BOYD GAMING CORP (BYD): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $78.02, BOYD GAMING CORP (BYD) is priced for +8.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BYD

Headline

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=10)

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

Bullet Takeaways

• Roughly one dollar in seven of the reported top line is money Boyd collects and immediately hands over on behalf of its online partners, a line the 10-K says resulted in zero operating income as an equal amount representing the amount of gaming taxes and other expenses paid on behalf of our online partners is also recorded as expense, so any margin or revenue multiple computed on reported revenue understates the operating business.
• The price works out to roughly 26 times company-wide operating profit and needs about 13.5% annual operating-profit growth held for five years, which is a demanding requirement for regional gaming when CZR grew revenue 2.3% and RRR 3.7% over the trailing year.
• With the online equity stake now sold, growth has to come from the properties and from a share count that has been falling about 9% a year; the next quarterly report is scheduled for October 22, 2026.

Bull Case

Begin with a piece of accounting that makes Boyd look worse than it is. About fourteen cents of every reported revenue dollar is Online reimbursements, which is not really revenue at all. It is gaming taxes and expenses that Boyd pays to the states on behalf of the online operators who use its licenses, recorded as revenue on the way in and as an identical expense on the way out. The 10-K is blunt about the effect: the arrangement resulted in zero operating income as an equal amount representing the amount of gaming taxes and other expenses paid on behalf of our online partners is also recorded as expense. Every operating margin, every price-to-sales comparison, and every revenue growth rate calculated against that top line is diluted by a line item with no economics in it. The reported 18.5% trailing operating margin is therefore a floor on what the casinos actually earn, not a measure of it.

What sits underneath is a collection of properties chosen for defensibility rather than glamour. Seven Las Vegas Locals properties serve residents rather than tourists, three downtown properties work a niche the 10-K describes as marketing to a unique niche - Hawaiian customers, and the Midwest and South portfolio spreads the rest across regional markets. Locals gaming is repeat business from people who live nearby, which behaves less like discretionary travel and more like a habit. It also runs on cash: the filing notes that the properties have historically generated significant operating cash flow, with the majority of our revenue being cash-based. There is no receivables cycle to speak of and no inventory to speak of.

That cash has gone almost entirely into shrinking the company. The board authorized an initial repurchase program of $300.0 million and then raised it by $500.0 million on five separate occasions, most recently on July 17, 2025, and Boyd retired 10.1 million shares in 2025 after 11.1 million the year before. The share count has fallen about 9% a year over the four years to March 2026. Compounded, that is close to a third of the company bought in and cancelled. A business growing operating profit at a modest pace while retiring a tenth of its equity annually delivers per-share results that look nothing like the property-level growth rate, and the arithmetic works regardless of whether the casinos have a good year.

The online decision deserves a fairer reading than it usually gets. Boyd sold its equity interest in the online operator but kept the commercial relationship, and the fee stream that remains requires no capital: under the market access agreements, including the FanDuel arrangements, the revenue share we receive from third-party operators is on actual net wagering wins and losses or a fixed annual fee. That is a royalty on somebody else's growth, paid for with a licence Boyd already owns. It carries no marketing spend, no promotional credits, and no technology risk.

Against the operators it competes with, the property economics hold up. RRR ran a 29.0% operating margin on $2.02 billion of revenue and CHDN 23.5% on $2.95 billion, while CZR managed 16.2%, WYNN 15.5%, MGM 5.2%, and PENN posted a negative operating margin. Boyd's reported figure sits in the upper part of that group before adjusting for the pass-through line that mechanically drags it down. The bear will point out that regional gaming grows slowly, and that is correct. It is also mostly irrelevant to a shareholder if the count of shares is falling faster than the market is expanding.

Bear Case

Here is the thing a holder has to sit with: this is a mature regional casino operator, and it is not being priced like one. The price works out to about 26 times company-wide operating profit, and the assumption embedded in it is roughly 13.5% annual operating-profit growth sustained for five years. The pace itself is not fantastical; Boyd has produced years like that. The demand is that it persist. Of comparable companies that reached that rate of growth, only about 47% were still holding it five years later. The bet is not on a good year. It is on five of them in a row from a business that fills the same casinos with the same customers.

Where would that growth come from? The peer set is a useful reality check on regional gaming's natural pace. CZR grew revenue 2.3% over the trailing year, MGM 3.4%, RRR 3.7%, WYNN 4.7%, CHDN 5.7%, and PENN 6.4%. None of those is 13.5%, and none of them is compounding. Regional gaming is a share fight in fixed geographies, which is why the 10-K spends its risk section on encroachment: it warns that Native American gaming in areas located near our properties, or in areas in or near those from which we draw our customers, could have an adverse effect on our operating results, and separately that there has been recent expansion of sports betting in various states. A casino cannot move to a better market. It can only defend the one it is in.

