BOOT BARN HOLDINGS, INC. (BOOT): what the price requires
At today's price, BOOT BARN HOLDINGS, INC. (BOOT) is priced for +24.6% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-17 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BOOT
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | BOOT |
| Company | BOOT BARN HOLDINGS, INC. |
| Current price | $164.36/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 4.4% |
| Operating margin today | 14.7% |
| Margin compression implied | -10.3pp |
| Implied growth | 24.6% |
| Multiple paid | 17x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 10, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 11.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.8pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~11.8%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.21σ |
| cohort percentile (of 210 peers) | 46 |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 31% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.95x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.07x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.20x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.75x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=16)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $303.87 | 0.54x | yes | FCF base $0.3B, growth 18% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.0%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $219.64 | 0.75x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 18.2x / 20.2x / 22.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $136.82 | 1.20x | yes | P/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.3x / 20.0x / 23.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $79.47 | 2.07x | yes | BV/sh $42.92, ROE (TTM) 17.1%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $106.75 | 1.54x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $159.53 | 1.03x | yes | Rev $2.3B, growth 18% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.8x / 2.2x / 2.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $209.58 | 0.78x | yes | EPS $7.35, growth 29% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.78 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $29.66 | 5.54x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.25B × (1−23%) / WACC 8.0% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $107.21 | 1.53x | yes | BV $42.92 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 17.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $84.25 | 1.95x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $7.35 × BVPS $42.92) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $100.04 | 1.64x | yes | EBITDA $0.32B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.21 | 782.67x | yes | FCF $126.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 16436.00x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.11B (FCF $0.13B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $237.16 | 0.69x | yes | EPS $7.35 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $8.82 | 18.63x | yes | BV $42.92 × (ROIC 1.6% / WACC 8.0%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $110.03 | 1.49x | yes | Revenue $2.25B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $275.63 | 0.60x | yes | EPS $7.35 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $79.46 | 2.07x | yes | EPS $7.35 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $127.6m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -0.48x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -0.37x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
At about $174 the market pays roughly 18 times operating income, which implies Boot Barn holds growth at its self-funding ceiling for about six years. That is a demanding bar, and only about a quarter of comparable fast-growers have sustained it that long.
The execution is keeping pace so far. Fiscal 2026 sales topped $2.2 billion with 25% EPS growth to $7.35, same-store sales rose 6.1%, e-commerce comps grew 14.1%, and management guided fiscal 2027 to $2.6 billion in sales and $8.64 EPS while opening 70 new stores.
The balance sheet is clean of funded debt, net cash of about $128 million, but the real obligation is the operating-lease load that comes with a store-expansion model. The asset and earnings-power frames say the stock is expensive; the bet is that unit growth and comps keep compounding.
Bull Case
Start with the bear case, because it is the obvious objection: at 18 times operating income, Boot Barn is priced for growth at its self-funding ceiling for roughly six years, and only about 27% of comparable fast-growers have sustained that pace for that long. The fear is that this is a richly-valued retailer riding a western-wear fad that will cool. So test it against the data, and the data pushes back hard. Fiscal 2026 sales exceeded $2.2 billion with 25% earnings-per-share growth to $7.35, and consolidated same-store sales grew 6.1%, with retail store comps up 5.2% and e-commerce comps up 14.1%. A retailer growing comps in the mid-single digits while also adding units is not a fad cooling off; it is a concept still taking share.
The growth is structural and self-funded, which is the key to why the model can persist. Boot Barn opened stores throughout the year and guided to 70 new stores in fiscal 2027, a 13% unit-growth rate, while projecting $2.6 billion in sales, up 16%, and EPS of $8.64, up 18%. Crucially, it funds this expansion from its own cash flow, not debt: the balance sheet carries net cash of about $128 million and essentially no funded borrowings. New stores reach profitability quickly and the company recycles the cash into the next cohort. That is the flywheel the growth-DCF models are crediting, with DCF Perpetual Growth landing at $299 and DCF Exit Multiple at $228, both well above the price.
The moat is in the merchandise and the loyalty base. Exclusive brands are climbing toward 41.3% penetration, which lifts merchandise margin to a guided 51.4%, because private-label product carries higher margin than national brands and cannot be price-shopped at a competitor. The loyalty database grew 12.5% to 10.8 million active customers, a direct line to repeat purchases that lowers customer-acquisition cost. A return on equity of 17.1%, a 13.3% operating margin, double-digit comps, self-funded unit growth, and a widening exclusive-brand mix are exactly the ingredients that let a retailer sustain growth longer than the base rate, which is the entire bull thesis.
