Century Aluminum Company (CENX): what the price requires
At today's price, Century Aluminum Company (CENX) is priced for +25.1% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CENX
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CENX |
| Company | Century Aluminum Company |
| Current price | $44.77/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 12.9% |
| Operating margin today | 19.3% |
| Margin compression implied | -6.4pp |
| Implied growth | 25.1% |
| Multiple paid | 10x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 15.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.3pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.81σ |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 34% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple value, while earnings-power lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.16x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 4.54x | 2 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.03x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative Families that call it expensive: Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=9)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $7.39 | 6.06x | no | FCF base $0.0B, growth 8% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.3%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $36.64 | 1.22x | no | Exit EV/EBITDA: 4.0x / 8.7x / 13.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $45.89 | 0.98x | yes | P/E 14x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 10.5x / 14.0x / 16.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 8x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $36.13 | 1.24x | yes | BV/sh $11.00, ROE (TTM) 30.4%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $67.73 | 0.66x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $35.14 | 1.27x | no | Rev $2.5B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.4x / 1.8x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $40.32 | 1.11x | no | EPS $3.36, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=6.83 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $14.45 | 3.10x | no | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.16B × (1−21%) / WACC 9.3% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $55.20 | 0.81x | yes | BV $11.00 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 30.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $28.84 | 1.55x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $3.36 × BVPS $11.00) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $41.24 | 1.09x | yes | EBITDA $0.51B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $5.16 | 8.68x | yes | FCF $27.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $108.42 | 0.41x | yes | EPS $3.36 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $38.76 | 1.16x | yes | BV $11.00 × (ROIC 32.6% / WACC 9.3%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $36.47 | 1.23x | no | Revenue $2.54B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $126.00 | 0.36x | no | EPS $3.36 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $36.32 | 1.23x | no | EPS $3.36 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $301.8m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 0.78x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 0.61x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 1.9% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
Century Aluminum is a pure-play primary-aluminum smelter, which means the numbers have to be read as a commodity producer near a cyclical high, not a steady business. Current operating margin of 19.2% reflects aluminum prices at multi-year highs and U.S. tariff-driven regional premiums, conditions that are favorable today but inherently cyclical.
At $51.76 the price pays about 11x company-wide operating income, which the model reads as growth held near the self-funding ceiling for roughly 6 years. That reads as elevated for a commodity name whose earnings power moves with the aluminum price, a variable management does not control.
The valuation methods are mixed: relative-multiple and several asset methods land near or above the price ($46 to $68), while the earnings-power and FCF methods read it as expensive. Recent results were also flattered by one-time gains, so the underlying earning power is lower than the headline.
Bull Case
Frame Century correctly and the bull case sharpens: this is a leveraged play on the U.S. primary-aluminum price, and the stage of that cycle is unusually favorable. Aluminum has been at multi-year highs, and Century's 10-K describes a supportive backdrop where 'low inventory levels, challenged aluminum supply growth and improving global demand for aluminum all led to a supportive pricing environment for aluminum in 2025' (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-013788). The price of primary aluminum, as the same filing lays out, is the LME base commodity price plus a regional premium, and the U.S. regional premium has been driven sharply higher by Section 232 tariffs, which were raised to a 50% additional tariff on aluminum in April 2026. As the only major U.S.-based primary-aluminum producer, Century captures that premium directly. Q1 2026 net sales of $649.2 million reflected both higher LME prices and much stronger regional premiums.
The earnings power at this stage of the cycle is large and the balance sheet is in good shape. Q1 2026 adjusted EPS of $1.63 beat estimates, and the operating margin of 19.2% shows how much cash a smelter throws off when prices are high and a large share of the price is a tariff-protected domestic premium. Net debt is only about 0.6x operating income, so the leverage is operational (to the aluminum price) rather than financial. Century also benefits from Section 45X production tax credits, which reduced Q1 cost of goods sold and SG&A by $25.7 million, a structural cost offset that improves the through-cycle economics of domestic smelting.
The policy tailwind is the differentiated leg. U.S. trade policy is actively trying to reshore aluminum production, and tariffs plus production tax credits are designed to make domestic smelting profitable enough to expand. Century has talked about restarting idled capacity and a potential new U.S. smelter, and it monetized the idled Hawesville smelter during the quarter. For a buyer who believes the tariff regime and the reshoring push are durable, Century is the most direct listed beneficiary: a domestic producer whose realized price is structurally supported by policy, generating substantial cash at the current point in the cycle, with the optionality of capacity growth if the favorable economics persist.
