COCA-COLA EUROPACIFIC PARTNERS PLC (CCEP): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $109.10, COCA-COLA EUROPACIFIC PARTNERS PLC (CCEP) is priced for +0.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CCEP

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCCEP
CompanyCOCA-COLA EUROPACIFIC PARTNERS PLC
Sector / IndustryConsumer Defensive
Current price$109.10/sh
CompositionGreat Britain 17% / Iberia 16% / Germany 15% / France 12% / Belgium/Luxembourg 5% / Netherlands 4% / Sweden 2% / Norway 2% / Iceland 0% / Australia 11% / Philippines 9% / New Zealand and Pacific Islands 3% / Indonesia 2% / Papua New Guinea 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)2.3%
Operating margin today13.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-11.1pp
Implied growth0.1%
Multiple paid19x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.90σ
cohort percentile (of 69 peers)48

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.11x5expensive
Earnings3.19x4expensive
Relative1.09x5expensive
Growth0.76x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$175.700.62xyesFCF base $2.6B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.5%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$143.030.76xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 18.8x / 20.8x / 22.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$90.141.21xyesP/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 18.3x / 22.0x / 25.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$51.782.11xyesBV/sh $20.10, ROE (TTM) 23.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$83.171.31xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$99.201.10xyesRev $22.7B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.8x / 2.2x / 2.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$100.391.09xyesEPS $4.63, growth 22% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.05 (Fair)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$22.704.81xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $2.36B × (1−23%) / WACC 7.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$75.831.44xyesBV $20.10 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 23.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$45.762.38xyes√(22.5 × EPS $4.63 × BVPS $20.10) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$63.021.73xyesEBITDA $3.04B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$26.024.19xyesFCF $2394.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$149.410.73xyesEPS $4.63 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$27.134.02xyesBV $20.10 × (ROIC 10.1% / WACC 7.5%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$101.181.08xyesRevenue $22.72B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$150.580.72xyesEPS $4.63 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 21.7% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 32.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$50.062.18xyesEPS $4.63 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$11.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.53x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.49x
Interest coverage9.1x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.0%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The methods used to triangulate this business are unusually spread out, and the direction of the spread is the argument. The approaches that discount future cash flows land above today's price. Peer-multiple comparisons land almost exactly on it. The approaches that capitalize a year of profit and assume the company never grows again land well below it. Read as a set, that is a market paying roughly what a permanently flat bottler would be worth, and getting whatever growth actually shows up for nothing.

Which matters because growth has been showing up. In the first quarter, revenue reached €5,001 million, up 6.7% as reported and 9.4% on a currency-neutral basis, with volumes of 970 million unit cases and revenue per unit case of €5.29. Europe delivered €3,549 million and Asia-Pacific €1,452 million. Management reaffirmed full-year guidance for comparable revenue growth of 3% to 4% and comparable operating profit growth of about 7%. A price that assumes flat is being asked to accommodate a company guiding to seven.

The structural reason this can be underwritten is what the business actually owns. CCEP does not own the brands; it owns the only lawful route those brands take to a shelf across fourteen countries, under agreements the 20-F describes as requiring the company to "purchase our entire requirement of concentrates and syrups for Coca-Cola trademark beverages" from the brand owner. That is a contractual territory, not a market share to be defended each quarter, and it comes with the physical assets, the routes and the retail relationships that make the territory worth anything.

The returns are ordinary and the cash is not. The company reported revenue of €20.9 billion and operating profit of €2.8 billion for 2025, alongside €3.0 billion of net cash from operating activities and a return on invested capital of 10.9%. Operating cash flow exceeding reported operating profit is what a business with heavy depreciation and disciplined working capital looks like, and it is the reason the company can pay a dividend, buy back stock and still invest at around 5% of revenue.

Capital return is where that shows up. The share count was flat across the four years to the end of 2025, and the company is now guiding to a €1 billion buyback across 2026, with €500 million already completed at the time of the April update, plus an interim dividend of €0.82 a share and a full-year payout target of roughly half of comparable earnings. The repurchased shares are cancelled outright.

The bear is right that a 13.4% trailing operating margin will never be a brand-owner margin, and it will not. What it will be is a margin on a very large revenue base that grows with population, price and pack mix in fourteen countries, collected by the only company legally able to collect it there.

Bear Case

The territory looked impregnable and it is being nibbled at from three sides, all of them visible in the company's own reporting. Start with pricing, because that is where the erosion is easiest to mistake for strength. Revenue per unit case rose 0.8% in the first quarter, and the company attributes the increase to "positive mix, headline pricing, Suntory alcohol exit & French sugar tax". Two of those four are not pricing power. A sugar tax passed through to the shelf raises the recorded revenue per case and takes nothing to the bottom line, and losing a distribution contract flatters the average by removing a low-priced product.

That Suntory exit is the second side. CCEP stopped distributing Suntory alcohol in Australia in June 2025 and in New Zealand in December 2025, and management sizes the full-year drag at roughly 0.5% of group revenue, with about a 3% hit to revenue per case in Asia-Pacific. Third-party distribution contracts are the part of a bottler's network that other people can take back, and one just was.

The third side is the consumer. The 20-F is explicit that comparable volumes were "partially offset by greater consumer focus on affordability and the increase in sugar taxes". In the first quarter, European away-from-home volumes fell 1.2% while home volumes rose 3.1%, and transactions ran behind volume growth in Europe, which the company links to "growth of large format packs". Away-from-home is the channel that carries the price; large multipacks bought at a supermarket are the channel that does not. A consumer trading from a chilled single-serve to a discounted two-litre bottle is still counted as volume, and the mix beneath that volume is moving the wrong way.

