BENTLEY SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED (BSY): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $36.93, BENTLEY SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED (BSY) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~7.8 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BSY

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBSY
CompanyBENTLEY SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$36.93/sh
CompositionEnterprise subscriptions 41% / SELECT subscriptions 18% / Term license subscriptions 32% / Perpetual licenses 3% / Services - Recurring 1% / Services - Other 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)13.4%
Operating margin today23.6%
Margin compression (value-band)-10.2pp
Must persist for7.8y
Multiple paid34x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 11: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.7% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.22σ
cohort percentile (of 188 peers)62

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.17x4expensive
Earnings3.47x5expensive
Relative1.36x5expensive
Growth0.82x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$44.870.82xyesFCF base $0.5B, growth 13% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.4%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$46.170.80xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 30.9x / 32.9x / 34.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$31.461.17xyesP/E 35x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 29.0x / 35.0x / 41.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 25x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$9.783.78xyesBV/sh $3.75, ROE (TTM) 24.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$15.822.33xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$34.731.06xyesRev $1.6B, growth 13% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 6.1x / 7.4x / 8.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$16.332.26xyesEPS $0.90, growth 18% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.25 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$4.268.67xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.26B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$14.362.57xyesBV $3.75 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 24.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$8.724.23xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.90 × BVPS $3.75) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$27.221.36xyesEBITDA $0.39B × sector EV/EBITDA 25.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$13.302.78xyesFCF $498.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$10.653.47xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.42B (FCF $0.50B − SBC $0.08B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$29.041.27xyesEPS $0.90 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$1.3427.56xyesBV $3.75 × (ROIC 3.0% / WACC 8.4%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelative$40.000.92xyesRevenue $1.60B × sector P/S 8.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$24.491.51xyesEPS $0.90 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 18.1% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 27.2x
Earnings YieldEarnings$9.733.80xyesEPS $0.90 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Bentley Systems (infrastructure engineering software)operatingenterprise1.5B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.1b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)3.59x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.83x
Interest coverage19.7x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.0%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with the objection, because it is the honest one. Bentley Systems is a ten billion dollar software company selling into disciplines where far larger vendors already operate, and it says so itself. The FY2025 10-K lists the field by application: "our key competitors in Industrial applications include Hexagon AB and the AVEVA unit of Schneider Electric", with Autodesk named in commercial and facilities work and Dassault Systèmes among the mining competitors. A reasonable investor looks at that list and concludes the smaller party eventually gets squeezed.

Then look at what the accounts actually show. The trailing operating margin is 26.7%, ahead of ADSK at 25.1% and several times what GWRE manages at 8.2%, QTWO at 8.0% or AVPT at 9.6% on comparable revenue bases. A company that were being squeezed by larger rivals would show it in the margin first, and this one converts more of each revenue dollar into operating profit than almost everything in its cohort. Whatever is protecting that margin is not scale, because Bentley has less of it than the competitors it names.

What protects it is the customer and the timescale. Infrastructure engineering models outlive the engineers who build them. A bridge design, a rail corridor, a water network: these are assets maintained for forty years by organisations that need the original model to remain readable, and switching the software means re-creating decades of work. The revenue mix reflects exactly that stickiness, with enterprise subscriptions at roughly 41% of revenue, term license subscriptions near 32%, and the legacy SELECT program near 18%, so close to nine-tenths of what comes in each year is contracted to come in again. The company's stated plan is to keep pushing the same direction: "We intend to continue to expand the reach of our E365 subscription within virtually all of our enterprise accounts", and the 10-K reports that new business from small and medium accounts, including hundreds of new logos each quarter, has become a substantial contributor to recurring-revenue growth.

The capital structure is a quiet asset that most readers will miss. The FY2025 10-K describes "a private offering of $ 690,000 of 0.125 % convertible senior notes due 2026" completed on January 26, 2021, alongside a later issue carrying an effective interest rate of 0.864%. Operating profit covers interest roughly thirty times over. Borrowing costs fixed in the 2021 window are money that cannot be raised on those terms today, and every year the notes remain outstanding is a year of financing that a competitor issuing paper now cannot match.

Capital allocation is unusual for software in the same direction. The share count has fallen about 0.7% a year over the four years to March 2026, which is a genuinely rare thing in an industry where stock-based pay normally pushes the count the other way, and the board declared a second-quarter 2026 dividend in May. The concession the bull has to make is on growth: full-year 2025 revenue of $1.50 billion was up 10.99%, and every domestic peer in the set grew faster. The answer is that Bentley is not competing for the same budget. Public infrastructure programs are appropriated, not discretionary, and they get spent slowly and for a long time.

Bear Case

The advantage being worn away here is the one that never appears in a product comparison: the ability to raise prices inside an installed base without anyone negotiating back. Bentley's original economics rested on SELECT, an annual subscription attached to licences that customers already owned, renewed largely as a matter of course. That program is now roughly 18% of revenue, while enterprise subscriptions account for about 41%. An enterprise agreement is a negotiated instrument. It is sized, discounted, benchmarked against alternatives and renewed by a procurement department rather than by an engineering manager. The revenue may be equally recurring. The pricing conversation is not the same conversation.

The evidence that something is loosening sits in the growth rate. Full-year 2025 revenue rose 10.99%. Over their trailing years, PTC grew 27.7%, GEN 27.1%, AVPT 27.1%, GWRE 24.9%, APPF 20.7%, ADSK 18.3% and QTWO 14.0%. Bentley is the slowest grower in its own comparison set and it is not the smallest company in it, which removes the usual explanation. The 10-K names the mechanism it fears in plain language, warning that competitive or ownership change "could lead to pricing pressure, erosion of our margins, loss of accounts, and loss of market share".