Bear Case
The variable with by far the most leverage on this thesis is the aluminum price, and Century controls none of it. The 10-K is explicit that the realized price is 'the base commodity price, which is based on quoted prices on the LME and other exchanges; plus any regional premium,' so earnings are a direct function of a global commodity market and a policy-set premium. The current 19.2% margin exists because both legs are elevated at once: the LME price near multi-year highs and a U.S. regional premium inflated by a 50% Section 232 tariff. Both can reverse. The LME price is set by global supply and demand, heavily influenced by Chinese production, and the tariff premium exists at the discretion of an administration and could be cut, litigated, or retaliated against. A price priced at 11x current peak-cycle operating income is implicitly assuming these favorable conditions persist for years, and commodity cycles rarely oblige.
The second issue is that the recent headline earnings are not the run-rate. Q1 2026 net income of $327.0 million looks spectacular against $22.4 million a year earlier, but it was boosted by a $287.9 million gain on the sale of the idled Hawesville smelter and a $33.0 million insurance gain tied to the Grundartangi transformer failure. Strip those out and adjusted EPS was $1.63. An investor anchoring on the GAAP figure would badly overstate the durable earning power; the smelter-sale gain is a one-time event that will not recur. The underlying business is a high-cost, energy-intensive smelter whose profitability is feast-or-famine.
The third risk is the input side: power. Aluminum smelting is one of the most electricity-intensive industrial processes, and Century's margins are as exposed to power costs as to metal prices. The Grundartangi transformer failure is a reminder that the asset base is operationally fragile and capital-intensive to maintain. Combine a metal price set abroad, a tariff premium set in Washington, and a power-cost structure that can move against the company, and the equity is a high-beta bet on three variables aligning. The stock carries a beta above 2 for exactly this reason. The earnings-power and FCF-yield methods, which strip out the cyclical and one-time noise, land far below the price (FCF yield near $5), and that is the methods' way of saying the normalized cash generation does not support the quote. At a price that has already extrapolated peak conditions, a reversal in any one of metal price, tariff policy, or power costs would compress earnings quickly, and a cheap-looking 11x multiple would prove expensive on mid-cycle numbers.
Valuation
Century is a commodity producer, so the headline multiple is a snapshot of the cycle rather than a measure of durable value. At about 11x company-wide operating income the price inverts to growth held near the self-funding ceiling for roughly 6 years, computed at a 15.1% cost of capital that reflects the stock's high beta, with each point of cost of capital moving the implied horizon by about 1.4 years. The model labels this elevated, and only about 27% of comparable fast-growers sustained this pace for nearly six years. The deeper issue is that the operating income being capitalized is itself near a cyclical peak, so an 11x multiple on peak earnings is more demanding than it looks.
The method families split along the cyclical fault line, which is informative. The relative-multiple methods land near $41 to $46, several asset and excess-return methods near $36 to $68 (residual income near $55, two-stage excess return near $68, ROIC-justified P/B near $39), and the Graham Number near $29. The earnings-power lens is the outlier on the low side: FCF yield near $5, which strips out the cyclical premium and the one-time gains and reads the normalized cash generation as far below the price. The honest read is that the valuation is reasonable to slightly stretched on current conditions and stretched on normalized conditions. The entire investment question is which earnings base is right: if the tariff premium and high LME prices are the new normal, the asset-based and relative methods near $46 to $68 are the fair read and the stock is roughly fairly valued with policy optionality. If current conditions are a peak, the earnings-power methods are the honest signal, and the price has discounted a cycle staying near its top.
Catalysts
The Q1 2026 report was the recent catalyst and it cut two ways. Net income of $327.0 million and GAAP diluted EPS of $3.23 looked huge, but the result included a $287.9 million gain on the sale of the idled Hawesville smelter and a $33.0 million insurance gain on the Grundartangi transformer failure; adjusted EPS of $1.63 beat the $1.56 estimate, and the stock fell after the print as the market separated the one-time gains from the run-rate. Section 45X production tax credits reduced Q1 cost of goods sold and SG&A by $25.7 million. The next quarters are a cleaner read on underlying earnings now that the smelter-sale gain is behind it.
The forward catalysts are dominated by policy and price. The April 2026 proclamation raising Section 232 tariffs on aluminum to a 50% additional tariff directly supports the U.S. regional premium Century captures, so any change to that regime, expansion, reduction, or legal challenge, is the single most important variable. LME aluminum prices, Chinese supply, and global demand drive the base commodity price. On the company side, decisions on restarting idled capacity or building new U.S. smelting capacity, and power-supply costs at existing plants, would each move the earnings trajectory. For a high-beta commodity name priced near peak conditions, the catalysts that matter most are the durability of the tariff premium, the direction of the aluminum price, and any operational disruption at its energy-intensive smelters.
