Calumet, Inc. /DE (CLMT): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers Calumet, Inc. /DE (CLMT) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CLMT

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCLMT
CompanyCalumet, Inc. /DE
Sector / IndustryEnergy
Current price$53.50/sh
CompositionSpecialty Products and Solutions - Lubricating oils 18% / Specialty Products and Solutions - Solvents 10% / Specialty Products and Solutions - Waxes 4% / Specialty Products and Solutions - Fuels, asphalt and other by-products 32% / Montana/Renewables - Gasoline 3% / Montana/Renewables - Diesel 2% / Montana/Renewables - Jet fuel 0% / Montana/Renewables - Asphalt, heavy fuel oils and other 4% / Montana/Renewables - Renewable fuels 19% / Performance Brands 8%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Multiple paid150x operating income

How unusual the bet is: n/a

Valuation X-Ray

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0
Earnings0
Relative0
Growth0

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=1)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$0.14382.14xnoFCF base $0.0B, growth 13% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.8%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$60.730.88xnoExit EV/EBITDA: 24.9x / 29.9x / 34.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 1.2x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAssetno
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAssetno
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$50.441.06xnoRev $4.6B, growth 13% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.8x / 1.0x / 1.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.23B × sector EV/EBITDA 6.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.015350.00xyesFCF $49.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $4.59B × sector P/S 1.2x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Specialty Products and Solutionsoperatingenterprise$2.6bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Performance Brandsoperatingenterprise$311.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Montana/Renewablesoperatingenterprise$1.2bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.2b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)57.80x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)45.66x
Interest coverage0.2x
Share count CAGR (dilution)3.2%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Refining is one of the few industries where a year of reported earnings tells you almost nothing about the business. Margins are the difference between two commodity prices neither party controls, inventories are marked through the income statement, and regulatory credits swing results by hundreds of millions without a dollar moving. Calumet takes that ordinary difficulty and adds a second layer, because half the company is not really a refinery at all. Specialty products such as lubricating oils, solvents and waxes are formulated, branded and sold into industrial supply chains on relationships rather than on the crack spread. The right way to read this company is as two asset bases with different economics, temporarily reported as one number.

The first quarter of 2026 makes the point with unusual clarity. The company reported a net loss of $317.0 million, and then explained that the figure contained $147.4 million of non-cash expense related to renewable fuel credits, $102.7 million of unrealised derivative losses, and $37.9 million of equity compensation expense that increased precisely because the share price went up. A loss driven partly by your own stock rising is a loss that is telling you about accounting, not operations. Underneath it, the specialty segment produced $44.3 million and the branded products segment $12.6 million on the company's own adjusted earnings measure.

That specialty half sits in niches the integrated majors treat as leftovers. The FY2025 annual report names the competition directly: "Our primary competitors in producing paraffinic lubricating oils include Exxon Mobil Corporation, Motiva Enterprises, LLC, Phillips 66, HF Sinclair Corporation and Chevron Corporation." Those are enormous companies for whom base oils and waxes are a small line item, which is exactly why a focused operator can hold share in them. The branded end of it, sold through Performance Brands, behaves differently again, and the first quarter carried record quarterly sales of the TruFuel line. Peers in that neighbourhood earn margins refining never sees: WDFC turns a 17.5% operating margin on $674.7 million of revenue, VVV 15.3% on $1.86 billion, CBT 15.7% on $3.58 billion. Refining peers live in a different band entirely, with DK at 2.3% on $10.73 billion and PBF at 2.5% on $30.17 billion. Calumet owns pieces of both worlds.

The renewables build is the reason the price is where it is, and its financing structure deserves attention. The annual report records that the company "executed a Loan Guarantee Agreement (the \"DOE Loan\") for a $1.44 billion guaranteed loan facility to fund the construction and expansion of the renewable fuels facility owned by MRL", with the first tranche of roughly $781.8 million already drawn, and adds that "MRL has the ability to draw additional tranches of up to $624.6 million through the anticipated completion of this project in 2028. Calumet is not a guarantor of MRL indebtedness." Read the last sentence twice. The expansion capital sits at the subsidiary, not on the parent's guarantee, which means the downside on the renewables bet is bounded in a way that a straight corporate borrowing would not be.