Now hold that against what the price requires. At roughly 27 times company-wide operating income, the arithmetic needs operating profit growth pinned at the ceiling a business can fund from its own cash flow, held there for about six years. Only about 29% of comparable fast-growing companies sustained a pace like that for that long. And here is the specific tension: revenue is growing near 11%, so operating profit cannot grow at a fast-grower's rate unless the margin keeps expanding. The margin is already 26.7%, ahead of most of the cohort. The bet embedded in this price is therefore not really a growth bet. It is a bet on margin expansion from a level that is already high, in a business whose own filing flags margin erosion as the competitive risk.

The financing advantage has a date on it. The 0.125% convertible notes described in the annual report reach their 2026 maturity this year, and the interest coverage near thirty times is a function of a coupon negotiated in a market that no longer exists. Whatever replaces that paper will cost more, and the coverage figure will move accordingly. That is not a solvency question at this size. It is a reminder that one of the numbers making the balance sheet look effortless is a legacy of timing rather than a permanent feature.

Two smaller exposures round it out. The company's principal supplier of cloud services is Microsoft under a multi-year agreement, which concentrates the delivery layer of a business whose customers are moving from desktop files to hosted models. And on unauthorised use, the 10-K concedes it is "unable to measure the full extent to which unauthorized use of our software products exists", which is a candid way of saying some portion of the installed base has never been a paying customer and the size of it is unknown.

The counter deserves stating. Renewal rates in this category are genuinely high, infrastructure spending is slow-moving and politically durable, and a company earning this margin at this size is not a company in retreat. The bear position is narrower: a price that needs six years of ceiling-rate profit growth, funded by margin expansion, from a business growing revenue at eleven percent, has left itself no room for the ordinary deceleration that its own filing describes as the competitive risk.

Valuation

Almost everything this business sells renews. Enterprise subscriptions, term licences and the older SELECT program together account for roughly nine-tenths of revenue, which makes the valuation question less about whether the money arrives and more about how fast it grows once it does. At the current price the market is paying about 27 times company-wide operating income. Invert that at a 9.56% cost of capital and the assumption embedded is operating profit growth held at the ceiling the business can fund from its own cash flow, sustained for about six years. The rate itself is within what this company has recently produced. The duration is the demand, and the calculation is comparatively firm about it: each percentage point of assumed cost of capital moves that horizon by only about 1.8 years.

The methods sort into two clear camps. Peer multiples and the forward-growth approaches land at or above where the shares trade, while the asset-value and earnings-power methods land far beneath them. Both of the low readings have specific mechanisms worth understanding rather than dismissing. Book equity is $3.81 a share, which for a software company that has bought its way into adjacent engineering disciplines records the accounting residue of past deals and essentially nothing about what the software now earns. The earnings-power reading normalizes operating profit across five years with one-time charges added back, credits no growth whatsoever, and capitalizes the result: that normalized figure is roughly 0.25 billion dollars against a trailing operating profit near 410 million dollars. The distance between those two numbers is the whole ramp of the last five years, and whether you find the price reasonable depends almost entirely on which of them you think describes the business.

Against its cohort the multiple sits in the lower half of the peer range, and the profitability comparison explains part of why. On operating margin this business runs 26.7%, ahead of ADSK at 25.1% and far ahead of GWRE at 8.2%, APPF at 17.1% and QTWO at 8.0%, but behind PTC at 38.7% and GEN at 42.4%. So it is a high-margin, slow-growth software company being priced below the group's typical multiple, which is internally consistent. The disagreement is not about what the business is. It is about how much longer the profit line can outrun the revenue line.

Solvency bounds rather than adds. Operating profit covers interest roughly thirty times, cash generation is positive, and the borrowings are convertible notes struck at 0.125% and an effective 0.864% rather than ordinary corporate paper. The share count has been falling about 0.7% a year across the four years to March 2026, so the per-share arithmetic has been working quietly in the holder's favour. The item to carry forward is the 2026 maturity on the cheaper of those two note issues, because the coverage figure above is partly a souvenir of when the money was raised.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results are scheduled for August 6, 2026, before the market opens, a date the company confirmed on July 8. The most recent print, delivered May 7, 2026, put first-quarter revenue at $424.2 million. For the full year 2025 revenue reached $1.50 billion, up 10.99%, with net income of $277.9 million, up 18.35% on the prior year. Profit growing faster than revenue is the pattern the current price depends on continuing, which makes the margin line in the August release more informative than the revenue line.

Analyst positioning has moved in both directions this summer. BMO Capital lowered its price target to $41 from $45 on July 24, 2026, while BNP Paribas initiated coverage at Outperform on June 23, 2026. Both targets sit above where the shares currently trade, which lines up with the growth-based methods discussed earlier landing above the price while the profit-normalizing ones land well beneath it. The street is crediting the continuation; the conservative frames are not.

On the business itself, two items in May are worth noting for what they signal about the customer base. The board declared a second-quarter 2026 dividend on May 22, 2026, and on May 19 the company announced a partnership with the Western Cape Department of Infrastructure. Public infrastructure agencies are the customer type that anchors the recurring base: they procure slowly, they standardize on a platform for a generation of assets, and once the asset models live in a given system, the relationship is measured in decades rather than contract terms.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Bentley Systems (infrastructure engineering software) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Bentley Systems full-year 2025 results · Bentley Systems announcement, July 8, 2026 · Bentley Systems press release, May 22, 2026 · Bentley Systems FY2025 Form 10-K · Bentley Systems press release, July 8, 2026 · Bentley Systems first-quarter 2026 results, May 7, 2026 · BMO Capital research note, July 24, 2026; BNP Paribas research note, June 23, 2026 · Bentley Systems press releases, May 19 and May 22, 2026

View the full interactive BSY report on boothcheck