The structural constraint is that the brand owner shares in any success. Concentrate cost is "directly linked to revenue per UC through incidence pricing", which means a successful price increase automatically raises what CCEP pays for its key input. That mechanism is why a 13.4% trailing operating margin sits where it does while COCA-COLA (KO) earns 29.3% and MONSTER (MNST) 29.3% on the brand side of the same value chain. Even KEURIG DR PEPPER (KDP), which owns brands and bottles them, runs 20.8%. The bottler is the party in this arrangement whose upside is capped by contract.

Regulation is the slow variable and the filing does not minimise it. The 20-F warns that "Health concerns could reduce consumer demand for some of our products, impacting our financial performance" and that fragmented packaging rules "could increase our costs and may have a material impact on the cost and efficiency of our operations". Fourteen jurisdictions means fourteen legislatures, and every deposit-return scheme, packaging levy and sugar tax lands as cost on a business already operating at bottler margins.

None of this threatens solvency. Interest was covered about 9.1 times over on trailing operating profit, which is comfortable. It threatens the growth assumption instead, and growth is what the buyer at this price is declining to pay much for and would still very much like to receive.

Valuation

Bottling is a business where the price you pay decides almost everything, because the margin is set by contract and the volume is set by demography. So begin with what today's price assumes. At roughly 18 times company-wide operating income, the embedded assumption is operating profit growing at about 0% a year over a five-year stage. Measured against the company's own record that is not a stretch; if anything it is a shortfall, and the multiple itself sits toward the cheaper end of the beverage comparisons.

The methods fan out around that. The forward cash-flow approaches land above the price, which is not the usual arrangement for a mature consumer name. The peer-multiple family sits essentially at the price, reading it about 5% above where that family lands. The book-value-plus-profitability family reads the price about double where it sits, and the earnings-power family, which capitalizes one year of profit at a required return and credits no growth at all, reads it further above still. The last of those is the one to interpret carefully rather than take at face value: a no-growth capitalization is close to the worst frame available for a company whose whole proposition is slow, contractual compounding in fourteen countries.

Cohort position is where the picture sharpens. A trailing operating margin near 13.4% is not a disappointment against the right comparison; it is the going rate for the job. COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED (COKE), the other listed bottler in this set, earns 13.3%. The brand owners earn roughly twice that, with COCA-COLA (KO) at 29.3% and MONSTER (MNST) at 29.3%, and PEPSICO (PEP), which is both, at 14.8%. Comparing CCEP's multiple to a brand owner's would be a category error; comparing its margin to COKE's is the comparison that means something, and on that basis it is performing to standard.

The filed numbers behind the multiple are unambiguous. Revenue of €20.9 billion produced reported operating profit of €2.8 billion in 2025, alongside €3.0 billion of net cash from operating activities and a 10.9% return on invested capital. The five-year average of operating income sits below the trailing figure, which is worth holding in mind: the trailing year is the better one, not a depressed one, so the flat growth the price embeds is being applied to a good base rather than a bad one.

Solvency does not constrain the story. Trailing operating profit covered the interest bill about 9.1 times over, and the same year's operating cash flow of €3.0 billion comfortably funded the €910 million of dividends paid. What that combination buys is optionality: a company with this coverage can keep buying its own shares through a soft consumer year without touching the investment programme, which is precisely what it committed to in April with a €1 billion repurchase for 2026. The price is not asking the balance sheet a difficult question. It is asking whether fourteen national beverage markets can grow at all.

Catalysts

The first-quarter trading update, published April 28, 2026 for the quarter ended April 3, carried the year's central numbers. Group revenue was €5,001 million, up 6.7% as reported and 9.4% currency-neutral, on 970 million unit cases and revenue per unit case of €5.29. Reported volume rose 8.5% but comparable volume, which strips out six extra trading days and an earlier Easter, rose 1.6%, with Europe up 1.4% and Asia-Pacific up 1.9%. Within Asia-Pacific, management flagged a return to more normalised growth in the Philippines and encouraging sparkling volumes in Indonesia. The gap between the reported and comparable volume figures is the thing to carry into the next report: those six extra days reverse in the fourth quarter.

Guidance was reaffirmed in full and is specific enough to be checked. For 2026 the company expects comparable revenue growth of 3% to 4%, cost of sales per unit case up about 1.5% with commodities hedged at roughly 85%, comparable operating profit growth of about 7%, a comparable effective tax rate near 26%, capital expenditure around 5% of revenue including leases, and comparable free cash flow of at least €1.7 billion. The commodity hedge coverage is the quiet detail: most of the input-cost risk for the current year is already fixed, so the guidance rests mainly on volume and mix rather than on raw materials.

Capital return is running on a published schedule. An interim dividend of €0.82 a share was declared in the first quarter and paid on May 27, 2026, calculated at roughly 40% of the prior year's dividend, against a full-year payout target near 50% of comparable earnings. The €1 billion buyback for 2026 was half completed by late April, and a further repurchase of up to €1 billion is subject to shareholder approval at the 2026 annual meeting. Weekly filings track the execution: in the week to July 17, 2026 the company bought 165,000 ordinary shares on US venues and 62,762 on London venues, all of which are cancelled rather than held. Half-year results are the next scheduled event, and the volume line beneath the pricing is what will decide how the guidance holds.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

APS (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 trading update, April 28, 2026 · FY2025 20-F · company 6-K, July 20, 2026

View the full interactive CCEP report on boothcheck