BOK FINANCIAL CORP (BOKF): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $137.48, BOK FINANCIAL CORP (BOKF) is priced for 11.7% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BOKF

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBOKF
CompanyBOK FINANCIAL CORP
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$137.48/sh
CompositionCommercial Banking 50% / Consumer Banking 19% / Wealth Management 31%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Return on equity needed11.7%
Return on equity now9.7%
ROE gap+2.0pp
Price-to-book1.40x

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.5% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026).

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history+2.27σ
cohort percentile (of 122 peers)58
sustained it ~10 years at this level71%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.20x3expensive
Earnings1.29x1expensive
Relative0
Growth0

Families that justify the price: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=4)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
Bank Fair Value (P/TBV)$92.661.48xyesTBVPS $80.58 × 1.15x (ROE (TTM) 10.3% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.07% allowance/loans → ×0.93)
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.3x / 10.0x / 11.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$109.241.26xyesBV/sh $98.31, ROE (TTM) 10.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$114.971.20xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowthnoRev $1.4B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.1x / 6.2x / 7.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $9.89, growth 16% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.87 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAsset$147.910.93xyes√(22.5 × EPS $9.89 × BVPS $98.31) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsnoEPS $9.89 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativeno
PEG Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $9.89 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 15.7% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 23.6x
Earnings YieldEarnings$106.921.29xyesEPS $9.89 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The issuer is a funded financial business. Debt, interest, and cash flows are operating inputs, so industrial EV, net-debt, WACC, and free-cash-flow lenses do not apply; value the common-equity claim with book, earnings, capital, and payout economics.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Commercial Bankingfinancialequity1.0B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required
Consumer Bankingfinancialequity0.4B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required
Wealth Managementfinancialequity0.6B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required

No unit-level total common-equity value is stated. Each financial unit requires supported standalone common equity, normalized earnings, capital adequacy, and payout capacity. Consolidated debt, interest, and cash are operating balances, not an enterprise-to-equity bridge; company-level book, earnings, capital, and payout lenses remain the coherent cross-checks.

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (buyback)-3.0%

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The most encouraging number on this balance sheet is one that got smaller. Unrealized losses on the securities portfolio, the hole that rate increases punched through every bank's equity, have been closing: the 10-K records "an accumulated other comprehensive loss of $166 million at December 31, 2025, compared to an accumulated comprehensive loss of $503 million at December 31, 2024". That is not a cash event and it never was, but it was a real constraint on what management felt able to do with capital. As it drains away, the constraint goes with it.

Capital was never actually tight. The common equity tier 1 ratio stood at about 12.9% as filed at the end of 2025, with a total capital ratio of 14.77% and a leverage ratio of 9.86%. Those are comfortable numbers for a commercial bank, and management has been treating them that way: the filing states plainly that "We also repurchased $390 million of common shares during 2025." Roughly 97% of the year's earnings went back to shareholders as dividends and buybacks. A management team that thought it needed the capital would not do that.

What makes the business more interesting than a loan book is the fee side. Commercial Banking here carries the TransFund electronic funds network alongside ordinary corporate lending, Consumer Banking absorbs "all mortgage loan origination", and Wealth Management sits beside both. In the second quarter of 2026 fees and commissions came to 202.0 million dollars against net interest income of 351.8 million dollars. Better than a third of revenue arriving from activities that do not consume balance sheet is a structurally different business from a bank that only lends.

Funding has been getting cheaper, too. The 10-K reports funding costs of 3.06%, down 27 basis points, with the cost of interest-bearing deposits down 23 basis points to 2.91%. Deposits grew in the second quarter to 39.9 billion dollars, up 3.0% from March, while loans reached 27.1 billion dollars, up 3.4%. Growing both sides at once while paying less for the funding is the combination that lifts a bank's margin without requiring it to take more risk.

Against its cohort the fee mix is the differentiator. In the wealth comparison set, NTRS runs 8.35 billion dollars of revenue with the trailing line down 3.0%, while in commercial banking CFR carries 2.27 billion dollars growing 8.0% and CBSH 1.14 billion dollars growing 7.8%. This company sits in the middle of that range on scale and above most of it on fee contribution, which is the reason its earnings do not move purely with the rate cycle.

Bear Case

A bank that hands back essentially everything it earns is telling you where it does not see opportunity. Roughly 97% of last year's earnings left as dividends and buybacks, which leaves almost nothing retained to grow book value from the inside. That is a defensible policy for a mature franchise. It sits awkwardly next to what the share price is asking for, which is not a mature franchise at all but a step up in profitability that then holds for decades. At about 1.45 times book, the price is pricing a return on equity near 12.3% carried indefinitely, which is the same bet as an elite-tier pace held for 28 years before it fades toward ordinary. Recent performance has run closer to about 9.8%, and across its own long record the bank has averaged near that. So the price is paying for something the company has neither demonstrated nor is retaining capital to build.

The consequence is mechanical rather than rhetorical. What a bank's shares are worth relative to book is a function of the return earned on that book against the return investors demand. If profitability settles near where it has actually been rather than climbing to the elite tier, the multiple compresses back toward the middle of the range rather than the range rising to meet it. History is not encouraging on the durability question either. Of the institutions that have ever reached this level, only about 69% still held it ten years on.

