Chord Energy Corp (CHRD): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers Chord Energy Corp (CHRD) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CHRD

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCHRD
CompanyChord Energy Corp
Sector / IndustryEnergy
Current price$146.39/sh
CompositionCrude oil revenues 73% / NGL revenues 3% / Natural gas revenues 4% / Purchased oil and gas sales 20%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)5.9%
Operating margin today19.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-13.1pp
Multiple paid7x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 7: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.08σ
cohort percentile (of 48 peers)15

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.83x5justifies
Earnings0.53x4justifies
Relative0.52x5justifies
Growth0.57x4justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$1815.930.08xyesFCF base $2.6B, growth 23% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.0%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$399.470.37xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 4.0x / 3.3x / 8.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$234.930.62xyesP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 7.5x / 10.0x / 12.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 6x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$190.610.77xyesStage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$167.670.87xyesBV/sh $152.79, ROE (TTM) 10.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$175.400.83xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$173.580.84xyesRev $6.3B, growth 23% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.0x / 1.3x / 1.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$364.410.40xyesEPS $15.03, growth 24% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.39 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$195.610.75xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.20B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.0% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$176.820.83xyesBV $152.79 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 10.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 6.6%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$227.310.64xyes√(22.5 × EPS $15.03 × BVPS $152.79) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$283.760.52xyesEBITDA $2.74B × sector EV/EBITDA 6.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$495.130.30xyesFCF $2587.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$484.970.30xyesEPS $15.03 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$98.211.49xyesBV $152.79 × (ROIC 5.1% / WACC 8.0%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$138.651.06xyesRevenue $6.32B × sector P/S 1.2x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$546.620.27xyesEPS $15.03 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 24.2% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 36.4x
Earnings YieldEarnings$162.490.90xyesEPS $15.03 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Exploration & Productionoperatingenterprise4.9B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$875.5m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.92x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.73x
Interest coverage12.1x
Share count CAGR (dilution)7.8%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Here is the fact that does not fit the story people tell about oil equities. Chord's balance sheet carries about 141.73 dollars of shareholders' equity behind every share outstanding, which is a little more than the market is currently willing to pay for one. An investor buying today is therefore paying roughly what the company's own accounts say the assets are worth, and in effect assigning very little value to everything the company intends to do with them. That is an unusual starting point for a business sitting on "1,302,921 net leasehold acres in the Williston Basin, which is the largest acreage position of any operator" in the play, per its own 10-K, against a total net leasehold position of 1,334,679 acres.

Scale in a single basin is not a consolation prize. It is the whole cost advantage. One operator working contiguous acreage drills longer laterals, shares water and gathering infrastructure across pads, keeps rigs moving without relocating crews, and negotiates with a small number of midstream counterparties rather than many. The 10-K frames the position as "a premier position in a top oil basin in the United" States and names capital discipline as the strategy, with the stated priority to "efficiently execute our development program and optimize capital allocation". That is a company saying it intends to harvest rather than to expand, which is what a mature basin position should say.

The cash the position generates is the second surprise. Free cash flow over the trailing year ran near 1.89 billion dollars, against a market value of 7.9 billion dollars. Chord has been handing it back through a defined route: the 10-K says it plans "to return capital through the base dividend payout, supplemented by opportunistic share repurchases and variable dividends", and it declared base cash dividends of $5.20 per share during 2025, aggregating $302.5 million. In February 2026 it declared a further "base cash dividend of $ 1.30 per share of common stock".

The repurchase authorization is where the optionality sits, and it is almost entirely unspent. The board approved a program in August 2025 of up to 1.0 billion dollars, and at the end of December "we had $952.2 million remaining under this share repurchase program". A company trading a shade under the book value of its own assets, holding an unused authorization worth more than a tenth of its market value, has a straightforward use for surplus cash. Retiring stock on those terms adds to the acreage behind every remaining share, which for a depleting asset is the one form of growth that does not require drilling anything.

The reserve base has been replacing itself, too. Proved undeveloped reserves ended 2025 at 287,963 thousand barrels of oil equivalent, up 24.0 MMBoe on the year, with the 10-K attributing the increase to new wells and "proved undeveloped (\"PUD\") locations added as a result of offset drilling". None of that makes oil prices behave. It does mean the bull case rests on inventory and cost position rather than on a commodity forecast, which is a sturdier place for it to rest.

Bear Case

Chord does not set the price of what it sells. Everything else in the analysis ranks below that. Management can drill faster or slower, cut a dollar a barrel out of lifting costs, buy back stock or pay it out, and none of those decisions moves the number that determines whether a year is good or bad. Crude oil is 73% of revenue. The company's own 10-K lists the drivers it is exposed to and they are almost entirely external: inventories, "events that impact global market demand, including impacts from wars, conflicts and global health epidemics and concerns", and regional supply and demand. An investor here is holding an operating team wrapped around a commodity position.

That matters because of what the current price assumes. At roughly 15x company-wide operating income, the market is embedding company-wide operating growth near 9.1% a year for five years. Read that against a business whose operating profit is a function of a price nobody forecasts reliably, and the assumption stops looking modest. The trailing figure it grows from is itself a point on a cycle, not a run rate. Trailing operating income was $438.8 million on revenue of about 5.33 billion dollars, an operating margin of 8.2%, and the trailing bottom line was a net loss of $66.8 million. A cyclical business priced off a single year's operating profit inherits whatever that year happened to be.

