BrightSpring Health Services, Inc. (BTSG): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $60.64, BrightSpring Health Services, Inc. (BTSG) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~7.5 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BTSG

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBTSG
CompanyBrightSpring Health Services, Inc.
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$60.64/sh
CompositionPharmacy Solutions 89% / Provider Services 11%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.4%
Operating margin today3.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-1.7pp
Must persist for7.5y
Multiple paid31x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 5: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.9% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 115 peers)73

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.03x5expensive
Earnings4.82x5expensive
Relative2.02x2expensive
Growth0.69x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$126.060.48xyesFCF base $0.5B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.9%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$86.100.70xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 25.5x / 28.5x / 31.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 22.44x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 33x), scenarios: 18.0x / 22.4x / 26.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16.94x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$20.003.03xyesBV/sh $10.35, ROE (TTM) 17.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$27.432.21xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$87.990.69xyesRev $14.4B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.8x / 1.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$19.803.06xyesEPS $1.65, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=16.39 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$4.7712.71xyesNormalized EBIT (3y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.24B × (1−7%) / WACC 7.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$27.312.22xyesBV $10.35 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 17.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$19.613.09xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.65 × BVPS $10.35) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.49B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$12.594.82xyesFCF $402.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$9.606.32xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.35B (FCF $0.40B − SBC $0.05B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$53.241.14xyesEPS $1.65 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$4.0315.05xyesBV $10.35 × (ROIC 3.1% / WACC 7.9%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $14.37B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$61.880.98xyesEPS $1.65 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$17.843.40xyesEPS $1.65 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Pharmacy Solutionsoperatingenterprise$11.4bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Provider Servicesoperatingenterprise$1.5bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.7b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.00x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.71x
Interest coverage2.9x
Share count CAGR (dilution)7.0%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

One number decides this investment, and it is 2.4%. That is the share of each revenue dollar BrightSpring keeps as operating profit. On $13.65 billion of revenue that is a business whose income statement is mostly pharmaceutical cost passing from a wholesaler to a patient. The arithmetic runs generously in one direction, though: lift that 2.4% by a single percentage point and operating profit rises by close to half again, without selling one additional prescription.

There is evidence the lift is happening rather than being hoped for. The annual filing attributes the year's profit growth to revenue rising with "selling, general, and administrative expenses growing less than the volume growth rate and demonstrating economies of scale". That is the whole thesis in one clause. A distribution-shaped business earns its return by adding volume to a fixed cost base, and the fixed cost base here covers pharmacy licensure, payor contracting, compliance infrastructure and a national logistics network that a smaller competitor has to build from scratch.

The scale itself is the moat, and management describes it as diversification rather than dominance: "Our scale provides complementary diversification and risk mitigation in payor sources, end markets, and geographies, while also creating exposure and access to a broader set of market growth opportunities." The Pharmacy Solutions segment runs "long-term institutional pharmacies, hospice pharmacies, specialty oncology pharmacies, and home infusion centers", four channels that sell into overlapping referral relationships. A hospice referral becomes a hospice pharmacy patient; a discharge becomes a home infusion patient. The customer acquisition cost of the second service is close to zero once the first exists.

Growth against the comparison set is not close. Revenue has been compounding near 28%, against ENSG at 19.2%, PACS at 22.2%, ADUS at 19.6%, AVAH at 20.5% and OPCH at 9.3%. BrightSpring is simultaneously the largest company in that group by revenue and the fastest growing, which is an unusual pair.

Execution has matched it so far. Management has raised guidance on nine separate occasions and set new guidance twice since 2024, a cadence that is either genuine conservatism in the initial number or genuine outperformance against it, and either reading favours the holder. First-quarter revenue was $3.61 billion, and the full-year outlook went up with it.

The portfolio has also been simplified rather than sprawled. The Community Living business went to Sevita for $835 million in cash, finalised in March 2026 after the FTC required the buyer to shed 126 intermediate care facilities. What remains is a pharmacy business with a home and community care business attached, and the pharmacy business is the one compounding.

Bear Case

Omnicare is a division of CVS Health. The 10-K names it directly as a nationwide competitor, and that single ownership fact frames the whole competitive problem: BrightSpring competes for institutional pharmacy volume against a business sitting inside an insurer, a pharmacy benefit manager and a retail chain. The filing is candid that "some of our competitors have vertically integrated business models with commercial" insurers, and that the owners of skilled nursing facilities are themselves "entering the facility-based pharmacy market, particularly in areas of their geographic concentration". A customer that becomes a competitor is a different kind of threat from a competitor that becomes larger.

In home infusion, the comparison is more direct. OPCH runs $5.67 billion of revenue at a 5.8% operating margin, growing 9.3%. CON earns 15.6%, CHE 12.9%, AVAH 10.9% and ADUS 9.8%. BrightSpring is the largest business in that group and the thinnest by margin at 2.4%. Scale is supposed to buy pricing power; here it has bought volume, and the profitability gap between BrightSpring and its smaller rivals has not closed.