A meaningful slice of the loan book is also lent against one commodity. The 10-K discloses "$ 2.9 billion or 11 % of total loans, including $ 2.2 billion of outstanding loans to energy producers", of which "Approximately 71 % of the committed production loans are secured by properties primarily producing oil and 29 % of the committed production loans are secured by properties primarily producing natural gas". Energy lending here is underwritten carefully and it has been shrinking rather than growing. That is not the same as being immune. A sustained move down in crude reprices the collateral behind roughly one loan dollar in nine, and it does so at the same time it slows the regional economies that carry the rest of the book.

Credit has already stopped improving. The filing notes that "Nonperforming assets not guaranteed by U.S. government agencies totaled $66 million at December 31, 2025, up from a historic low of $42 million at December 31, 2024". The absolute numbers are still small, and that is the honest framing. The direction is the point: a bank cannot keep releasing reserves once the trough is behind it, and provisioning that stops being a tailwind is exactly the kind of quiet change that turns a rising earnings line flat.

The most recent quarter shows how much of the reported result can come from items that do not repeat. Second-quarter net income was 176.5 million dollars, or $2.92 per diluted share; strip out a gain on the exchange of Visa B shares and a loss on repositioning the available-for-sale portfolio and the figures become 156.5 million dollars and $2.59. That is a gap of more than a tenth of the headline. A price already assuming an elite return has very little room for the underlying number to be the smaller one.

Valuation

A horizon of 28 years is a long time to assume anything about a bank. That is roughly what today's price implies: an elite-tier return on equity sustained that long before it fades toward ordinary, which comes to the same thing as holding about 12.3% forever. At about 1.45 times book, the price is not paying for continuation. It is paying for an improvement, and then for that improvement to prove unusually durable. What the bank has actually delivered is plainer than that. Recent profitability has run around 9.8% on trailing earnings measured against book equity, and its own multi-decade record sits close to the same place.

The methods used to triangulate divide along the line you would expect. The approaches built specifically for banks, valuing the shares against tangible book adjusted for the return actually earned and against the excess of that return over the cost of capital, all land below today's price. The approaches that treat the company as a generic earnings stream growing at its recent pace land above it. Neither set says the price is unsupportable; the spread between them is the argument, and it is really an argument about whether recent earnings growth off a rate-cycle trough is a rate or an event.

Capital is where a bank's downside actually lives, and here it is straightforward. The common equity tier 1 ratio was about 12.9% as filed at the end of 2025, the total capital ratio 14.77%, and the leverage ratio 9.86%. Standard coverage and leverage arithmetic does not apply to a balance sheet funded by customer deposits; the equivalent question is how much loss the capital stack can absorb before the dividend is at issue, and on these ratios the answer is a great deal. What that capital is not doing is compounding: with roughly 97% of earnings distributed, book value grows mainly through the buyback rather than through retention, and the filing records the mechanism directly at "3,656,259 common shares at an average price of $105.72 per share during 2025".

Cohort position depends on which segment you look through, which is the useful part of a three-segment bank. Against commercial banking peers, CFR carries 2.27 billion dollars of revenue growing 8.0% and CBSH 1.14 billion dollars growing 7.8%, both in the same organic range. Against wealth peers, NTRS operates at 8.35 billion dollars with its trailing revenue down 3.0%. The price-to-book here sits in the upper half of the peer group, which is a defensible place for a bank with this fee mix and this capital position, and a demanding one for a bank earning below ten percent on its equity.

The second quarter gave the clearest read available on which way the underlying line is moving. Net interest margin was 2.91%, up a single basis point from the prior quarter, while fees and commissions slipped to 202.0 million dollars from 209.8 million dollars. A margin holding flat and fee income easing is a business in balance rather than one accelerating, and the price is written for acceleration.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results landed on July 20, 2026, and they were better on the surface than underneath. Net income was 176.5 million dollars, or $2.92 per diluted share. Excluding a net gain on the exchange of Visa B shares and a loss from repositioning the available-for-sale securities portfolio, the figures were 156.5 million dollars and $2.59 per diluted share. Both items are real, both are one-time, and the difference between the two versions of the quarter is the number worth carrying forward.

Underneath the headline the operating trends were mixed in an informative way. Net interest income rose 9.3 million dollars to 351.8 million dollars and net interest margin edged up to 2.91% from 2.90% in the prior quarter, while fees and commissions eased to 202.0 million dollars from 209.8 million dollars. Balance sheet growth was the stronger signal: period-end loans reached 27.1 billion dollars, up 896 million dollars or 3.4% from March 31, and deposits reached 39.9 billion dollars, up 1.18 billion dollars or 3.0%.

The variable with the most leverage from here sits outside the company. Roughly one loan dollar in nine is lent against oil and gas production, weighted about seventy-thirty toward oil, so the commodity strip feeds directly into collateral values and into the regional economies the rest of the book serves. Energy exposure has been shrinking rather than building, which is the company's own risk decision showing up in the numbers, and the direction of that balance in coming quarters is the cleanest available read on how management sees the cycle.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Commercial Banking (reported)

Consumer Banking (reported)

Wealth Management (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q2 2026 results release, July 20, 2026

View the full interactive BOKF report on boothcheck