CROWN HOLDINGS, INC. (CCK): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers CROWN HOLDINGS, INC. (CCK) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CCK

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCCK
CompanyCROWN HOLDINGS, INC.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$118.44/sh
CompositionMetal beverage cans and ends 69% / Transit packaging 16% / Metal food cans and ends 8% / Other products 3% / Other metal packaging 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)5.1%
Operating margin today12.3%
Margin compression (value-band)-7.2pp
Multiple paid11x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-1.39σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)11

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.52x5expensive
Earnings1.57x5expensive
Relative0.47x2justifies
Growth0.87x2justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$192.650.61xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 7.8x / 9.8x / 11.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.9x / 18.0x / 21.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$77.931.52xyesBV/sh $26.36, ROE (TTM) 27.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$136.210.87xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$104.951.13xyesRev $13.3B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.8x / 1.0x / 1.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$243.600.49xyesEPS $6.96, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.47 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$105.221.13xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.44B × (1−21%) / WACC 6.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$117.061.01xyesBV $26.36 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 27.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$64.251.84xyes√(22.5 × EPS $6.96 × BVPS $26.36) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.94B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$63.181.87xyesFCF $1199.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$58.702.02xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.15B (FCF $1.20B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$224.580.53xyesEPS $6.96 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$16.617.13xyesBV $26.36 × (ROIC 4.1% / WACC 6.5%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $13.26B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$261.000.45xyesEPS $6.96 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$75.241.57xyesEPS $6.96 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Americas Beverageoperatingenterprise$5.6b$1.0b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
European Beverageoperatingenterprise$2.3b$334.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Transit Packagingoperatingenterprise$2.0b$258.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$5.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.21x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.33x
Interest coverage4.1x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.5%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with the objection, because it is the honest one. Crown carries roughly 5.68 billion dollars of net debt, equal to about 3.68 times operating profit, and the interest bill eats a real share of what the business earns. Coverage of about 3.9 times is adequate rather than comfortable. For a company selling a commodity container into consolidated customers, that is the number a cautious investor stops at.

Now test it. The debt sits on a business whose input cost is contractually somebody else's problem. The 10-K is explicit that the company "primarily manages its risk to adverse commodity price fluctuations and surcharges through contracts that pass through raw material costs to customers". Aluminum can double and the revenue line moves with it. In 2025 the filing attributes a large part of the sales increase to "the pass-through of higher aluminum costs", and reports that "Segment income increased primarily due to continued operational improvements and improved customer mix". The earnings came from running the plants better, not from the metal.

The physical economics are the reason that works. A can is mostly air, and air is uneconomic to ship, so plants are built next to filling lines and the relationship that follows is closer to infrastructure than to supply. SLGN describes the same constraint in its own filing, noting that its plant network is shaped "Because of the high cost of transporting empty containers". Crown's answer is 179 plants across 39 countries and roughly 23,000 employees, a footprint that a new entrant does not assemble by writing a cheque. Second-quarter volumes bear out the demand side: global beverage can shipments rose 5%, with double-digit growth in Asia, 7% in Europe and 5% in North America.

Cash conversion is where the leverage argument turns. Free cash flow ran at 995 million dollars, the company is not burning cash, and management has committed publicly to a target it repeats in the filing: "The Company's strategy is anchored by strong cash flow generation and a healthy balance sheet with a long-term net leverage target of 2.5x adjusted EBITDA". Meanwhile the share count has shrunk about 2.5% a year over the four years to March 2026, and $305 million came out in the second quarter alone. Debt paydown and buybacks compete for the same dollar, and the company is running both.

On profitability the comparison group is not close. Crown earns about 12.4% on a trailing basis at the operating line. PKG, the strongest of the paper converters here, reports an 11.7% operating margin; GPK reports 7.0%, SW 4.5%, and OI is close to breakeven at 0.2%. Packaging is a low-return business for most of the people in it. Crown is not one of them, and the debt is being serviced out of the best margin in the room.

Bear Case

The advantage under pressure is substitution, and the company names it first among its own risks. Its 10-K states that "The Company is subject to substantial competition from producers of alternative packaging made from glass, paper, flexible materials and plastic". The reason that matters more now than it used to is that the alternatives are being rebuilt to fight. OI, on the glass side, is running a programme whose stated aim is "cost position and driving profitable growth. The Fit to Win initiative will deliver immediate cost benefits, while the long-term strategy focuses on substantially improving the competitive position". A competitor cutting cost to win back share is not a neutral event for the incumbent's pricing.

Inside the can market itself the structure invites capacity indiscipline. BALL's filing describes containers "sold based on price, quality, service, innovation and sustainability in a highly competitive market, which is relatively capital intensive", and adds that these plants run continuously because that is the only way they operate profitably. Lines that must run cannot be idled gracefully when demand softens, so the adjustment shows up in price. That is the mechanism by which a local-monopoly story quietly becomes a commodity story.

