BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc (BMRN): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $61.89, BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc (BMRN) is priced for +24.4% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-07-29 · Exported: 2026-08-01 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BMRN

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBMRN
CompanyBioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$61.89/sh
CompositionVOXZOGO 29% / VIMIZIM 25% / NAGLAZYME 15% / PALYNZIQ 13% / ALDURAZYME 6% / BRINEURA 6% / KUVAN 3% / ROCTAVIAN 1% / Royalty and other revenues 2%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.2%
Operating margin today9.7%
Margin compression (value-band)-6.5pp
Implied growth24.4%
Multiple paid36x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 9: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~9.1pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~7.3 years; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.48σ
cohort percentile (of 116 peers)81
sustained it ~5 years at this level36%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset6.31x5expensive
Earnings2.91x4expensive
Relative1.37x3expensive
Growth0.85x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$106.590.58xyesFCF base $0.8B, growth 10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.3%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$72.600.85xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 26.7x / 28.7x / 30.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$45.061.37xyesP/E 30.15x (blended: static sector reference 24x + trailing (TTM) 45x), scenarios: 25.1x / 30.1x / 35.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 19.81x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$15.034.12xyesBV/sh $32.14, ROE (TTM) 4.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$9.816.31xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$49.001.26xyesRev $3.2B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.1x / 3.7x / 4.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$14.374.31xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.26B × (1−25%) / WACC 8.3% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$8.407.37xyesBV $32.14 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 4.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$31.701.95xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.39 × BVPS $32.14) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$36.311.70xyesEBITDA $0.39B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$47.001.32xyesFCF $767.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$36.531.69xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.58B (FCF $0.77B − SBC $0.19B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$1.1653.35xyesEPS $1.39 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$6.889.00xyesBV $32.14 × (ROIC 1.8% / WACC 8.3%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$67.100.92xyesRevenue $3.24B × sector P/S 4.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$15.034.12xyesEPS $1.39 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$791.6m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-3.36x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-2.51x (net cash)
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.4%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Run this company through the standard machinery and the output looks terrible. A reported return on equity in the low single digits, set against a required return closer to ten percent, makes every book-value method read the shares as wildly expensive. Capitalize last year's profit with no growth credited and the answer is the same. Both readings are arithmetically correct and analytically misleading, because the year they are built on contains a decision the company made to stop selling one of its own products.

That decision is in the filing in plain language. On December 17, 2025 management "committed to a plan to voluntarily withdraw ROCTAVIAN from the market due to lower than previously anticipated commercial opportunities". Pulling a launched product means writing off its inventory and impairing the plant and equipment built to supply it, and both landed inside the same reported twelve months. Operating income of 583.7 million dollars on revenue of 3.24 billion is what came through that. Reported net income of 268.7 million is what was left afterward. A model that reads the second figure as the earning power of the franchise is reading a demolition invoice as a run rate.

What the machinery genuinely cannot see is the shape of the demand. "Other than PALYNZIQ and KUVAN, as described below, our products have no direct approved competition currently on the market in the U.S. or the EU" is a disclosure, not a marketing claim. For a business turning over more than three billion dollars a year, having essentially no approved competitor across most of the portfolio is a structural position that no peer-multiple lens knows how to record. The filing also explains why it holds: "because the number of potential patients in each disease population is small, it is not only important to find patients who begin therapy to achieve significant market penetration of the product, but we also need to be able to maintain these patients on therapy for an extended period of time". A child started on enzyme replacement for a lifelong genetic condition stays on it. Revenue here behaves less like a sales funnel and more like a census.

VOXZOGO is where the growth sits, and it is about to be pointed at a second population. A Phase 3 trial in children with hypochondroplasia met its primary endpoint with gains in height and arm span against placebo, and the company intends to file a supplemental application with the FDA in the third quarter of 2026. An approval there widens the treatable population for a drug that already accounts for 29% of revenue, using the same specialist physicians, the same distribution and the same manufacturing.

