Chubb Ltd (CB): what the price requires
At today's price, Chubb Ltd (CB) is priced for 12.3% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CB
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CB |
| Company | Chubb Ltd |
| Current price | $354.68/sh |
| Composition | Overseas General Insurance 64% / Global Reinsurance 6% / Life Insurance 31% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 12.3% |
| Return on equity now | 14.0% |
| ROE gap | -1.7pp |
| Price-to-book | 1.86x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.4% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~1.9pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.50σ |
| cohort percentile (of 80 peers) | 49 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 69% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.03x | 3 | expensive |
| Earnings | 0.77x | 2 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.36x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.07x | 1 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=9)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $290.26 | 1.22x | yes | TBVPS $119.62 × 2.43x (ROE (TTM) 15.3% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption)) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $340.89 | 1.04x | yes | P/E 11x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 9.1x / 11.0x / 12.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 10x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $309.56 | 1.15x | yes | BV/sh $186.99, ROE (TTM) 15.3%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $393.45 | 0.90x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $332.65 | 1.07x | yes | Rev $60.8B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.9x / 2.3x / 2.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $989.45 | 0.36x | yes | EPS $28.27, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.35 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $344.88 | 1.03x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $28.27 × BVPS $186.99) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $912.18 | 0.39x | yes | EPS $28.27 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $1060.13 | 0.33x | yes | EPS $28.27 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $305.62 | 1.16x | yes | EPS $28.27 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -2.1% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Chubb is a global property-and-casualty and life insurer that makes money two ways at once: underwriting profit, shown by a first-quarter combined ratio of 84.0% (a ratio under 100 means the policies themselves were profitable before any investment income), and the return it earns investing the premiums it holds.
- The defining risk is the insurance cycle turning: management described property pricing in some markets softening at a pace it called "dumb," with declines of 25% to 40%, and the 10-K is blunt that insurance markets "have historically been cyclical, characterized by periods of intense price competition."
- The next signals are catastrophe load and pricing: first-quarter pretax catastrophe losses fell to $500 million from $1.6 billion a year earlier, so the year's underwriting result will turn on weather and on whether rate discipline holds.
Bull Case
An insurer's balance sheet is the whole business, and Chubb's reflects a company underwriting at a level few peers reach. The clearest evidence is the combined ratio: 84.0% in the first quarter, and 82.1% on a current-accident-year basis excluding catastrophes. The 10-K explains why that number is the scorecard, noting a "P&C combined ratio under 100 percent indicates" the underwriting itself made money before a dollar of investment income. Chubb is running roughly sixteen cents of underwriting profit on every premium dollar, which means the float, the premiums it holds before claims are paid, is effectively cheaper than free, and everything the company earns investing that float is profit on top.
The capital story shows management putting that profitability to work for shareholders rather than chasing growth at any price. Share count has been declining at about 2% a year through buybacks, and the company carries a deep enough capital base to absorb the volatility that defines insurance. That discipline is the confidence signal: a management team that buys back stock while maintaining the reserves to pay a bad-weather year is one that trusts its own underwriting. Premium growth has not stalled to fund it either, with net premiums written up 10.7% in the quarter, led by a 33.1% surge in life insurance and 7.2% in P&C.
The diversification is the structural advantage the static methods undervalue. Chubb writes across overseas general insurance, global reinsurance, and life, and across geographies, so a catastrophe concentrated in one region or a soft cycle in one line is cushioned by the others. That breadth is why a $1.6 billion catastrophe quarter a year ago could become a $500 million one this year without the franchise wobbling. The price reflects a company earning a return on equity recently around 14%, comfortably above its cost of capital, and the valuation methods grounded in book value and earnings power all support the current level rather than relying on an optimistic growth story.
Bear Case
The structural truth a Chubb holder would rather not face is that the company is underwriting near the top of a cycle, and cycles turn. The first-quarter combined ratio of 84% is excellent, but excellent is exactly what fades when capacity floods back into the market. The 10-K does not hide it: insurance and reinsurance markets "have historically been cyclical, characterized by periods of intense price competition due to excessive underwriting capacity as well as periods when shortages of capacity permitted favorable premium levels." Management's own language in the quarter was sharper, describing property pricing softening at a pace it called "dumb," with rate declines of 25% to 30% in North America and London and up to 40% on larger accounts. When rates fall that fast, today's 84% combined ratio is borrowed from a market that is already correcting.