Two operational events since then matter more than the quarter they interrupted. Montana Renewables completed its turnaround and started up the MaxSAF 150 expansion in early May 2026, and the Shreveport plant, which lost roughly 750,000 barrels of production to organic chloride contamination in its crude supply, resumed normal operations in early April. Both drags were self-limiting. Management also described the regulatory backdrop as having shifted in its favour after the EPA announced its renewable volume obligations in March 2026. The bull case does not require the renewables plant to become a great business. It requires the specialty half to keep earning while the renewables half stops consuming, at which point the consolidated number starts describing the company again.

Bear Case

The uncomfortable thing about Calumet is not any single ratio. It is that a company carrying more debt than its entire specialty business is worth has been repriced as a growth story on the strength of a plant that is still being built. Everything else follows from that observation. The equity is the residual claim on a heavily levered, commodity-exposed asset base, and residual claims move violently in both directions for reasons that have very little to do with the operating business.

Start with what the balance sheet actually says. Book equity is negative, which is why most conventional valuation approaches decline to produce a number here at all. Net debt is roughly 2.2 billion dollars against gross borrowings a little higher, and the FY2025 annual report shows the cushion behind it shrinking: "The borrowing base on our revolving credit facilities decreased from approximately $472.1 million as of December 31, 2024, to approximately $412.3 million at December 31, 2025." The company is direct about what that implies, warning that "Our ability to service our indebtedness will depend upon, among other things, our future financial and operating performance, which will be affected by prevailing economic conditions and financial, business, regulatory and other factors, some of which are beyond our control." Trailing operating profit across the last twelve months came to almost nothing, which means the business is currently covering its interest bill out of timing and non-recurring items rather than out of operating earnings.

The renewables thesis rests on two things the company does not control, and it says so. The first is the price of sustainable aviation fuel, where the annual report lists among its risks the possibility that "SAF cannot generate the premium we currently expect, that a market for SAF does not evolve as expected and that alternate technologies supersede the expected demand for SAF". The second is the regulator. Renewable fuel economics run through volume obligations the EPA resets periodically, and the filing notes that "The periodic update process featured in the RFS and similar programs nonetheless introduces a degree of uncertainty in demand for our products on a yearly basis." A March 2026 announcement moved that setting in Calumet's favour. The same mechanism can move the other way, and it does not need a change of technology or a change of demand to do it, only a change of rule.

Operations have not been steady either. The first quarter lost roughly 750,000 barrels of production at Shreveport to contamination in the crude supply, and the renewables plant was down for a turnaround and expansion through March and into April. Neither event was strategic. Both are the kind of thing that happens to complex processing plants, which is precisely the risk in a business whose fixed charges do not pause when a unit does.

Against its cohort the profitability gap is stark. On trailing figures the consolidated operating margin rounds to essentially zero, which sits below even the refining comparison set, where DK runs 2.3% and CVI 2.2%, and far below the specialty and branded names Calumet's own segment mix invites comparison to, with CBT at 15.7% and IOSP at 6.9%. The bull answer is that the trailing figure is distorted, and it genuinely is. But a company that needs its reported numbers explained away for several consecutive periods is asking the market for patience that a levered balance sheet does not always allow. Share count has also crept up about 3.2% a year since late 2023, so the equity holder is funding some of that patience directly.

Valuation

Trailing profit is the wrong instrument for this company, and the reason is specific rather than an excuse. Operating profit across the last twelve months came to a rounding error on $4.17 billion of revenue, not because the business collapsed but because renewable fuel credit marks, derivative positions and inventory accounting run straight through the income statement in this industry. Divide any price by a number close to zero and the answer is arithmetic, not information. So the multiple that number produces is set aside here, and the assumption embedded in the price is treated as directional at best: the price leans on a long run of compounding that the current earnings base does not yet demonstrate.

