COEUR MINING, INC. (CDE): what the price requires
At today's price, COEUR MINING, INC. (CDE) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~13.0 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CDE
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CDE |
| Company | COEUR MINING, INC. |
| Current price | $15.49/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 22.1% |
| Operating margin today | 32.4% |
| Margin compression implied | -10.3pp |
| Must persist for | 13.0y |
| Multiple paid | 21x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 7, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 14.4% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.4 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~18.4%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.02σ |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 15% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by earnings-power and relative-multiple value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.38x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.01x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.92x | 2 | justifies |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
Families that justify the price: Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=10)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $26.56 | 0.58x | no | FCF base $0.9B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $13.75 | 1.13x | no | Exit EV/EBITDA: 4.0x / 7.7x / 12.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $17.63 | 0.88x | yes | P/E 14x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 10.5x / 14.0x / 16.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 8x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $12.37 | 1.25x | yes | BV/sh $14.90, ROE (TTM) 7.7%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $11.24 | 1.38x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $13.95 | 1.11x | no | Rev $2.6B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.2x / 4.2x / 5.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $14.88 | 1.04x | no | EPS $1.24, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=6.77 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $2.39 | 6.48x | no | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.24B × (1−29%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $11.06 | 1.40x | yes | BV $14.90 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 7.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.0%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $20.39 | 0.76x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $1.24 × BVPS $14.90) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $16.08 | 0.96x | yes | EBITDA $1.30B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $15.33 | 1.01x | yes | FCF $914.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $14.95 | 1.04x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.89B (FCF $0.91B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $40.01 | 0.39x | yes | EPS $1.24 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $4.15 | 3.73x | yes | BV $14.90 × (ROIC 2.6% / WACC 9.2%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $5.51 | 2.81x | no | Revenue $2.57B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $46.50 | 0.33x | no | EPS $1.24 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $13.41 | 1.15x | no | EPS $1.24 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $779.4m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -1.51x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -1.07x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 27.6% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Coeur Mining is a silver and gold producer whose fortunes ride on metal prices it does not set; the FY2024 10-K states that its "revenue, profitability and future rate of growth of the Company are substantially dependent on the prevailing prices for gold, silver, zinc and lead."
- The most recent quarter was a record because those prices are extraordinary, with realized prices of $4,383 per gold ounce and $82.85 per silver ounce driving revenue of $856 million and net income of $247 million.
- The company is using the windfall to reward shareholders, a $750 million buyback authorization and an inaugural dividend, while sitting on net cash, but the share count has jumped about 28% from the stock-funded SilverCrest acquisition.
Bull Case
The obvious bear worry is that Coeur's record results are a mirage built on peak metal prices that will inevitably fall, so start there. It is a real risk, and the company says as much. But look at what the data actually shows beneath the prices, and the picture is more durable than a simple peak-cycle story. Production is genuinely growing, not just the prices: the first quarter delivered 96,503 ounces of gold and 4.4 million ounces of silver, up 11% and 18% year over year. Higher volume at higher prices is operating leverage in its purest form, and it is why the company generated $341 million of operating cash flow in a single quarter.
The balance sheet is what turns the windfall into a real bull case rather than a fleeting one. Coeur ended the period with net cash, roughly $779 million in cash against minimal debt, a transformation for a company that historically carried leverage into every cycle. That financial position is what lets management do something miners rarely can at a high in prices: return capital aggressively. It authorized a $750 million buyback and initiated its first dividend, deploying the cash flow to shareholders rather than chasing expensive acquisitions at the top of the market. A debt-free miner returning cash is a fundamentally different, more resilient animal than the indebted Coeur of prior cycles.
The growth pipeline extends the production story beyond this year's prices. The SilverCrest acquisition brought the Las Chispas mine into the portfolio, and the 10-K frames Coeur's strategy around "the opportunistic acquisition or development and start-up of exploration projects or new mining properties." Las Chispas is contributing to a rising silver profile, with a further step-up expected at the expanded Rochester operation, and full-year guidance calls for 680,000 to 815,000 ounces of gold and 18.7 to 21.9 million ounces of silver. The earnings-power and relative-multiple methods support the price; the bull case is a growing, debt-free producer leveraged to precious metals at exactly the moment those metals are in demand.
Bear Case
The structural reality a Coeur holder has to confront is that the entire valuation rests on metal prices that are at extraordinary levels and on an earnings base that has been diluted by acquisition. Take the prices first. The 10-K is unambiguous that profitability is "substantially dependent on the prevailing prices for gold, silver, zinc and lead," which are "volatile and affected by many factors beyond" the company's control. The first quarter's 38.7% operating margin and record cash flow exist because gold realized $4,383 and silver $82.85 an ounce. Those are not normal prices. A miner's costs are largely fixed, so when prices fall, margin collapses faster than revenue, and the same operating leverage that makes the up-cycle spectacular makes the down-cycle brutal.
The capital structure has been reshaped in a way the strong cash balance can obscure. To acquire SilverCrest and Las Chispas, Coeur issued a large amount of stock, and the share count has risen about 28% year over year. That dilution means the record net income is spread across far more shares, so per-share earning power has grown much less than the headline figures suggest. The acquisition itself carries the risk the 10-K names: the company "cannot guarantee that we will" realize the expected returns from properties like Las Chispas, and a deal funded with stock at a high in the cycle is a bet that the acquired ounces stay economic if prices retreat.