The catastrophe exposure is the volatility the smooth quarters mask. Chubb's results can swing hard on events it cannot predict; the filing states plainly that catastrophic events "are inherently unpredictable and the actual nature of such events, when they occur, could be more frequent or severe than contemplated in our pricing." The first quarter's $500 million of catastrophe losses was a relief precisely because the prior year's $1.6 billion, driven by California wildfires, showed what a bad quarter looks like. A single severe season can erase a year of underwriting margin, and climate trends are pushing severity the wrong way for property insurers.
The valuation does not offer a deep discount to cushion that. At about 1.7 times book, the price embeds a sustained return on equity near 11.7%, below the roughly 14% the company has recently earned, so the bar is not aggressive, but it is not cheap either. The return Chubb is earning today is partly a function of the hard pricing cycle that management says is now softening. If rates keep falling and the combined ratio drifts back toward the high 80s or low 90s, the return on equity compresses toward the implied level, and the price-to-book the market pays compresses with it. Sitting in the lower half of its peer group on price-to-book is some comfort, but a peer-relative discount is thin protection when the whole cohort is exposed to the same softening rates.
Valuation
An insurer is worth the return it earns on its capital, so Chubb is read off price-to-book rather than an operating multiple. At today's price it trades around 1.7 times book value, and inverting that, the price assumes Chubb sustains a return on equity around 11.7%. The company has recently been earning closer to 14%, so the assumption is comfortably within reach of its own record. The bet is not that Chubb earns a heroic return; it is that it keeps earning a good one through whatever the pricing cycle does next.
The valuation methods agree the price is supported. The asset-value lenses, which begin at book value near $187 per share and add the present value of returns earned above the cost of equity, land at or near the price. The earnings-power and relative-multiple frames land close as well, and even the growth method reaches it. There is no single family carrying the valuation and no reliance on an optimistic extrapolation; the price is grounded in what the insurer actually earns and owns. The read is a value-and-asset-supported name, which is the right characterization for a diversified insurer compounding book value at a steady premium return.
For an insurer, solvency is not net debt or interest coverage; debt is funding and operating cash flow tracks claims and premiums. The frame is capital strength and payout capacity, and here the signals are the reserve depth that lets Chubb absorb a $1.6 billion catastrophe quarter without distress and the buyback that has been shrinking the share count about 2% a year. The cohort comparison is the useful one: Chubb's price-to-book sits in the lower half of its peer set even as its return on equity runs above the implied requirement, which is the closest thing to a value tilt in a high-quality franchise. The caution embedded in that read is the cycle: the return funding the premium is partly a hard-market return, and the section that follows the price down if rates soften is the same one the methods now reward.
Catalysts
The first quarter was strong on both underwriting and growth. Net premiums written rose 10.7% to $14.0 billion, with P&C up 7.2% and life up 33.1%, and the P&C combined ratio came in at 84.0%, or 82.1% excluding catastrophes on a current-accident-year basis. Core operating income reached $2.7 billion, or $6.82 per share, helped by lower catastrophe losses of $500 million versus $1.6 billion a year earlier, when the California wildfires drove the prior-year figure.
The forward signals are about pricing more than weather. Management flagged that property pricing in certain markets is softening sharply, with declines of 25% to 30% in North America and London and up to 40% on larger premiums, a direct read on whether the hard market that lifted recent returns is ending. The two variables to watch are the catastrophe load through the heart of the storm season and whether Chubb holds rate discipline as competitors cut, since the combination of softening rates and a heavy weather year is the scenario that would pull the combined ratio up from the low 80s and test the return the price assumes.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
North America Commercial P&C Insurance / North America Personal P&C Insurance / Global Reinsurance (reported)
- TRV (Travelers Companies, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PGR (PROGRESSIVE CORP/OH/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ALL (ALLSTATE CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AIG (American International Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CINF (CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HIG (The Hartford Insurance Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WRB (W. R. BERKLEY CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
North America Agricultural Insurance (reported)
- TRV (Travelers Companies, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WRB (W. R. BERKLEY CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HIG (The Hartford Insurance Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ALL (ALLSTATE CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CNA (CNA FINANCIAL CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ACGL (Arch Capital Group Ltd.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MKL (MARKEL GROUP INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EG (EVEREST GROUP, LTD.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Overseas General Insurance (reported)
- AIG (American International Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ACGL (Arch Capital Group Ltd.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AXS (AXIS CAPITAL HOLDINGS LIMITED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MKL (MARKEL GROUP INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WTM (WHITE MOUNTAINS INSURANCE GROUP, LTD)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FIHL (FIHL)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Life Insurance (reported)
- AFL (AFLAC INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PRI (Primerica, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GL (GLOBE LIFE INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MET (MetLife, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PRU (PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- RGA (REINSURANCE GROUP OF AMERICA INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 earnings release · Q1 2026 earnings call