CHURCH & DWIGHT CO., INC. (CHD): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $101.26, CHURCH & DWIGHT CO., INC. (CHD) is priced for +7.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CHD

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCHD
CompanyCHURCH & DWIGHT CO., INC.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Defensive
Current price$101.26/sh
CompositionHousehold Products 41% / Personal Care Products 36% / Total Consumer International 18% / Total SPD 5%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)8.7%
Operating margin today17.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-8.8pp
Implied growth7.1%
Multiple paid24x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.22σ
cohort percentile (of 69 peers)62

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.83x5expensive
Earnings2.63x5expensive
Relative0.90x2justifies
Growth1.42x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Relative Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$71.201.42xyesFCF base $1.1B, growth 3% (input: historical growth), terminal g 2.7%, WACC 8.5%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$91.281.11xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 18.1x / 20.1x / 22.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 18.5x / 22.0x / 25.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$33.952.98xyesBV/sh $18.33, ROE (TTM) 17.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$45.592.22xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$71.441.42xyesRev $6.2B, growth 3% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.2x / 3.9x / 4.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$108.850.93xyesEPS $3.11, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.92 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$29.793.40xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.99B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$45.792.21xyesBV $18.33 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 17.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$35.812.83xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.11 × BVPS $18.33) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.30B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$41.672.43xyesFCF $1115.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$38.462.63xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.04B (FCF $1.12B − SBC $0.07B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$100.351.01xyesEPS $3.11 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$7.2713.93xyesBV $18.33 × (ROIC 3.4% / WACC 8.5%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $6.23B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$116.630.87xyesEPS $3.11 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$33.623.01xyesEPS $3.11 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Consumer Domesticoperatingenterprise$4.8b$920.8m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Consumer Internationaloperatingenterprise$1.1b$116.2m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
SPD (Specialty Products)operatingenterprise$299.0m$40.6m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.0b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.32x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.84x
Interest coverage11.3x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.8%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

This is a mature business, and mature businesses should be read on a different axis than growing ones. Nobody buys a maker of baking soda, laundry detergent and pregnancy tests expecting a revenue surprise. What matters is whether the portfolio holds its shelf space, whether the margin structure survives contact with the retailer, and whether the cash that comes out gets deployed at a decent return. On the first two, the record is good. On the third, the last twelve months have been unusually interesting.

The brand architecture is deliberately two-tiered, and the 10-K is explicit about it: seven brands are designated "power brands" because they compete in large categories, and we believe they have the potential for significant global expansion, sitting alongside a long tail that includes FIRST RESPONSE pregnancy tests, NAIR, ORAJEL, XTRA laundry detergent and ZICAM. That mix matters commercially. A premium brand and a value brand in the same category means the company keeps the sale whether the shopper trades up or down, which in a period when the filing observes consumers moving toward lower-priced brands is the difference between losing a customer and losing a few points of mix.

The interesting move was subtraction. Over 2025 the company divested the vitamin business and exited the Flawless, Spinbrush and Waterpik showerhead lines, completing the exits by year end. That is roughly a tenth of the sales base voluntarily removed. In its place came acquisitions: Touchland from July 16, 2025, and then the Miss Mouth's Messy Eater brand, closed on May 29, 2026 for about $325 million. Management is swapping slower, lower-margin revenue for faster, higher-margin revenue, and taking a reported sales-growth hit while it does. The first quarter of 2026 shows the trade in one line: product volumes up 5.3% and acquisitions up 2.2%, offset by 8.1% of exited product lines, for consolidated net sales of $1,469.3 million and a 0.2% increase. Underneath a flat headline, the underlying business grew.

International is the quieter compounder. Consumer International net sales were $273.9 million in the first quarter of 2026, up 4.6%, with the filing attributing the segment's operating improvement to strong organic sales growth across the portfolio plus volume from Touchland. The segment is 18% of the revenue mix, so it does not move the whole company yet, and that is exactly why it is the option worth watching.

Financially, the company is built to keep doing this. Interest is covered close to 12 times, net debt sits at about 1.5 times operating profit, and the share count has come down roughly 0.9% a year over the four years to March 2026. Management has raised guidance on 20 separate occasions and reaffirmed it on 15 since 2007, against a single withdrawal. A track record of setting reachable targets is not a moat, but it tells you how the current 3% to 4% organic growth guide was probably constructed.

Bear Case

Today's price embeds operating profit growing about 5.8% a year for five years. That is the assumption to interrogate, because the Consumer Domestic segment, which supplies most of the profit, produced product volumes of 0.0% and pricing and mix of negative 0.5% in 2025. The segment's reported net sales rose 0.9%, and 2.2 points of that came from acquisitions. Strip the deals out and the core household and personal care business in the United States sold the same number of units at a slightly lower average price. Five years of mid-single-digit profit growth has to come from somewhere, and in 2025 it did not come from the core.

The candidate sources each carry their own problem. Price is under pressure from below: the 10-K states that an increase in consumers purchasing more "private label" or other lower price brands has increased competition in certain product categories, and separately that Significant price competition may require us to reduce the prices for some of our products to price levels that do not offset manufacturing cost increases. Category exposure compounds it, since the company derive[s] a substantial percentage of our revenues from sales of laundry detergent, which is the most heavily private-labelled aisle in the store and the one where a retailer's own brand sits at eye level next to yours.

