BROOKFIELD WEALTH SOLUTIONS LTD. (BNT): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $45.35, BROOKFIELD WEALTH SOLUTIONS LTD. (BNT) is priced for 8.0% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BNT

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBNT
CompanyBROOKFIELD WEALTH SOLUTIONS LTD.
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$45.35/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Return on equity needed8.0%
Return on equity now4.8%
ROE gap+3.2pp
Price-to-book0.57x

Solve inputs: computed at a 11% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2025); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~0.6pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~7%; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.33σ
cohort percentile (of 88 peers)3
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.09x3expensive
Earnings1.25x1expensive
Relative—0—
Growth—0—

Families that justify the price: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 1.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=4)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth——no—
Bank Fair Value (P/TBV)—$33.871.34xyesTBVPS $67.75 × 0.50x (ROE (TTM) 4.9% / CoE 9.3%, g=3.2% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption))
Relative ValuationRelative——noP/E 11x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.9x / 11.0x / 13.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 22x
Simple DDMGrowth——no—
Two-Stage DDMGrowth——no—
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$41.641.09xyesBV/sh $78.50, ROE (TTM) 4.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$28.341.60xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth——noRev $11.6B, growth 23% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.9x / 1.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative——noEPS $3.35, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.34 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowth——no—
Earnings Power ValueEarnings——no—
Residual IncomeAsset——no—
Graham NumberAsset$76.920.59xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.35 × BVPS $78.50) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative——no—
FCF YieldEarnings——no—
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings——no—
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings——noEPS $3.35 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset——no—
P/Sales SectorRelative——no—
PEG Fair ValueRelative——noEPS $3.35 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$36.221.25xyesEPS $3.35 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative——no—
Clinical Phase NPVGrowth——no—
MertonAsset——no—
V5 Mechanical———no—

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (dilution)29.5%

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Run the usual set of valuation approaches across this company and something odd happens. Almost none of them says the shares are expensive. The asset-value methods, which start from book equity and adjust for the return actually earned on it, land essentially on top of today's price. The earnings-power methods land above it. The peer-multiple methods land furthest above it of all. For a financial whose balance sheet has been compounding through one acquisition after another, a clean sweep like that is worth understanding before it is dismissed.

What the company does is collect money that does not have to be paid back for a long time, then invest it. Retail annuities are the consumer end of that, and the filing sets out the mechanics plainly: "The annuity contract value is equal to the sum of premiums paid, premium bonuses and interest credited". The institutional end is pension risk transfer and funding agreements, where a corporate pension plan hands a block of obligations to an insurer in one negotiated transaction. Different customers, same raw material. Patient liabilities with a known cost.

The second half of the model is where Brookfield's ownership stops being a governance footnote and becomes the business. In the first quarter of 2026 the company originated 5 billion dollars of sales across its retail annuity, pension and funding agreement channels, and put 4 billion dollars to work in strategies Brookfield itself originates, carrying an average target yield of 10%. The filing describes the plumbing that makes that routing possible, including "our investment warehousing activities where we temporarily warehouse investments that will ultimately be transferred into our insurance investment portfolios in the near term". An insurer that can source its own credit does not have to be clever about duration to earn a spread. It only has to be disciplined about underwriting.

Liability growth has not come only from the retail counter. "On September 30, 2025, our company announced a flow reinsurance transaction with leading Japanese insurance company Dai-ichi Frontier Life", routed through the American National subsidiary, and flow arrangements of that kind add obligations steadily rather than in lumps. Total assets stood at 156.1 billion dollars at the end of the first quarter.

None of this requires taking share from anyone. The retirement market is expanding for the whole cohort: RGA, the largest life reinsurer in the comparison set, grew revenue 18.6% over the trailing year to 24.9 billion dollars, and FG, the closest listed annuity specialist, grew 18.2% to 6.0 billion dollars. Demand for guaranteed retirement income and for pension transfer is broad enough that several balance sheets can grow into it at once, which is a more comfortable position than fighting over a fixed pool.

Underneath all of it sits regulated capital, and the filing reports that "The Company's insurance subsidiaries in the U.S. met the minimum regulatory requirements." For an insurance group, that is not a footnote. It is the sentence everything else in the argument stands on.

Bear Case

The uncomfortable fact about these shares is that the book value on the balance sheet is not a claim they carry. Brookfield Corporation owns the class C shares, and the annual filing states what those entitle it to: "all of the residual value in our company after payment in full of the amount due to holders of exchangeable shares and class B shares". The exchangeable share is engineered to do one thing, which is to deliver "one Brookfield Class A Share or its cash equivalent (the form of payment to be determined at the election of Brookfield Corporation)". So the screen that flags a financial trading near half of stated book, and the investor who reads that as a gap waiting to close, are both looking at a number attached to the accounting entity rather than to the security. The discount is real as arithmetic. Whether it is available as a return is a different question entirely.

Set the structure aside and the operating arithmetic is still demanding. Return on equity has recently been running near 4.8%. Reading the price as a multiple of book, it assumes something closer to 7.5% sustained, and even that assumed figure falls short of what the equity being deployed actually costs. A company earning less on its capital than that capital demands does not trade at book. Half of book is the arithmetic working normally, not the market being inattentive. The bull argument therefore has to be that deployment into Brookfield-originated credit lifts the earned return, not that the multiple re-rates on its own.

