Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV (BUD): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV (BUD) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BUD
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | BUD |
| Company | Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV |
| Current price | $79.25/sh |
| Composition | North America 24% / Middle Americas 29% / South America 20% / EMEA 16% / Asia Pacific 10% / Global Export & Holding Companies 1% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 9.0% |
| Operating margin today | 26.0% |
| Margin compression implied | -17.0pp |
| Multiple paid | 13x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.8% sits below it).
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~2.9%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.75σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by earnings-power and growth-DCF value, while asset-based lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.75x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.22x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.35x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.99x | 5 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Earnings, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=19)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $85.22 | 0.93x | yes | FCF base $11.2B, growth 2% (input: historical growth), terminal g 2.3%, WACC 9.3%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $79.66 | 0.99x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 7.6x / 9.6x / 11.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $103.48 | 0.77x | yes | P/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 18.6x / 22.0x / 25.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $424.06 | 0.19x | yes | DPS $2.25, g=8.7% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $56.25 | 1.41x | yes | Stage 1: 11% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $45.39 | 1.75x | yes | BV/sh $48.41, ROE (TTM) 8.7%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $43.96 | 1.80x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $55.26 | 1.43x | yes | Rev $59.3B, growth 2% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.3x / 2.7x / 3.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $41.40 | 1.91x | yes | EPS $3.45, growth 11% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.68 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $64.43 | 1.23x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $14.64B × (1−25%) / WACC 9.3% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $43.72 | 1.81x | yes | BV $48.41 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 8.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.6%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $61.30 | 1.29x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $3.45 × BVPS $48.41) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $112.58 | 0.70x | yes | EBITDA $15.40B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $65.88 | 1.20x | yes | FCF $11227.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $89.68 | 0.88x | yes | EPS $3.45 × (8.5 + 2×11.3%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $70.08 | 1.13x | yes | BV $48.41 × (ROIC 13.4% / WACC 9.3%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $58.76 | 1.35x | yes | Revenue $59.32B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $58.26 | 1.36x | yes | EPS $3.45 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 11.3% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 16.9x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $37.30 | 2.12x | yes | EPS $3.45 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $61.4b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 5.32x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 3.98x |
| Interest coverage | 3.0x |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
At about $81, AB InBev trades near 13 times operating income, low enough that the price sits below what even a steady 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. Most valuation methods land at or above the price; only the pure asset-based reads call it expensive, which is typical for a brand-heavy business carried below its earning power.
The first quarter of 2026 showed the model working. Revenue rose 5.8% organically to $15.3 billion on premiumization rather than volume, normalized EBITDA grew 5.3% with a stable 35.6% margin, and underlying EPS jumped about 21%. Beer volumes grew modestly with records in Mexico and Brazil.
The balance sheet is the swing factor. Net debt is roughly $61 billion, the legacy of past mega-acquisitions, and management is steadily paying it down toward about 2 times EBITDA while running a $6 billion buyback and raising the dividend 15%. Free cash flow of more than $11 billion funds all of it.
Bull Case
Look at where the price sits against the valuation methods, because for AB InBev the spread tells a value story, not a growth one. At about $81 (June 27, 2026) the stock trades near 13 times company-wide operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a steady decline in operating profit would warrant. Run the methods and most of them land at or above the price: a perpetual-growth DCF near $85, an earnings-power value near $64, a sector relative read above $100, and a return-on-invested-capital justified book value near $70. The only family that calls the stock expensive is the pure asset-based read, which anchors on book value and understates a business whose value is its brands, not its breweries. When the cash-flow and earnings frames cluster around or above the price and only the accounting-asset frame disagrees, the price is undemanding for the earnings the company actually produces.
The earnings power behind that is genuinely large and global. AB InBev is the largest brewer in the world, holding the number one share of beer by volume in the United States, Mexico, and Brazil, three of the largest beer markets, with sales in over 150 countries (FY2025 20-F, accession 0001193125-26-088105). That scale produces a normalized EBITDA margin around 35.6% and free cash flow north of $11 billion. The growth that matters now is premiumization: first-quarter 2026 revenue rose 5.8% organically on higher revenue per hectoliter and megabrand strength even as volumes grew only modestly, and underlying EPS jumped about 21%. Consumers trading up to premium brands like Michelob Ultra is more valuable than raw volume because it expands margin, and the company's BEES digital ordering platform deepens its grip on the distribution channel.
The capital-return turn is the catalyst the value case has been waiting for. The legacy of the SABMiller acquisition was a mountain of debt, and for years all the free cash flow went to paying it down. Now, with net debt heading toward about 2 times EBITDA, the company has room to return cash: a $6 billion buyback is underway and the dividend was raised 15%. A debt-laden business deleveraging into a buyback is the classic setup where shrinking share count and a re-rating can compound shareholder returns even with only mid-single-digit operating growth.