The recent headline results deserve a second look for a related reason. The 10-K places the proceeds of the online stake sale in a single line: Included within Other, net for 2025, is the gain from the FanDuel Equity Sale, net of transaction costs. An investor who anchors on last year's bottom line is anchoring on a transaction that happens once. Worse for the bull, the thing sold was the fastest-growing claim Boyd owned. DKNG grew revenue 25.8% over the trailing year and RSI 28.2%. Those are the compounding curves in this industry, and Boyd traded its participation in one of them for cash and a fee arrangement, then spent the cash retiring shares in the slow-growing business it kept. That may prove to be good discipline. It is also, unambiguously, a decision to be smaller and steadier rather than larger and faster.

The balance sheet limits how long that trade can keep flattering the per-share line. Net debt runs about 4.3 times operating profit, interest is covered about 4.6 times, and there are operating lease obligations of roughly 666 million dollars carrying a weighted average remaining term of 14.1 years, which is a fixed claim on the properties for the next decade and a half whatever the customers do. Meanwhile the valuation is unusually sensitive to something Boyd does not control: each percentage point of movement in the cost of capital shifts the growth the price requires by roughly 8 points. That is a business whose multiple is more exposed to the bond market than to the slot floor.

If the required growth does not arrive, nothing dramatic happens. The multiple simply drifts down toward what a collection of regional casinos earns, and the buyback stops being an accelerator and starts being the only thing holding the per-share line up.

Valuation

Take the price as given and read backwards. At $87.04 the market is paying roughly 26 times company-wide operating profit, which is another way of saying it expects operating profit to grow about 13.5% a year for the next five years. Boyd has delivered that pace before, so the assumption is not exotic; what makes it demanding is duration, since only about 47% of companies reaching that rate were still running it five years on. One caveat matters more than the rest here. The whole calculation is highly geared to the discount rate: a single percentage point on the cost of capital moves the growth the price requires by about 8 points. Small changes in the rate environment produce large changes in what this price is asking for.

The methods used to triangulate the business split sharply, and the split is informative rather than confusing. Peer multiples land close to the price, roughly 8% under it. The cash-flow approaches land above it, including the one that projects five years of free cash flow and exits on today's enterprise-to-EBITDA multiple held flat. The method that capitalizes a five-year average of operating profit, with one-time charges added back, at the cost of capital also lands above the price. What lands far below are the lenses anchored on book value and on trailing per-share earnings, which is what happens to a company that has retired close to a third of its shares over four years: buybacks consume book equity, and a bottom line reshaped by an asset sale makes any per-share earnings comparison across years close to meaningless. Those lenses are describing the accounting, not the casinos.

Against the operators it is compared with, Boyd's multiple sits in the upper half of the range. That position is defensible on property economics and harder to defend on growth. RRR earned a 29.0% operating margin on $2.02 billion of revenue growing 3.7%, and CHDN 23.5% on $2.95 billion growing 5.7%; Boyd's reported 18.5% trailing operating margin understates its own properties because of the pass-through line inside its revenue, but no adjustment to that margin changes the fact that the cohort as a whole grows at low single digits.

The balance sheet neither rescues nor endangers the case. Net debt sits at about 4.3 times operating profit with interest covered about 4.6 times, the business is not consuming cash, and the leases run long. Capital return is the visible part of the story: the repurchase authorization has been raised by $500.0 million on five separate occasions since 2022, and the share count has come down about 9% a year through March 2026.

Strip it to one sentence and the position is this: the properties are priced as though they will compound, the share count is falling fast enough to make that partly self-fulfilling on a per-share basis, and the difference between those two statements is what a buyer at today's price is actually taking on.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results arrived on July 23, 2026 and came in above the consensus estimate, restoring a pattern that had broken one quarter earlier: the March 2026 quarter, reported on April 23, 2026, was the only miss in the last eight and it followed four consecutive beats. The next report is scheduled for October 22, 2026, though that date is still tentative.

The more consequential development is in the credit documents. Under the New Credit Agreement the Term A Loan Facility may be drawn until July 1, 2027 in up to four borrowings, and on February 1, 2026 the remaining availability was reduced by the greater of the loans previously made and 400.0 million dollars. Beginning with the fiscal year ending December 31, 2026, the company is required to use a portion of its annual excess cash flow to prepay loans if the consolidated total net leverage ratio exceeds specified levels. That sweep matters because excess cash flow is precisely what has been funding the repurchase program, so the two uses now compete under a formula rather than at management's discretion. A revolving commitment of about 1.45 billion dollars is available, with 14.2 million dollars allocated to letters of credit. The 4.750% senior notes due 2027 also carry a refinancing requirement the company may satisfy through the revolver or the term facility.

