First Busey Corporation (BUSE): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $30.66, First Busey Corporation (BUSE) is priced for 9.6% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BUSE

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBUSE
CompanyFirst Busey Corporation
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$30.66/sh
CompositionBanking 87% / Wealth Management 10% / FirsTech 3%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Return on equity needed9.6%
Return on equity now5.1%
ROE gap+4.5pp
Price-to-book1.06x

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.3% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026).

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.99σ
cohort percentile (of 121 peers)16
sustained it ~10 years at this level77%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.99x3justifies
Earnings1.09x1expensive
Relative0
Growth0.67x1justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=5)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
Bank Fair Value (P/TBV)$24.051.27xyesTBVPS $23.15 × 1.04x (ROE (TTM) 9.7% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.26% allowance/loans → ×0.94)
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.0x / 10.0x / 12.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$45.810.67xyesStage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$30.241.01xyesBV/sh $28.86, ROE (TTM) 9.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$30.940.99xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowthnoRev $0.8B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.6x / 3.2x / 3.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $2.60, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.31 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAsset$41.090.75xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.60 × BVPS $28.86) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsnoEPS $2.60 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativeno
PEG Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $2.60 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$28.111.09xyesEPS $2.60 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The issuer is a funded financial business. Debt, interest, and cash flows are operating inputs, so industrial EV, net-debt, WACC, and free-cash-flow lenses do not apply; value the common-equity claim with book, earnings, capital, and payout economics.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Bankingfinancialequity$635.7bwithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required
Wealth Managementfinancialequity$70.2bwithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required
FirsTechfinancialequity$21.6bwithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required

No unit-level total common-equity value is stated. Each financial unit requires supported standalone common equity, normalized earnings, capital adequacy, and payout capacity. Consolidated debt, interest, and cash are operating balances, not an enterprise-to-equity bridge; company-level book, earnings, capital, and payout lenses remain the coherent cross-checks.

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (dilution)11.1%

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

First Busey grew revenue by nearly half last year, and the honest description of that growth changes how every other number should be read. Revenue reached $666.84 million in 2025, up 46.6%, almost all of it because the bank bought CrossFirst. The deal closed on 1 March 2025 and brought $7.50 billion of total assets, $6.02 billion of portfolio loans net of allowance, and $6.57 billion of deposits. This is a bank in the middle of digesting a business roughly half its own size, and trailing profitability during that digestion is not a reading of what the combined bank earns.

The reason matters, and it is an accounting mechanic worth understanding rather than a euphemism. When a bank acquires loans, the rules require it to book, on day one, an allowance covering the lifetime expected losses on the acquired loans that were not already credit-impaired. The filing describes acquisition expenses for CrossFirst as "comprised primarily of an initial provision to establish an ACL on non-PCD loans (recorded as provision expense)", alongside salaries, benefits and equity compensation. Every dollar of expected loss over the next several years is charged in a single quarter, while the interest income on those same loans arrives over the following years. Reported earnings in the year of a deal are therefore structurally understated relative to the run rate of the business that emerges.

Capital came through the transaction intact. The common equity tier 1 ratio stood at about 12.3% as filed at 31 March 2026, comfortably above the level regulators require, which is what gives the board room to keep returning cash while the integration finishes. It did exactly that in the April quarter, raising the quarterly dividend to $0.26 a share from $0.25, and share repurchases ran alongside it in the first quarter under an existing plan.

The revenue mix is also broader than the bank label suggests. Banking is 87% of revenue, but Wealth Management contributes 10% and FirsTech, a payments and remittance-processing business, another 3%. FirsTech handles "customer service payment processing via telephone; direct debit services; merchant services referral solutions for financial institution partners and their commercial customers; and lockbox remittance processing for mail-based payments." Fee income of that kind does not consume regulatory capital and does not reprice when the Federal Reserve moves, which is precisely the property a rate-sensitive balance sheet wants alongside it.

Finally, the price does not demand very much. The stock changes hands at roughly 1.05 times book value, which sits in the lower half of its peer group on that measure. A bank near book is being asked to earn a return on its capital only a little above what its shareholders require, not to transform itself.

Bear Case

Over the four years to March 2026 the share count grew about 11.8% a year. That is the structural fact a holder has to sit with. The bank is materially larger than it was; each existing owner's claim on it is materially smaller. The CrossFirst transaction is the clearest illustration: net assets acquired came to $760.4 million, and the consideration was almost entirely newly issued common stock rather than cash. Growth bought with equity is growth every existing shareholder helped pay for, and it only creates value if the acquired earnings exceed what the issued shares would otherwise have been worth.

That test is not yet passed on the reported numbers. Trailing net income is $215.2 million, on a balance sheet carrying roughly 14.74 billion dollars of deposits at 31 March 2026. Some of that shortfall is the merger accounting, which front-loads credit provisions. Some of it may not be. The distinction only resolves over several more quarters of clean reporting, and until it does, the bull case rests on an argument about what the numbers would look like rather than on what they do look like.

