Bausch Health Companies Inc. (BHC): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $6.56, Bausch Health Companies Inc. (BHC) is priced for +10.5% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BHC

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBHC
CompanyBausch Health Companies Inc.
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$6.56/sh
CompositionPharmaceuticals 46% / Devices 24% / OTC 20% / Branded and Other generics 9% / Other revenues 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.5%
Operating margin today8.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-4.6pp
Implied growth10.5%
Multiple paid30x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 4.2% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.59σ
cohort percentile (of 115 peers)70

Valuation X-Ray

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0
Earnings0
Relative0
Growth0

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 2.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=2)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$51.030.13xnoExit EV/EBITDA: 16.9x / 18.9x / 20.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 4.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAssetno
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAssetno
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$5.531.19xnoRev $10.9B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.2x / 0.2x / 0.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$105.850.06xnoNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.78B × (1−25%) / WACC 2.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.18B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.01656.00xyesFCF $1431.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.01656.00xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.20B (FCF $1.43B − SBC $0.23B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $10.85B × sector P/S 4.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Salixoperatingenterprise$2.6bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Solta Medicaloperatingenterprise$518.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Diversifiedoperatingenterprise$937.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Bausch + Lomboperatingenterprise$5.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$18.9b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)28.67x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)21.42x
Interest coverage0.5x
Share count CAGR (dilution)1.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start at the bottom of the capital structure and work upward, because that is where this equity actually sits. Bausch Health is a mature collection of prescription, consumer and eye-care franchises, not a growth story, and the ordinary tools for reading a mature company do not fit it. Trailing net income is negative by about 1.2 billion dollars, so there is no earnings multiple to work with. What there is instead is an enterprise worth roughly 21.4 billion dollars, of which the shareholders own the last slice. That geometry is the bull case in a sentence: an enterprise moving 10% is worth more than the entire equity market value today.

And the operations are moving in the right direction. Revenues in the March 2026 quarter came in at "$2,524 million and $2,259 million for the three months ended March 31, 2026" and the year-ago period, growth of about 12%. That is a level of top-line movement that a business at this stage is not supposed to produce, and it is broad rather than concentrated in a single line.

Salix is doing most of the heavy lifting. Its segment profit "for the three months ended March 31, 2026 and 2025 was $468 million and $371 million, respectively, an increase of $97 million, or 26%", and the filing attributes that to higher revenue plus lower selling and administrative expense. Twenty-six percent profit growth in a segment of this size is not a rounding effect. It is the operating leverage a specialty pharmaceutical franchise produces when volume rises against a fixed sales force.

The eye-care business is compounding more quietly. Bausch + Lomb segment revenue was "$1,244 million and $1,137 million for the three months ended March 31, 2026 and 2025, respectively, an increase of $107 million, or 9%", with 42 million of that increase coming from currency. Bausch Health holds roughly 87% of Bausch + Lomb's outstanding shares, and management continues to say the separation makes strategic sense once leverage targets are met. A separately listed asset that keeps growing at high single digits is a live source of proceeds that most levered pharmaceutical companies do not have.

The bull has to concede the obvious: interest expense is enormous relative to what the business currently earns, and the refinancing schedule is a permanent chore. But the company has been doing exactly that chore. The 10-K describes the April 2025 refinancing accounted for as an extinguishment of debt and a December 2025 exchange in which "126NumberCo issued $ 1,600 million of such incremental equivalent debt in the form of new 2032 Senior Secured Notes". Pushing maturities out is not deleveraging. It is buying the operating recovery time to work, and time is precisely what a residual claim needs.

Bear Case

The product doing the most work right now is also the one with a clock on it. Salix grew 26% in the March quarter on Xifaxan, and the 10-K is explicit about what surrounds that product: "for a number of our products (including Xifaxan ® 550 mg, Trulance ® , Cabtreo ® and Lumify ® in the U.S), we have commenced (or anticipate commencing) and have (or may have) ongoing infringement proceedings against potential generic competitors in the U.S. If we are not successful in these proceedings, we may face increased generic competition". The company also warns that following a loss of exclusivity "we would anticipate that product sales for such product would decrease significantly shortly" afterward, and that for products already past exclusivity "we anticipate that generic competitors may launch in 2026 or in later years". This is a moat with a published expiry, defended in court.

One of the litigants on the other side is a company whose numbers sit in plain view. AMRX, named in the Xifaxan proceedings alongside Norwich Pharmaceuticals, runs a 14.3% operating margin on $3.05B of revenue growing 7.6%, and it holds 61 products with pending applications and another 43 in development. A challenger with that cost base does not need to win quickly. It needs to win once. Meanwhile the concentration is going the wrong way: every quarter Salix outgrows the rest of the company, more of the equity value depends on the outcome of a patent docket.