That leaves acquisitions to carry the growth, and acquisitions are where this company has already been burned. The 2024 results included impairment charges of 357.1 million dollars against the vitamins business, none of it cash, of which 327.4 million landed in Consumer Domestic, and the vitamin business was subsequently divested in the fourth quarter of 2025. Buy a business, write down the intangibles, sell the business. The 10-K notes the carrying values rest on discounted cash flow methods whose key assumptions used in determining fair value are sales growth, profitability margins, tax rates, discount rates and royalty rates, all of which move when the categories move. Roughly $325 million went into a new brand in May 2026. The pattern is not that deals cannot work. It is that the growth in the price now depends on them working.

The retailer sits on the other side of every one of these decisions. The filing flags that consumer shifts toward online shopping could also impact our sales to our largest customers, and that retailers using evolving technology to develop more complex pricing models have driven pricing pressure in some categories. In plainer terms: the buyer on the other side of the table now has better data than the seller, and uses it. That is a slow, grinding form of margin risk that never announces itself in a single quarter.

None of this threatens the company's existence. Net debt is a little over 1.5 times operating profit and interest is covered nearly 12 times. The risk is entirely to the multiple. Every family of valuation method lands below today's price: the price sits roughly 40% above where peer multiples land, about 43% above the forward-growth approaches, and near three times the earnings-power methods, with the book-value approaches further under still. A stock priced for mid-single-digit profit growth that delivers two does not fall because the company failed. It falls because the assumption was retired.

Valuation

At $97.75 the enterprise carries about 23 times company-wide operating income. Invert that and it resolves into a plain demand: operating profit compounding at roughly 5.8% a year over a five-year stage. Measured against the company's own record, that pace is not a stretch, and it sits in the upper half of the peer multiple range rather than at the extreme of it. As priced-in assumptions go, this one is ordinary. The interesting question is not whether the number is achievable but where the growth would come from, given that Consumer Domestic sold flat volumes at slightly lower prices last year.

The demand is also more delicate than it looks, because it is computed against a cost of capital near 7.3%, a low figure that reflects how defensive the market considers this business. Add a single percentage point to that required return and the growth the price needs rises by roughly eight points. The valuation is therefore leveraged less to the company's execution than to the market's willingness to keep treating consumer staples as a low-risk asset.

The methods are unanimous in direction and spread out in degree. None of the four families reaches the price. The price sits about 40% above the peer-multiple family and about 43% above the forward-growth family, both of which get their numbers by holding today's multiples flat out to the exit year: one carries the current cash-earnings multiple forward unchanged, the other holds today's price-to-sales ratio constant. The earnings-power methods, which capitalize normalized profit with no growth at all, sit near a third of the price, and the book-value approaches land lower still. That is the ordinary shape for a branded consumer business, where the balance sheet holds almost none of the value and the brands hold nearly all of it. The pattern says the premium is being paid for durability, not for a growth inflection.

Peer context puts the margin structure in perspective. On trailing operating margin Church and Dwight earns 18.3%, which is comfortably ahead of CL at 15.4% and roughly in line with KVUE at 17.2%, and below PG at 23.2%. So the company is a good, not exceptional, margin performer in its cohort, and the price is in the upper half of the cohort's multiple range. The gap between those two rankings is the part a buyer is paying for.

The balance sheet supports the arrangement without much drama. Net debt runs about 1.5 times operating profit, trailing operating income of $1,102.6M covers interest close to 12 times, and the share count has fallen roughly 0.9% a year over the four years to March 2026. What that buys is optionality on the strategy currently in motion: the company can keep pruning slower lines and buying faster ones without the leverage becoming the story. The 2026 plan calls for 3% to 4% organic sales growth and 5% to 8% earnings-per-share growth, which is roughly the same order as the growth the price already assumes. Delivery keeps the multiple where it is. It does not expand it.

Catalysts

July 31, 2026 is the next real information event, when the company reports second-quarter results and hosts a webcast. The thing to look for is not the headline sales number, which the portfolio exits will continue to distort for another few quarters, but the split underneath it: organic volume against price and mix. In the first quarter of 2026 the consolidated line rose 0.2% while product volumes rose 5.3% and exited product lines subtracted 8.1%. Those two numbers are moving in opposite directions on purpose, and the moment they stop is when reported growth turns.

The reshaping continued in May. On May 29, 2026 the company closed its acquisition of the Miss Mouth's Messy Eater brand for approximately $325 million, the second bolt-on in under a year following Touchland in July 2025. Both are small relative to a $23.3B market value, which is the point: this is a programme of repeated small purchases funded from operating cash rather than a transformational deal. The relevant test is whether the acquired brands hold their growth after the first year inside a large distribution system, which is the exact thing that did not happen with the vitamins business the company wrote down and then sold.

Guidance sets the bar for the rest of the year. Management's 2026 outlook calls for organic sales growth of 3% to 4%, earnings-per-share growth of 5% to 8%, and roughly 100 basis points of margin improvement, and the first quarter came in ahead of the company's own expectations on sales, gross margin and earnings. This is a management team that has raised guidance on 20 separate occasions since 2007 against a single withdrawal, so a mid-year raise would be in character. The market has largely priced the delivery already.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Consumer Domestic (reported)

Consumer International (reported)

SPD (Specialty Products) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Church and Dwight earnings webcast announcement, July 24, 2026 · Church and Dwight fourth-quarter 2025 results release, January 30, 2026 · Church and Dwight acquisition announcement, May 29, 2026 · Church and Dwight first-quarter 2026 results release, May 1, 2026

View the full interactive CHD report on boothcheck