The inorganic move points the same direction. BioMarin completed the purchase of Amicus Therapeutics on April 27, 2026 for 14.50 dollars a share in cash, an equity value of roughly 4.8 billion dollars, adding GALAFOLD and the POMBILITI and OPFOLDA combination. Those are rare-disease products sold to the same physicians through the same channels. Full-year 2026 revenue guidance sits at 3.83 to 3.93 billion dollars. The logic is not clever, which is a point in its favour: a company that has built rare-disease commercial infrastructure buying more rare-disease products to run through it.

Underneath, cash generation is considerably healthier than the earnings line implies. Free cash flow ran near 767 million dollars while reported net income came in at well under half that, which is exactly the signature of a year absorbing non-cash write-offs. On the capital structure that existed before the acquisition, operating profit covered the interest bill about 34 times over. And the share count has barely moved across four years, so none of this progress was paid for by handing out equity.

Bear Case

The trouble with owning a portfolio of drugs that have no approved competitors is that the same sentence describes the ceiling. Each of these therapies treats a population measured in thousands of people worldwide. There is no share left to take, because BioMarin already has it. Growth therefore has to come from diagnosing patients who have not been found, from opening new countries, or from launching new products. The first is slow, the second is slower, and the third is where the company most recently and most expensively failed.

ROCTAVIAN was that failure. A one-time gene therapy for severe haemophilia A, developed over years, approved, launched, and then withdrawn: on December 17, 2025 management "committed to a plan to voluntarily withdraw ROCTAVIAN from the market due to lower than previously anticipated commercial opportunities". It still appears in the revenue mix at roughly 1%. The lesson is not that gene therapy is bad. It is that a rare-disease franchise does not transfer automatically to the next rare disease, and that the accounting for a failure arrives compressed into one year while the spending that produced it was spread across many.

Only now do the ratios matter, and they are stark. Measured against book value and the returns earned on it, the asset-based approaches leave a premium of roughly 519%, which follows directly from a reported return on equity in the low single digits set against a required return closer to ten percent. The earnings-power approaches leave a premium near 180%. Peer-multiple approaches leave a premium near 36%. A bull will answer, correctly, that these are all reading a distorted year. A bear answers that the distortion was a management decision, not weather, and that the company has to demonstrate the undistorted year before anyone can price it.

The cohort comparison at BioMarin's exact size is the part that stings. NBIX carries almost the same revenue base, 3.10 billion dollars, at a 25.4% operating margin while growing 28.6%. BMRN produced an 18.8% operating margin on 3.24 billion dollars of revenue. EXEL, smaller at 2.38 billion, runs a 39.4% operating margin. VRTX, roughly four times the size, runs 38.3%. Rare-disease economics clearly permit very high margins. This particular portfolio is not currently producing them, and the price is being asked to look past that.

The balance sheet is also a different object than it was six months ago. The annual filing reported cash, cash equivalents and investments totalling 2.1 billion dollars as of December 31, 2025, against debt obligations of 600.0 million. Funding the acquisition added a two billion dollar seven-year term loan, an 800 million dollar five-year term loan, and 850 million dollars of 5.500% senior unsecured notes due 2034. A company that was effectively a net creditor to its own capital structure is now a borrower of size. The interest obligation is contractual and fixed. VOXZOGO's expansion is neither.

And the product carrying the growth is precisely the one competitors are aiming at. The filing names them: VOXZOGO, for hypochondroplasia, "could have competition from clinical stage products under development by Ascendis Pharma A/S and QED Therapeutics, Inc. (a subsidiary of BridgeBio Pharma, Inc.), and a preclinical product candidate from Tyra Biosciences Inc." A supplemental approval in a new indication is worth considerably less if two funded competitors reach the same indication a few years later. The same document warns that without protected intellectual property the company "may not be able to compete effectively or preserve our market shares", which in a business with nine products and no generic pressure yet is the single quietest risk on the list.