Then there is the arithmetic that governs everything else. The 10-K reports that "Interest expense was $1,604 million and $1,388 million" for 2025 and 2024, an increase of "$216 million, or 16%". Trailing operating profit is about $389 million. Read those two figures together and the picture is unambiguous: the business currently earns about a fifth of its own interest bill from operations, and net borrowings sit near 50 times operating profit. Every dollar of operating improvement is spoken for before it reaches a shareholder. That, not the multiple, is what the equity is actually underwriting.

The escape hatch is narrower than it looks. Monetising Bausch + Lomb is the obvious way to fix the balance sheet, but the credit agreements have already claimed those proceeds: the 2030 term loan carries "a 100 % net cash proceeds sweep, on a pro rata basis with obligations under the 2032 Senior Secured Notes, in connection with (i) the receipt of net cash proceeds from the sale or disposition of Bausch + Lomb Share Collateral". A sale delivers cash to lenders first, and the separation itself is conditioned on reaching leverage targets, which is a circular requirement: the transaction that would reduce leverage waits on leverage being reduced.

The price, for its part, is not priced for stagnation. At the enterprise level it works out to roughly 40 times trailing operating profit, which under a single set of fixed assumptions implies operating profit compounding around 18% a year for five years. Treat that as a direction rather than a measurement. The direction is enough: it says the market is already crediting a sustained operating recovery at a company where a court, not management, controls the largest single input to it. A fair bear grants that the March quarter was genuinely good and that Bausch + Lomb has real independent value. The counter is that at this level of leverage, being right about the business and wrong about the timing produces the same outcome for the equity as being wrong about both.

Valuation

At $4.44 the shares are less a claim on a business than a claim on what remains after the lenders. Market value is about 1.7 billion dollars. The enterprise it sits on top of is worth roughly 21.4 billion, with net borrowings near 19.5 billion filling the gap. More than nine-tenths of the capital financing these franchises belongs to somebody else, and that single fact governs how every other number in the report should be read.

It also explains why the usual valuation approaches have so little purchase. Trailing net income is negative by about 1.2 billion dollars, so there is no profit figure to apply a multiple to, and price-to-sales comparisons across a company that spans prescription dermatology, gastrointestinal therapies, contact lenses and consumer eye drops compare portfolios that share almost nothing. What is left is the enterprise arithmetic, and there the price is not conservative. Roughly 40 times trailing operating profit at the enterprise level implies, under one set of fixed discount and fade assumptions, operating profit compounding near 18% a year for five years. Keep that approximate; the point is its direction, which is that a recovery is already in the price rather than waiting to be discovered.

The operating base underneath is real but thin. Revenue runs about $10.53B with a trailing operating margin near 3.9%. Set that beside the cohort. AMRX earns a 14.3% operating margin on $3.05B of revenue, growing 7.6%. OGN turns $6.16B of revenue into a 4.0% profit margin with sales down 2.1%. VTRS, at $14.56B of revenue, converts under one percent of it to operating profit. Bausch Health sits at the low end of that distribution on margin while carrying the highest leverage in it, which is the combination that makes the equity behave like an option rather than a share.

Solvency is therefore not a footnote here; it is the analysis. Interest expense was "$1,604 million" in 2025 against about $389 million of trailing operating profit, leaving coverage near 0.2. Net borrowings run about 50 times operating profit. The share count has been close to steady, rising about 0.8% a year over four years, so dilution is not the pressure; the pressure is the coupon. Two things would change that picture: a large operating step-up, which the March quarter's 12% revenue growth and 26% Salix profit growth argue is at least underway, or a Bausch + Lomb monetisation, whose proceeds the credit agreements have already routed to lenders. Both are visible. Neither is quick.

Catalysts

Two clocks are running here, and only one has a date on it. Bausch Health reports second-quarter 2026 results after the close on Wednesday, July 29, 2026, with a call at 5:00 p.m. Eastern. The number that matters is not revenue, which has been growing, but the gap between segment profit and the interest line. The March quarter closed that gap; whether it kept closing is what the print answers.

The second clock is legal and has no fixed date. The 10-K discloses ongoing Paragraph IV proceedings concerning Xifaxan 550 mg tablets against Norwich Pharmaceuticals and Amneal, and separately notes that for products that already lost exclusivity "we anticipate that generic competitors may launch in 2026 or in later years". Any docket movement on rifaximin is a larger event for this equity than a quarterly beat, because Salix profit growth is currently the main thing supporting the enterprise value the shares sit on top of.

The third item is structural. As of April 22, 2026 the company indirectly held 310,449,643 common shares of Bausch + Lomb, roughly 87% of that company, and continues to describe a separation, whether by monetisation, distribution to shareholders, or a combination, as strategically sensible subject to reaching targeted leverage ratios and obtaining approvals. There is no announced timetable. Progress toward those leverage targets, disclosed quarter by quarter, is the closest thing to a countdown available.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Salix (reported)

Solta Medical (reported)

Diversified (reported)

Bausch + Lomb (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Bausch Health press release, July 2026 · Bausch Health Q1 2026 10-Q, April 2026

View the full interactive BHC report on boothcheck