CASEY’S GENERAL STORES, INC. (CASY): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $766.20, CASEY’S GENERAL STORES, INC. (CASY) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.0 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.
Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CASY
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CASY |
| Company | CASEY’S GENERAL STORES, INC. |
| Sector / Industry | Consumer Cyclical |
| Current price | $766.20/sh |
| Composition | Prepared food and dispensed beverage 10% / Grocery and general merchandise 26% / Fuel 60% / Other 3% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Must persist for | 5.0y |
| Multiple paid | 37x operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 8% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.
How unusual the bet is: n/a
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| cohort percentile (of 212 peers) | 93 |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.12x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 4.47x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.11x | 4 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.13x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $486.63 | 1.57x | yes | FCF base $0.8B, growth 10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.4%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $802.35 | 0.95x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 280.1x / 282.1x / 284.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $288.59 | 2.65x | yes | P/E 25.91x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 40x), scenarios: 21.5x / 25.9x / 30.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 30.8x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $208.72 | 3.67x | yes | BV/sh $106.79, ROE (TTM) 18.1%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $288.12 | 2.66x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $675.51 | 1.13x | yes | Rev $17.6B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.3x / 1.6x / 1.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $670.60 | 1.14x | yes | EPS $19.16, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.13 (Fair) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $286.07 | 2.68x | yes | BV $106.79 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 18.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $214.56 | 3.57x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $19.16 × BVPS $106.79) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.01 | 76620.40x | yes | EBITDA $0.11B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $146.45 | 5.23x | yes | FCF $721.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $127.92 | 5.99x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.66B (FCF $0.72B − SBC $0.06B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $618.23 | 1.24x | yes | EPS $19.16 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $711.84 | 1.08x | yes | Revenue $17.56B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $718.50 | 1.07x | yes | EPS $19.16 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $207.14 | 3.70x | yes | EPS $19.16 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Convenience store retail (single reportable segment) | operating | enterprise | 15.9B reported-currency | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.9b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 2.91x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 2.29x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.1% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Fuel supplies about 60% of Casey's revenue, yet the FY2026 10-K states that prepared food, dispensed beverage, grocery and general merchandise, at roughly 36% of total revenue over the last three years, produced approximately 63% of revenue less cost of goods sold.
- Net unit growth is slower than the expansion story implies: the base moved from 2,904 stores to 2,944 during fiscal 2026, after 40 built, 40 acquired and 41 closed.
- The line to watch is operating expense, which absorbed roughly half of the fiscal 2026 improvement in revenue less cost of goods sold.
Bull Case
One sentence in the annual report carries this entire company. Casey's sells more gasoline than anything else, and gasoline is nearly beside the point. The FY2026 10-K lays the arithmetic out: prepared food, dispensed beverage, grocery and general merchandise have generated about 36% of our total revenue, but they have resulted in approximately 63% of our revenue less cost of goods sold (excluding depreciation and amortization). Roughly a third of the top line delivers nearly two-thirds of the gross profit. Hold that ratio and this is a food business that happens to pump fuel. Lose it and it is a fuel retailer paying to keep 2,944 buildings lit.
Geography is why the ratio has held. The 10-K describes stores placed where the competition is not: management believes a Casey's store provides a service generally not otherwise available in smaller towns and that a convenience store in an area with limited population can be profitable if it stresses sales volume, quality products, and competitive prices. Selling pizza in a town of a few thousand people is a different business from selling pizza in a metro area, and the margin difference is not a management achievement so much as a structural one. Structural advantages are the durable kind.
Both halves worked in fiscal 2026. Grocery and general merchandise revenue rose $419.7 million, up 10.1%, of which same-store sales contributed 3.9% and new stores roughly 6.2%. Prepared food benefited from whole pizza sales plus about 5.0% from store growth. On the fuel side, average revenue less cost of goods sold per gallon increased 10.1%. It is unusual for the food attachment and the fuel spread to improve in the same year, and it is the reason the trailing numbers look as good as they do.
The growth engine is acquisition, and it has been running. The Fikes transaction added 198 stores and a wholesale fuel network, and fiscal 2026 brought another 40 acquired stores alongside 40 newly built ones. The logic is straightforward: buy locations that already sell fuel and packaged goods, then move them toward the revenue mix that produces two-thirds of the gross profit. Every acquired store that migrates toward the company's own mix is worth considerably more than it cost, which is the whole reason to keep buying.
The capital structure supports the strategy without straining. Interest is covered roughly eight times over by operating earnings, and the FY2026 10-K puts the fair value of long-term debt near 2.23 billion dollars against a company the market values around 32.1 billion dollars. Dividends declared reached $2.28 per share in fiscal 2026 against $2.00 the year before, a raise of about 14%, and the share count has been essentially flat over four years. Cash goes into stores rather than into financial engineering, which for a business that earns its return by opening more locations is the right order of priorities.
Bear Case
Casey's has to buy most of its growth, and buying growth is expensive in ways the headline multiple does not show. Fiscal 2026 tells the story cleanly: 40 stores built, 40 acquired, 41 closed, taking the base from 2,904 to 2,944. That is a net addition of roughly 1.4% for a full year of construction crews, deal teams and integration work. Set that beside what the price assumes and the gap is uncomfortable. Around 41 times the company's trailing pre-tax operating result is what today's price works out to, and the assumption behind that multiple is compounding at the fastest rate the business can self-fund, held for about six years.
The company's own record says otherwise. Over its history the growth rate has averaged closer to 7.7%, and the pace the price assumes runs well above what has actually been delivered. Among companies that have compounded at that assumed pace, only about 26% kept it going even six years. This multiple also sits at the very top of its peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. Trim one percentage point off the assumed growth rate and the required run stretches by roughly two more years.