Bear Case
The fragility in this story is not funded debt, it is the lease-driven operating leverage that comes with the store-expansion model. Boot Barn carries net cash and almost no borrowings, but a retailer adding 70 stores a year signs long-dated lease commitments that behave like fixed obligations. Those leases are why the cash-flow frames look so different from the earnings frames: the FCF Yield model collapses toward zero because the company is plowing cash into new-store capital and inventory, leaving little free cash after growth investment. In good times, fixed rent on a growing store base amplifies profit. In a downturn, the same fixed rent amplifies the pain, because comps can fall while the rent does not. A store-expansion retailer is structurally more exposed to a demand shock than an asset-light one.
The demand itself is the second risk. Boot Barn sells discretionary apparel and footwear into customer bases tied to ranching, energy, construction, and the broader western-lifestyle consumer. Those end markets are cyclical and partly tied to commodity and farm economics. A consumer pullback, a weak farm economy, or a slowdown in the trades would hit comps directly, and a stock priced for six years of ceiling-rate growth has no cushion for a comp deceleration. Management's own fiscal 2027 guide already steps same-store growth down to 4% from the 6.1% just delivered, an acknowledgment that the comp tailwind is moderating.
The third risk is the valuation and the input costs underneath it. The price assumes growth at the self-funding ceiling for about six years, which the engine flags as elevated, above what fundamentals comfortably support. The static frames agree: Earnings Power Value lands at $29, the Graham Number at $84, and Simple Excess Return at $79, all far below the price, because they capitalize current earnings without crediting the growth. Tariffs add another variable, with the company's outlook excluding roughly $18 million in IEEPA tariff refunds it is still pursuing, a reminder that import costs sit outside management's control and can pressure the 51.4% merchandise margin the bull case depends on. The business is excellent and debt-free, so this is not a solvency question. It is an expectations question: a high-quality growth retailer priced for many years of flawless execution, with operating leases and a cyclical consumer as the two structural pressure points.
Valuation
Boot Barn is priced as a whole company on its operating earnings, and the read is demanding. At about $174 (June 27, 2026) the market pays roughly 18 times company-wide operating income, which inverts to growth held at the self-funding ceiling for about six years at an 11.4% cost of capital. Each percentage point of cost of capital moves that implied horizon by about 1.6 years, so the assumption is sensitive, but the central read is clear: the price needs the high growth to last a long time, and only about 27% of comparable fast-growers have sustained it for nearly six years.
The model families split sharply. The asset and earnings-power frames sit far below the price: Earnings Power Value at $29, the Graham Number at $84, Simple Excess Return at $79, and the cash-flow models near zero because growth capital consumes free cash. The relative frame lands near the price, with Relative Valuation at $148 and EV/EBITDA Relative at $100. The characterization is that relative-multiple and growth-DCF justify the price while asset and earnings-power say expensive.
That band puts the current price above the base case and near the high end. The interpretation is straightforward: on current earnings the stock is expensive, and the entire premium is a bet on durable, self-funded unit growth that the static frames cannot price. The buyer is underwriting roughly six years of ceiling-rate compounding. The fiscal 2026 results, with 25% EPS growth and 6.1% comps, and the fiscal 2027 guide of 18% EPS growth and 13% unit growth, are consistent with that bet so far. The deciding variables are same-store-sales durability as the comp guide steps down to 4%, the pace and productivity of new-store openings, the exclusive-brand margin trajectory, and tariff costs on imported merchandise.
Catalysts
Fourth-quarter and full-year fiscal 2026 results, reported May 15, were the recent driver and they beat. Quarterly EPS of $1.45 topped the $1.43 forecast and revenue of $539 million beat the $533.1 million estimate. For the full year, sales exceeded $2.2 billion with 25% EPS growth to $7.35, and consolidated same-store sales grew 6.1%, with retail comps up 5.2% and e-commerce comps up 14.1%. The loyalty database grew 12.5% to 10.8 million active customers.
The forward guidance is the standing catalyst. For fiscal 2027 the company projects $2.6 billion in sales, up 16%, EPS of $8.64, up 18%, same-store sales growth of 4%, exclusive-brand penetration reaching 41.3%, merchandise margin of about 51.4%, and 70 new stores at a 13% unit-growth rate. The outlook excludes roughly $18 million in IEEPA tariff refunds the company is actively pursuing, which is potential upside if recovered.
The watch items are same-store-sales trends against the stepped-down 4% guide, the cadence and productivity of new-store openings, exclusive-brand penetration and its effect on merchandise margin, the resolution of the tariff refund and broader import-cost pressure, and e-commerce growth. Sources: Boot Barn Q4 fiscal 2026 results and earnings call (fool.com, investing.com, finance.yahoo.com), fiscal 2027 outlook (seekingalpha.com, alphastreet.com).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Boot Barn (single retail segment) (reported)
- URBN (Urban Outfitters, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AEO (American Eagle Outfitters, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ANF (Abercrombie & Fitch Co.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BKE (BUCKLE, INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LULU (lululemon athletica inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AS (Amer Sports, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LEVI (LEVI STRAUSS & CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- COLM (COLUMBIA SPORTSWEAR COMPANY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.