Bausch & Lomb Corp (BLCO): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $17.15, Bausch & Lomb Corp (BLCO) is priced for +17.3% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BLCO

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBLCO
CompanyBausch & Lomb Corp
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$17.15/sh
CompositionPharmaceuticals 21% / Devices 38% / OTC 36% / Branded and Other Generics 5% / Other revenues 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)2.1%
Operating margin today6.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-4.0pp
Implied growth17.3%
Multiple paid34x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.4% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.95σ
cohort percentile (of 115 peers)78

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.07x3expensive
Earnings0
Relative0
Growth0

Families that justify the price: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=3)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$19.870.86xnoExit EV/EBITDA: 23.6x / 25.6x / 27.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 4.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$17.850.96xyesReference only (book value floor): BV/sh $17.85, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$16.071.07xyesReference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $17.85, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$14.631.17xnoRev $5.3B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.0x / 1.2x / 1.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.011715.00xnoNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.22B × (1−21%) / WACC 5.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.42B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.011715.00xyesFCF $137.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$1.859.27xyesBV $17.85 × (ROIC 0.6% / WACC 5.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $5.32B × sector P/S 4.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Vision Careoperatingenterprise$2.9b$24.4b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Pharmaceuticalsoperatingenterprise$1.3b$2.1b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Surgicaloperatingenterprise$894.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$4.7b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)18.46x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)14.58x
Interest coverage0.8x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.5%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

There is no dividend here and no buyback. Every dollar this company generates has somewhere it must go before it reaches a shareholder, and where it goes is the whole bull case. It goes into three product segments and into a debt stack that costs a weighted average stated rate of 7.72% a year as of the end of 2025. That is a brutal allocation constraint, and it is also a clarifying one: management cannot buy its way out of a bad quarter, so the only thing that improves the equity is the operating business improving.

In the March 2026 quarter it did, in all three places at once. The 10-Q reports that The Vision Care segment profit was $202 million and $176 million for the three months ended March 31, 2026 and 2025, that The Pharmaceuticals segment profit was $66 million and $11 million for the three months ended March 31, 2026 and 2025, and that The Surgical segment profit was $9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2026, as compared to a loss of $7 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025. Add those and segment profit went from about 180 million dollars to about 277 million dollars in a single year, on a company whose whole market value is 5.8 billion dollars.

The mix behind that improvement matters more than the amount. Devices, at 38% of revenue, and over-the-counter products at 36%, are the two largest lines, and the surgical part of the device business is where the operating leverage lives: the filing describes it as covering intraocular lenses ("IOLs") and delivery systems, phacoemulsification equipment and other surgical instruments and devices necessary for ophthalmic surgery. Equipment placements pull consumables behind them for years. A segment that swings from a loss to a profit on a shift toward premium product is the early part of that curve, not the late part.

The comparison that flatters this company is with the only listed business that does something similar in scale. COO earns an 11.8% operating margin on revenue of $4.23 billion growing 6.1%. This company runs about $5.21 billion of revenue growing at a similar mid-single-digit pace, and its through-the-cycle operating margin is 4.4%, so most of the gap between the two is margin rather than demand. Closing even part of that gap on a revenue base this size produces a very large number, which is exactly what the last four quarters of segment results started to show.

And there is a floor of a sort under the equity that is unusual for a levered business. Book value works out to 17.96 dollars a share against a price of $16.19. Buying the operations for less than the accountants carry them at is not a valuation argument by itself, but it does mean the bull case does not require paying up for goodwill the market has already written off.

Bear Case

Start with the obligation, because it is the thing that decides how much time the operating story gets. The company carries about 5.0 billion dollars of borrowings against 268 million dollars of liquid assets, at a weighted average stated rate of 7.72% as of December 31, 2025. Borrowings under the January 2031 facility run at a term SOFR-based rate, plus an applicable margin of 4.25 %, which is not investment-grade pricing. Measured on the company's own through-the-cycle operating profit rather than the depressed trailing figure, that debt is about 21.76 times operating profit, and through-cycle operating profit covers only about half of the interest bill. Trailing free cash flow rounds to nothing.

The covenant is the mechanism that turns a slow year into a fast problem. Under the June 2025 credit facility amendment, when revolving borrowings exceed a threshold share of commitments, the company must maintain a maximum first lien net leverage ratio. Leverage covenants measured against a normalized earnings figure work fine until the earnings stop being normal. With a trailing operating margin of 0.7% against a through-cycle 4.4%, this company has already spent a stretch below its own normal, and the segment recovery in the March quarter is one quarter old.

