MAPLEBEAR INC. (CART): what the price requires
At today's price, MAPLEBEAR INC. (CART) is priced for +12.9% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CART
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CART |
| Company | MAPLEBEAR INC. |
| Current price | $48.12/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 3.5% |
| Operating margin today | 15.4% |
| Margin compression implied | -11.9pp |
| Implied growth | 12.9% |
| Multiple paid | 18x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 8, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.4pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| cohort percentile (of 212 peers) | 52 |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 48% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.33x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.60x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.23x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.73x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $92.91 | 0.52x | yes | FCF base $1.0B, growth 12% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $66.24 | 0.73x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 17.4x / 19.4x / 21.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $39.03 | 1.23x | yes | P/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.5x / 20.0x / 23.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $20.68 | 2.33x | yes | BV/sh $9.44, ROE (TTM) 20.3%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $30.29 | 1.59x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $44.21 | 1.09x | yes | Rev $3.9B, growth 12% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.6x / 3.2x / 3.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $62.54 | 0.77x | yes | EPS $1.80, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.72 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $29.20 | 1.65x | yes | BV $9.44 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 20.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $19.56 | 2.46x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $1.80 × BVPS $9.44) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $35.26 | 1.36x | yes | EBITDA $0.60B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $39.73 | 1.21x | yes | FCF $882.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $24.13 | 1.99x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.52B (FCF $0.88B − SBC $0.37B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $58.08 | 0.83x | yes | EPS $1.80 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $7.95 | 6.05x | yes | BV $9.44 × (ROIC 7.8% / WACC 9.2%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $22.86 | 2.10x | yes | Revenue $3.86B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $67.50 | 0.71x | yes | EPS $1.80 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $19.46 | 2.47x | yes | EPS $1.80 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $690.0m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -1.50x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -1.19x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 4.7% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- The number that makes Instacart work is advertising: roughly $286 million in the first quarter of 2026, growing 16%, and it is the high-margin revenue that turned a grocery-delivery business into a profitable one.
- The company crossed two milestones at once last quarter, more than $10 billion in gross transaction value and over $1 billion in revenue, while net income rose 36%.
- The defining risk is competition from DoorDash and Uber, both of which have pushed into grocery delivery and now split the market roughly three ways, pressuring the network advantage Instacart relies on.
Bull Case
The single metric that defines Instacart's investment case is advertising revenue, because it is the difference between a thin-margin delivery service and a genuinely profitable platform. Instacart generates revenue, as its filing puts it, "from the sale of advertising to companies that are interested in reaching end users... Sponsored Product ads, display ads, coupons," shown to shoppers as they browse for groceries. That advertising reached about $286 million in the first quarter of 2026, up 16%, the fastest pace since 2023, with more than 9,000 brands now advertising on the platform. Advertising on a grocery marketplace is close to pure margin: the shopper traffic already exists, and selling a sponsored placement to a consumer-goods brand costs almost nothing incremental. That is why a company once known for losing money on deliveries now earns real profit.
The scale milestones reached last quarter show the underlying marketplace is healthy, not just monetizing harder. Gross transaction value crossed $10 billion for the first time, up 13%, total revenue topped $1 billion, up 14%, and GAAP net income rose 36% to $144 million with adjusted EBITDA up 23% to $300 million. Growth and profitability are improving together, which is the signature of a marketplace that has reached the point where its fixed costs are covered and incremental orders and ad dollars fall to the bottom line. The company is also growing roughly four times faster than the overall grocery market as shopping shifts online, a tailwind that has years left to run.
The balance sheet gives Instacart freedom that its delivery rivals lack. It holds about $690 million in cash with no debt, so it funds its own growth and has been buying back stock. The long-term opportunity in advertising is the part the bull case leans on hardest: management targets advertising at roughly 4% to 5% of gross transaction value over time, well above where it sits today, which on a $40-billion-plus annualized GTV base implies a large runway of high-margin revenue still ahead. A debt-free marketplace leader with a profitable core and an advertising business still early in its monetization is a stronger business than the loss-making delivery company it was at its public debut.
