions. Read the cash flow statement and operations produced 628.5 million dollars during the same year, with capital expenditures of 263.2 million dollars. Those two facts describe the same company, and only one of them is about the business.

What generates the cash is a subscription base with unusual stickiness. About 65% of revenue is subscription, another 18% re-occurring, leaving roughly 17% transactional. The 10-K explains why the re-occurring piece behaves the way it does: Because of the re-occurring nature of the patent and trademark lifecycle, our customers engage us on a regular basis to ensure their intellectual property rights remain protected. These contracts typically include evergreen clauses or are multi-year agreements. The customer list runs past 45,000 across academic institutions, libraries, corporations, law firms, government bodies and pharmaceutical companies, which management describes as producing strong and consistent annual customer renewal. In a business where the underlying content took decades to accumulate, retention is the moat, and the company treats the annual renewal rate as a headline operating indicator rather than a footnote.

The portfolio just got simpler, and the balance sheet is the intended beneficiary. The July agreement sends Life Sciences and Healthcare to Altaris for 600 million dollars, with 500 million in cash at closing, 25 million deferred to completion of a transition services agreement and a 75 million dollar seller note, and management has said the cash goes to reducing borrowings. That leaves two segments that already share content assets and technology platforms, Academia and Government alongside Intellectual Property. A leveraged business that sells a division at a decent multiple and applies the proceeds to debt does something specific for the equity: it moves value across the capital structure toward the shareholder without the operating business having to improve at all.

Improvement would compound it. The comparison set shows what these assets earn when the acquisition accounting has washed through. FDS runs a business of almost identical size, 2.438 billion dollars of trailing revenue, at a 29.6% operating margin, and VRSK earns 44.0% on 3.102 billion dollars. Neither is a perfect analogue, but both describe the steady state of a subscription data business that is not paying down purchase amortization. Clarivate does not need to reach those margins for the equity to work. It needs the recurring base to stop shrinking while the borrowings come down, and the outlook management reaffirmed alongside the divestiture, organic annualized contract value growth of 2.0% to 3.0% for full-year 2026, is a claim that the first half of that is already happening.

Bear Case

The price rests on one assumption doing all the work: that the recurring revenue base holds while the borrowings shrink. Take away either half and the equity is in trouble, because there is very little of it. Net borrowings run to about 4.18 billion dollars against a market value near 1.3 billion, which means shareholders own the thin slice left after lenders are satisfied. The most fragile piece is not the debt schedule. It is the revenue line underneath it, and the 10-K is candid about the direction of travel, attributing revenue declines to product group wind-downs and lower transactional and subscription revenues.

The competitive backdrop is what makes that fragility acute. This is a business that sells access to curated content and the workflow tools wrapped around it, at precisely the moment when general-purpose models are getting better at summarizing and searching text. Peers name the risk plainly in their own filings; FDS warns that if competitors incorporate AI technologies, such as emerging generative and agentic AI, into their products and processes more quickly or more effectively, its competitive position may suffer. The same pressure applies here with less margin to absorb it. FDS earns 29.6% at the operating line and VRSK 44.0%, while WLY, the closest peer by shape and the one whose revenue was roughly flat over its trailing year at 1.677 billion dollars, earns 16.5%. Clarivate reports 2.5%.

The accounting record shows what happens when the growth assumption is revised. Goodwill and intangible asset impairments were 979.9 million dollars in 2023 and 540.7 million dollars in 2024, before falling to 15.0 million dollars in 2025. The risk factors are explicit that this is not necessarily finished, warning that further sustained declines in share price and market capitalization may trigger the need for updated impairment assessments. The divestiture itself carries one: management expects to record a non-cash goodwill impairment of roughly 225 to 250 million dollars on the segment being sold, based on the agreed price. Selling an asset below its carrying value is a market test of the carrying value, and the market marked it down.

Then there is what the price requires. The enterprise is valued at roughly 92 times what the business earned at the operating line over the trailing year, and unwinding that says growth has to run at the ceiling the business can fund from its own earnings for something like nine years. Only about 18% of comparable fast-growers have sustained that pace across a similar span. Set that against guidance for recurring organic revenue growth of 0.75% to 2.25% in 2026 and the tension is obvious: the price is underwriting a compounding profile that the company's own outlook does not describe. Borrowings net of liquid assets sit at roughly 69 times operating profit, and interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so the coverage question has to be answered by watching the cash-flow statement rather than a ratio. What is clear is that with borrowings of that size, the operating business has almost no room to disappoint.