Against that, the repurchase authorization was raised again on July 17, 2025, and the pace of retirement has been running at 10.1 million shares in 2025 and 11.1 million the year before. Whether that pace survives contact with the excess-cash-flow requirement is the single most useful thing to watch in the coming quarters, because the per-share growth rate this business has been delivering depends on it.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Las Vegas Locals / Downtown Las Vegas (reported)

• RRR (RED ROCK RESORTS, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: 70,000 at December 31, 2025, down 1.1% as compared to December 31, 2024, according to the Las Vegas Realtors®. In addition, the Las Vegas metropolitan area population continues to grow, posting a 1.6% growth rate in 2025 over the prior year. In light of uncertainty in the economic outlook stemming from inflation,…
• FY2025 10-K: …popular slot and video games featuring the latest technology. We also believe the high-quality entertainment experience we provide our customers differentiates us from our competitors. Most of our major properties are master-planned for expansion, enabling us to incrementally expand our facilities as demand dictates.…
• WYNN (WYNN RESORTS LTD)
• FY2025 10-K: . Food and beverage revenues decreased $31.3 million, primarily due to a decrease in revenues from nightlife venues at our Las Vegas Operations during the year ended December 31, 2025. The year ended December 31, 2024 included incremental food and beverage revenue at our Las Vegas Operations from Super Bowl-related…
• FY2025 10-K: …LLC or any of the registered intermediary subsidiaries without first registering (for equity ownership of 5% or less), or obtaining licenses and approvals from the Nevada Gaming Authorities. The Nevada Gaming Authorities may investigate any individual who has a material relationship to or material involvement with…
• CZR (CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …operating in the immediate and surrounding areas. There has been increased competition from openings of newly developed casinos and plans of development in certain regions, including new tribal expansions throughout the United States. In Las Vegas, our largest jurisdiction, there have been openings, projects in…
• FY2025 10-K: …Our Regional segment's impairments were due to a decrease in projected future cash flows at certain regional properties primarily due to localized competition within certain markets. We identified three reporting units in the Regional segment with estimated fair values associated with trademarks and goodwill below…
• MGM (MGM Resorts International)
• FY2025 10-K: ; Recruiting, training and retaining well-qualified and motivated employees who provide superior customer service; • Providing unique, "must-see" entertainment attractions; • Investing in digital offerings and opportunities domestically and abroad; and • Developing distinctive and memorable marketing, promotional and…
• FY2025 10-K: …our customers. Also, the growth of retail gaming in areas outside Las Vegas has increased the competition faced by our operations in Las Vegas and elsewhere, including growth in tribal gaming in states such as Florida. In addition, in the last several years local referendums to allow retail gaming have passed in…
• PENN (PENN Entertainment, Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: …table games, including high-limit slots and table games, a baccarat room, and a retail sportsbook. Its unique bars and restaurants include Sorellina by Giada De Laurentiis and Boulevard Food & Drink Hall. Additional features of the new property include an approximately 10,000 square foot, all-ages event center with…
• FY2025 10-K: SegmentsMember us-gaap:CasinoMember penn:WestSegmentMember 2023-01-01 2023-12-31 0000921738 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember us-gaap:CasinoMember penn:MidwestSegmentMember 2023-01-01 2023-12-31 0000921738 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember us-gaap:CasinoMember penn:InteractiveSegmentMember 2023-01-01 2023-12-31 0000921738…
• MCRI (MONARCH CASINO & RESORT, INC)
• FY2025 10-K: …loyalty and generate repeat and cross property guest visits. ​ 7 Table of Contents Competition ​ Reno/Sparks. Gaming competition in the Reno area is intense. Based on information obtained from the December 31, 2025 Gaming Revenue Report published by the Nevada Gaming Control Board, there are approximately 13 casinos…
• FY2025 10-K: …of periodic reports with the Nevada Gaming Authorities; ● the prevention of cheating and fraudulent practices; and ● the provision of a source of state and local revenues through taxation and licensing fees. ​ Changes in such laws, regulations and procedures could have an adverse effect on our gaming operations. ​…

Midwest & South (reported)