Bear Case
The hardest fact for an Instacart holder to sit with is that the company no longer has the grocery-delivery market to itself, and the competitors moving in are formidable. DoorDash now accounts for roughly a third of U.S. grocery-delivery platform sales, with Uber Eats and Instacart each holding around a fifth, which means the category leader by reputation is no longer the clear leader by volume. Both DoorDash and Uber bring their own enormous, engaged user bases, their own advertising machines, and the willingness to spend heavily to take share. Instacart's filing concedes that competitors "enjoy substantial competitive advantages, such as greater brand recognition, longer operating histories, larger marketing budgets," and that it has "modified, and may need to modify in the future, retailer fee arrangements" to keep retailers, which is a direct admission that competition can compress its economics.
That competitive pressure threatens the two pillars the bull case rests on. The marketplace's growth depends on retailers and shoppers choosing Instacart over alternatives that are now nearly as large, and any need to cut retailer fees or raise shopper incentives to defend share flows straight through to transaction margin. The advertising business, meanwhile, is only as valuable as the audience it reaches; if shoppers migrate to DoorDash or Uber for grocery orders, the ad inventory Instacart sells loses reach, and brands follow the audience. The advertising flywheel that makes Instacart profitable runs in reverse if the marketplace loses share.
The valuation leaves modest room for that to go wrong. At about $45 (June 27, 2026), the price embeds operating-profit growth around 10% a year for five years, which the recent results support but which assumes the competitive intensity does not erode growth or margin. The asset-based methods land below the price, flagging that little of the value rests on tangible assets and most rests on the durability of the marketplace and ad earnings, exactly the things competition puts at risk. There is also a quieter dilution issue: the share count has been rising despite buybacks, because stock-based compensation is heavy, so part of the cash returned to shareholders is offsetting dilution rather than shrinking the float. The bear case is not that Instacart is a bad business; it is that a marketplace facing two equally large, well-funded competitors is priced for continued double-digit growth that the competition could interrupt.
Valuation
Instacart is a marketplace whose profitability now comes largely from advertising, so its price should be read against the durability of its transaction volume and its ad monetization, not its tangible assets. At about $45 the stock trades near 17 times company-wide operating income, and inverting that says the price requires operating profit to grow roughly 10% a year for five years. That is a within-range assumption: the company is currently growing GTV and revenue in the low-to-mid teens and growing profit faster, so the price is extrapolating the recent trajectory at a slightly more conservative pace rather than demanding an acceleration.
The valuation methods spread in a way that frames this as a quality-and-growth name rather than a speculative one. The growth-discounted and peer-multiple methods land at or above the price, supported by the marketplace's growth and the high-margin advertising layer; the asset-based methods land below it, because a marketplace's value is its network and its ad audience, not its balance sheet. Several methods land meaningfully above the current price, which says the stock is not obviously expensive on its growth, while the asset-based caution reflects how much of the value is intangible and therefore exposed to competition. The cleanest read is that the price is reasonable if the marketplace holds its position, and the debate is entirely about whether it does.
Solvency is a clear strength and removes financial risk from the equation. Instacart holds about $690 million in cash with no debt, so it funds growth and buybacks internally and faces no refinancing pressure. The one caveat is that the share count has been rising despite repurchases, because stock-based compensation is substantial, so some of the buyback is offsetting dilution rather than reducing the float, a real cost that a per-share investor should weight. What a buyer at this price underwrites is that Instacart defends its roughly one-fifth share of grocery delivery against DoorDash and Uber, keeps growing GTV in the double digits, and continues scaling advertising toward its 4% to 5% of GTV target. The upside is a high-margin ad business compounding on a growing marketplace; the risk is that competition forces fee cuts or share loss that undercut both the volume and the ad reach the price depends on.
Catalysts
Advertising growth is the catalyst that matters most, because it drives the profitability that justifies the valuation. Advertising and other revenue grew 16% to about $286 million in the first quarter of 2026, the fastest pace since 2023, with more than 9,000 brands on the platform, and management reiterated a long-term target of advertising reaching roughly 4% to 5% of gross transaction value. Continued acceleration in ads, especially gains toward that long-term target, is the clearest confirmation of the monetization story; a slowdown would weigh on the whole thesis.
