Cathay General Bancorp (CATY): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $61.87, Cathay General Bancorp (CATY) is priced for 12.5% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CATY

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCATY
CompanyCathay General Bancorp
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$61.87/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Return on equity needed12.5%
Return on equity now10.8%
ROE gap+1.7pp
Price-to-book1.35x

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.3% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026).

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+1.24σ
cohort percentile (of 122 peers)53
sustained it ~10 years at this level68%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.99x3justifies
Earnings1.12x1expensive
Relative0
Growth0

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=4)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
Bank Fair Value (P/TBV)$55.761.11xyesTBVPS $40.00 × 1.39x (ROE (TTM) 11.4% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.07% allowance/loans → ×0.93)
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.3x / 10.0x / 11.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$56.271.10xyesBV/sh $45.67, ROE (TTM) 11.4%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$62.200.99xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowthnoRev $0.8B, growth 12% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.4x / 5.3x / 6.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $5.12, growth 24% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.49 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAsset$72.530.85xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.12 × BVPS $45.67) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsnoEPS $5.12 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativeno
PEG Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $5.12 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 24.1% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 36.1x
Earnings YieldEarnings$55.351.12xyesEPS $5.12 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The issuer is a funded financial business. Debt, interest, and cash flows are operating inputs, so industrial EV, net-debt, WACC, and free-cash-flow lenses do not apply; value the common-equity claim with book, earnings, capital, and payout economics.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Commercial Banking (whole company)financialequity0.8B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required

No unit-level total common-equity value is stated. Each financial unit requires supported standalone common equity, normalized earnings, capital adequacy, and payout capacity. Consolidated debt, interest, and cash are operating balances, not an enterprise-to-equity bridge; company-level book, earnings, capital, and payout lenses remain the coherent cross-checks.

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.8%

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The competitive advantage here is written into one clause of the loan disclosure. Describing its commercial property borrowers, the FY2025 10-K calls them investors and developers who have moderate levels of leverage, many of whom are long-time customers of the Bank. Underwriting people you have known for decades is not a strategy a competitor can copy by opening a branch across the street, and it is the reason a bank of this size can hold a property-heavy book without the loss rates a property-heavy book usually implies.

Where that advantage comes from is geography of a specific kind. The 10-K locates the business among clients in the high-density Asian-populated areas of Southern and Northern California; New York City; New York; Dallas and Houston, Texas; Seattle, Washington; Boston, Massachusetts; Chicago, Illinois; Nevada; New Jersey; Rockville, Maryland and Las Vegas, Nevada. That is a national footprint assembled community by community rather than county by county, and it produces deposits and loans from the same relationships. Banks built that way tend to keep customers through cycles because the relationship predates the rate sheet.

The returns show the advantage is earning something. Return on equity has recently been running about 11.1%, against a long record for this bank averaging nearer 9.4%. It is doing that while credit stays contained: net charge-offs were $35.7 million in 2025, or 0.18% of average loans, with an allowance for loan losses of $195.9 million standing behind the book. For a lender whose portfolio is more than half commercial property, losing eighteen cents on every hundred dollars of loans in a year is a quiet result.

The fee side has started to matter as well. Non-interest income increased $19.8 million, or 35.5%, to $75.4 million in 2025. That is not yet a second engine, but revenue that does not depend on the spread between what the bank pays for deposits and what it charges for loans is worth more than the same dollar of interest income, because it does not move when the rate curve does.

Capital return is where the bull case gets concrete, and the prices paid are the point. The company paid cash dividends of $1.36 per common share in 2025, 2024 and 2023. Alongside that, its previous 125.0 million dollar repurchase authorization retired 2,905,487 shares at an average cost of $43.02, and under a new authorization announced on June 4, 2025 it repurchased a further 2,973,982 shares at an average cost of $46.24, for a total of $137.5 million through December 31, 2025. Together, dividends plus repurchases absorbed roughly 87% of the latest fiscal year's earnings. Buying back close to six million shares in the low-to-mid forties, with the stock now at $62.91, is the kind of capital allocation that shows up later in per-share results rather than in a press release.

Bear Case

Strip this balance sheet down and it is one bet held in several sizes. The FY2025 10-K reports that Total commercial real estate loans accounted for 52.4% of gross loans at December 31, 2025, compared to 51.8% at December 31, 2024, and that construction, land development and other land lending represented 14% of total risk-based capital. More than half the earning assets are secured by commercial property, and the share went up rather than down last year. Everything else in the bear case is a consequence of that sentence.

The concentration is doubled by geography. The same borrowers and the same depositors sit in the same communities, in a defined set of metropolitan markets. A regional property downturn in Southern California or New York would arrive on the asset side as impaired collateral and on the funding side as customers drawing down balances, at the same time, from the same relationships that make the franchise valuable. Diversification by relationship quality is real, but it is not diversification by asset class or by region.

