Bausch & Lomb Corp (BLCO): what the price requires
At today's price, Bausch & Lomb Corp (BLCO) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.5 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BLCO
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | BLCO |
| Company | Bausch & Lomb Corp |
| Current price | $16.22/sh |
| Composition | Pharmaceuticals 21% / Devices 38% / OTC 36% / Branded and Other Generics 5% / Other revenues 0% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 2.2% |
| Operating margin (mid-cycle) | 4.4% |
| Margin compression implied | -2.2pp |
| Trailing margin (depressed year) | 0.7% |
| Must persist for | 5.5y |
| Multiple paid | 49x mid-cycle operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.3% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.3 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~9.7 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +1.21σ |
| sustained it ~5.5 years at this level | 28% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based value, while relative-multiple lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.95x | 2 | justifies |
| Earnings | — | 0 | — |
| Relative | 6.15x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
Families that justify the price: Asset Families that call it expensive: Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=4)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $15.61 | 1.04x | no | Exit EV/EBITDA: 30.0x / 32.0x / 34.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $58.65 | 0.28x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 4.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $17.96 | 0.90x | yes | Reference only (book value floor): BV/sh $17.96, ROE negative |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $16.16 | 1.00x | yes | Reference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $17.96, ROE converges to ke |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $13.46 | 1.21x | no | Rev $5.2B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.9x / 1.1x / 1.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $0.01 | 1622.00x | no | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.21B × (1−21%) / WACC 5.6% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $1.35 | 12.01x | yes | EBITDA $0.33B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 1622.00x | yes | FCF $1.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $0.74 | 21.92x | yes | BV $17.96 × (ROIC 0.2% / WACC 5.6%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $58.65 | 0.28x | no | Revenue $5.21B × sector P/S 4.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $4.8b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 27.55x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 21.76x |
| Interest coverage | 0.5x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.4% |
| Burning cash | no |
Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 4.4%); the trailing year was depressed.
Bullet Takeaways
Bausch and Lomb is a storied eye-health franchise in a leveraged turnaround: net debt of about 4.77 billion dollars at over 20 times operating income, with interest coverage near 0.5 times, so operations do not currently cover interest.
New product launches are reaccelerating: Miebo dry-eye revenue grew 33 percent to 76 million dollars, and management raised full-year 2026 guidance to revenue of 5.42 to 5.52 billion and adjusted EBITDA of 1.01 to 1.06 billion.
The price near 15 dollars sits below an acquisition-inflated book value of about 18 dollars; the thesis depends on EBITDA growth deleveraging the balance sheet, with interest rates and the unresolved Bausch Health ownership overhang as the key risks.
Bull Case
Bausch and Lomb is best read as a recovering franchise still in transition, and the stage it is in explains why the reported numbers look worse than the business. This is one of the oldest and most recognized names in eye health, spanning pharmaceuticals, surgical devices, contact lenses, and over-the-counter eye care. The 10-K describes the breadth plainly, a portfolio addressing patients "across the full spectrum of their eye health needs throughout their lives," backed by a "significant global research, development, manufacturing and commercial footprint" (accession 0001860742-25-000004). The reason the income statement is depressed is that the company is investing behind new product launches and carrying heavy debt from its separation history, not because the underlying demand is weak.
The new products show the franchise is reaccelerating, not fading. Miebo, the dry-eye treatment, generated 76 million dollars in the most recent quarter, up 33 percent, and management says it has moved from launch mode into a revenue-and-profit growth phase, with physician satisfaction topping every other eye drop surveyed. Xiidra, also in dry eye, is growing strongly alongside it. The company raised full-year 2026 revenue guidance to 5.42 to 5.52 billion dollars and adjusted EBITDA guidance to 1.01 to 1.06 billion, with first-quarter revenue up 9 percent. A business raising guidance on accelerating product launches is one whose earnings are catching up to its revenue.
The valuation has a tangible floor that limits downside. The price of about 15 dollars sits below book value per share of roughly 18 dollars, and the asset-based reference reads cluster near that book floor. As the company grows EBITDA toward its guided range and the new launches scale into profit, the operating leverage on a debt-heavy capital structure is substantial: each dollar of incremental EBITDA both improves earnings and reduces the leverage ratio. The bull case is that a storied eye-health franchise, priced below book with launches reaccelerating, re-rates as the EBITDA recovery deleverages the balance sheet.
Bear Case
The external variable with the most leverage on Bausch and Lomb is, quite literally, leverage, and interest rates are the lever that moves it. The company carries about 4.77 billion dollars of net debt against trailing operating income of only 229 million, putting net debt at more than 20 times operating income with interest coverage of roughly 0.5 times. Read that plainly: operations do not currently cover interest expense. The 10-K shows the debt is real and constraining, with "Senior Secured Credit Facilities secured by substantial" assets and a covenant requiring the company to "maintain a total leverage ratio of not greater than 4.00:1.00" after certain triggers (accession 0001860742-25-000004). In a higher-for-longer rate environment, refinancing this stack is expensive, and a covenant tied to leverage leaves little room if EBITDA disappoints. The current price embeds a recovery; the debt punishes any stumble in it.