What the expense line did in fiscal 2026 is the practical version of the same concern. Revenue less cost of goods sold improved by $568.6 million, a genuinely good result. Operating expenses rose 285.1 million dollars against it, cash paid for interest rose 23.9 million dollars and cash paid for taxes rose 48.2 million dollars. Rather more than half of the incremental gross profit was consumed before it reached the shareholder. That is not mismanagement; it is what happens when growth arrives as more stores rather than as more profit per store, and it is precisely the pattern that a compounding assumption cannot survive for six years.
The funding has shifted too. Casey's amended its credit agreement on October 30, 2024 to take on an incremental term loan, and the same filing reports the fair value of long-term debt near 2.23 billion dollars. Coverage is still comfortable at roughly eight times, so this is not a solvency argument. It is an observation about direction: the acquisition programme is now partly rented rather than fully self-funded, and rented growth carries a fixed charge that shows up whether or not the acquired stores hit their numbers.
If the compounding fades toward the company's own history, there is very little underneath. Only the growth-projection family of methods reaches $861.60 at all. The peer-comparison methods land about a fifth below it, the book-value lenses near a third of the price, and the earnings-power lenses closer to a fifth of it. MUSA, the one directly comparable filer in the set, runs $19.68 billion of revenue on a 4.2% operating margin with revenue down 1.2% over the year, which is what a fuel-led convenience retailer looks like when the food attachment is thinner. The premium here is a bet on the food ratio holding while the store count keeps climbing, and nothing in the static frames will catch the price if either leg slips.
Valuation
Today's price works out to roughly 41 times the company's trailing pre-tax operating result. The assumption behind that figure is specific: operating profit compounding at the fastest rate the business can fund from its own cash flow, roughly 25% a year, held for about six years. Set that beside a company whose own long-run growth has averaged nearer 7.7% and the size of the ask becomes plain. The arithmetic runs on an 8.1% cost of capital, and each percentage point of growth shifts the required run by about two years, so treat these as approximations rather than measurements.
Now the methods, which are unusually lopsided here. Only the forward-growth family reaches $861.60, and it clears the price by a small margin, roughly 13%. The peer-comparison methods sit about 25% under the price. The book-value lenses land near a third of it and the earnings-power lenses lower still. That is the profile of a durability premium: a bet on compounding that static frames are structurally incapable of pricing, because none of them can encode a food attachment migrating across an expanding store base. The one growth method that lands closest gets there by projecting revenue forward at about 10% a year and holding today's sales multiple flat across the projection, which is a fair description of the bet rather than an independent confirmation of it.
The cohort is thin, and thin cohorts should be read carefully. MUSA is the one directly comparable filer, running $19.68 billion of revenue at a 4.2% operating margin with revenue down 1.2% over the year. Casey's turns $17.56 billion of revenue, and the difference between the two companies is not scale. It is the mix disclosed in the filing, where roughly 36% of the top line yields approximately 63% of revenue less cost of goods sold. That mix is what the market is paying the premium for, and MUSA is a useful picture of the same industry with a smaller food attachment.
The balance sheet is not what makes this interesting. Interest is covered around eight times over, the company is not consuming cash, and the FY2026 10-K reports the fair value of long-term debt near 2.23 billion dollars against a market value of about 32.1 billion dollars, with a further 850 million dollars of revolving capacity and a 50 million dollar bank line available. Dividends declared rose to $2.28 per share in fiscal 2026 from $2.00, and the share count has barely moved in four years, so essentially all the cash is going into stores. That is coherent capital allocation. It also means the price rests entirely on how many stores get added and how much gross profit each one eventually carries, with nothing in the capital structure to soften the answer.
Catalysts
Fiscal 2026 closed on April 30, 2026 and the annual report landed that June. Store count ended at 2,944, up from 2,904, after 40 newly built stores, 40 acquisitions and 41 closures; grocery and general merchandise revenue rose $419.7 million, or 10.1%, with same-store sales up 3.9%; and average revenue less cost of goods sold per gallon on fuel rose 10.1%. The Fikes stores, acquired in the prior fiscal year, contributed for a full twelve months for the first time, so fiscal 2027 comparisons lose that lift.
Capital return moved up modestly. Dividends declared totalled $2.28 per share in fiscal 2026 against $2.00 in fiscal 2025, and the board declared a further quarterly dividend at its June 2026 meeting. That remains a small share of earnings, consistent with a company directing cash toward store additions rather than payouts.
The acquisition pipeline and its funding are the forward variables. Casey's acquired 40 stores during fiscal 2026 and 37 during fiscal 2025, and it amended its credit agreement on October 30, 2024 to add an incremental term loan alongside an $850 million revolving facility and a $50 million bank line. Whether the next tranche of stores is funded from operations or from that capacity is the practical test of how self-sustaining the growth actually is, and the answer shows up first in cash paid for interest, which rose $23.9 million in fiscal 2026.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Convenience store retail (single reportable segment) (reported)
- MUSA (MURPHY USA INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …change in the number and type of retailers offering similar products and services. With respect to merchandise, our retail stores compete with other convenience store chains, independently-owned convenience stores, supermarkets, drugstores, discount clubs, gasoline service stores, mass merchants, fast-food operations…
- FY2025 10-K: VENUE RECOGNITION - Revenue is recognized when obligations under the terms of a contract with our customers are satisfied; generally, this occurs with the transfer of control of our petroleum products, convenience merchandise, Renewable Identification Numbers ("RINs") and other assets to our third-party customers.…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
FY2026 Form 10-K · FY2026 Form 10-K, filed June 22, 2026