MAPLEBEAR INC. (CART): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $50.63, MAPLEBEAR INC. (CART) is priced for +13.0% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CART

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCART
CompanyMAPLEBEAR INC.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$50.63/sh
CompositionTransaction 72% / Advertising and other 28%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.3%
Operating margin today14.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-11.5pp
Implied growth13.0%
Multiple paid19x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 8: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)59

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by earnings-power and growth-DCF value, while asset-based/relative-multiple land below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.26x5expensive
Earnings1.19x4expensive
Relative1.68x5expensive
Growth0.63x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Earnings, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$138.120.37xyesFCF base $1.3B, growth 13% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$80.370.63xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 15.9x / 17.9x / 19.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$43.451.17xyesP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.5x / 20.0x / 23.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$22.422.26xyesBV/sh $10.03, ROE (TTM) 20.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$33.211.52xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$47.351.07xyesRev $4.0B, growth 13% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.4x / 2.9x / 3.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$22.082.29xyesEPS $1.84, growth 11% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.23 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$31.811.59xyesBV $10.03 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 20.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$20.382.48xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.84 × BVPS $10.03) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$40.301.26xyesEBITDA $0.62B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$57.790.88xyesFCF $1176.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$39.061.30xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.78B (FCF $1.18B − SBC $0.40B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$46.831.08xyesEPS $1.84 × (8.5 + 2×10.9%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$7.426.82xyesBV $10.03 × (ROIC 6.8% / WACC 9.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$25.871.96xyesRevenue $3.99B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$30.171.68xyesEPS $1.84 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 10.9% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 16.4x
Earnings YieldEarnings$19.892.55xyesEPS $1.84 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Instacart (single segment)operatingenterprise3.7B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$850.0m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-1.83x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-1.44x (net cash)
Share count CAGR (dilution)3.9%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The direction of travel is the argument. Instacart now produces $582 million of operating profit on $3.86 billion of trailing revenue, roughly 15 cents on the dollar, and that is not a rounding-error profit dressed up as a turnaround. Set it beside the cohort it usually gets grouped with: DASH converts 4.9% of revenue into operating profit while growing 31%; UBER converts 11.7%; LYFT converts nothing, running a negative operating margin outright. Only EBAY, at 19.6%, does better. For a company built on paying people to push carts through other companies' stores, earning a mid-teens operating margin is the plot twist.

Volume is still doing the work underneath it. The FY2025 10-K reports orders rising to 338.8 million in 2025, or 15% growth, compared to 2024, driven primarily by new customers and increased engagement of existing customers. The first quarter of 2026 carried the pattern forward, with gross transaction value reaching $10,288 million, or 13% growth, compared to the same period of 2025, primarily driven by the increase in orders and higher average order value. More customers, ordering more often, spending more per basket. Those are three separate levers all pointing the same way, which is rarer than it sounds.

Advertising is why the margin exists at all. Roughly 28% of revenue comes from advertising and other, a line that attaches to transactions the company was already processing, so incremental dollars land with far less incremental cost than the delivery side carries. That is the structural reason a business handling groceries at scale can print a mid-teens operating margin while a peer running a similar logistics motion cannot.

The cash arrives ahead of the accounting. Free cash flow ran roughly 882 million dollars over the trailing year, comfortably clear of the operating profit line above, because customers pay at checkout while retailers, shoppers and brand partners get settled later. The pattern is not a single good year: the 10-K reports that For the year ended December 31, 2024, net cash provided by operating activities was $687 million, which consisted of net income of $457 million. Strip out stock compensation of roughly $370 million and the free cash figure drops to about half a billion, which is the honest version of the number, and still a lot of cash for a company this size.

Management has been converting that into capacity to shrink the share base. The board raised the repurchase authorization to $750 million, then $1 billion, then $2.5 billion in November 2024, May 2025 and November 2025 respectively, with no expiration date attached. The share count has been climbing at about 4.7% a year over the last three and a half years, so today the buying is offsetting equity compensation rather than concentrating ownership. The bull case is that with an authorization of that size against a company valued near $10.7 billion, the arithmetic flips from offset to reduction, and every point of operating improvement then reaches holders undiluted.

Bear Case

Instacart does not employ the people who do its work, and no line on the income statement carries more valuation weight than that arrangement. The FY2025 10-K is direct about the exposure: the state of the law regarding independent contractor status varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and among governmental agencies and is subject to change based on court decisions and regulation. The first-quarter 2026 filing lists certain legal, regulatory, and policy expenses, including those related to worker classification as a recurring cost the company adjusts around, which is a quiet way of saying the issue is not settled and is not free. On January 13, 2026 an FTC consent order became final, carrying a $60 million payment and, per the filing, no admission of liability.

