CECO ENVIRONMENTAL CORP (CECO): what the price requires
At today's price, CECO ENVIRONMENTAL CORP (CECO) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~8.5 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CECO
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CECO |
| Company | CECO ENVIRONMENTAL CORP |
| Current price | $81.93/sh |
| Composition | Engineered Systems Segment 70% / Industrial Process Solutions Segment 30% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 6.3% |
| Operating margin today | 11.9% |
| Margin compression implied | -5.6pp |
| Must persist for | 8.5y |
| Multiple paid | 35x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 8, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 10% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~1.9 years.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.19σ |
| cohort percentile (of 225 peers) | 76 |
| sustained it ~8.5 years at this level | 18% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 14.63x | 2 | expensive |
| Earnings | 19.93x | 1 | expensive |
| Relative | 3.38x | 3 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.17x | 1 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=7)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Reference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.0B |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $24.23 | 3.38x | yes | P/E 39.6x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 214x), scenarios: 32.8x / 39.6x / 46.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 26.4x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $4.14 | 19.79x | yes | BV/sh $8.75, ROE (TTM) 4.4%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $2.71 | 30.23x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% (excluded from median) |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $70.16 | 1.17x | yes | Rev $0.8B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.0x / 3.6x / 4.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $4.07 | 20.13x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.04B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.5% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $2.35 | 34.86x | yes | BV $8.75 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 4.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.8%/yr (excluded from median) |
| Graham Number | Asset | $8.65 | 9.47x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.38 × BVPS $8.75) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $10.85 | 7.55x | yes | EBITDA $0.05B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $0.32 | 256.03x | yes | EPS $0.38 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $0.28 | 292.61x | yes | BV $8.75 × (ROIC 0.3% / WACC 8.5%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $57.10 | 1.43x | yes | Revenue $0.82B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $4.11 | 19.93x | yes | EPS $0.38 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $207.8m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 2.88x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 2.28x |
| Interest coverage | 4.5x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.3% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
At $98.56 the price pays about 41x company-wide operating income, which the model reads as a bet that operating growth holds near its self-funding ceiling for roughly 10 years. The rate is within what CECO has recently delivered; the demand is on how long it persists.
Only the forward-growth method reaches the price. The discounted-future-market-cap model lands near $138 and P/Sales near $102, but every asset, earnings-power, and most peer-multiple methods sit far below, with current operating margin at just 3.2%. The priced-in assumption reads as elevated, above what the fundamentals comfortably support.
The order book is what is carrying the multiple. Q1 2026 orders jumped 97% to $449 million, backlog crossed $1 billion for the first time at $1.035 billion (up 72%), and management raised full-year revenue guidance to $940 million to $1 billion. The demand is real and tied to AI-data-center power; the risk is paying 41x for early-cycle margins to compound for a decade.
Bull Case
The most useful place to start is where the price sits against the valuation methods, because that spread tells you exactly what the market believes. Group the families and the pattern is stark: the forward-growth methods reach the price (discounted-future-market-cap near $138, P/Sales near $102), while the asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple methods land far below it. That is the signature of a price built entirely on future compounding, not on current assets or current earnings. The bull case has to argue that the compounding is real, and CECO's order book is the evidence. In Q1 2026 orders rose 97% year over year to $449 million, revenue grew 17% to $206 million, and EPS of $0.36 beat by a wide margin.
The backlog is the bridge from order to earnings. It crossed $1 billion for the first time at $1.035 billion, up 72% year over year, and the 10-K describes a book that has been building for a while, noting backlog of $793.1 million at the end of 2025 versus $540.9 million a year earlier, an increase of 46.6%, with 'substantially all backlog expected to be delivered within 18 to 24 months' (FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-085815). That delivery window is what gives the growth its visibility: orders booked now convert to revenue over the next two years, so a 25% organic-growth target for 2026 is anchored in contracts already signed rather than hoped-for demand. Management raised full-year guidance for the second time this year, lifting revenue to $940 million to $1 billion and adjusted EBITDA to $120 million to $140 million.
The demand driver is a genuine secular wave. CECO supplies engineered air-quality, emissions, and industrial-process systems, and the order surge is tied to natural-gas power generation built to feed AI data centers, alongside its traditional petrochemical and refined-products end markets, which the filing frames around 'increasing global demand for petrochemicals and refined products' as customers produce a wider range of products from new sources. If the power-buildout for AI is as large and as long as the order book suggests, CECO sits in a part of the supply chain that has to be built before the data centers can run. The growth that the price requires for a decade is the same growth the backlog is currently delivering. For a buyer who believes the AI-power capex cycle has years left, the elevated multiple is the price of admission to a structural growth story, not an overpayment for a fad.