The asset consumes itself, and the accounts say so in plain numbers. Depreciation, depletion and amortization ran $384.2 million in the March 2026 quarter, and the 10-Q reports the depletion rate rising to 15.20 dollars per barrel of oil equivalent, up 1.11 dollars period over period. Every barrel sold is a barrel that must be replaced by capital spending or by acquisition, and a rising depletion rate means the replacement is getting more expensive per unit. Proved undeveloped reserves are not an inventory that sits still; they convert, deplete and get revised, with revisions of previous estimates taking 16,388 thousand barrels of oil equivalent off the 2025 ledger.

Growth by acquisition is how the gap gets filled, and holders have paid for it. The share count has risen about 10.1% a year over the four years to March 2026, principally because "On May 31, 2024, we acquired Enerplus Corporation" in a stock-and-cash transaction. The dividends and the repurchase program are real, but so is the arithmetic that the count is materially larger than it was, and the repurchase authorization approved in August 2025 was almost untouched at year end, with "$952.2 million remaining". Capital-return frameworks that flex with cash flow are honest and also mean the payout falls exactly when the commodity does.

The balance sheet is the one part that does not argue. Net debt is about 2.9 times operating profit, operating income covers interest 5.5 times over, and the company is not burning cash. Below even that, roughly 140.1 million dollars of equity interests sit outside the operating business as a separate recoverable claim, though against a market value near 7.9 billion dollars that is a boundary rather than a meaningful cushion. The bear case is not insolvency. It is that a price already assuming five years of high single-digit growth in operating profit leaves no room for the ordinary behaviour of the thing being sold.

Valuation

Trailing operating income for an oil producer is a photograph, not a trend, and it is worth saying so before any multiple gets quoted. With that caveat in place: at $138.51 the market pays roughly 15x company-wide operating income, and inverting that gives a requirement of company-wide operating growth near 9.1% a year over five years. Against the company's own record that pace is inside what it has recently delivered, and against its peer group the multiple sits in the lower half of the range. The assumption is not extreme. It is simply a growth assumption applied to a business whose profit is a derivative of a commodity price.

The methods land close together, which itself is information. The balance-sheet lenses sit essentially on top of the shares. Shareholders' equity works out near 141.73 dollars for each share outstanding, fractionally more than the market is paying, so the accounts and the market currently agree about what the assets are worth. Peer-multiple methods land modestly above, one of them applying a sector cash-flow multiple to trailing EBITDA of about 1.70 billion dollars. The two discounted cash-flow methods both land above the price as well, the exit-multiple version reaching its answer with its terminal multiple held flat rather than expanded. What lands below the price are the approaches that project the dividend forward as a fixed growing perpetuity and the one that carries revenue out and applies a sales multiple, neither of which describes how a variable-payout oil company actually distributes cash.

The gap between reported profit and generated cash is the number a reader should carry away. Trailing operating income was $438.8 million on revenue near 5.33 billion dollars, an 8.2% operating margin, and the trailing bottom line was a net loss of $66.8 million. Free cash flow over the same period ran close to 1.89 billion dollars. Those figures are not in conflict; they describe the same business seen through two accounting conventions. Depreciation, depletion and amortization of $384.2 million in the March quarter, at 15.20 dollars per barrel of oil equivalent, is a charge for reserves already consumed rather than a bill arriving in the post. Roughly 20% of the revenue line is purchased oil and gas resold, which flows through at little margin and makes the headline margin look thinner than the produced barrels earn.

Capital return is where the cash has gone and where the argument gets tested. The 10-K states the plan is "to return capital through the base dividend payout, supplemented by opportunistic share repurchases and variable dividends", with base dividends of $5.20 per share declared during 2025 and 952.2 million dollars still available under the repurchase authorization at year end. A share count that has grown about 10.1% a year over four years is the other half of that ledger, and the buyback has so far been an option rather than an action.

Solvency does not constrain any of it. Net debt runs about 2.9 times operating profit, interest is covered 5.5 times, and cash is not burning. Roughly 140.1 million dollars of equity interests sit outside the operating business. The constraint that matters here is not the balance sheet at all: it is that the price embeds five years of growth in a profit line the company does not control, while paying roughly the accounting value of the assets that produce it.

Catalysts

First-quarter 2026 results landed on May 6, 2026, alongside an updated outlook for the year and a declared base dividend, with 145 million dollars returned to shareholders in the quarter. Second-quarter results are scheduled for August 5, 2026. The line worth watching is not production. It is whether the repurchase authorization starts getting spent, because with the shares near the company's own book value the choice between buying back stock and paying a variable dividend is the clearest signal management can send about where it thinks the value is.

One item in May points at the equity interests Chord holds outside its producing assets: on May 20, 2026 the company made a strategic investment in MaverickX to advance its PetroX Boost technology. Investments of that kind are small relative to the enterprise and sit apart from barrels in the ground, but they are the visible edge of a balance-sheet item that carries value independent of the drilling program.

The sell side spent five days in July revising in both directions, which is what commodity-deck maintenance looks like rather than a change of view on the company. Truist cut its target to 170 dollars from 185 on July 6, 2026. Citi cut to 130 dollars from 155 with a Neutral rating and UBS to 153 dollars from 179, both on July 9, 2026. Roth Capital moved the other way the following day, to 145 dollars from 140. Those revisions straddle the current quote in both directions inside a single week, which is the honest tell that the disagreement is about the oil price rather than about Chord's acreage or execution.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Exploration & Production (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release, May 6, 2026 · company earnings calendar, 2026 · company announcement, May 20, 2026 · Truist research note, July 6, 2026 · Citi research note, July 9, 2026; UBS research note, July 9, 2026 · Roth Capital research note, July 10, 2026

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