Not every line is growing, either. The filing reports the traditional life book shrinking hard: "Our Life Insurance segment reported total revenues of $563 million in 2025, $956 million in 2024 and $1.1 billion in 2023, respectively." Roughly half that segment's revenue has gone in two years while capital and management attention went to annuities and pension transfer. A shrinking life book is not fatal to the model. It does mean the growth on display is concentrated in the newest and most competitively contested products.

Those products are the ones most exposed to what rates do next, and the company's own risk disclosure is blunt about the mechanism: "Increasing rates on other insurance or investment products offered by competitors may also lead to higher surrenders by customers within certain segments of our insurance business." Raise crediting rates to hold the money and the spread narrows. Hold rates and the money leaves. In a business whose asset side is illiquid private credit by design, a liability side that can walk out is the exposure that compounds fastest.

The capital is also not somewhere a holder can reach it. Money moves up from the regulated subsidiaries only with permission, and the filing says so directly: "Certain regulations include restrictions that limit the dividends or other distributions, such as loans or cash advances, available to stockholders without prior approval of the insurance regulatory authorities." Meanwhile the reported quarterly result swings on investment marks rather than on underwriting: first-quarter 2026 operating earnings were flat against the prior year while the GAAP bottom line moved the other way on mark-to-market movements. A holder buying the operating story has to be willing to sit through quarters where the headline number says something else.

Valuation

Half of book is where this one trades, and that single ratio is most of the conversation. Read the price against the company's stated book equity and it assumes a sustained return on equity of roughly 7.5%. Recent experience has been about 4.8%. The distance between those two figures is the assumption a buyer is making today, and it is not a heroic one: the company has earned better than 7.5% within its own short record, so the requirement sits within reach rather than past it. Shift the cost of equity used to read the price by one percentage point and the assumed return moves about half a point, which is the reminder that a figure like this is a reading rather than a measurement.

The methods used to triangulate disagree in an unusual direction. The asset-value approaches come out essentially where the shares trade. The earnings-power approaches land above the price, and the peer-multiple approaches land furthest above it. Not one family of method reads the price as stretched. That is the profile of a value or asset-supported name rather than a growth bet, and against the peer group itself the shares sit in the lower half on price to book.

That pattern invites an obvious conclusion and deserves a caution. Every one of those approaches values the accounting entity: its book equity, its earnings, its revenue set against comparable insurers. The traded security is contractually pegged to a different company's share, one for one, and the residual value of the entity belongs to the class C holder. A gap between the methods and the price on this ticker is therefore not straightforwardly a mispricing waiting to be collected. It is closer to a statement that the operating company's economics and the instrument's terms are answering two different questions.

The share count has risen sharply since 2021, and the reason is not a capital raise. The filing records the mechanism: "Under the Exchange Offer, the Company took up 49,401,862 Brookfield Class A shares and issued 49,401,862 Class A-1 exchangeable shares in exchange." Shares went out and shares came in, matched one for one. The standard leverage and coverage arithmetic does not apply to a balance sheet funded by policyholder obligations, either; the equivalent question for an insurer is whether the regulated subsidiaries hold the capital their regulators demand, and the filing reports that "The Company's insurance subsidiaries in the U.S. met the minimum regulatory requirements."

The closing calendar may settle the argument before the operating question does. Shareholders approved the combination in July, and on completion the exchangeable shares are replaced by Brookfield Corporation shares and stop trading on their own. From that point the question is no longer what half of this company's book value is worth. It is what the parent is worth.

Catalysts

The dominant event is corporate rather than commercial. On July 16, 2026, shareholders approved a transaction that folds Brookfield Wealth Solutions into Brookfield Corporation: the company is delisted, Brookfield Corporation becomes the listed parent on the NYSE and TSX, and each class A exchangeable share converts on a one for one basis. Completion is expected by year end and remains subject to the applicable regulatory approvals, which for an insurance group operating across the United States, the United Kingdom, Bermuda, Canada and the Cayman Islands is the substantive condition left.

The most recent operating print landed on May 14, 2026. Distributable operating earnings came in essentially flat year over year, 438 million dollars against 437 million dollars, with higher investment income on annuities and better property and casualty underwriting carrying the comparison. Total assets reached 156.1 billion dollars. The GAAP result for the quarter went the other way on mark-to-market swings that the company said had largely recovered by the time it reported.

Origination is the number to follow through the rest of the year. The quarter brought 5 billion dollars of sales across retail annuity, pension and funding agreement channels, a figure that already includes Just Group, the United Kingdom retirement business now inside the group, while 4 billion dollars went into Brookfield-originated strategies carrying an average target yield of 10%. Those two figures are the whole engine. Money in at a cost, money out at a yield, and the rest of the reported result is timing.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

BNT shareholder approval release, July 17, 2026 · Q1 2026 results release, May 14, 2026 · BNT shareholder approval and 2026 annual meeting results release, July 17, 2026

View the full interactive BNT report on boothcheck