Bear Case
The competitive and structural disruption case starts with what CECO actually is: a roll-up of engineered-equipment businesses competing against larger, better-capitalized industrial peers for project work. Its own peer set includes names like AZZ, JBT Marel, and Bloom Energy, all of which can chase the same power and industrial-process contracts, and the engineered-systems market is fragmented and bid on a project basis where pricing discipline erodes when everyone wants the same data-center work. A 3.2% trailing operating margin is the tell: this is a low-margin equipment integrator, not a high-return franchise, so the durable compounding the price assumes has to come from volume in a competitive bidding market rather than from pricing power.
That thin margin is the heart of the valuation problem. At about 41x operating income the price implies growth held near the self-funding ceiling for roughly 10 years, and historically only about 14% of comparable fast-growers sustained that pace for even a decade. Every static valuation frame screams about the gap: Earnings Power Value near $4, residual income near $2, excess-return methods near $3 to $4, the Graham Number near $9, all a fraction of the $98.56 (June 27, 2026) quote. The price is not rich on one method and cheap on another; it is rich on essentially every method except the one that extrapolates the order book forever. When the entire valuation rests on a single growth assumption persisting longer than 86% of fast-growers have managed, the margin for disappointment is gone.
The third risk is the cyclicality the backlog can disguise. A backlog that delivers over 18 to 24 months is reassuring while orders keep coming, but it is also a lagging indicator: if the AI-data-center power-buildout slows, or if a few large projects slip or cancel, the order line turns first and the backlog drains without replenishment. The company carries net debt of about $208 million against trailing operating income near $46 million, roughly 4.5x, with interest coverage near 2.4x, and it has grown partly by acquisition, which adds integration risk to an already-levered balance sheet. A 97% order jump is spectacular but unsustainable as a run rate by definition; the moment growth normalizes toward something a competitive equipment business can actually hold, a 41x multiple has a long way to fall. The bear case is not that the demand is fake. It is that the price has already paid for the best-case version of it.
Valuation
CECO's X-ray is the textbook shape of a momentum-priced growth name: one family reaches the price and the rest are nowhere near it. The forward-growth methods clear the bar (discounted-future-market-cap near $138, P/Sales near $102, with the growth-DCF family carrying the price), while the asset and earnings-power methods land in single digits: Earnings Power Value near $4, residual income near $2, the excess-return methods near $3 to $4, the Graham Number near $9. The relative-valuation method at $25 and EV/EBITDA-relative at $11 sit far below the quote.
Inverting the $98.56 price makes the bet explicit. At about 41x company-wide operating income, the market is paying for operating growth held near the 25% self-funding ceiling for roughly 10 years, computed at a 10% cost of capital, with each additional point of cost of capital shortening the tolerable horizon by about 2 years. The near-term growth rate is within what CECO is currently delivering, so the question is not the rate but the duration, and the historical base rate is unforgiving: only about 14% of comparable fast-growers sustained this pace for a decade. That is why the priced-in assumption reads as elevated rather than within range. The valuation is entirely a function of whether the AI-power order cycle is a multi-year structural buildout or a sharp pull-forward. If the backlog keeps compounding and margins scale with volume, the price is defensible; if orders normalize, the static methods near single digits are the gravity the price eventually answers to.
Catalysts
The Q1 2026 report was the catalyst and it was emphatically strong. Orders jumped 97% year over year to $449 million, revenue rose 17% to $206 million, EPS of $0.36 beat by a wide margin, and backlog crossed $1 billion for the first time at $1.035 billion, up 72%. Management raised full-year guidance for the second time this year, lifting revenue to $940 million to $1 billion (the first time it has projected the billion-dollar milestone) and adjusted EBITDA to $120 million to $140 million. The stock rose on the print. With substantially all backlog deliverable within 18 to 24 months, the next several quarters are a direct test of conversion: revenue should follow the order book, and the key signal is whether new orders keep replenishing the backlog or whether the 97% surge was a one-time step up.
The forward watch items center on the AI-power demand cycle and order durability. New orders tied to natural-gas power generation for data centers are the demand engine, so any slowing in that buildout, or slippage and cancellation in large projects, would show up in the order line before the backlog. Acquisition activity is the other lever, since CECO has grown partly through deals, and integration progress and balance-sheet capacity matter for a name carrying roughly 4.5x net-debt-to-operating-income. For a stock priced at 41x for a decade of compounding, the catalysts that matter are continued order momentum, margin expansion as volume scales, and evidence the power-capex cycle has years left rather than quarters.
Sources: CECO Q1 2026 orders jump 97%, raises outlook (StockTitan), CECO Q1 2026 beats forecasts, stock rises (Investing.com), CECO Q1 2026 record backlog and raised guidance (Yahoo Finance), CECO FY2025 10-K.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Engineered Systems (reported)
- DCI (DONALDSON COMPANY, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BW (BABCOCK & WILCOX ENTERPRISES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GTLS (CHART INDUSTRIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CW (CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NPO (NPO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ESAB (ESAB Corporation)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Industrial Process Solutions (reported)
- DCI (DONALDSON COMPANY, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NDSN (NORDSON CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- IEX (IDEX CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GGG (GRACO INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NPO (NPO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.