CONAGRA BRANDS, INC. (CAG): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers CONAGRA BRANDS, INC. (CAG) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CAG

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCAG
CompanyCONAGRA BRANDS, INC.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Defensive
Current price$16.00/sh
CompositionFrozen 35% / Other shelf-stable 21% / Refrigerated 6% / Snacks 20% / International 8% / Foodservice 10%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Multiple paid9x mid-cycle operating income

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 6% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 6% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 5.5% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.15σ
cohort percentile (of 69 peers)4

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.27x2expensive
Earnings2.96x3expensive
Relative0
Growth1.45x4expensive

Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=9)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$13.731.17xyesFCF base $1.0B, growth -3% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 6.5%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$17.690.90xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 34.3x / 36.3x / 38.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowth$2.486.45xyesDPS $1.40, g=-30.1% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3%
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$-17.29noStage 1: -200% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$13.281.21xyesReference only (book value floor): BV/sh $13.28, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$11.961.34xyesReference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $13.28, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$9.221.74xyesRev $11.3B, growth -3% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.6x / 0.7x / 0.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$6.632.41xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.92B × (1−21%) / WACC 6.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.43B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$5.402.96xyesFCF $978.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$4.163.85xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.92B (FCF $0.98B − SBC $0.05B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $11.28B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Grocery & Snacksoperatingenterprise$4.6b$885.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Refrigerated & Frozenoperatingenterprise$4.6b$485.6m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Foodserviceoperatingenterprise$1.1b$114.3m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$7.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)26.30x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)20.78x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.1%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The most useful number in this whole file is not a margin. It is the interest line, and it is going the right way. The FY2026 10-K reports that Interest paid was $374.2 million, $426.7 million, and $444.2 million in fiscal 2026, 2025, and 2024, respectively. Two consecutive years of paying less interest is not a forecast or an adjusted metric. It is cash that left the building, and less of it left each year. The company has also been retiring term debt outright, using proceeds to repay 300.0 million dollars and 200.0 million dollars of unsecured term loans along with commercial paper borrowings.

Then, in July, management cut the dividend in half. Read as a signal about the payout, that is bad news. Read as a signal about priorities, it is the clearest statement a board can make that the balance sheet comes before the yield. A new chief executive arriving and immediately reallocating cash from shareholders to lenders is not a company defending appearances.

What secures that debt is a great deal more profit than the headline suggests. Across the four reported segments the FY2026 10-K shows segment operating profit of $885.0 million in Grocery & Snacks, $485.6 million in Refrigerated & Frozen, $134.4 million in International and $114.3 million in Foodservice, roughly 1.6 billion dollars in total before items management classifies as not comparable. Reported operating income for the year was $269.3 million. Nearly all of the difference is writedowns of brands and assets, which are real admissions about the future but are not cash going out the door this year. Lenders are paid out of the first number.

The revenue underneath is not melting uniformly either. Snacks net sales grew in fiscal 2026, reaching 2,225.5 million dollars against 2,108.5 million a year earlier, and Frozen held roughly steady, 3,916.7 million dollars versus 3,945.5 million. The decline is concentrated in Other shelf-stable, which dropped from 2,790.8 million dollars to 2,384.6 million. A packaged-food business with a growing snacks line and a stable frozen line is a different proposition from one shrinking everywhere at once.

Context matters on the margin comparison, because the whole category is in the same ditch. GIS is running a 4.8% operating margin with revenue down 5.4%, and SJM a 4.0% operating margin with a negative net margin. Meanwhile CPB is at 11.3% and MKC at 14.9%, which is what normalized packaged-food economics look like when the cycle turns. On a through-the-cycle basis this company's own operating margin is 15.8%, at the top of that range rather than the bottom.

Which brings valuation into view. At $14.79 the market is paying about 8.4 times the company's mid-cycle operating profit, a multiple low enough that the quote already sits below what even a five-percent-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. The equity carries a book value of $17.02 a share, a level the shares have not kept up with. The bull case does not require a recovery to be underwritten. It requires the decline to be slower than the quote already assumes.

Bear Case

The methods do not agree here, and the shape of the disagreement is the bear case. Every approach that reaches today's price gets there by normalizing: putting the company back on its through-the-cycle operating margin of 15.8%, or applying a sector price-to-sales multiple to a revenue line that is shrinking. Every approach that uses what the business actually earned in fiscal 2026, then subtracts the borrowings from it, lands well below the quote. So the question is not which model is more sophisticated. It is whether fiscal 2026 was a trough or a level, and the conservative methods are the ones taking the reported numbers at face value.

The evidence for "level" is in the composition of the revenue. Total net sales came to $11,281.6 million in fiscal 2026 against $11,612.8 million a year earlier, down 2.9%. Inside Grocery & Snacks, the FY2026 10-K reports organic volumes down 2.4% with price/mix up 2.3%. Sell fewer units at higher prices and the revenue line looks calm while the underlying demand does not. That is the pattern of a business trading volume for price, and it can only run so long before the volume loss compounds.

