Carnival Corp Ltd. (CCL): what the price requires
At today's price, Carnival Corp Ltd. (CCL) is priced for +15.1% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CCL
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CCL |
| Company | Carnival Corp Ltd. |
| Current price | $26.50/sh |
| Composition | Passenger ticket 65% / Onboard and other 35% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 4.2% |
| Operating margin today | 16.5% |
| Margin compression implied | -12.3pp |
| Implied growth | 15.1% |
| Multiple paid | 13x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 5, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 11.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~4.3%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.43σ |
| cohort percentile (of 225 peers) | 14 |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 44% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.10x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.08x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.55x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.01x | 2 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $34.71 | 0.76x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 6.7x / 8.7x / 10.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $48.32 | 0.55x | yes | P/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.8x / 20.0x / 23.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $24.04 | 1.10x | yes | BV/sh $9.36, ROE (TTM) 23.8%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $38.55 | 0.69x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $21.07 | 1.26x | yes | Rev $27.0B, growth 6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.1x / 1.4x / 1.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $27.24 | 0.97x | yes | EPS $2.27, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=5.96 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $0.01 | 2649.50x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.39B × (1−6%) / WACC 5.6% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $35.19 | 0.75x | yes | BV $9.36 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 23.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $21.87 | 1.21x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.27 × BVPS $9.36) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $49.23 | 0.54x | yes | EBITDA $7.38B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $3.51 | 7.55x | yes | FCF $2986.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $73.25 | 0.36x | yes | EPS $2.27 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $2.35 | 11.27x | yes | BV $9.36 × (ROIC 1.4% / WACC 5.6%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $38.76 | 0.68x | yes | Revenue $26.98B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $85.13 | 0.31x | yes | EPS $2.27 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $24.54 | 1.08x | yes | EPS $2.27 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $24.6b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 6.01x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 5.64x |
| Interest coverage | 3.3x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 2.6% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Carnival is the world's largest cruise operator in a strong post-pandemic recovery, with record second-quarter revenue of $6.7 billion, customer deposits at an all-time high of $9.0 billion, and a 12th consecutive quarter of record yields.
- The defining issue is the debt taken on to survive the shutdown: net debt sits around $24.6 billion, more than 5 times operating income, so a large share of the recovery's cash flow goes to lenders before it reaches shareholders.
- The price embeds operating profit compounding above 20% a year, a pace the company has recently delivered as it recovers but that only a minority of fast-growers sustain, so the bet is on how long the recovery and deleveraging run.
Bull Case
Read Carnival through the lens of where it sits in its own cycle, and the story is a mature business in the steep part of a recovery, with the operating metrics to prove the demand is real. Bookings are the leading indicator, and they are exceptional: the company is 93% booked for the year with less inventory left to sell than a year ago, and customer deposits hit an all-time high of $9.0 billion. Those deposits are cash guests have already handed over for future voyages, the clearest evidence that demand is not just present but committed. The 10-K describes the model plainly, with payment terms that require "an initial deposit to confirm a reservation, with the balance due prior to the commencement of the voyage." A business collecting cash in advance for sold-out sailings is one with genuine pricing power.
The yield trajectory turns that demand into profit. Carnival posted its 12th consecutive quarter of record net yields, the revenue it earns per available berth, and is guiding to full-year net yields up about 3.2% over a record 2025. Rising yields on a largely fixed-cost asset base, the ships, is powerful operating leverage: once a voyage is scheduled, incremental revenue per passenger drops heavily to profit. That is why record revenue translated into net income up more than 20% year over year and adjusted EBITDA of $1.58 billion in the quarter.
The deleveraging is the part of the recovery that most directly benefits equity holders, and it is well underway. Total debt declined to $24.89 billion and net debt to adjusted EBITDA fell to 3.1 times, while the company resumed both buybacks, more than $450 million, and dividends, $414 million year to date. As EBITDA rises and debt falls, the enterprise value increasingly accrues to shareholders rather than lenders, which is the mechanical reason a recovering, deleveraging operator can compound equity value faster than its revenue grows. The relative-multiple and cash-flow methods support the price; the bull case is that the booking strength funds continued deleveraging.
