CROWN HOLDINGS, INC. (CCK): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for CROWN HOLDINGS, INC. (CCK) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-17 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CCK
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CCK |
| Company | CROWN HOLDINGS, INC. |
| Current price | $109.55/sh |
| Composition | Metal beverage cans and ends 69% / Transit packaging 16% / Metal food cans and ends 8% / Other products 3% / Other metal packaging 4% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 5.2% |
| Operating margin today | 12.4% |
| Margin compression implied | -7.2pp |
| Multiple paid | 12x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~0.1%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -1.39σ |
| cohort percentile (of 225 peers) | 11 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.58x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.61x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.50x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.98x | 2 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $149.43 | 0.73x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 8.0x / 10.0x / 12.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $133.01 | 0.82x | yes | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.0x / 18.0x / 21.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $69.19 | 1.58x | yes | BV/sh $25.93, ROE (TTM) 24.7%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $113.47 | 0.97x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $88.98 | 1.23x | yes | Rev $12.7B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.8x / 1.0x / 1.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $220.15 | 0.50x | yes | EPS $6.29, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.49 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $100.79 | 1.09x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.41B × (1−21%) / WACC 6.3% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $102.01 | 1.07x | yes | BV $25.93 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 24.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $60.58 | 1.81x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $6.29 × BVPS $25.93) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $142.72 | 0.77x | yes | EBITDA $1.87B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $39.30 | 2.79x | yes | FCF $995.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $34.78 | 3.15x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.95B (FCF $0.99B − SBC $0.05B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $202.96 | 0.54x | yes | EPS $6.29 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $12.78 | 8.57x | yes | BV $25.93 × (ROIC 3.1% / WACC 6.3%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $283.04 | 0.39x | yes | Revenue $12.74B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $235.87 | 0.46x | yes | EPS $6.29 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $68.00 | 1.61x | yes | EPS $6.29 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $5.7b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 4.65x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 3.68x |
| Interest coverage | 3.9x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.5% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Crown Holdings makes the aluminum cans that hold the world's sodas and beers, and despite a reputation as a sleepy packager it grew global beverage can volumes 5% in the first quarter, led by Europe and Asia-Pacific.
- The defining risk is customer concentration: the FY2024 10-K reports that Crown's top ten global customers represented roughly 48% of consolidated net sales, so the business rides on a handful of large beverage marketers.
- The price is undemanding, at about 11 times operating income, low enough to build in a steady decline, while management reaffirmed full-year adjusted EPS guidance of $7.90 to $8.30 and roughly $900 million of free cash flow.
Bull Case
The counterintuitive fact about Crown Holdings is that a business everyone files under boring cyclical packaging is actually posting volume growth in a sluggish global economy. Global beverage can volumes rose 5% in the first quarter, led by robust shipments across Europe and Asia-Pacific. That growth is structural, not just cyclical: aluminum cans are taking share from glass and plastic as beverage makers respond to sustainability pressure and consumer preference, and Crown sits in a consolidated industry with the scale to serve the largest customers globally. A packaging company growing units mid-single digits while raising price is not the no-growth utility the multiple implies.
The economics are better than the thin net margin suggests. Crown earns a return on equity near 25%, because the can business is capital-efficient once the lines are built and runs on long-term customer contracts. Those contracts also pass through raw-material costs: the 10-K notes the company uses "forward commodity contracts to hedge aluminum price fluctuations" and structures pricing to recover input-cost changes, which protects margins through the aluminum cycle even if with a timing lag. A business that grows volumes, recovers its costs, and earns a high return on capital is the kind the static asset-based methods understate, because they price the balance sheet rather than the cash-generating franchise.
Capital allocation is squarely shareholder-friendly and the price gives little credit for it. Crown generates strong free cash flow, reaffirmed at about $900 million for the year after roughly $550 million of capex, and it has been shrinking its share count about 2.5% a year while paying down debt and funding growth, including a new two-line beverage can plant in Northern India slated for late 2027. Adjusted EPS rose 11% to $1.86 in the quarter, and management reaffirmed full-year guidance of $7.90 to $8.30. The relative-multiple and cash-flow methods support the price; the bull case is that a high-return, cash-generative volume grower is worth more than a low-double-digit multiple.
Bear Case
The sector-cycle lens is the right way to pressure-test Crown, and the first issue is that its fate is not its own to control. The 10-K is direct that the company's "sales depend heavily on the volumes of sales by the Company's customers in the beverage and food markets," which means Crown grows when its customers grow and stalls when they stall. Those customers are concentrated: the top ten global customers were about 48% of 2024 net sales, with two customers each individually significant. A pricing dispute, a customer switching part of its volume to a competitor, or a downturn in a single large account would land hard, and concentration this high is a structural vulnerability the can business cannot diversify away.