The pass-through that protects the input cost also flatters the revenue line, and the protection has limits the company states plainly. Its risk disclosure warns of an inability "to increase its prices to offset increases in raw material costs without suffering reductions in unit volume, revenue and operating income", and notes that "The ability to mitigate inflationary risks through these measures varies by region". Read the 2025 sales increase in that light: a material portion of it came from aluminum moving through the contracts, which is revenue that carries no incremental profit and disappears when metal falls.

Which leaves the price and the debt in the same sentence. At about 12 times company-wide operating profit the quote does not embed a heroic assumption. It implies operating growth of about -4.4% a year over five years, which is to say the market has already agreed the business shrinks gently. The problem is what sits underneath. The methods that credit no growth whatsoever land below the price: the price carries roughly a 70% premium over the earnings-power family's central estimate, and capitalizing free cash flow with zero growth lands further below still. Against that, net debt of 3.68 times operating profit and coverage near 3.9 times means the equity absorbs the whole of any margin slip. GPK shows what the downside path looks like in packaging: its amended credit agreement "limits share repurchases to $65 million on an annual basis" once leverage crosses a defined threshold. Buybacks are the first thing a lender takes away.

Valuation

A price of $117.96 works out to about 12 times company-wide operating profit, which for a mature packaging business is not a demanding number. Run the price backwards and the assumption it embeds is mildly negative: operating growth of about -4.4% a year sustained across a five-year stage, discounted at a cost of capital of 8.2%, with the multiple sitting in the lower half of the range its comparison group trades at. The market is not paying for growth here. It is paying for continuation, and pricing a slow fade into the bargain.

The methods disagree about whether that is enough, and they split cleanly along one line: whether growth is credited at all. The peer-multiple methods land above the quote, and the forward cash-flow method lands essentially on it, so the price is defensible on both a comparison basis and a projection basis. The methods that value only what has been demonstrated do not get there. Against the earnings-power family the price sits about 1.7 times above the central estimate, and capitalizing the current free cash flow at the cost of equity with no growth at all lands well under half the quote. The gap between those two readings is the whole question: whether the plants keep converting cash at the recent rate, or whether the last few years were the good part of the cycle.

Segment mix is what makes the earnings-power lens harsh. Crown reports across metal beverage cans and ends, transit packaging, metal food cans and ends, and smaller lines, and the beverage business is the one carrying the growth. Second-quarter global beverage can volumes rose 5%, led by double-digit gains in Asia, while transit packaging serves industrial end markets with a different cycle entirely. A single company-wide operating multiple averages those together and tells you less than the parts would.

Among the packaging comparison group Crown's returns stand out. Its trailing operating margin runs about 12.4%. PKG reports 11.7% on revenue of 9.216 billion dollars, GPK 7.0% on 8.653 billion dollars with revenue flat on the year, SW 4.5% on a much larger base, and OI has compressed to roughly breakeven at the operating line on revenue down 1.6%. BALL, the closest direct competitor in beverage cans, grew revenue 13.7% to 13.667 billion dollars and converts 6.9% of it to net profit. Crown is priced at a multiple in the lower half of that group while earning the highest operating margin in it.

The balance sheet is where the discount lives. Net debt runs about 5.68 billion dollars against gross borrowings of roughly 6.26 billion dollars, which is 3.68 times operating profit, and interest is covered about 3.9 times. The company is not burning cash, free cash flow ran at 995 million dollars, and the filing commits to a "long-term net leverage target of 2.5x adjusted EBITDA". Until the reported ratio meets that target, a portion of every dollar of cash flow belongs to lenders rather than shareholders, and that is the most concrete reason a business earning the best margin in its cohort trades at one of its lower multiples.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results landed on July 20, 2026 and were strong on both lines. Net sales came in at $3,668 million against $3,149 million in the same quarter of 2025, segment income at $501 million against $476 million, and diluted earnings per share at $2.23 against $1.56. Global beverage can volumes rose 5%, with double-digit growth in Asia, 7% in Europe and 5% in North America. Volume growth of that shape, spread across three regions rather than concentrated in one, is the version that tends to persist.

Capital return accelerated alongside it. The company repurchased $305 million of stock during the quarter, taking repurchases across the first six months of 2026 past half a billion dollars. A quarterly dividend was declared on July 23, 2026. Management also set full-year capital expenditure at approximately $550 million. Spending at that level against the cash the business generates leaves room for both debt reduction and repurchases, which is the balancing act the leverage target implies.

The variable worth tracking from here is aluminum. Because the contracts pass metal costs through, a falling aluminum price pulls reported revenue down without touching profit, and a rising one does the reverse. Reported sales growth in this business therefore carries a metal component that has nothing to do with how many cans were sold, and the volume figure is the cleaner read on demand.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Americas Beverage (reported)

European Beverage (reported)

Transit Packaging (reported)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q2 2026 earnings release, July 20, 2026 · Crown Holdings dividend announcement, July 23, 2026

View the full interactive CCK report on boothcheck