Cboe Global Markets, Inc. (CBOE): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $310.45, Cboe Global Markets, Inc. (CBOE) is priced for -0.7% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CBOE

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCBOE
CompanyCboe Global Markets, Inc.
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$310.45/sh
CompositionTransaction and clearing fees 76% / Access and capacity fees 9% / Market data fees 7% / Regulatory fees 6% / Other revenue 2%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)5.2%
Operating margin today34.7%
Margin compression (value-band)-29.5pp
Implied growth-0.7%
Multiple paid18x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 11: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.81σ

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.22x5expensive
Earnings1.64x5expensive
Relative0.67x2justifies
Growth0.83x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$480.370.65xyesFCF base $2.0B, growth 12% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.7%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$374.920.83xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 15.3x / 17.3x / 19.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 15.59x (blended: static sector reference 12x + trailing (TTM) 24x), scenarios: 12.9x / 15.6x / 18.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$140.072.22xyesBV/sh $53.87, ROE (TTM) 24.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$226.191.37xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$262.791.18xyesRev $5.1B, growth 12% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.3x / 6.4x / 7.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$449.050.69xyesEPS $12.83, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.68 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$89.283.48xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.22B × (1−29%) / WACC 8.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$205.481.51xyesBV $53.87 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 24.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$124.702.49xyes√(22.5 × EPS $12.83 × BVPS $53.87) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarnings$194.491.60xyesFCF $1874.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$188.991.64xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.82B (FCF $1.87B − SBC $0.05B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$413.980.75xyesEPS $12.83 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$37.788.22xyesBV $53.87 × (ROIC 6.1% / WACC 8.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $5.06B × sector P/S 3.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$481.130.65xyesEPS $12.83 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$138.702.24xyesEPS $12.83 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Optionsoperatingenterprise$2.4b$1.1b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
North American Equitiesoperatingenterprise$1.7b$188.1m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Europe and Asia Pacificoperatingenterprise$378.6m$53.9m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Futuresoperatingenterprise$135.9m$73.9m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Global FXoperatingenterprise$93.8m$46.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$946.9m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-0.76x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-0.54x (net cash)
Interest coverage33.1x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.3%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Sort the valuation methods by what each one actually measures and this price falls along a clean fault line. The approaches that value the balance sheet, and the approaches that capitalize today's profit while crediting no growth at all, both land well under $285.61. The peer-multiple approaches land essentially on top of it. The approaches that project cash flow forward land above it. That split is information rather than noise: the market is paying for an earnings stream it expects to keep arriving, not for assets and not for a one-off spike.

What makes that persistence plausible is that Cboe owns the products rather than renting them. The exchange runs SPX index options and the VIX complex, and the FY2025 10-K notes it pioneered the trading of exchange-traded volatility products with its introduction of VIX futures in 2004. Proprietary products do not have to compete on price the way a multi-listed contract does, because the contract only exists in one place. The company has been widening the surface too, adding expirations across the week on the reasoning that these additional expirations provide customers with more precision when hedging overall portfolio risk. More expiries means more reasons to trade, and each trade carries a fee.

Underneath the trading business sits a quieter one that does not depend on any single day's volume. The 10-K reports that Access and capacity fees increased primarily due to increased logical and physical port fees in the Options, North American Equities, and Europe and Asia Pacific segments driven by increased customer demand, alongside higher proprietary market data fees. Ports and data feeds are subscriptions. A trading firm connected to an exchange pays whether or not it trades that morning, and it does not disconnect during a quiet quarter because reconnecting costs more than staying.

Profitability holds up in the cohort once the accounting is read properly. The reported operating margin of 32.8% looks middling against CME at 65.6% and ICE at 41.1%, but a chunk of Cboe's reported revenue never belongs to it: the filing explains that the company recognizes the amount that we are charged under Section 31 as a cost of revenues and the corresponding amount that we charge our customers as regulatory transaction fees revenue, so the same dollars appear on both lines and inflate the denominator. Measured against the revenue the company actually keeps, the economics sit far closer to the top of the group than the headline ratio suggests. NDAQ, on its own reported basis, earns 29.4%.

The balance sheet is not doing anything clever, which for an exchange is the point. Operating income covers interest roughly 30 times over, the company holds net cash rather than net borrowings, and the share count has edged down about 0.4% a year across the last four years while a quarterly dividend of $0.72 a share goes out the door. An exchange is a clearing and matching utility whose customers must trust it to be there tomorrow. Financial conservatism is part of the product.

Bear Case

The variable with the most leverage over this business is not the economy or the rate cycle. It is the rulebook, and Washington writes it. The FY2025 10-K lists among the risks to results that implementation of the SEC's reduced equity access fee cap and other potential market structure changes may lead to decreased exchange revenue. That is a regulator setting a ceiling on what an exchange may charge for connectivity, which is precisely the recurring revenue line the bull case rests on. The filing also flags that changes to Regulation NMS Rule 611, the order protection rule, could hit operations, even after the SEC withdrew its Regulation Best Execution and Order Competition proposals on June 12, 2025. A withdrawn proposal is not a repealed idea.

The concentration underneath makes rule changes travel further than they look. The company states that in 2025 approximately 74% of our revenues less cost of revenues were generated by our transaction and clearing-based business, heavily oriented toward U.S. index and equity options. A single regulatory shift in how those options are quoted, routed or priced does not trim a segment; it moves three quarters of the net revenue base.