The cost pass-through that protects margins also lags, and that lag is where the cyclical risk lives. The 10-K concedes that price increases "may take effect after related cost increases, reducing operating income in the near term," so a sharp move in aluminum or energy compresses margin until contracts reset. Tariffs are the live version of that risk: trade measures on aluminum raise input costs, and while the company points to the Midwest premium as the mechanism to absorb them, any disruption in raw-material access, which the filing warns "would be disrupted and any such disruption may adversely affect the Company's financial results," hits a business with little room to store inventory or switch suppliers quickly.
The leverage turns a soft patch into an equity concern. Crown carries net debt of about $5.7 billion, roughly 3.7 times operating income, with interest covered only about 3.9 times. That is meaningful debt for a business whose operating profit swings with customer volumes and input costs, and it competes for cash with the buyback, the dividend, and the growth capex like the India plant. The price embeds a multiple low enough to assume a steady decline, which is the market's caution showing through, and the bear case is that the combination of customer concentration, cost-pass-through lag, tariff exposure, and real leverage is exactly why a high-return business trades at a packaging multiple rather than a consumer-staples one.
Valuation
The bet in Crown's price is defensive. At today's level the market pays about 11 times company-wide operating income, a multiple low enough that the price sits below what even a steady annual decline in operating profit would warrant. The company earns a 12.2% operating margin, and the price is not asking it to grow so much as not to shrink faster than expected. For a business posting 5% volume growth and reaffirming its guidance, that is a conservative starting point, and it reflects the market discounting the cyclicality and customer concentration rather than doubting the franchise.
The methods broadly support the price, with no family flagging it as expensive. The relative-multiple and growth-and-cash-flow lenses reach the price, valuing the revenue base and the forward volume growth. The earnings-power method, which capitalizes current profit with no growth, lands right around the price, which is a strong signal: it says today's earnings alone roughly justify the valuation, with growth as upside rather than as a requirement. The asset-value lenses sit modestly above the price because the high return on equity adds value above book. The pattern is a name where the demonstrated earnings already do most of the work, which is the hallmark of a value-supported industrial rather than a growth bet.
Solvency is the variable that decides the downside, and it deserves attention. Net debt of about $5.7 billion against trailing operating income puts leverage near 3.7 times, with interest covered about 3.9 times and modest liquid assets of roughly $584 million. That is investment-grade but real leverage, and it means a stretch of soft customer volumes or a lagging cost recovery would pressure the cash flow that services the debt while the company is also funding growth capex. The cohort comparison is awkward because Crown is grouped with industrial-machinery names rather than packaging peers, but on its own metrics the picture is clear: a high-return, cash-generative can maker priced at a low multiple, where the discount is the market's pay for the customer concentration and the cyclicality, and the upside is the volume growth and free-cash deployment continuing.
Catalysts
The first quarter showed the volume engine working. Net sales rose to $3.259 billion from $2.887 billion, driven by a 5% increase in global beverage shipments plus $74 million of favorable currency, and adjusted diluted EPS rose 11% to $1.86, though reported EPS slipped to $1.56. The growth came from Europe and Asia-Pacific, partially offset by lower volumes in Brazil and weaker cost recovery in North American beverage. Management reaffirmed full-year adjusted EPS guidance of $7.90 to $8.30 and roughly $900 million of free cash flow after about $550 million of capex.
The forward catalysts are growth investment and the tariff question. Crown announced a two-line beverage can plant in Northern India expected to begin operations in the second half of 2027, extending its footprint into a growth market. The watch items are the durability of European and Asia-Pacific volume growth, the recovery in Brazil and North American cost pass-through, and how tariffs and the Midwest aluminum premium flow through to margins. Each feeds the operating profit that the low multiple gives the company little credit for sustaining, so steady volumes and on-track cost recovery would close the gap between an 11-times multiple and a high-return franchise.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Americas Beverage (reported)
- BALL (BALL CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- OI (O-I GLASS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SLGN (SILGAN HOLDINGS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AMCR (AMCOR PLC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GPK (Graphic Packaging Holding Co)
- (no filing in the citation store)
European Beverage (reported)
- BALL (BALL CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- OI (O-I GLASS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AMCR (AMCOR PLC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SLGN (SILGAN HOLDINGS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GPK (Graphic Packaging Holding Co)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Transit Packaging (reported)
- AMCR (AMCOR PLC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GPK (Graphic Packaging Holding Co)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PKG (PACKAGING CORP OF AMERICA)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BALL (BALL CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- IP (INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SLGN (SILGAN HOLDINGS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- OI (O-I GLASS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Core business (reported)
- SLGN (SILGAN HOLDINGS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BALL (BALL CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AMCR (AMCOR PLC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GPK (Graphic Packaging Holding Co)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PKG (PACKAGING CORP OF AMERICA)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SW (Smurfit Westrock plc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- OI (O-I GLASS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release · Q1 2026 earnings call