CCC Intelligent Solutions Holdings Inc. (CCC): what the price requires
At today's price, CCC Intelligent Solutions Holdings Inc. (CCC) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~8.7 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CCC
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CCC |
| Company | CCC Intelligent Solutions Holdings Inc. |
| Current price | $6.15/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 5.2% |
| Operating margin today | 7.1% |
| Margin compression implied | -1.9pp |
| Must persist for | 8.7y |
| Multiple paid | 69x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.7% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.4 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~12.2 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: high
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| cohort percentile (of 178 peers) | 92 |
| sustained it ~8.7 years at this level | 18% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore requires assumptions beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 11.83x | 1 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.59x | 1 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.58x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=4)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $15.68 | 0.39x | no | FCF base $0.3B, growth 12% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.1%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $9.09 | 0.68x | no | Exit EV/EBITDA: 45.8x / 47.8x / 49.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $13.39 | 0.46x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 8.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $0.03 | 205.00x | yes | BV/sh $2.83, ROE (TTM) 0.1%, ke 9.3% (excluded from median) |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $0.01 | 615.00x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% (excluded from median) |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $5.66 | 1.09x | no | Rev $1.1B, growth 12% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.0x / 3.7x / 4.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $0.01 | 615.00x | no | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.02B × (1−21%) / WACC 7.1% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $0.01 | 615.00x | yes | BV $2.83 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 0.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 0.1%/yr (excluded from median) |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $2.27 | 2.71x | yes | EBITDA $0.11B × sector EV/EBITDA 25.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $2.37 | 2.59x | yes | FCF $254.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 615.00x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.08B (FCF $0.25B − SBC $0.18B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $0.52 | 11.83x | yes | BV $2.83 × (ROIC 1.3% / WACC 7.1%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $13.39 | 0.46x | no | Revenue $1.06B × sector P/S 8.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.2b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 20.62x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 16.29x |
| Interest coverage | 1.0x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 2.8% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- CCC runs the software network that connects auto insurers, repair shops, and parts suppliers when a car is in an accident, and its hold on the insurer side is deep: the 10-K reports 26 of the top 30 automotive insurers as customers, with average relationships spanning more than ten years and numerous exclusive arrangements.
- The recurring-revenue model is sticky, with gross dollar retention of 98% in the first quarter, but it slipped from 99% the prior quarter, and any sustained erosion in retention is the metric that would change the story.
- The price is demanding relative to GAAP profit: net income is near breakeven and stock-based compensation consumes most of the reported free cash flow, so the equity rests on the recurring-revenue growth continuing, with net debt of about $1.2 billion adding leverage to the bet.
Bull Case
Valuing CCC on its GAAP earnings would mislead you, and understanding why is the key to the bull case. This is a software business whose accounting profit sits near zero, but the cash economics underneath are strong: an adjusted EBITDA margin around 43% on highly recurring subscription revenue. The gap between near-zero net income and a 43% cash-flow margin is mostly stock-based compensation and the depreciation of acquired intangibles, neither of which is a cash drain on the operating business. A SaaS company at this scale and margin is valued on its recurring revenue and retention, not its bottom-line EPS, which is why the relative-multiple lens supports the price while the earnings-based methods do not.
The moat is a two-sided network that is genuinely hard to dislodge. CCC sits in the middle of the auto-claims workflow, and the 10-K describes a customer base that includes "26 of the top 30 automotive insurers based on DWP, with average customer relationships spanning more than 10 years, and numerous exclusive arrangements." On the other side of the network are the repair shops and parts suppliers who use the same platform to estimate, collaborate, and transact. Each insurer that joins makes the network more valuable to repairers, and vice versa, and a decade-long relationship embedded in a carrier's claims process is not something a competitor wins with a lower price. That is the structural advantage the recurring revenue rests on.
The growth engine is shifting toward higher-value AI products, which extends the runway. The Emerging Solutions business, led by EvolutionIQ in casualty and AI-based diagnostics, was about 11% of revenue and grew roughly 50% year over year, contributing four points to total growth. EvolutionIQ now serves nine of the top-15 disability insurers and has expanded into workers' compensation, pushing CCC beyond auto physical damage into the broader insurance-claims market. Management raised full-year revenue guidance to $1.155 billion to $1.163 billion with a 42% adjusted EBITDA margin. The bull case is a sticky network compounding while a new AI layer widens the addressable market.
