BLACK HILLS CORP /SD/ (BKH): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers BLACK HILLS CORP /SD/ (BKH) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BKH

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBKH
CompanyBLACK HILLS CORP /SD/
Sector / IndustryUtilities
Current price$72.80/sh
CompositionRetail 82% / Transportation 8% / Wholesale 1% / Market - off-system sales 2% / Transmission 2% / Other revenues 4% / Alternative revenue and other 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Multiple paid18x operating income

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 6.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-1.01σ
cohort percentile (of 70 peers)33

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.90x5expensive
Earnings1.70x3expensive
Relative1.81x2expensive
Growth1.30x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthnoReference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.6B
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.7x / 20.0x / 23.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowth$181.040.40xyesDPS $2.81, g=7.6% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3%
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$55.931.30xyesStage 1: 6% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$42.391.72xyesBV/sh $51.71, ROE (TTM) 7.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$38.251.90xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$41.831.74xyesRev $2.3B, growth 3% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.0x / 2.4x / 2.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$47.521.53xyesEPS $3.96, growth 6% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.17 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$35.992.02xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.49B × (1−11%) / WACC 5.6% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$37.631.93xyesBV $51.71 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 7.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 4.9%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$67.881.07xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.96 × BVPS $51.71) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.84B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$67.111.08xyesEPS $3.96 × (8.5 + 2×5.9%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$9.567.62xyesBV $51.71 × (ROIC 1.0% / WACC 5.6%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.30B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$34.812.09xyesEPS $3.96 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 5.9% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 8.8x
Earnings YieldEarnings$42.811.70xyesEPS $3.96 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Material operating units span distinct economics, so a single sector multiple or target margin is not representative. Consolidated cash-flow lenses may remain as secondary checks, while segment SOTP is primary.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Electric Utilitiesoperatingenterprise$933.2m$222.5m operating-income$3.6b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Gas Utilitiesoperatingenterprise$1.4b$320.8m operating-income$5.1b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$4.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)9.09x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)8.06x
Interest coverage2.7x
Share count CAGR (dilution)4.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The strangest number in this utility is what the market assumes about its gas business. Invert the price and the natural gas segment is carrying an assumption of operating profit declining about 3.5% a year over the next five years. That is a single solve under fixed assumptions and it moves a great deal with the discount rate, so hold it loosely. But the direction is unmistakable, and it sits oddly beside what is actually happening at the company, because the growth event here is on the electric side and it is the largest in the company's recent history. The FY2025 10-K notes that in 2025 "Wyoming Electric continued to grow its large-load demand from existing" customers, and by June 2026 the company reported progress on a 1.8 gigawatt data center project in Cheyenne, including equipment procurement, substation filings, and more than 200 million dollars of refundable customer construction contributions, with service targeted for early 2028.

The structure of that last detail is the part worth pausing on. In a regulated utility, growth is not a marketing achievement. It is capital placed into rate base, on which the regulator allows a return. The 10-K puts it plainly: the regulated utilities are "subject to cost-of-service/rate-of-return regulation and earnings oversight from federal and state" commissions. That means the interesting question is never whether demand exists but who funds the pipes and wires to serve it. Construction contributions paid by the customer are capital the company does not have to raise, and for a business whose share count has been growing about 4% a year to fund investment, capital it does not have to raise is worth more than the headline suggests.

The underlying business is about as plain as a listed company gets. Operations run through two segments, Electric Utilities, which "generates, transmits and distributes electricity", and Gas Utilities, with retail service accounting for about 82% of revenue and the remainder spread across transportation, transmission and off-system sales. Trailing operating income is 568.1 million dollars on revenue of roughly 2.29 billion, so close to a quarter of every revenue dollar reaches the operating line. That is respectable company in this cohort: SR converts 21.5% of 2.54 billion dollars of revenue, NJR 23.8% of 2.18 billion, and SWX 24.4% of 2.02 billion, while the much larger ATO manages 35.9% of 4.88 billion.

And the shareholder gets paid to wait. The dividend runs 2.81 dollars a share against a share price of $75.33, a yield well above what a five-year Treasury pays, funded by regulated cash flows rather than by a payout policy that depends on a good year. The honest concession is that this is not a fast-growing enterprise and the balance sheet is doing real work to keep the investment program going. But a utility priced as though half of it is in decline, while the other half prepares to serve gigawatt-scale load, is at minimum an asymmetry worth naming.

Bear Case

One variable moves this company more than any other, and it is not electricity demand. It is the interest rate, and it presses from three sides at once. It sets the cost of the borrowings that fund the investment program, it sets the discount an income-seeking buyer applies to a dividend stream, and through regulatory lag it decides how long the company absorbs higher costs before rates catch up. Net borrowings run about 4.63 billion dollars against trailing operating profit of 568.1 million, which is roughly 8.2 times operating profit, and interest is covered only about 2.8 times over. For a business whose earnings are set by a commission rather than by a market, that is not a comfortable amount of room.

The deeper problem is that the equity is not currently earning what it costs. Trailing earnings of $3.84 per share against book value of $52.19 per share is a return near 7.3%, while the required return applied to that equity is about 9.3%. A regulated utility earning below its cost of capital is destroying a little value with every dollar it invests, and the methods that begin from the balance sheet say so bluntly: the book-value-and-profitability approaches leave the price roughly 107% above where they land, and the earnings-power methods about 95% above. Only the peer-multiple lens reaches the price, and it reaches it by observing that utilities trade at utility multiples. That is a comparison, not a defence. The 10-K is candid about the mechanism, warning that the company "may be subject to unfavorable or untimely federal and state regulatory outcomes" and that "regulatory delay in adjusting rates as a result of reduced customer usage" can hurt results.