The corporate structure adds an overhang the market cannot ignore. Bausch and Lomb was carved out of Bausch Health Companies, which still controls a large ownership stake, and the separation is unfinished. BHC has signaled it may monetize that interest through a sale, a distribution to shareholders, or other means, which creates a persistent share overhang and strategic uncertainty. A controlling parent that may sell its stake is not aligned with minority holders on timing, and the path to a clean, independent Bausch and Lomb remains undefined. That uncertainty is a discount the stock carries regardless of how the eye-care business performs.
The valuation methods underscore how much optimism is required. On a normalized, through-the-cycle basis the price works out to roughly 47 times mid-cycle operating income, which implies about 24 percent annual operating growth for five years, a demanding bet flagged as elevated. The cash-flow read collapses to near zero because free cash flow is minimal after interest and investment, and the relative read is excluded because earnings are negative. The only supportive anchor is book value, which is itself inflated by goodwill from acquisitions. The bear case is that a heavily indebted, parent-controlled company earning below its interest cost is priced for a margin recovery that rates, refinancing, and the BHC overhang could all derail.
Valuation
Bausch and Lomb has to be valued through its capital structure first, because the structure dominates everything else. The company carries about 4.77 billion dollars of net debt against trailing operating income of 229 million, an interest-coverage ratio near 0.5 times that means operations do not cover interest today. On a normalized basis the price of about 15 dollars works out to roughly 47 times mid-cycle operating income, implying about 24 percent annual operating growth for five years, computed at a 7.2 percent cost of capital. That is an elevated, demanding assumption, and it reflects how depressed current earnings are rather than a clean read on value.
The model families are sparse and split because negative earnings disable most of them. The cash-flow and earnings-power methods collapse to near zero, since free cash flow is minimal after interest and investment. The relative read using a sales multiple lands near 59 dollars but is excluded from the central estimate because it leans on revenue against negative profit. The one supportive anchor is the asset-based family: book value per share of about 18 dollars sits above the price, and the excess-return reference reads cluster near that book floor. The catch is that book value is heavily weighted with goodwill from the company's acquisitive history, so it is a softer floor than it looks.
The honest synthesis is that Bausch and Lomb is a leveraged turnaround priced modestly below an acquisition-inflated book value. The bridge from today to a higher value is EBITDA growth, guided to 1.01 to 1.06 billion dollars, which would both lift earnings and deleverage toward the covenant. The downside is that the same leverage magnifies any shortfall, and the unresolved Bausch Health ownership adds an overhang no operating result can fully offset. The buyer at 15 dollars is paying for a margin recovery to deleverage a fragile balance sheet, with rates and the parent's stake as the variables that decide it.
Catalysts
The earnings and guidance cadence is the central catalyst because the thesis is a margin recovery. Q1 2026 (reported April 30, 2026) showed revenue up 9 percent to 1.24 billion dollars with the loss narrowing, and management raised full-year 2026 guidance to revenue of 5.42 to 5.52 billion dollars and adjusted EBITDA of 1.01 to 1.06 billion (StockTitan, Motley Fool transcript). Each quarter's EBITDA print is the catalyst that drives both earnings and the leverage ratio.
The dry-eye franchise is the product catalyst. Miebo delivered 76 million dollars in the quarter, up 33 percent, with management describing a shift from launch mode to a revenue-and-profit growth phase, and Stifel raised its price target on the strength of Miebo sales while keeping a Hold rating (Investing.com). Continued Miebo and Xiidra growth is what converts the top line into the EBITDA the deleveraging story needs.
The Bausch Health separation is the structural catalyst and overhang. BHC continues to evaluate completing the separation, which could include selling its stake, distributing it to shareholders, or a sale of the company (Globe and Mail). A resolution would remove the share overhang; continued uncertainty keeps a discount on the stock. The watch items are the EBITDA trajectory against the deleveraging covenant, the interest-rate path for refinancing, and any concrete step on the BHC ownership stake.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Vision Care (reported)
- MDT (Medtronic plc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SYK (STRYKER CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BSX (BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ABT (ABBOTT LABORATORIES)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Pharmaceuticals (reported)
- JNJ (Johnson & Johnson)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ABBV (AbbVie Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LLY (ELI LILLY & Co)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BMY (Bristol-Myers Squibb Company)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PFE (Pfizer Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Surgical (reported)
- COO (The Cooper Companies, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ALGN (ALIGN TECHNOLOGY, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NVST (ENVISTA HOLDINGS CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- XRAY (DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MMSI (MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ICUI (ICU MEDICAL INC/DE)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SOLV (SOLVENTUM CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ITGR (INTEGER HOLDINGS CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.