Sources: Century Aluminum Q1 2026 EPS $3.23, EBITDA $231.4M (StockTitan), Century beats Q1 2026 but stock falls (Investing.com), US expands Section 232 tariffs on aluminum effective April 6, 2026 (CH Robinson), Century FY2025 10-K.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- AA (Alcoa Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …is dependent upon the type of product we are selling. The market for primary aluminum is global, and demand for aluminum varies widely from region to region. We compete with commodity traders, such as Glencore, Trafigura, Vitol, Mercuria and Gunvor, and aluminum producers, such as Emirates Global Aluminum, Norsk…
- FY2025 10-K: …position depends, in part, on our ability to operate as an integrated aluminum value chain, leverage innovation expertise across businesses and key end markets, and access an economical power supply to sustain our operations in various countries. See Part I Item 1 of this Form 10-K under caption Competition. We may…
- CSTM (CONSTELLIUM SE)
- FY2025 10-K: …markets in regions with abundant natural resources, low-cost labor and energy, and lower environmental and other standards may pose a significant competitive threat to our business. Moreover, technological innovation is important to our customers who require us to lead or keep pace with new innovations to address…
- FY2025 10-K: …ability to maintain or raise prices in the future may be limited, including during periods of raw material and other cost increases. If we are forced to reduce or maintain prices or reduce volumes of production during periods of increased costs, or if we lose customers because of consolidation, pricing or other…
- KALU (KAISER ALUMINUM CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …to Net sales and Adjusted EBITDA to Net income, see below in "Results of Operations - Selected Operational and Financial Information." Metal Pricing Policies A fundamental part of our business model is to remain neutral to the impact from fluctuations in the market price for aluminum and certain alloys, thereby…
- FY2025 10-K: …30% is sold to metal service centers. For the years ended December 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024, our largest customer accounted for 16% of Net sales. While the loss of this customer could have a material adverse effect on us, we believe that our long-standing relationship with the customer is good and that the risk…
- CRS (CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …Products. The SAO segment is comprised of the Company's major premium alloy and stainless steel manufacturing operations. This includes operations performed at mills primarily in Reading and Latrobe, Pennsylvania and surrounding areas as well as South Carolina and Alabama. The combined assets of the SAO operations…
- FY2025 10-K: …statements. See Note 18 to the consolidated financial statements in Item 8. "Financial Statements and Supplementary Data" for a full reconciliation of the statutory federal tax rate to the effective tax rates. Business Segment Results Summary information about our operating results on a segment basis is set forth…
- ATI (ATI INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …as the ATI Europe distribution operations thru 2024. Approximately 92 % of its revenue is derived from the aerospace & defense markets including nearly 68 % of its revenue from products for commercial jet engines and 11 % from defense products. HPMC produces a wide range of high performance materials, components, and…
- FY2025 10-K: …alloys and improved sales mix on higher demand for nickel-based alloys and titanium mill products. Results in fiscal year 2025 included $2.8 million of benefits related to the recognition of previously deferred employee retention tax credits. Fiscal year 2024 also included $7.7 million of benefits related to the…
- CMC (COMMERCIAL METALS COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: …This is a strategic advantage when imports increase as our steel mills can continue to supply our fabricators. Contract pricing that is utilized for these operations helps to stabilize short-term volatility. The construction-related solutions and value-added products within our Emerging Businesses Group segment…
- FY2025 10-K: …and meeting our business goals and objectives, and we depend on a qualified labor force for the manufacture of our products. The impact of labor shortages and increased competition for available workers may increase our costs or impede our ability to optimally staff our facilities and could have an adverse impact on…
- WS (WORTHINGTON STEEL, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: 1,200 customers during fiscal 2025 in many end markets including automotive, construction, machinery and equipment, agriculture, and heavy trucks, among others. The automotive industry is one of the largest consumers of flat-rolled steel, and the largest end market for us. During fiscal 2025, our top three customers…
- FY2025 10-K: …Competition for most of our products is primarily on the basis of price, product quality and our ability to meet delivery requirements. Our business has been subject to increasing consolidation of suppliers. Depending on a variety of factors, including raw material, energy, labor and capital costs, freight…
- WOR (WORTHINGTON ENTERPRISES, INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …performance, competitive position, sales, volumes, cash flows, earnings, margins, balance sheet strengths, debt, financial condition or other financial measures; • pricing trends for raw materials and finished goods and the impact of pricing changes; • the ability to improve or maintain margins; • expected demand or…
- FY2025 10-K: …freight availability, government control of foreign currency exchange rates and government subsidies of foreign steel producers or competitors, our businesses may be materially adversely affected by competitive forces. Competition may also increase if suppliers to our customers begin to more directly compete with our…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.