COMMERCE BANCSHARES, INC. (CBSH): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $58.04, COMMERCE BANCSHARES, INC. (CBSH) is priced for 13.9% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CBSH

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCBSH
CompanyCOMMERCE BANCSHARES, INC.
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$58.04/sh
CompositionRetail Banking 34% / Commercial 46% / Wealth 20%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Return on equity needed13.9%
Return on equity now14.9%
ROE gap-1.0pp
Price-to-book1.91x

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.2% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026).

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.40σ
cohort percentile (of 122 peers)82
sustained it ~10 years at this level64%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.11x3expensive
Earnings1.35x1expensive
Relative0
Growth0

Families that justify the price: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=4)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
Bank Fair Value (P/TBV)$49.971.16xyesTBVPS $27.63 × 1.81x (ROE (TTM) 13.4% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 0.95% allowance/loans → ×0.92)
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.3x / 10.0x / 11.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$43.991.32xyesBV/sh $30.38, ROE (TTM) 13.4%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$52.441.11xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowthnoRev $1.2B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.9x / 7.1x / 8.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $3.98, growth 3% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=4.49 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAsset$52.161.11xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.98 × BVPS $30.38) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsnoEPS $3.98 × (8.5 + 2×3.2%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativeno
PEG Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $3.98 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 3.2% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 4.8x
Earnings YieldEarnings$43.031.35xyesEPS $3.98 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The issuer is a funded financial business. Debt, interest, and cash flows are operating inputs, so industrial EV, net-debt, WACC, and free-cash-flow lenses do not apply; value the common-equity claim with book, earnings, capital, and payout economics.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Retail Bankingfinancialequity0.6B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required
Commercialfinancialequity0.8B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required
Wealthfinancialequity0.4B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required

No unit-level total common-equity value is stated. Each financial unit requires supported standalone common equity, normalized earnings, capital adequacy, and payout capacity. Consolidated debt, interest, and cash are operating balances, not an enterprise-to-equity bridge; company-level book, earnings, capital, and payout lenses remain the coherent cross-checks.

Solvency

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

One number decides this report, and it is not the price. Commerce Bancshares has been earning a return on equity close to 14.9% while the return investors require for owning a bank of this risk sits a little over nine percent. That gap of more than five points is the entire reason a bank can be worth twice what its balance sheet says its equity is worth. Close the gap and the arithmetic collapses to book value. Hold it and the premium is not a premium at all, just the market pricing a machine that turns a dollar of retained capital into fifteen cents a year.

The spread survives because a large share of the earnings does not require capital at all. The 10-K reports deposit account fees rising $7.9 million, or 7.9%, mainly due to higher corporate cash management fees of $7.4 million, and describes a merchant processing operation where the bank offers merchant processing services to its business customers to enable them to accept credit and debit card payments, gathering sales information, authorizing transactions and collecting funds from card issuers. Processing a payment consumes no regulatory capital. Neither does managing a trust account. When a bank earns a meaningful slice of income from services rather than from lending, the denominator of the return calculation stops growing while the numerator keeps going.

The wealth business is where that logic is being pressed hardest. Wealth carries about a fifth of the revenue mix. The FineMark acquisition completed on January 1, 2026. In June the company agreed to buy Nolan & Associates, a St. Louis boutique investment bank. Neither purchase adds a loan book. Both add fee streams and the client relationships that carry them, which is the most efficient use of capital available to a bank already earning well above its cost of it.

Capital return is not a policy statement here; it is a habit measured in decades. February brought a 5% dividend increase and the 58th consecutive year of raises. In April the board added 2.5 million shares to the repurchase authorization. During the second quarter the company repurchased 2.1 million shares for $110 million. About 62.5% of earnings goes back to holders as dividends plus buybacks. That leaves roughly a third retained, and because it is retained into a business earning almost fifteen cents on the dollar, book value per share grew 17% during 2025.

Credit discipline is the quiet part that makes the rest defensible. Net loan charge-offs totaled $40.7 million in 2025, an increase of only $1.8 million from the prior year, per the 10-K. Against a bank generating $576 million of trailing net income, that is a loss rate a downturn would have to multiply several times over before it threatened the earnings power the price is capitalizing. Nothing about the loss experience suggests a bank reaching for yield.

Bear Case

In May the bank recognized a gain of about $99 million from exchanging Visa Class B-2 shares and took a loss of roughly $95 million repositioning its securities portfolio, in the same announcement. Two nearly equal numbers moving in opposite directions is how a balance sheet gets tidied without the tidying reaching the earnings line. What it discloses is the thing worth noticing: the investment portfolio was carrying positions worth materially less than the bank paid for them, and it took a one-off windfall to clear them without a visible dent. A securities book bought at lower rates does not become a problem until the bank needs the cash, and then it becomes one all at once.

The loan side is showing its own drift. The 10-K raised the allowance to 1.01% of loans at the end of 2025, attributing the increase to recent increased loan net charge-off trends impacting expected loss rate assumptions for the consumer credit card, automobile, and other non-real estate consumer portfolios together with model enhancements targeted at the credit card book. Consumer card and auto lending are the first places household stress appears, and they are unsecured or thinly secured. The absolute numbers remain small. The direction is the signal, and the direction is up.