Valuation

What the price asks for here is unusually modest, and that is the first thing to register. Today's quote pays about 18 times company-wide operating income, and inverted it embeds operating profit growing roughly 5% a year over a five-year stretch, discounted near 8% with 4% growth assumed beyond it. Treat those as approximations from a single solve rather than measurements. The point is the size of the ask, not its decimals.

Two reference points, both benign. The implied pace sits inside what the company has recently delivered, so nothing here requires acceleration. And against the wider set of comparable biopharmaceutical names, the multiple falls in the lower half of the range. Taken together the embedded assumption reads as broadly consistent with plausible growth, which is not a common verdict in this sector and is the most useful single fact about the current price.

The methods still disagree violently, and the shape of the disagreement is more informative than any one of them. Book-value approaches leave a premium of roughly 519%, running as they do off a reported return on equity stuck in the low single digits. Earnings-power approaches leave a premium near 180% for the same underlying reason. Peer-multiple approaches leave a premium near 36%. The forward cash-flow methods land above today's price altogether, reaching there by projecting a double-digit expansion rate off a free cash flow base rather than off reported profit. So the static frames and the forward frames are not arguing about the business. They are arguing about which twelve months to treat as representative, and the twelve months in question contain a product withdrawal.

Two filing-sourced inputs anchor the rest. The annual filing reports cash, cash equivalents and investments totalling 2.1 billion dollars as of December 31, 2025, against debt obligations of 600.0 million, a position that predates the acquisition financing. And the revenue base is concentrated by design: VOXZOGO at 29%, VIMIZIM at 25% and NAGLAZYME at 15% are the largest three of nine lines, with one of those nine, ROCTAVIAN at roughly 1%, being the product management committed to withdraw in December 2025.

Management's own forecasting record is a legitimate input and it is better than most. Since 2006 it has raised guidance on 15 separate occasions, cut it on 2, reaffirmed it on 9, and withdrawn it once. Of three revenue guides that can be scored against reported results, two were delivered. That track record is what gives the current 2026 range of 3.83 to 3.93 billion dollars its weight. On the pre-acquisition capital structure operating profit covered interest roughly 34 times over, and the share count has been essentially flat across four years. The acquisition changes the first of those and leaves the second alone, which is the cleanest way to state what has actually shifted: the growth now has a fixed obligation to service as well as itself to fund.

Catalysts

The defining event of the year has already happened. BioMarin completed its acquisition of Amicus Therapeutics on April 27, 2026, paying 14.50 dollars a share in cash for an equity value of roughly 4.8 billion dollars and adding GALAFOLD along with the POMBILITI and OPFOLDA combination to the commercial portfolio. The financing was assembled over the winter: 850 million dollars of 5.500% senior unsecured notes due 2034 priced on January 29 and closed on February 12, 2026, alongside a two billion dollar seven-year term loan, an 800 million dollar five-year term loan, and a 600 million dollar five-year revolving facility.

The clinical calendar is where the next move comes from. A Phase 3 trial of VOXZOGO in children with hypochondroplasia met its primary endpoint, showing gains in height and arm span against placebo, and the company plans to file a supplemental new drug application with the FDA in the third quarter of 2026. The same set of materials points to FDA approval of PALYNZIQ for adolescents and to a separate acquisition of Inozyme, with full-year 2026 revenue guided to 3.83 to 3.93 billion dollars.

Working in the other direction is an event already booked. The voluntary withdrawal of ROCTAVIAN, committed to on December 17, 2025, is done, and its accounting consequences sit inside the trailing figures rather than ahead of them. That matters for how the next few quarters read: as the withdrawal charges roll out of the comparison, reported profitability should look materially different without the underlying business having changed at all. Distinguishing that optical recovery from genuine operating improvement is the main analytical task of the next several prints.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

BioMarin (consolidated) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

BioMarin first-quarter 2026 earnings materials · BioMarin acquisition closing announcement, April 2026 · BioMarin 2026 guidance, first-quarter 2026 earnings materials · BioMarin financing announcements, January and February 2026

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