Then there is the licence question, which most holders never think about. The economics of the proprietary complex rest on exclusivity, and the 10-K says so directly: the risks include losing the S&P 500 Index licence, and separately, if we are unable to retain exclusive proprietary rights in the VIX Index methodology and related products and indices, competitors could build substantially similar volatility products. The moat here is contractual and intellectual rather than physical. Contracts expire and intellectual property gets litigated.

Competition is already probing from the multi-listed side. The filing acknowledges rivals offering multi-listed options products, such as SPY options, which offer some of the features of our proprietary products, such as SPX options, and notes that to defend share the company may resort to inverted pricing specials or non-transaction-fee trading. NDAQ states in its own 10-K that its combined options market share in 2025 represented the largest share of the U.S. market for multi-listed equity options. MIAX, the smallest listed comparison, grew revenue 17.5% over its trailing year against Cboe's more measured pace. New venues do not need to win; they only need to make pricing competitive.

Which is where the price comes in. At about 18.6 times operating income the market is asking for company-wide operating growth of only around 0.3% a year over five years, so this is not a stretched multiple demanding heroics. But the requirement is not zero either: it is that today's earnings power persists indefinitely, on a 32.8% reported operating margin built during a stretch of exceptionally heavy options activity. Record volumes are the numerator of a cyclical business. If access fees get capped, or the volatility complex loses its exclusivity, or trading simply quiets down, the earnings that the peer-multiple lens is capitalizing shrink, and the multiple compresses on the smaller base at the same time. Two things moving the same direction is how a modest-looking valuation becomes an expensive one.

Valuation

The demand this price places on the business is unusually light. At around 18.6 times operating income, the assumption embedded is company-wide operating growth of roughly 0.3% a year across five years, computed at a cost of capital in the low sevens. Treat the figure as approximate, because it is one solve under fixed assumptions, but the shape of it is the point: nobody is being asked to double anything. The business simply has to keep earning what it earns.

Where the methods land tells you what kind of business the market thinks it is buying. The price sits roughly 125% above where the asset-value approaches come out, and about 64% above the earnings-power lens that capitalizes current profit with no growth credited. Neither of those is surprising for an exchange, because an exchange's value has almost nothing to do with its book: there is no factory, no inventory, and the productive asset is a rulebook, a licence and a matching engine. The approaches that do fit, peer multiples and forward cash flow, land at the price and above it respectively. When the asset-based lenses come out low and the cash-flow lenses come out high, the premium being paid is for durability of a fee stream, not for anything a balance sheet can show.

Reading the reported margin requires one adjustment the headline does not make. The trailing operating margin is 32.8%, but Section 31 regulatory fees pass through both the revenue and the cost lines at identical amounts, per the 10-K, so the reported revenue base is larger than the revenue the company keeps. That is why the ratio sits below CME at 65.6% while the underlying economics do not. The comparison that survives is the one on net revenue, and on that basis the trading and clearing business the filing says produced roughly 74% of revenues less cost of revenues is a high-margin operation by any standard.

Solvency bounds the downside without much drama. Operating income covers interest roughly 30 times over, the company carries net cash rather than net debt, and the share count has drifted down about 0.4% a year over four years. There is no refinancing risk here and no dilution to clear. What the balance sheet does not do is protect the fee stream, and the fee stream is what the price is capitalizing. The most decisive number in this report is therefore not a multiple at all: it is the 74% concentration in transaction and clearing revenue tied to U.S. index and equity options, because that is the figure a rule change or a quiet market acts on first.

Catalysts

Volume has been running hot into the print. The company reported record monthly and quarterly U.S. options volumes in late June, and May trading set a record average daily volume of 22.0 million U.S. options contracts, with multi-listed options up 25.7% year over year. June activity showed growth in global equities and foreign exchange as well. Second-quarter results arrive before the open on July 31, 2026. Volume translates to revenue through revenue per contract, and the mix between proprietary index products and lower-fee multi-listed contracts is what decides how much of the record volume actually reaches the income statement.

Product launches are widening the surface the fee stream runs across. Daily expirations for Dow Jones Industrial Average index options began in May, and in June the company introduced Cboe Predicts, a prediction-markets suite built on binary options on the Mini-S&P 500 Index. The SEC also approved extended trading hours on selected single-stock options, with a launch planned for July 13, 2026. Each of these adds trading occasions rather than new customers, which is the cheaper way to grow an exchange.

Capital return and governance ran on schedule. The board declared a second-quarter dividend of $0.72 a share, payable June 15, 2026, and shareholders elected all twelve nominated directors at the May annual meeting. The company also filled two positions that matter for a regulated venue, hiring a Chief Risk Officer in May and appointing a head of government relations earlier the same month. Given how much of this business is decided by market-structure rulemaking, the second appointment is less routine than it reads.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Options (reported)

North American Equities (reported)

Europe and Asia Pacific (reported)

Futures (reported)

Global FX (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company announcements, June 23 and July 6, 2026 · dividend declaration, May 14, 2026 · monthly volume report, June 3, 2026, and company announcement, June 23, 2026 · monthly volume report, July 6, 2026 · company announcement, July 6, 2026 · company announcements, May 18 and June 23, 2026 · company announcement, May 28, 2026 · company announcements, May 14, 2026 · company announcements, May 11 and May 26, 2026

View the full interactive CBOE report on boothcheck