The valuation does not price a return to normal. At today's level the market pays about 24 times operating income, embedding growth held near the self-funding ceiling for more than a decade, a pace only about 15% of comparable cyclicals have sustained that long. The asset-value lenses already read the stock as expensive: book value is about $15 per share against a price near $17.50 (June 27, 2026), and the return on equity, even in a record quarter, is only about 8%, below the cost of capital. That is the tell, a company earning record dollars but a mediocre return on its capital, because the asset base and the share count have grown alongside the profits. The bear case is that a cyclical priced for a long, durable peak, on diluted shares and a sub-cost-of-capital return, is exposed to the one variable it cannot control: the metal price coming back to earth.
Valuation
The bet in Coeur's price is a commodity bet dressed as a growth bet. At today's level the market pays about 24 times operating income, which inverts to a requirement that operating profit hold near its self-funding ceiling for more than a decade. The current 38.7% operating margin makes that look almost reachable, but the margin is a function of extraordinary metal prices, not a structural feature of the business. Read honestly, the price assumes both that production keeps growing and that precious-metal prices stay near record levels for years, which is a demanding combination for a cyclical.
The methods split in the way a peak-cycle miner's should. The earnings-power and relative-multiple lenses support the price, because they capitalize a record year's cash flow and value the company against sector multiples that are themselves elevated. The asset-value lenses read the stock as expensive: at about $15 of book value per share and a return on equity near 8%, below the cost of capital, the company is not earning an economic return on its capital even at these prices. The growth and projection methods are gated off entirely because the company trips distress signals on negative retained earnings, a legacy of past cycles, even though it now holds net cash. The pattern is a low-quality X-ray where the supportive methods lean on peak prices and the asset method flags that the underlying return is thin.
Solvency, unusually for a miner, is a genuine strength rather than a worry. Coeur holds roughly $779 million in cash against minimal debt, a net-cash position that removes the financial fragility that has historically defined the sector and the company. That balance sheet is what funds the $750 million buyback and the new dividend, and it means a downturn in metal prices would hit earnings hard but not threaten the company's survival. The cohort comparison is the useful caveat: against silver-and-gold peers, Coeur's production growth is real, but its valuation embeds a durable peak that the sector's history rarely delivers, and its share count has expanded more than most. The buyer at today's price is underwriting sustained record metal prices and continued production growth, on a strong balance sheet but a thin underlying return on capital.
Catalysts
The first quarter was a record on every line that prices touch. Coeur reported revenue of $856 million, operating cash flow of $341 million, and GAAP net income of $247 million, or $0.35 per share, with record adjusted EBITDA of $475 million. Production rose to 96,503 ounces of gold and 4.4 million ounces of silver, up 11% and 18% year over year, realized at $4,383 per gold ounce and $82.85 per silver ounce.
The company turned the windfall into capital return and reaffirmed its growth plan. It authorized a $750 million buyback and initiated an inaugural semi-annual dividend, and it held full-year 2026 production guidance of 680,000 to 815,000 ounces of gold, 18.7 to 21.9 million ounces of silver, and 50 to 65 million pounds of copper. Las Chispas, acquired through the SilverCrest transaction, is contributing to the rising silver profile, with a further step-up expected at Rochester. The forward watch items rank clearly: the direction of gold and silver prices, since they drive nearly all of the margin; the execution of the Rochester ramp and Las Chispas integration; and the pace of the buyback as the mechanism by which the cash flow reaches shareholders.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- PAAS (Pan American Silver Corp.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HL (HECLA MINING COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: …losses, respectively, as part of the line item fair value adjustments, net on our statement of consolidated operations and comprehensive income (loss). Note 4: Business Segments, Sales of Products and Significant Customers F- 13 We discover, acquire and develop mines and other mineral interests and produce and market…
- FY2025 10-K: …our debt impose restrictions on our operations. 3 PART I Item 1. Business For information regarding the organization of our business segments and our significant customers, see Note 4 of Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements. Information set forth in Items 1A and 2 below are incorporated by reference into this…
- HMY (HARMONY GOLD MINING COMPANY LIMITED)
- FY2025 20-F: …- Holistic health and wellness " on pages 141 to 153 . Mining companies face strong competition and industry consolidation The mining industry is competitive in all of its phases. We compete with other mining companies and individuals for specialised equipment, components and supplies necessary for exploration and…
- FY2025 20-F: . These factors could materially and adversely affect our financial and operating results. We compete with mining and other companies for key human resources with critical skills and our inability to retain key personnel could have an adverse e ffect on our business The risk of losing senior management or being unable…
- AGI (ALAMOS GOLD INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SCCO (SOUTHERN COPPER CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: EPORTING SEGMENTS: Our management divides Southern Copper into three reportable segments and manages each as a separate segment. The three segments identified are groups of individual mines, each of which constitutes an operating segment with similar economic characteristics, product types, processes and support…
- FY2025 10-K: …recorded as revenue of our Mexican mines. The Mexican open-pit operations produce copper and zinc, with production of by-products of molybdenum, silver and other materials. 3. Mexican underground mining operations, which include five underground mines that produce zinc, copper, lead, silver and gold; and a zinc…
- NEXA (NEXA RESOURCES S.A.)
- FY2025 20-F: …corresponding intercompany purchases; both are calculated on an arm's length basis to evaluate each segment's performance individually and are eliminated in consolidation. The profitability of our mining segment depends primarily on prevailing world prices for the metals we produce and on our unit cost to produce…
- FY2025 20-F: …by the United States or from the potential imposition of import tariffs on zinc or copper. The primary impact observed continues to be exchange rate volatility, driven by U.S. economic policy announcements and ongoing geopolitical tensions. 2 Information by business segment Business segment definition The Company's…
- CCJ (Cameco Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release · Q1 2026 earnings call