Credit is already drifting, off a genuinely low base. Net charge-offs ran $35.7 million in 2025, or 0.18% of average loans, against $29.7 million and 0.15% in 2024 and $17.6 million and 0.09% in 2023. Losses have doubled as a share of loans since 2023. The allowance for loan losses is $195.9 million, roughly a dollar for every hundred dollars of loans. Doubling charge-offs again would cost roughly a tenth of a year's earnings and is absorbable. A commercial property cycle that pushed losses toward a full percent of the book would consume close to a year of profit and most of the reserve at once, and with 52.4% of gross loans in that asset class there is no other part of the portfolio to offset it.

Set that against what the price is asking. At roughly 1.4 times book, the embedded assumption is a return on equity around 13.1% held indefinitely, equivalent to staying in the top tier near 12.2% for roughly 34 years before normalising. The bank has lately been producing about 10.8%. Its own full published record averages closer to 9.4%, so what is being asked for is improvement first and then a very long hold. Roughly two-thirds of firms earning at that level were still doing so a decade later, which is the good news, and it still leaves the improvement unexplained.

Two structural details tighten the frame. Junior Subordinated Notes totalled $119.1 million at year-end, and under their terms the company may not, with certain exceptions, declare or pay any dividends or distributions on its capital stock or purchase or acquire any of its capital stock if it has deferred interest on them. Capital return, which is doing most of the per-share work, is legally contingent on servicing that instrument through any stress. Meanwhile the moat faces direct entry: the 10-K notes that banks from Pacific Rim countries continue to open branches in the Los Angeles area, thus increasing competition in the Bank's primary markets. Competition aimed precisely at the deposit franchise is the version that raises funding costs first.

Valuation

Banks are priced off what they earn on capital, so book value is the lens. The market is paying roughly 1.4 times book here. The assumption folded into that figure is a return on equity around 13.1% carried indefinitely, which is the same as saying the bank stays in the top tier near 12.2% for roughly 34 years before normalising. Recent performance sits lower, around 10.8%, and this institution's full published record averages closer to 9.4%. The calculation uses a 10.4% cost of equity, so the bar sits only modestly above the hurdle rate. Treat all of it as approximate.

What makes this read unusual is how ordinary it is. The price-to-book sits in the upper half of its peer group rather than at the top, and among firms earning returns at this level roughly two-thirds were still earning them ten years on. The demand is a step up from what the bank currently earns, held for a very long time, at a level a good regional lender can plausibly reach. That is a different risk profile from a stretched multiple. It is closer to a slow leak than a cliff.

The methods agree with it, and unusually they all agree. The peer-comparison lens lands furthest above $62.91, the earnings-power lens lands above it as well, and the book-value and forward-growth lenses land just under. A bank-specific tangible-book frame clears it too, taking tangible book value per share of $38.71 and applying a multiple built from the trailing return against the cost of equity, then trimming that multiple for an allowance running about 1.05% of loans against the portfolio. Clustering rather than fanning out means the disagreement here is not really about valuation. It is about credit. Every one of those calculations assumes losses stay close to where they are today, on a loan book where commercial property makes up 52.4% of the gross total.

What decides the per-share outcome is the payout, and here the arithmetic is unusually visible. Dividends plus buybacks absorbed roughly 87% of the latest fiscal year's earnings, leaving little to retain, so book value per share compounds slowly and repurchase does the heavy lifting. The company paid $1.36 per common share in each of 2025, 2024 and 2023 while retiring 2,905,487 shares at an average cost of $43.02 under the prior authorization and 2,973,982 more at an average cost of $46.24 under the current one. Both averages were struck well beneath the level the shares command now, which is the clearest evidence available that the capital went out at levels management judged attractive. It also means the future depends on that discipline continuing, because with retention this low there is not much else driving value per share.

Catalysts

Fiscal 2025 closed with credit drifting in one direction and fee income in another. Net charge-offs came to $35.7 million, or 0.18% of average loans, against $29.7 million and 0.15% in 2024 and $17.6 million and 0.09% in 2023, while non-interest income rose $19.8 million, or 35.5%, to $75.4 million. The charge-off trajectory is the single most informative line to follow through 2026, because it is the variable that decides whether the property concentration is a strength or a liability.

The repurchase authorization is close to used up, which makes the next board decision a real event. The company announced a new $150.0 million program on June 4, 2025 and had deployed $137.5 million of it by December 31, 2025, retiring 2,973,982 shares at an average cost of $46.24. With roughly 87% of the latest fiscal year's earnings already going out as dividends plus buybacks, whether a fresh authorization arrives, and at what size, determines how much of the per-share story continues.

The dividend has been the constant. Cash dividends were $1.36 per common share in 2025, 2024 and 2023, held flat across three years while the repurchase programs did the incremental work. The loan mix moved the other way over the same period, with total commercial real estate loans rising to 52.4% of gross loans from 51.8%, so the concentration question is not resolving on its own.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Commercial Banking (whole company) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2025 Form 10-K, filed March 2, 2026 · FY2025 Form 10-K

View the full interactive CATY report on boothcheck