Bear Case
The variable with the most leverage over Carnival is the one it controls least: the willingness of millions of people to spend discretionary income on a vacation, in a world that keeps interrupting travel. The 10-K is blunt about the exposure, warning that "geopolitical uncertainty, war and other military actions, pandemics, inflation, higher interest rates and other general concerns impacting the ability or desire of people to travel could lead to a decline in demand for cruises." Cruising is the most deferrable of purchases, and the company has already felt the routing risk firsthand, redeploying away from Arabian Gulf voyages, a shift that weighs on full-year yields. A consumer recession, a fuel spike, or a single high-profile incident at sea can cut demand faster than the company can adjust a fleet whose itineraries are set far in advance.
The debt is what converts that demand risk into an equity risk, and it is enormous. Net debt of about $24.6 billion runs more than 5 times trailing operating income, with interest covered only about 3.6 times. Carnival has been repricing and refinancing its term loans, but it remains a heavily leveraged company whose recovery is partly a story of paying lenders back, not shareholders. In a downturn, the fixed cost of that debt does not flex with revenue, so a demand shock hits the equity with the full force of the leverage. The company carries less than $1.5 billion in liquid assets against that debt load, which leaves little cushion if a soft season collides with a refinancing window.
The valuation gives the recovery little benefit of the doubt to stall. At today's price the market embeds operating profit growing above 20% a year for five years, a pace Carnival has recently delivered off depressed pandemic-era levels but that becomes much harder to sustain as the comparison base normalizes. Only about a third of comparable fast-growers held that pace for five years, and the yield guidance itself, full-year net yields up about 1.75% in constant currency once the redeployment and loyalty-accounting changes are included, shows the growth rate already moderating. Dilution compounds the concern: the share count has risen about 5% as equity was issued to survive the shutdown, so per-share value has to climb against a larger base. The bear case is that a richly assumed growth rate, an outsized debt load, and acute macro sensitivity are a fragile combination if the consumer or the geopolitical backdrop turns.
Valuation
The bet in Carnival's price is a recovery bet. At today's level the market pays about 15 times company-wide operating income, which inverts to a requirement that operating profit grow above 20% a year for the next several years. That pace is within what Carnival has recently delivered as it climbed back from the pandemic, so the assumption is not detached from reality; the demanding part is duration, sustaining a recovery-era growth rate as the comparison base normalizes. The yield guidance moderating toward low single digits in constant currency is the early sign that the easy part of the recovery is behind it.
The methods support the price without flagging it as expensive, which fits a recovering operator. The relative-multiple and growth-and-cash-flow lenses reach the price, valuing the revenue base and the forward recovery. The asset-value lenses sit modestly above the price because the high return on equity, near 24%, adds value over a small book base. The one cautionary read is the no-growth earnings method, which lands far below the price, a reminder that a single year of normalized profit cannot justify the valuation; the price requires the growth to continue. The pattern is a name justified by its forward trajectory rather than its static earnings, which is exactly what a mid-recovery cyclical looks like.
Solvency is the heart of the analysis here, not a closing aside. Net debt of about $24.6 billion sits at more than 5 times trailing operating income, with interest covered about 3.6 times and liquid assets under $1.5 billion. That leverage is the legacy of the shutdown, and the entire investment case turns on whether rising EBITDA and falling debt continue to shift enterprise value toward equity. The cohort comparison is informative: against its cruise peers Carnival trades in the lower half of the multiple range, which reflects both its heavier leverage and its larger share count from pandemic-era issuance. The buyer at today's price is underwriting a continued recovery, sustained yield growth, and steady deleveraging, on a balance sheet that has improved markedly but still leaves the equity geared to demand that the macro environment can interrupt.
Catalysts
The most recent quarter was a record across the board. Carnival reported second-quarter revenue of $6.7 billion, adjusted EBITDA of $1.58 billion, and net income of $569 million, up more than 20%, with adjusted earnings of $0.41 per share beating estimates. The forward indicators were the highlight: customer deposits reached an all-time high of $9.0 billion, the company is 93% booked for the year, and it logged a 12th consecutive quarter of record yields.
Deleveraging and capital return advanced alongside the operating strength. Total debt declined to $24.89 billion, net debt to adjusted EBITDA fell to 3.1 times, and the company executed more than $450 million of buybacks and $414 million of dividends year to date. Guidance points to full-year 2026 net yields up about 3.2% versus record 2025, adjusted EPS near $2.22, and EBITDA above $7 billion. The forward watch items are whether booking strength and yields hold as the recovery base normalizes, the pace of further debt reduction, and the macro and geopolitical backdrop, since fuel, routing disruptions, and consumer confidence are the variables that move cruise demand most.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Tour and Other (reported)
- NCLH (NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS LTD.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- RCL (ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q2 2026 earnings release