Competition attacks the exact thing the bull case rests on. The filing warns that large national institutions have substantial capital, technology and marketing resources and that new competitors may lower fees to grow market share, which could result in a loss of customers and lower fee revenue for the Company. Fee income is what lifts this bank's return above its cost of capital, because it earns without absorbing capital. Compress the fees and the return compresses with them, and the return is what the price is buying.

The requirement is specific enough to test. At roughly twice book value, the market is assuming a sustained return on equity near 14.6%. That is barely below what the bank produces today, which is why the multiple does not look aggressive on a single year. Stretch the record to eighteen years and the average is nearer thirteen percent. Only about 61% of firms earning a return like this one held it for a decade. If the return drifts back toward its own long-run average, the price-to-book the market supports drifts with it, and a two-times multiple has a fair distance to travel before it meets book value.

The payout policy narrows the margin for error. Roughly 62.5% of earnings leaves as dividends plus buybacks, so only about a third is retained to grow the capital base. A bank that distributes two thirds of what it earns has less cushion to absorb a credit cycle without cutting something, and this particular bank has a fifty-eight-year dividend record it would be extremely reluctant to break. Against peers, the price-to-book sits at the very top of the group, which means there is no valuation discount already absorbing a bad year, and CFR, WTFC and BOKF are all running comparable regional franchises against which that premium has to be earned rather than assumed.

Valuation

Roughly two thirds of what this bank earns goes straight back out to holders. Dividends plus buybacks absorb about 62.5% of earnings in a typical year, leaving only around a third behind to grow the capital base. The return to an owner therefore comes overwhelmingly from the rate the bank earns on capital it already holds rather than from compounding a bigger balance sheet. Read that way, the price makes a single testable claim.

The claim is this. At about twice book value, the market assumes a sustained return on equity near 14.6%. Recent performance has run around 14.9%. Widen the lens to the full eighteen years of record and the average is closer to thirteen percent, so the price is underwriting today's result rather than the long-run one, and it needs that result to persist. Of firms earning a return at this level, roughly 61% carried it for a decade, which is a real but not overwhelming base rate.

The methods cluster tightly, which is what usually happens with a bank whose earnings are steady and whose assets are mostly financial instruments carried at measurable values. The price sits somewhere between 12% and 22% above where the asset-value, earnings-power and peer-multiple families come out, using earnings per share of $4.02 and book value per share of $28.96 as the inputs. A modest premium across three families is the profile of a quality operator priced as one. The single forward-growth approach lands furthest below the quote, but a discounted market-cap model built off a revenue multiple is a poor lens for a deposit-funded balance sheet, and the pattern rather than that one output is what matters.

Credit and capital return are the frame that replaces leverage arithmetic for a bank, because deposits are funding rather than debt and the standard coverage math does not apply. On the credit side, net loan charge-offs of $40.7 million during 2025 rose only $1.8 million year over year, against trailing net income of $576 million, with the allowance at 1.01% of loans. On the return side, the payout leaves roughly a third of earnings retained, which is what funded the 17% growth in book value per share during 2025. Against the peer group, the price-to-book sits at the very top, so the buyer is paying for the best-in-class version of a regional bank and is being asked to be right about the credit book to justify it.

Catalysts

The July print held the line. Second-quarter 2026 diluted earnings per share came to $1.10 against $1.09 a year earlier, on net income of $159.8 million and total revenue of $498.9 million, with a second-quarter return on average equity of 14.70% and a return on assets of 1.84%. The same release disclosed the repurchase of 2.1 million shares for $110 million during the quarter. The first quarter had produced diluted earnings per share of $0.96 on net income of $141.6 million with a first-quarter return on average equity of 13.22%, so the second quarter marks a clear step up on the return measure that drives this valuation.

Two acquisitions are reshaping the mix toward fee income. The FineMark transaction closed on January 1, 2026. In June the company agreed to acquire Nolan & Associates, a boutique investment banking firm in St. Louis. Neither deal is large enough to move the loan book. Both point the same direction, toward wealth management and advisory revenue that earns fees without absorbing regulatory capital, and the integration of the first one is the thing to watch in the next two prints.

Capital return has its own calendar and it rarely surprises. February brought a 5% dividend increase and the 58th consecutive annual raise. April brought a quarterly declaration of $0.275 a share. Later that month the board added 2.5 million shares to the repurchase authorization, taking it to 7.5 million. Separately, May's Visa Class B-2 share exchange produced a gain of about $99 million that was largely offset by a securities repositioning loss of roughly $95 million. That pairing cleans up the investment portfolio without a visible earnings hit, and the cleaner book is what shows up in future quarters rather than this one.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Retail Banking (reported)

Commercial (reported)

Wealth (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company announcements, February 6 and April 28, 2026 · Q1 2026 results, April 21, 2026 · company announcement, June 29, 2026 · dividend announcement, February 6, 2026 · company announcement, April 28, 2026 · Q2 2026 results, July 16, 2026 · Q4 2025 results, January 22, 2026 · company announcement, May 12, 2026 · company announcement, February 6, 2026 · company announcement, April 24, 2026

View the full interactive CBSH report on boothcheck