That leaves the standard methods with very little to grip. Negative book equity removes the asset-value approaches. Negative trailing earnings and negative free cash flow remove the earnings-power and cash-flow approaches. What survives is a sales-based lens, and it says the price sits about a quarter below what a sector sales multiple applied to Calumet's revenue would imply. That comparison is worth exactly as much as its assumption, which is that a dollar of Calumet revenue deserves the same multiple as a dollar of the average energy company's revenue, and that the debt in front of the equity does not matter. Both are generous. The honest read of the method set is not that the price is defended. It is that the price is being set by something none of these frames measure.

What they do not measure is the renewables asset and the option attached to it. Montana Renewables commenced MaxSAF 150 operations in early May 2026 following its turnaround, and the expansion behind it is funded by a facility whose terms the annual report sets out plainly: "MRL has the ability to draw additional tranches of up to $624.6 million through the anticipated completion of this project in 2028. Calumet is not a guarantor of MRL indebtedness." That last clause is the single most important valuation fact in the filing, because it separates the parent's solvency from the project's outcome. The renewables bet can disappoint without dragging the specialty business into a restructuring.

Solvency is where the argument has to land, and here the picture is tight rather than dire. Net debt is roughly 2.2 billion dollars, cash on hand is thin, and the revolver's borrowing base fell over the course of 2025 to roughly $412.3 million. On the other side, the specialty and branded segments together produced $56.9 million on the company's own adjusted earnings measure in a quarter that included a major unplanned outage, and the renewables segment turned positive on that same measure once federal fuel credits are counted. The share count has grown about 3.2% a year since September 2023, which is modest for a company at this stage of a capital programme.

The decisive question is not what multiple to apply. It is whether the specialty business alone can carry the corporate debt while Montana Renewables is finished. If it can, the renewables plant is a free option on a fuel market the regulator has just made more attractive. If it cannot, the same option is being financed by the people who own the equity, one quarter at a time.

Catalysts

The first quarter of 2026 was a transitional quarter by design and by accident. Calumet reported a net loss of $317.0 million, or $3.64 per basic share, against a loss of $162.0 million, or $1.87 per share, a year earlier. The company attributed the widening to items that moved no money at all. Renewable fuel credits accounted for $147.4 million of expense, $102.7 million of unrealised derivative losses including $46.0 million tied to inventory inside its supply and offtake financing arrangement, and $37.9 million of equity compensation expense driven by the rise in its own share price. On the company's own adjusted earnings measure including federal tax attributes, the quarter produced $50.1 million against $55.0 million a year earlier.

Two operational disruptions sat inside those figures and have since cleared. The Shreveport facility took an unplanned outage after organic chloride contamination was discovered in its crude supply, costing roughly 750,000 barrels of production, and resumed normal operations in early April 2026. Montana Renewables entered a planned turnaround in March combined with the MaxSAF 150 expansion, and commenced operations on the expanded configuration in early May 2026. Renewable fuels production ran at 7,853 barrels per day in the quarter against 9,932 a year earlier, which is the turnaround showing up in the volume line rather than a demand problem.

The regulatory event is the one with the longest reach. Management described the EPA's renewable volume obligation announcement in March 2026 as having transformed the outlook for biofuel margins, and framed the company as entering a strong margin environment across both traditional and renewable markets. Separately, at the annual meeting on June 2, 2026 shareholders elected three Class II directors, approved executive compensation on an advisory basis, and ratified Grant Thornton LLP as auditor for the year ending December 31, 2026. What to watch from here is straightforward: whether the second-quarter print, with Shreveport running and Montana restarted, converts the improved margin backdrop into cash that reduces debt.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Specialty Products and Solutions (reported)

Performance Brands (reported)

Montana/Renewables (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Calumet first-quarter 2026 results, 8-K filed May 8, 2026 · Calumet 8-K filed June 3, 2026

View the full interactive CLMT report on boothcheck