Management's own accounting says something similar. The company took a charge of roughly $2 billion with the July results, and the FY2026 10-K discloses brand-name impairments including $180.0 million against the Birds Eye brand and $17.0 million against the Earth Balance and Smart Balance spreads businesses. An impairment is not a market opinion. It is the company writing down its own estimate of what those brands will earn, on assumptions it selected itself, using a discount rate of 7.50% and terminal growth between 1% and 1.5%. When a company lowers its internal forecast for brands it owns and operates, treating the same year as a temporary trough requires an argument the company itself is not making.

The dividend halving points the same direction. Boards do not cut a long-standing payout to make a point about capital discipline; they cut it when the cash is needed elsewhere and the old level was not comfortably covered. Deleveraging is the right response, but the need to deleverage is the observation.

The arithmetic behind that need is stark. Net borrowings run about 4.25 times operating profit measured through the cycle, which is elevated but survivable. Measured against what the business actually produced last year, the picture is different: interest paid of $374.2 million in fiscal 2026 exceeded the $269.3 million of reported operating income for the same year. One year in which the operating profit does not cover the interest bill is a bad year. Two would be a capital-structure problem, and the debt does not adjust downward on its own.

The breadth is the last piece. This was not one bad segment. Segment operating profit fell 13.0% in Grocery & Snacks, 25.5% in Refrigerated & Frozen, 12.8% in Foodservice and 6.7% in International. Behind it sits a customer base with growing leverage, which the 10-K states plainly: Our customers, such as supermarkets, warehouse clubs, and food distributors, have continued to consolidate, resulting in fewer customers on which we can rely for business. Fewer buyers, falling volumes, and a fixed interest bill is a combination that does not resolve itself through patience.

Valuation

At $14.79 the market is paying roughly 8.4 times this company's mid-cycle operating profit. That multiple is low enough that the price sits below what even a five-percent-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant, which is a boundary rather than a forecast: the arithmetic says the market has stopped pricing a path and started pricing a floor. Treat it as indicative. The wider point survives the imprecision, because it is visible in the methods themselves.

The methods split on which earnings figure is real. The book-value approaches land essentially at the quote. Book value per share is $17.02, modestly above what the shares fetch today. The earnings-power and forward cash-flow approaches land below the price, because they run on what the trailing year produced rather than on what the business produces in a normal one. There is no family here arguing the price is a growth bet. Every path to a number above today's quote runs through normalization.

So the concrete question is the margin, and the basis matters more than the figure. Through the cycle this company has earned an operating margin of about 15.8%. On the trailing twelve months the same measure was about 2.4%, on reported operating income of $269.3 million, after brand and asset writedowns. Those two numbers describe the same business in different years, and nothing in this report can tell you which one describes fiscal 2027. What can be said is that the price is closer to the second than to the first.

The cohort makes the range concrete rather than theoretical. GIS is running a 4.8% operating margin with revenue down 5.4%; SJM a 4.0% operating margin with net margin below zero; HRL 5.8%; POST 10.1%; CPB 11.3%; MKC 14.9%. The category's better operators are earning double-digit operating margins right now while its weaker ones are near four. The subject's through-cycle figure would sit at the top of that group, and its trailing figure sits below the bottom of it. The distance between those two placements is exactly what a buyer at this price is taking a position on.

Underneath, the segment detail from the FY2026 10-K shows where the revenue actually is. Frozen contributed $3,916.7 million of net sales in fiscal 2026, Snacks $2,225.5 million and rising, Other shelf-stable $2,384.6 million and falling hard, on total net sales of $11,281.6 million. The growth line is the smaller one and the shrinking line is not.

Solvency is the constraint that decides how much time this has. Net borrowings sit near 7.57 billion dollars, and the FY2026 10-K reports interest paid of $374.2 million in fiscal 2026, down from $426.7 million and $444.2 million in the two prior years. The share count has been essentially unchanged since February 2022, so nothing has been solved by issuance or by buybacks. What management has done instead is cut the payout and repay term loans, which buys time. Whether time is enough depends on the margin question, and that will be answered in the operating line rather than in any multiple.

Catalysts

The single largest event in this file is three weeks old. On July 15, 2026 the company reported fiscal fourth-quarter and full-year results, swung to a reported loss, booked a charge of roughly $2 billion, and cut the dividend in half to an annualized $0.70 a share, with the quarterly payment set at $0.175 and an ex-dividend date of July 30, 2026. The annual profit outlook accompanying it came in below street expectations. Any read of this company that predates that day is reading a different company.

It arrived under new leadership. A new chief executive is running the turnaround, and the July print was the first full set of results published under that leadership. New chief executives are the people most able to reset a payout and take a large charge, because the charge belongs to the previous plan. Which means the July numbers should be read as a reset baseline rather than as a run rate.

The sell side did not converge on what it means. In the days after the print Barclays raised its target to $17 from $16, UBS raised its to $14 from $13, and RBC Capital cut its to $14 from $16. Two of the three now sit at or below the current quote and one above it, which is a fair description of the underlying disagreement: whether the writedowns marked the bottom of the cycle or simply marked the accounts to a lower permanent level.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Grocery & Snacks (reported)

Refrigerated & Frozen (reported)

Foodservice (reported)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

fiscal fourth-quarter results, July 15, 2026 · fiscal fourth-quarter results and dividend declaration, July 15, 2026 · Reuters report on fiscal fourth-quarter results, July 2026 · Wall Street Journal, July 2026 · analyst notes reported July 2026

View the full interactive CAG report on boothcheck