Credit is moving in the wrong direction while that argument runs. Potential problem loans rose to "$166.5 million, or 1.2% of portfolio loans, as of March 31, 2026, compared to $116.4 million, or 0.9%" in the prior comparison, an increase of roughly a third in the dollar amount. The allowance stands at about 1.27% of loans, which is thin cover if that trend continues rather than reverses. A recently acquired loan book is also the least well understood part of any bank's portfolio, because the credit culture that underwrote it was somebody else's.

The funding side gave a little ground too. Total deposits were 14.74 billion dollars at 31 March 2026 against 14.91 billion at the end of 2025. A single quarter of deposit decline is noise. It is the kind of noise worth tracking closely in a bank whose deposit base was assembled through acquisition, because acquired depositors are the ones most likely to leave when the sign on the branch changes.

The competitive backdrop makes the strategy harder rather than easier. Every regional bank in the comparison set is doing the same thing: RNST grew revenue 70.8%, UMBF 72.5%, CNOB 56.8% and ONB 43.6%, growth rates that only come from consolidation. When an entire cohort is buying the same scarce targets at the same time, the price of the next deal goes up and the returns on it go down. Busey's growth model requires a supply of sellers at sensible prices, and it is competing for them against six other buyers with the same idea.

The valuation offers little cushion in exchange. At roughly 1.05 times book the stock is not expensive, but a bank trading near book has already had most of its optimism removed, which means there is not much of a discount left to absorb a credit surprise. The equity is only worth book value if the loans are worth what the balance sheet says they are.

Valuation

A bank is not valued on a multiple of profit; it is valued on what it earns against the capital it must hold. So the reference point is book value, and First Busey trades at roughly 1.05 times it. Book value works out near 27.47 dollars a share and tangible book near 22.06. What the market is asking, in plain terms, is that the bank earn a return on its capital modestly better than what shareholders require for holding it. Right now it is earning less than that, and the gap between the two is the whole investment question.

Set against the peer group on the same measure, that price-to-book sits in the lower half of the distribution. And the persistence record for a requirement of this kind is comparatively forgiving: roughly 77% of firms earning at this level held it for something like a decade. This is not a demanding bet on an exceptional outcome. It is a bet on a normal one.

The methods used to triangulate the value agree to an unusual degree, which is itself worth noting. Not one family reads the price as expensive. The earnings-power and forward cash-flow methods land above today's price, the peer-multiple methods well above it, and only the asset-value lens sits below, with the price about 13% above its central estimate. When every frame lands at or above the price, the analytical question stops being whether the stock is cheap and becomes why the market is discounting it anyway.

The answer is visible in the credit and integration lines rather than in the valuation. The allowance for credit losses runs at about 1.27% of loans. Potential problem loans reached $166.5 million at 31 March 2026, or 1.2% of the portfolio, up from 0.9% previously. Deposits stood at 14.74 billion dollars, down from 14.91 billion three months earlier. Those are the three numbers a bank investor reads first, and two of the three moved the wrong way in the most recent quarter.

Against them sits the capital position, which is where solvency lives for a bank rather than in coverage ratios or net debt. Common equity tier 1 stood at about 12.3% as filed at 31 March 2026, and that cushion is what funds the payout: the quarterly dividend went to $0.26 a share from $0.25 in April, with buybacks running alongside. The complication is that the buyback is not the dominant force on the share count. Shares outstanding have grown about 11.8% a year over four years, because acquisitions were paid for in stock. Per-share value at this bank has been determined by acquisition arithmetic, not by capital return, and the next few quarters of clean post-integration reporting are what will show whether that arithmetic worked.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results are due on 28 July 2026. It is the fifth full quarter since the CrossFirst acquisition closed on 1 March 2025, which makes it one of the first prints where the year-over-year comparison is closer to like-for-like rather than dominated by the addition of a $7.50 billion balance sheet. The integration-cost line and the credit provision are the two places the quality of the deal will show first.

The credit trend is the specific thing to read. Potential problem loans stood at 166.5 million dollars, or 1.2% of portfolio loans, at 31 March 2026, against 116.4 million and 0.9% previously. If that number stabilises, the merger-accounting explanation for depressed reported earnings holds. If it keeps climbing, the more uncomfortable reading, that the acquired book was underwritten to a different standard, gains ground. Deposits over the same period slipped to 14.74 billion dollars from 14.91 billion at the end of 2025, so the funding line is worth checking in the same print.

Capital return is the steadier signal. The board raised the quarterly dividend to $0.26 a share from $0.25 alongside first-quarter results on 28 April 2026, and repurchases continued under the existing plan during the quarter. A board raising a dividend while finishing an integration is expressing a view about the earnings power on the other side of it, and the common equity tier 1 ratio of about 12.3% as filed at 31 March 2026 is what makes that view affordable.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Banking (reported)

Wealth Management (reported)

FirsTech (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 results and dividend declaration, 28 April 2026 · FY2025 results · Q1 2026 dividend declaration, 28 April 2026 · company results calendar, 2026 · Q1 2026 dividend declaration

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