Thin margins are where reimbursement risk becomes existential rather than annoying. Substantial revenue comes from Medicare and Medicaid, and the filing warns that changes to "Medicare and Medicaid rates or methods governing Medicare and Medicaid payments for our services could materially adversely affect our business". Work the arithmetic: at 2.4%, a reimbursement change worth one percentage point of revenue removes about 40% of operating profit. There is no cushion in the structure of the business, only in its growth rate.

The referral base is not contracted either. In the company's own words, "Our referral sources are not, and cannot be, obligated to refer patients to us and may refer their patients to other providers." Every dollar of that 28% growth rests on relationships that can be redirected by a hospital system deciding to keep the pharmacy revenue.

What the price requires of all this is demanding. The market is paying roughly 52 times company-wide operating income, a multiple that sits at the very top of the peer distribution and well beyond its upper quartile, and that implies growth held at the company's self-funding ceiling for something like eleven years. Of comparable fast-growers, only about 14% sustained that kind of pace for a decade. The bet is not that the business is good. It is that a good business stays this good for eleven years without a reimbursement change, a vertically integrated competitor or a lost referral network interrupting it.

The balance sheet does not give much room for a mistake. Net borrowings run to 1.63 billion dollars, about 5.28 times operating profit, and operating income covers interest only about twice. Meanwhile the share count has grown roughly 7.8% a year over the last three years. The filing is explicit about the direction of travel: "You may be diluted by the future issuance of additional common stock in connection with our incentive plans, acquisitions or otherwise." Roughly 1.3 billion shares sit authorised but unissued. A roll-up that pays for acquisitions in stock, at a multiple this high, is at least buying cheaply with expensive currency. That works until the currency reprices.

Valuation

The market is paying roughly 52 times what BrightSpring earns before interest and tax. That is not a multiple you pay for a distribution business; it is a multiple you pay for a compounder, and it embeds a specific commitment: operating growth held at the company's self-funding ceiling for something like eleven years. The sensitivity around that is worth knowing. Each additional percentage point of growth pulls roughly two years off the requirement, and each point lost adds them back.

How rare is that commitment? The multiple sits at the very top of its peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. Looking at how such runs have actually ended, only about 14% of comparable fast-growers held that pace for anything like a decade. That is not a prediction of failure. It is the base rate a holder is betting against.

The methods used to triangulate a business like this split cleanly, and the split is informative. Only the forward-looking cash-flow methods reach today's price. The peer-multiple methods land well under it, with the price sitting about 85% above their central estimate, and the asset-value lens lands at roughly a quarter of the price. That is the signature of a durability premium: every static frame that values what exists today says the price is far past it, and the only frames that reach the price are the ones that credit years of future compounding.

Both of the static lenses are structurally handicapped here, which is worth saying plainly rather than treating their verdict as decisive. The earnings-power method capitalises a normalised operating profit with no growth at all, which for a business compounding revenue near 28% removes the entire thesis before it starts. The asset lens runs off book value, and this is a services roll-up whose value lives in payor contracts, pharmacy licences and referral relationships rather than in anything on the balance sheet. Their reads are real information about how little of the price is covered by demonstrated economics; they are not an independent verdict on the business.

Underneath, the composition is lopsided. Pharmacy Solutions is 89% of revenue and Provider Services 11%, and the 2.4% consolidated operating margin reflects the pharmacy mix, where drug acquisition cost dominates the revenue line. Against the comparison set that margin is the lowest: CON at 15.6%, CHE at 12.9%, AVAH at 10.9%, ADUS at 9.8%, ENSG at 8.5%, OPCH at 5.8%. The premium in the multiple is not being paid for current profitability. It is being paid for the belief that scale converts into it.

Solvency sets the outer edge of the downside. Gross borrowings of 2.52 billion dollars against 889 million of liquid assets leave net borrowings near 1.63 billion, about 5.28 times operating profit, with interest covered roughly twice and no cash burn. There was 475.0 million dollars of undrawn revolver capacity at the end of 2025. The share count is going up, not down, at about 7.8% a year over three years, so the per-share arithmetic gets no help from capital return. Coverage of two times is adequate for a business growing; it is thin for one that stops.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results arrive on 31 July 2026, before the market opens. The bar was set on 1 May, when first-quarter revenue came in at $3.61 billion and management raised full-year 2026 guidance to a revenue range of $14.73 billion to $15.23 billion and adjusted EBITDA of $795 million to $825 million. Given a raise cadence of nine guidance increases since 2024, the market has learned to expect another one, which is its own kind of risk: the price already contains the raise.

The portfolio question was settled earlier this year. The Community Living business went to Sevita in an all-cash deal worth $835 million, announced in January 2025 and finalised in March 2026 after the Federal Trade Commission required the buyer to divest 126 intermediate care facilities. The regulatory delay is the useful detail: antitrust review of post-acute care consolidation is now slow enough to matter to deal timing, and BrightSpring's own growth strategy runs on acquisitions.

The variable with the most leverage on the numbers is not a company event at all. It is reimbursement policy for Medicare Part D and Medicaid, which the company flags as a direct determinant of Pharmacy Solutions profitability. On a 2.4% operating margin, that policy file moves earnings more than any operational decision management makes this year.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Pharmacy Solutions (reported)

Provider Services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release, 1 May 2026 · transaction close, March 2026 · company announcement, 8 July 2026

View the full interactive BTSG report on boothcheck