Bear Case
The moat is real, but the data shows the edges fraying, and that is where the bear case lives. The single cleanest measure of a subscription network's durability is retention, and CCC's gross dollar retention dipped to 98% from 99% the prior quarter. One point sounds trivial, but in a SaaS business the difference between 99% and 98% retention compounds meaningfully over time, and the direction is the concern. The stickiness is not absolute either: the 10-K concedes that contracts "can be canceled or not renewed by the customer after the expiration of the SaaS term, as applicable, on relatively short notice." A network anchored by a handful of giant insurers is exposed if even one large carrier rethinks its commitment.
The dilution is the slower erosion of shareholder value. CCC's reported free cash flow is heavily reduced by stock-based compensation, which consumes the large majority of it, and the share count has been climbing roughly 3% a year. There is also a structural overhang from the company's go-public structure: the 10-K discloses that former holders "have the right to receive up to an additional 13.5 million shares" of common stock under earnout provisions tied to the share price. When a SaaS company's cash margin looks excellent but the per-share value leaks out through compensation and earnout shares, the headline economics overstate what reaches the equity holder.
The valuation does not leave room for the erosion to continue. At today's price the market pays roughly 54 times company-wide operating income, embedding growth held near the self-funding ceiling for about six years, a pace only a minority of fast-growers sustain. Layer leverage on top: net debt of about $1.2 billion runs more than 12 times operating income, with interest covered only about 1.3 times on trailing earnings. That is real debt for a company whose GAAP profit is thin, and it means the cash flow that services the debt is the same cash flow under pressure if retention keeps slipping or the AI growth decelerates. The bear case is that a slowly eroding moat, persistent dilution, and meaningful leverage are a poor combination at a multiple priced for the moat to hold.
Valuation
The right lens on CCC is a SaaS one, because the GAAP numbers actively mislead. Net income is near breakeven, which makes earnings-based methods read the stock as wildly expensive, but the business throws off a 43% adjusted EBITDA margin on recurring revenue. The bet embedded in the price is for operating profit to grow near its self-funding ceiling for about six years, which the inversion flags as elevated relative to what comparable fast-growers have sustained. The price is paying for durable, high-margin subscription growth to continue, not for the current accounting profit.
The methods are sparse and divided, which the distressed GAAP profile causes. The growth and projection methods are gated off because the company carries distress signals on a GAAP basis, sustained net losses and negative retained earnings, even though the cash economics are healthy. The asset and earnings-power lenses read the stock as expensive, anchored to a thin book value and a near-zero bottom line. Only the relative-multiple lens, valuing the recurring revenue at a software multiple, supports the price. That is a low-confidence X-ray: the methods that work for a normal company do not fit a SaaS business whose value is its retention and growth, so the relative lens carries most of the weight, and it says the revenue base supports the price while everything tied to GAAP earnings says otherwise.
Solvency is where the SaaS-versus-GAAP tension becomes a real risk rather than an accounting curiosity. Net debt of about $1.2 billion sits at more than 12 times trailing operating income, with interest coverage near 1.3 times and modest liquid assets of about $111 million. The cash flow comfortably services that debt today, but the reported free cash flow is heavily flattered relative to its stock-based-compensation-adjusted level, and the share count is rising. So the buyer is underwriting a high-margin, sticky network, on a balance sheet that is more levered than a software company's reputation suggests, at a multiple that needs the growth and retention to hold. The cohort comparison is imperfect because CCC is a vertical insurance-claims platform rather than a horizontal software vendor, but against software peers its growth is solid and its leverage is high, which is the combination that defines both the opportunity and the risk.
Catalysts
The first quarter beat and the company raised its outlook. Revenue rose 12% to $281.3 million, adjusted EBITDA margin came in around 43%, and earnings per share of $0.11 topped consensus. The growth standout was Emerging Solutions, led by EvolutionIQ, which reached about 11% of revenue and grew roughly 50% year over year, contributing four points to total growth. EvolutionIQ added disability insurers and workers' compensation customers during the period, broadening CCC's reach beyond its auto-claims core.