Valuation

Two numbers frame everything here. Shareholders are collectively paying about 1.3 billion dollars, and the enterprise being bought carries roughly 5.5 billion dollars of total value once borrowings are added. The equity is therefore a minority claim on the business, sitting behind lenders, which is why the shares move far more than the underlying operations do. Against trailing operating profit of about 60 million dollars, that enterprise value works out near 92 times, and unwinding that multiple implies operating growth held at the ceiling the business can self-fund for about nine years. Among comparable fast-growers, only about 18% sustained that pace across a similar stretch. The trailing operating margin is 2.5%.

That 2.5% is where the analysis has to slow down, because it is not a description of how the business runs. Amortization of acquired databases and customer relationships consumed 757.2 million dollars in 2025, and the same year's operations produced 628.5 million dollars of cash before capital expenditures of 263.2 million dollars. The methods that price a company off its earnings therefore have almost nothing to work with here, and the frames that do carry a number are the balance-sheet ones. Book value stands at 7.47 dollars a share against a price of 2.04. The price sits below the asset lens rather than above it, which puts this in value territory rather than growth territory, and the honest caveat is that book value here is largely acquired goodwill and intangibles, the same assets written down by 979.9 million dollars in 2023 and 540.7 million dollars in 2024.

So the two readings pull against each other, and the reader should see the conflict rather than a resolution of it. Measured against reported operating profit, the price looks demanding to the point of implausibility. Measured against cash generation and against book, it looks like a discount. Both are computed from the same filings. The difference is entirely purchase amortization, and whether that amortization is a real economic cost depends on whether the acquired content and customer relationships need replacing at anything like the rate they are being written off. For a citation index and a patent database, the honest answer is probably not, but it is not nothing either, since the 10-K also books restructuring and other impairments of 50.7 million dollars in 2025 and share-based compensation of 63.0 million dollars.

Solvency is the binding constraint on all of it. Borrowings net of liquid assets are roughly 69 times operating profit, liquid assets stand near 242 million dollars, and the revolving facility prices at a floating base rate plus 3.25%, stepping down as first-lien leverage improves. The share count has drifted down about 1.8% a year over the past four years, so dilution is not currently the mechanism eroding the claim. The pending divestiture, which brings in 500 million dollars of cash at closing against a segment already marked down, is the first concrete reduction of the load. What the price is really tracking is the pace of that deleveraging, not the quarterly earnings print.

Catalysts

On July 6, 2026 Clarivate entered a definitive agreement to sell its Life Sciences and Healthcare segment to Altaris LLC for 600 million dollars, structured as 500 million dollars of cash at closing, 25 million dollars deferred to the completion of a transition services agreement and a 75 million dollar seller note. The company said the cash proceeds go to reducing borrowings, that the transaction is expected to close by the end of the year subject to regulatory approvals and customary conditions, and that the segment will be reported as discontinued operations beginning in the third quarter. Management also flagged an expected non-cash goodwill impairment of approximately 225 to 250 million dollars on the segment, based on the agreed price.

Guidance was reaffirmed alongside the announcement rather than reset. For full-year 2026 the company pointed to revenues of 1.94 to 2.04 billion dollars on continuing operations, or 2.30 to 2.42 billion dollars including the business being sold, with organic annualized contract value growth of 2.0% to 3.0% and recurring organic revenue growth of 0.75% to 2.25%. Management said it expects to update the outlook when the transaction closes. The gap between those two revenue figures is a useful sizing of what is leaving.

Leadership of the segment that has to carry the remaining company changed a month earlier. Simon Webster became President of the Intellectual Property segment effective June 10, 2026, succeeding Maroun S. Mourad, who departs at the end of September. Webster previously ran CPA Global before its combination with Clarivate, and the company framed the appointment around returning the IP segment to sustainable recurring growth. Between now and the close of the divestiture, the two things that carry information are the pace of debt reduction against the announced proceeds, and whether organic contract value lands inside the reaffirmed range.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Academia & Government (reported)

Intellectual Property (reported)

Life Sciences & Healthcare (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company 8-K and press release, July 6, 2026 · company press release, July 6, 2026 · FY2025 Form 10-K, filed February 24, 2026 · FY2025 Form 10-K · company press release, June 8, 2026

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