Here is why that matters more than a one-off penalty. The current price works out to roughly 16 times operating income, which implies the company grows operating profit around 8.9% a year for five years. That assumption is calculated at a 9.2% cost of capital, and it is unusually fragile to that input: a single percentage point of cost of capital swings the required growth by roughly six points. Reclassification risk, agency pricing inquiries and worker-status litigation are exactly the sort of thing that widens the discount rate investors demand. The regulatory variable does not attack the earnings line first. It attacks the multiple, and this multiple has a lot of leverage sitting behind it.

The demonstrated economics are already drifting the wrong way relative to what the price assumes. In 2025 orders grew 15% while gross profit grew only 8% to $2,758 million, and gross margin fell a point to 74% primarily due to cost of revenue growing faster than revenue. That is volume growth arriving with thinner economics attached. In the first quarter of 2026, net income equalled 12% of revenue against 14% a year earlier. If operating profit growth settles below the roughly 8.9% the price embeds, the support underneath the multiple is the peer-comparison lens, and beneath that the book-value lenses sit near half of today's price.

Concentration compounds it. The 10-K states plainly that GTV and revenue from our largest retailers will continue to account for a significant portion of our GTV and revenue for the foreseeable future, and those same retailers are building their own fulfillment. Macro sits on top: the filing names inflation and interest rate fluctuations, the effects of supply chain challenges, the impact of trade policies enacted or proposed by the United States among the forces that move order counts and basket values. Grocery is one of the few categories where consumer trade-down shows up in the transaction value within a quarter. Meanwhile the share count keeps rising at about 4.7% a year against stock compensation of roughly $370 million, so a flat year in operating profit is a down year per share.

Valuation

Sixteen times operating income is what the market is paying, and the assumption folded into that multiple is comparatively mild: operating profit compounding around 8.9% a year for five years, computed at a 9.2% cost of capital with 4% growth assumed thereafter. Treat those as approximate. The more revealing number is the sensitivity behind them, because one percentage point of cost of capital moves the required growth by roughly six points. The growth assumption is not really the bet. The discount rate is.

The methods split along an informative line. Grouped by what each one actually looks at, the growth-based methods land above $42.22, the peer-comparison methods land essentially on it, the earnings-power methods sit modestly below, and the book-value lenses sit near half. That is the shape you get when a market prices a business on its forward economics rather than on what its balance sheet holds, which for a company whose main assets are software, a shopper network and retailer contracts is the correct way round. It also means the price has no asset-value cushion under it. Nothing on the balance sheet is holding this valuation up.

The cohort gives the multiple context. DASH grows revenue 31% a year and converts 4.9% of it into operating profit; UBER grows 18% and converts 11.7%; EBAY grows 12.5% and converts 19.6%; ETSY grows 3.2% and converts 14.3%. Instacart converts roughly 15 cents on the revenue dollar, ahead of every one of those except EBAY, on a much smaller base. What the price does not appear to include is a premium for that conversion rate, which is the most interesting single fact about where the stock trades.

Solvency is the least interesting part of this company, and that is the point. The FY2025 10-K states that our existing cash, cash equivalents, and marketable securities will be sufficient to satisfy our anticipated cash needs for working capital and capital expenditures for at least the next 12 months and beyond, there is no funded borrowing generating an interest bill, and the FTC payment cleared in January 2026 without any financing event. Downside here is not amplified by leverage. It is amplified by the share count, which has risen about 4.7% a year over the last three and a half years while the repurchase authorization has been lifted to $2.5 billion. Whether that authorization outruns the equity grants is what decides how much of the operating improvement actually arrives on a per-share basis.

Catalysts

The first quarter of 2026 kept the volume story intact and put a small dent in the profitability one. Gross transaction value reached $10,288 million, up 13% against the same quarter of 2025, driven by more orders and higher average order value, while net income came to 12% of revenue against 14% a year earlier. Volume is compounding; conversion of that volume into profit is not, at least not yet.

The regulatory file moved in January. An FTC consent order became final on January 13, 2026, with no admission of liability, requiring a $60 million payment that was made with cash on hand that month. The company also discloses that it continues to receive inquiries from various agencies regarding pricing on its platform. Worker classification remains the larger open question, and the company carries it as a recurring legal, regulatory and policy expense line rather than a resolved matter.

Capital return is the lever most under management's control. The board has raised the repurchase authorization three times, to $750 million, then $1 billion, then $2.5 billion in November 2024, May 2025 and November 2025, with no expiration date. Against a company valued near $10.7 billion, an authorization that size is enough to change the share-count trajectory materially if management chooses to use it at pace, which makes the quarterly repurchase disclosure the number worth tracking through 2026.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Instacart (single segment) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 Form 10-Q, period ended March 31, 2026 · FY2025 Form 10-K, accession 0001579091-26-000018 · FY2025 Form 10-K · Q1 2026 Form 10-Q

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