The marketplace scale numbers are the supporting signal. First-quarter gross transaction value crossed $10 billion for the first time, up 13%, total revenue topped $1 billion, and adjusted EBITDA rose 23% to $300 million, with second-quarter guidance for GTV of $10.1 billion to $10.25 billion and ads growth of 11% to 14%. Whether GTV growth holds in the double digits as competition intensifies is the volume test that underpins both transaction and advertising revenue.
The competitive dynamic is the catalyst that cuts the other way. DoorDash and Uber Eats have each built substantial grocery-delivery share, and any sign of Instacart losing ground, or having to raise shopper incentives or cut retailer fees to hold it, would pressure margins and ad reach. Online grocery itself remains a strong tailwind, growing well above the overall grocery market, which gives all three players room to grow; the question the catalysts will answer is whether Instacart keeps its share of that expanding pie.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Instacart (single segment) (reported)
- DASH (DOORDASH, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …DoorDash Marketplace, the Wolt Marketplace, and the Deliveroo Marketplace (our "Marketplaces"), and our Commerce Platform. Our Marketplaces operate in over 40 countries, including the United States, and account for the vast majority of our revenue today. Our Marketplaces serve three primary constituents: merchants,…
- FY2025 10-K: …the delivery of products by connecting consumers with Dashers. As the Company's role with the delivery facilitation service is only to arrange for a delivery opportunity to be offered to prospective Dashers, it does not control how the delivery service is ultimately provided to the consumer. 87 Table of Contents In…
- UBER (UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Service Schedule, dated June 15, 2023, among Google LLC and the Registrant. 10-Q 001-38902 10.1 August 2, 2023 10.17+ Third Amendment to the Google Maps Master Agreement - Platform Rides and Deliveries Solution Service Schedule, dated April 22, 2024, among Google LLC and the Registrant. 10-Q 001-38902 10.1 August 6,…
- FY2025 10-K: …2020-10-01 2020-10-31 0001543151 uber:A2020FreightSeriesAInvestorMember uber:FreightHoldingMember us-gaap:PrivatePlacementMember 2020-10-06 2020-10-06 0001543151 uber:A2020FreightSeriesAInvestorMember uber:FreightHoldingMember us-gaap:PrivatePlacementMember 2022-08-01 2022-08-31 0001543151…
- LYFT (Lyft, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …(I.R.S. Employer Identification No.) 185 Berry Street, Suite 400 San Francisco , California 94107 (Address of principal executive offices) (Zip Code) Registrant's telephone number, including area code: ( 844 ) 250-2773 Securities registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act: Title of each class Trading Symbol(s)…
- FY2025 10-K: …periods and interim reporting periods beginning after December 15, 2025. Early adoption is permitted. The Company is currently evaluating the impact of this standard on the consolidated financial statements. 82 In September 2025, the FASB issued ASU 2025-06, "Intangibles - Goodwill and Other - Internal-Use Software…
- EBAY (eBay Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …efficiently within these communities without disruption to buyers and sellers outside of those communities. Additionally, our growth strategy has increasingly emphasized our Focus Categories, such as motor parts and accessories, collectibles, refurbished goods, and authenticated luxury items. Our Focus Category…
- FY2025 10-K: -gaap:AccumulatedOtherComprehensiveIncomeMember 2025-12-31 0001065088 2023-12-31 0001065088 us-gaap:CommonStockMember 2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0001065088 us-gaap:CommonStockMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0001065088 us-gaap:CommonStockMember 2023-01-01 2023-12-31 0001065088 ebay:AdevintaMember 2025-01-01 2025-12-31…
- ETSY (ETSY, INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …etsy:ConvertibleSeniorNotesDue2030Member us-gaap:ConvertibleDebtMember 2025-12-31 0001370637 us-gaap:EstimateOfFairValueFairValueDisclosureMember us-gaap:FairValueInputsLevel2Member etsy:ConvertibleSeniorNotesDue2030Member us-gaap:ConvertibleDebtMember 2025-12-31 0001370637…
- FY2025 10-K: Exhibit Incorporated by Reference Filed Herewith Number Exhibit Description Form File No. Exhibit Filing Date 2.1 Sale and Purchase Agreement by and among Etsy , Inc. and eBay Inc. , dated as of February 15 , 2026. 8-K 001-36911 2.1 2/18/2026 3.1 Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Etsy, Inc. 10-Q…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Instacart Q1 2026 results