Then there is who owns it. Bausch Health held 310,449,643 Bausch + Lomb common shares, which represents approximately 88% of the issued and outstanding common shares of Bausch + Lomb, as of February 11, 2026. The 10-K lists among its own risks our status as a controlled company, and the possibility that BHC's interest may conflict with our interests and the interests of our other securityholders. The float is small, the votes are not in public hands, and the direction of the company is set by a parent with its own creditors to satisfy.

Those creditors have noticed. The filing discloses litigation alleging that the potential future separation of Bausch + Lomb from BHC by distribution of Bausch + Lomb stock to BHC's shareholders would harm them. A separation is the single event most likely to reprice these shares, and it is being contested before it happens. Restructuring, integration and separation costs already ran 58 million dollars in 2025 against 26 million dollars in 2024, so the process keeps consuming cash while the outcome stays open.

Underneath all of it sits the assumption the price is making. At roughly 49 times through-the-cycle operating profit, the arithmetic can only be satisfied by holding growth at the ceiling a self-funding business can manage, for about 5.5 years. Of comparable fast growers, only about 28% held that kind of pace over a stretch that long, and none of those were doing it while paying 7.72% on five billion dollars of borrowings. The bull case and the bear case agree on the segment numbers. They disagree on whether one good quarter buys enough time.

Valuation

Most valuation approaches need an earnings figure to work from, and this company's trailing bottom line is negative. Trailing operating margin ran 0.7%, against a through-the-cycle figure of 4.4% on the same revenue base, so the sensible read uses the normalized number rather than the trough. On that basis the enterprise costs roughly 49 times operating profit, which the arithmetic can only satisfy by holding growth at the ceiling a self-funding business can reach, for about 5.5 years. The cost of capital used is 7.3%, and each additional percentage point of it moves the required horizon by about 2.3 years.

Two things survive when the earnings-based approaches cannot run. One is book value, at 17.96 dollars a share against a price of $16.19, so the equity changes hands below what the balance sheet carries. The other is revenue: about $5.21 billion of it, growing in the high single digits. The two point in different directions, which is the honest state of this valuation. The asset frame says the market has already written the business down. The multiple frames, working off a company that converts very little of that revenue into profit today, say the enterprise value is generous.

The reconciliation between them is entirely about leverage. The market capitalization is 5.8 billion dollars, and the enterprise carries roughly 10.7 billion dollars of value once the borrowings are added. So the equity looks cheap against book while the whole business looks expensive against its earnings, and both statements are true at once because the creditors own most of the enterprise. That is not a paradox. It is what a levered recovery looks like from two seats.

The filed inputs that carry the recovery case are the segment results. Vision Care profit of 202 million dollars against 176 million dollars, Pharmaceuticals of 66 million dollars against 11 million dollars, and Surgical at 9 million dollars against a 7 million dollar loss, all for the March 2026 quarter, add to roughly 277 million dollars against roughly 180 million dollars a year earlier. Against that, the mandatory amortization on the September 2028 facility is $ 13 million through June 2028, so the near-term calendar is manageable even if the refinancing at the end of it is not.

Cohort position is where the gap gets sized. COO earns an 11.8% operating margin on $4.23 billion of revenue, ALGN 13.6% on $4.10 billion, and NVST 8.5% on $2.81 billion. This company's through-the-cycle margin of 4.4% sits below all of them on a larger revenue base. Whether the price is reasonable comes down to how much of that distance is closable and how quickly, because at about 21.76 times through-cycle operating profit in borrowings, the interest bill does not wait for the answer.

Catalysts

The March 2026 quarter, filed on April 29, 2026, is the first in a while where all three segments moved the same way. Vision Care profit reached $202 million against $176 million a year earlier, Pharmaceuticals $66 million against $11 million, and Surgical $9 million against a $7 million loss, with the filing attributing the surgical swing to higher revenue and to a shift toward premium product. That is roughly 277 million dollars of combined segment profit against roughly 180 million dollars, and it is the single most important development in the story.

The separation from Bausch Health is the event with the largest potential effect on the shares and the least certain timing. As of February 11, 2026 the parent still held about 88% of the outstanding common shares, and the 10-K describes the plan as proposed, listing among its uncertainties whether financing is obtained on the terms or timelines anticipated or at all and how the transaction is structured, as a distribution or a sale. Litigation is already pending over whether a distribution to the parent's shareholders would harm the parent's creditors, which means the timing is not purely a management decision.

The cost of that process is visible and continuing. Restructuring, integration and separation costs ran $58 million in 2025 against $26 million in 2024 and $44 million in 2023. Against a company that produced almost no free cash flow over the trailing year, those are not rounding items, and they will keep appearing until the structure is settled one way or the other.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Vision Care (reported)

Pharmaceuticals (reported)

Surgical (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 Form 10-Q, filed April 29, 2026 · fiscal 2025 Form 10-K, filed February 18, 2026

View the full interactive BLCO report on boothcheck