Bear Case
The competitive pressure on AB InBev is broad, and it is eating at beer from several directions at once. In spirits and ready-to-drink, Diageo and the broader cocktail and hard-seltzer category keep taking share of the total alcohol occasion, especially among younger drinkers who increasingly reach for tequila, canned cocktails, or nothing at all. In the United States, Constellation Brands owns the rights to the Modelo and Corona franchises that have been winning share, so the fastest-growing import beers do not benefit AB InBev domestically. And the broader beer category in developed markets has been in slow structural volume decline for years, which is why the company's own growth now comes from price and premium mix rather than from selling more beer. A business whose volumes are flat to down is one bad pricing cycle away from flat earnings, and the price, while low, still assumes the premiumization engine keeps offsetting the volume erosion.
The balance sheet is the structural vulnerability that magnifies any stumble. Net debt of roughly $61 billion is the lingering cost of the SABMiller deal, and while leverage is coming down, a large slice of free cash flow is still committed to interest and deleveraging before it reaches shareholders. The 20-F shows the company funds itself with about $71.5 billion of fixed-rate debt, which protects it from rising rates but is an enormous absolute obligation (FY2025 20-F, accession 0001193125-26-088105). The buyback and the 15% dividend increase are real, but they compete with the deleveraging ambition for the same cash, and any unexpected EBITDA softness would force a choice between them.
Then there is the geographic and currency exposure that cuts both ways. AB InBev earns a large share of its profit in emerging markets, Brazil, Mexico, much of Latin America and Africa, where the volume growth is but where currencies are volatile and consumer demand is cyclical. A strong dollar translates those local-currency earnings into fewer dollars, and a recession in a key market like Brazil or Mexico hits volume and mix together. The asset-based valuation methods already land below the current price, signaling that on a hard-asset basis the stock is not the obvious bargain the operating multiple implies, and the value case leans on the earnings-power and DCF methods being right about durable cash flows. If beer's structural decline accelerates, premiumization stalls, or a currency or demand shock hits the emerging-market profit base, the low multiple turns out to be low for a reason, and the heavy debt load leaves less room to absorb it.
Valuation
AB InBev prices like a deleveraging value name. At about $81 the stock trades near 13 times company-wide operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a steady 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. In plain terms, the market is pricing the business as if it shrinks, while the company is actually growing revenue and EBITDA in the mid-single digits and underlying EPS much faster as deleveraging reduces the interest drag.
The method families lean supportive. The growth-DCF reads bracket the price, with a perpetual-growth read near $85 and an exit-multiple read near $81. The earnings-power value lands near $64 and a return-on-invested-capital justified book value near $70, both above or near the price. The relative methods land well above, with a sector P/E read above $100 and an EV/EBITDA read above $110. The only family that calls the stock clearly expensive is the pure asset-based read, near $44 to $46, which anchors on a book value of about $48.41 per share and a return on equity around 8.7%, understating a business whose value is its brands rather than its physical assets. The blended read across the applicable methods is near $68, below the current price but well above the asset floor.
The honest conclusion: the price is undemanding for the earnings AB InBev produces, supported by the cash-flow and relative frames and contradicted only by the accounting-asset frame. The bet is that premiumization keeps revenue and EBITDA growing in the mid-single digits, that deleveraging toward about 2 times EBITDA continues to lift EPS and free up cash for buybacks and the dividend, and that the emerging-market profit base holds. If that plays out, the low operating multiple plus the capital-return turn make for an attractive total return without needing a re-rating. The risk is on the volume and balance-sheet side: a structural acceleration of beer's decline, a stalled premium mix, or an emerging-market currency or demand shock would pressure the EBITDA the valuation leans on, and the heavy debt amplifies the downside.
Catalysts
The latest print was a record-EPS quarter driven by premiumization. First-quarter 2026 revenue rose 5.8% organically to $15.267 billion on higher revenue per hectoliter, normalized EBITDA grew 5.3% to $5.437 billion with a stable 35.6% margin, and underlying EPS jumped 20.8% to $0.97. Beer volumes grew 1.2% organically with record highs in Mexico and Brazil. (tickeron, Globe and Mail) Management reaffirmed full-year 2026 guidance of 4% to 8% organic EBITDA growth.
Capital allocation is the catalyst the value case keys on. AB InBev announced a $6 billion share buyback on October 30, 2025 and had completed about $635 million of it by early February 2026, while proposing a dividend of roughly €1.15 per share, a 15% increase over the prior year, and reiterating its ambition to cut net debt toward about 2 times EBITDA. (Simply Wall St) The combination of deleveraging, a buyback, and a rising dividend is the structural shift in how the cash gets used.
Analyst sentiment is constructive, with a Moderate Buy consensus and one recent target at $105 implying meaningful upside. (TipRanks) The things to watch over the coming quarters: whether premiumization and revenue-per-hectoliter growth keep offsetting flat-to-soft volumes, the pace of deleveraging and the buyback, US trends for Bud Light, Michelob Ultra, and Busch Light, the adoption of the BEES digital platform, and currency and demand conditions in the key emerging markets of Brazil and Mexico.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- ABEV (AMBEV S.A.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TAP (MOLSON COORS BEVERAGE CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SAM (THE BOSTON BEER COMPANY, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- STZ (CONSTELLATION BRANDS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DEO (DIAGEO plc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MNST (Monster Beverage Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CELH (CELSIUS HOLDINGS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CCEP (COCA-COLA EUROPACIFIC PARTNERS PLC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.