Management raised full-year 2026 revenue guidance to $1.155 billion to $1.163 billion, about 10% growth at the midpoint, with adjusted EBITDA of $484 million to $490 million. The forward watch items are clear. Gross dollar retention, which slipped to 98% from 99%, is the leading indicator of whether the network is holding; the pace of EvolutionIQ and the broader AI portfolio determines whether the addressable market keeps expanding; and the trajectory of stock-based compensation and debt reduction decides how much of the cash economics actually reaches shareholders.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- GWRE (Guidewire Software, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Insurity, Majesco, Origami Risk, and Sapiens; and horizontal software vendors such as SAP SE, Salesforce and ServiceNow. Competitive factors in our industry depend on the product being offered and the size, geographic market, and line of business of potential customers. The principal competitive factors include…
- FY2025 10-K: …our internal services team. We expect license gross profit to decline due to customers migrating from licenses to subscription services. Overall, we expect gross margins to continue to improve over time as improvements in subscription and support gross margin and services gross margin will more than offset the…
- VERX (Vertex, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …our competitors who currently focus their tax compliance services on small- to medium-sized businesses may be better positioned to increase their market share with small- to medium-sized businesses and may choose to enter our markets, whether competing based on price, service or otherwise. We also face a growing…
- FY2025 10-K: Research and development 11.2 % 10.0 % Selling and marketing 26.3 % 25.6 % General and administrative 23.9 % 22.9 % Depreciation and amortization 3.3 % 3.1 % Change in fair value of acquisition contingent earn-outs (2.3) % 2.6 % Other operating expense (income), net 1.7 % - % Total…
- PCOR (Procore Technologies, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …their needs through focus groups at our innovation labs, trade shows, and conferences (including Groundbreak), and with customers and collaborators on the jobsite. Our Competition The market for construction management software is competitive and rapidly evolving. We believe the market is in its early phases of…
- FY2025 10-K: …commissions, and bonuses. Additionally, cost of revenue includes non-personnel-related expenses, such as third-party hosting costs, amortization of capitalized software development costs related to our platform, amortization of acquired technology intangible assets, software license fees, and allocated overhead. We…
- INTA (Intapp, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …administrative at the consolidated level to manage the Company's operations, which are identified as significant segment expenses. Since the Company operates as a single operating and reportable segment, these significant segment expenses are the costs and expenses presented on the consolidated statements of…
- FY2025 10-K: …Many of the companies with which we compete for experienced personnel have greater resources than we have. We may incur significant costs to attract, train and retain such personnel, and we may lose new employees to our competitors or other technology companies before we realize the benefit of our investment after…
- ALKT (ALKAMI TECHNOLOGY, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Because competition for key employees is intense, we may not be able to attract and retain the highly skilled employees we need to support our operations and future growth. Competition for executive officers, software developers and other key employees in our industry is intense. In particular, we compete with many…
- FY2025 10-K: L to certain historical developed technology, customer relationships and capitalized developed software assets. Non-operating Income (Expense) Non-operating income (expense) consists primarily of interest income from our cash balances, interest expense from borrowings under our Revolving Facility and 2030 Convertible…
- BRZE (Braze, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and for professional services upfront. Cost of Revenue Cost of revenue consists of direct costs related to providing platform access to our customers and to performing onboarding and professional services including consulting services. These costs primarily include payments to third-party cloud infrastructure…
- FY2025 10-K: …Teams, customers can create groups to manage individual regions or subsets of their businesses while restricting the ability of specified users to view or manage data outside of their assigned region. We also integrate with a variety of identity providers for single-sign-on or user account provisioning and provide…
- KVYO (Klaviyo, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …programs, such as Customer Success at Scale, Voice of the Customer, and dedicated Customer Success Managers for our largest customers. With this ongoing feedback, we can continue to make impactful improvements to our platform and to the customer experiences we offer. Competition The market in which we compete is…
- FY2025 10-K: Financial Statements. Cost of Revenue Our cost of revenue primarily consists of cloud-based infrastructure costs, outbound communication sending costs, employee-related costs including payroll, benefits, bonuses, and stock-based compensation expense related to our customer support team, amortization of capitalized…
- SEMR (Semrush Holdings, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: 5 % Purchases of property and equipment (as a percentage of revenue) (0.4) % (1.0) % Capitalization of internal-use software costs (as a percentage of revenue) (3.4) % (2.1) % Free cash flow margin 9.7 % 9.4 % Components of our Results of Operations Revenue We generate nearly all of our revenue from subscriptions to…
- FY2025 10-K: …may bundle their solutions with other companies' offerings to provide a broader range of functionality at reduced volume pricing. Similarly, certain competitors may use marketing strategies that enable them to acquire customers at a lower cost than we do. Even if such competitive products do not include all the…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release · Q1 2026 earnings call