• PENN (PENN Entertainment, Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: Lease; and (iv) Greektown Lease. (8) Impairment charges of $ 67.0 million, $ 15.9 million, and $ 6.2 million relate to the Northeast, South, and Midwest seg ments, respectively. See Note 8, "Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets." (9) Consists principally of depreciation expense associated with our Kansas Entertainment…
• FY2025 10-K: …2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0000921738 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember us-gaap:ProductAndServiceOtherMember penn:MidwestSegmentMember 2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0000921738 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember us-gaap:ProductAndServiceOtherMember penn:InteractiveSegmentMember 2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0000921738…
• CZR (CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: FacilityMember czr:CVACreditAgreementMember us-gaap:LineOfCreditMember 2024-04-26 0001590895 us-gaap:LetterOfCreditMember czr:CVACreditAgreementMember us-gaap:LineOfCreditMember 2024-04-26 0001590895 czr:CEISeniorSecuredNotesDue2030Member us-gaap:SeniorNotesMember 2023-02-06 0001590895…
• FY2025 10-K: …a copy of, among other data, our loyalty program database, which includes driver's license numbers and/or social security numbers for a significant number of members in the database (the "Data Incident"). As a result of the Data Incident, numerous putative class action lawsuits have been filed against us purporting…
• RRR (RED ROCK RESORTS, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …of construction and costs of development in exchange for providing development services related to the North Fork Project. In April 2025 the Mono completed its construction financing and we concluded that collection of this development fee was reasonably certain as this fee is stipulated as a permissible use of funds…
• FY2025 10-K: . We also paid $13.8 million related to tax withholding on share-based compensation during the year. Restrictive Covenants Certain customary covenants are included in both the Credit Agreement governing the Credit Facilities and the indentures governing Station LLC's senior notes that, among other things and subject…
• MCRI (MONARCH CASINO & RESORT, INC)
• FY2025 10-K: …10-Q (SEC 0-22088) filed on November 6, 2020. ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ 10.10 ​ Amendment to Fourth Amended and Restated Credit Agreement, dated as of April 30, 2021, among Monarch Casino & Resort, Inc., Golden Road Motor Inn, Inc. and Monarch Growth Inc., as Borrowers, the Lenders named therein, and Wells Fargo Bank, National…
• FY2025 10-K: …iv) a $0.3 million decrease in utility expense. As a percentage of net revenue, SG&A expense decreased to 20.1% in the year ended December 31, 2025 from 20.7% in the corresponding prior year period of 2024. ​ Depreciation and amortization expense increased to $54.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, as…
• CHDN (Churchill Downs Inc)
• FY2025 10-K: …us-gaap:ProductAndServiceOtherMember chdn:ExternalCustomerMember chdn:LiveAndHistoricalRacingMember 2023-01-01 2023-12-31 0000020212 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember us-gaap:ProductAndServiceOtherMember chdn:ExternalCustomerMember chdn:WageringServicesAndSolutionsMember 2023-01-01 2023-12-31 0000020212…
• FY2025 10-K: 2.7 % of Midwest Gaming. Both the Company and High Plaines have participating rights over Rivers Des Plaines, and both must consent to certain operating, investing, and financing decisions. As a result, we account for Rivers Des Plaines using the equity method. The Company's investment in Midwest Gaming is presented…

Online (reported)

• DKNG (DRAFTKINGS INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …available to all our customers to support responsible play. All employees receive annual responsible gaming training, and customer-facing employees receive additional training. Available Information Our internet address is www.DraftKings.com. Our website and the information contained therein or linked thereto are not…
• FY2025 10-K: …Enforcement, Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, the West Virginia Lottery and the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario, respectively. Generally, online gambling in the United States is only lawful when specifically permitted under applicable state law. At the federal level, several laws provide federal law…
• RSI (Rush Street Interactive, Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: …online casino, online sports betting and/or retail sports betting in 16 U.S. states, Colombia, Ontario, Canada, Mexico and Peru. We also provide social gaming, where users can earn or purchase (where permitted) virtual credits to enjoy free-to-play games. Our revenue is predominantly generated from our U.S. and…
• FY2025 10-K: …than sports betting revenue. Our online casino offering consists of a combination of licensed content from leading industry suppliers, customized third-party games, our proprietary online poker platform and a small number of proprietary games that were developed exclusively for us. Third-party content is usually…
• PENN (PENN Entertainment, Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: …do not typically have a material impact to our results of operations and cash flows. 38 Table of Contents Key performance indicators related to online gaming revenue, including OSB and iCasino, are handle, which is a volume indicator, and "win" or "hold" percentage. Our OSB win percentage is in the range of…
• FY2025 10-K: …the overall sports betting, and iCasino industry. Any difficulties these providers face, including the potential of certain network traffic receiving priority over other traffic (i.e., lack of net neutrality), may adversely affect our business, and we exercise little control over these providers, which increases our…
• CHDN (Churchill Downs Inc)
• FY2025 10-K: …chdn:GamingSegmentMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0000020212 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember chdn:PariMutuelHistoricalRacingMember chdn:ExternalCustomerMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0000020212 us-gaap:CorporateNonSegmentMember chdn:PariMutuelHistoricalRacingMember chdn:ExternalCustomerMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31…
• FY2025 10-K: …chdn:LiveAndHistoricalRacingMember 2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0000020212 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember chdn:GamingMember chdn:ExternalCustomerMember chdn:WageringServicesAndSolutionsMember 2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0000020212 us-gaap:OperatingSegmentsMember chdn:GamingMember chdn:ExternalCustomerMember…

Methodology Note

• Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
• Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
• Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
• Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
• Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.