On the gas side, the structural threat is named in the filing itself. The 10-K states that "electrification initiatives in our service territories could negatively impact demand for natural gas and decrease future growth", and separately lists "Our customers' focus on energy conservation which may be assisted by emerging technologies" among the pressures on usage. This is the rare case where the market's assumption and the company's own risk disclosure point the same direction. The price already embeds gas operating profit shrinking about 3.5% a year. The filing describes exactly the forces that would produce that outcome.

The electric growth story has a specific soft spot as well. The 10-K warns that customer growth "can be negatively impacted by population declines or the loss of large-load industrial customers (including data center facilities)", and as of June 2026 the Cheyenne project's original development partner was no longer involved, with the company working with a potential customer to advance it. Gigawatt-scale load that is planned is not the same as load that is contracted. Meanwhile the equity base keeps widening, with the share count up about 4% a year since March 2022, so each year's earnings are divided across more shares before any of this reaches a per-share result. The bear case here is not that the lights go out. It is that a levered, under-earning utility funding growth with new shares is a slow way to compound, and the price is not asking for a discount to reflect that.

Valuation

The natural gas segment is the piece carrying the market's assumption, and the assumption is subtraction. Inverting today's price puts gas operating profit declining roughly 3.5% a year over the next five years. Treat that as a rough read rather than a measurement: it comes from one solve at one discount rate, and a single percentage point on that rate swings the implied growth by around nine points. What it establishes is the sign, not the size. The market is not paying for the gas business to expand.

The more reliable signal is how the methods line up against each other, and they line up in one direction. The peer-multiple lens lands essentially on top of the current price. Everything anchored to what the company actually earns or owns lands beneath it: the cash-flow methods put the price about 61% above their central estimate, the earnings-power methods about 95% above, and the book-value-and-profitability methods about 107% above. The mechanism behind that last figure is worth spelling out, because it is the whole argument. Trailing earnings of $3.84 per share sit on book value of $52.19 per share, a return near 7.3% on the equity actually invested, while the cost of that equity runs about 9.3%. When a company earns less on its book than the book costs to fund, the arithmetic says the equity is worth less than its carrying value. The peer lens does not disagree with that arithmetic. It simply prices the company against other utilities rather than against its own returns.

The operating base under all of this is straightforward and disclosed. The business runs through two reportable segments, Electric Utilities and Gas Utilities, with retail service about 82% of revenue and the rest in transportation, transmission and off-system sales. Trailing revenue is about 2.29 billion dollars and trailing operating income 568.1 million. On the gas side the 10-K describes a Choice Gas Program supplying "approximately 48,000 retail distribution customers" in Nebraska and Wyoming, one of several small regulated pieces that together make the segment.

Compared with the gas cohort the profitability is mid-pack rather than distinguished. ATO turns 35.9% of 4.88 billion dollars of revenue into operating profit, SWX 24.4% of 2.02 billion, NJR 23.8% of 2.18 billion, and SR 21.5% of 2.54 billion. On the electric side, XEL runs 18.0% of 14.78 billion and AEP 24.2% of 22.26 billion. This company sits among them rather than above them, which is consistent with a price the peer lens defends and the return-based methods do not.

The balance sheet is where the risk concentrates. Net borrowings of about 4.63 billion dollars amount to roughly 8.2 times operating profit, with interest covered about 2.8 times, and the share count has grown about 4% a year since March 2022 as equity has been issued to fund the investment program. Against that, the dividend of 2.81 dollars a share is being paid out of regulated revenue rather than out of a cyclical upswing. One last thing conditions every number above: the company has shareholder approval for an all-stock merger of equals with NorthWestern Energy expected to close in the second half of 2026, so the standalone figures here describe the business as it currently files, not the company that is likely to exist by year end.

Catalysts

The largest pending item is not an operating one. On August 18, 2025 the company signed a definitive agreement with NorthWestern Energy Group for a tax-free all-stock merger of equals, under which NorthWestern shareholders receive 0.5856 Black Hills shares for each of theirs, forming a combined regulated energy company to be named Bright Horizon Energy Corporation with roughly 1.35 million electric and natural gas customers across eight states. Both shareholder bases approved the transaction and its related proposals at special meetings on April 2, 2026. Nebraska regulators approved in May 2026, with the parties agreeing to a moratorium on general base rate increases running to May 1, 2027 for NorthWestern in that state and to May 1, 2028 for Black Hills. Approvals in Montana and South Dakota and at the federal level remain outstanding, and the companies expect to close in the second half of 2026.

The operating story to watch is in Cheyenne. In June 2026 the company reported continued progress on a proposed 1.8 gigawatt data center project, including equipment procurement, regulatory filings for new substation infrastructure, and more than 200 million dollars of refundable customer construction contributions, with service anticipated to begin in early 2028. The original development partner is no longer involved, and the company described working with a significant potential customer to carry the project forward. For a utility of this size, a load of that scale is not an incremental customer. It is a step change in rate base, and the sequence to follow is contract, then regulatory approval, then construction, in that order.

Second-quarter results are scheduled for release after the market closes on August 5, 2026, with the conference call the following morning. Given the pending combination, the more informative content of that call is likely to be the regulatory calendar rather than the quarter itself. Rate reviews and merger conditions are what determine the earnings this company is permitted to make.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Electric Utilities (reported)

Gas Utilities (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company project update, June 2026 · company earnings-date release, July 8, 2026; shareholder approval release, April 2, 2026 · merger announcement, August 18, 2025 · joint shareholder approval release, April 2, 2026 · Nebraska regulatory approval, May 2026 · company earnings-date release, July 8, 2026

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