BUNGE GLOBAL SA (BG): what the price requires
At today's price, BUNGE GLOBAL SA (BG) is priced for +6.8% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BG
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | BG |
| Company | BUNGE GLOBAL SA |
| Current price | $117.82/sh |
| Composition | Soybean Processing & Refining Products 52% / Softseed Processing & Refining Products 16% / Other Oilseeds Processing & Refining Products 7% / Merchandising Products 24% / Milling Products 2% / Other Products 0% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin today | 1.4% |
| Implied growth | 6.8% |
| Multiple paid | 35x operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 6.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~11.4pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~7.2 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.43σ |
| cohort percentile (of 69 peers) | 86 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.97x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.70x | 2 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.76x | 4 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.69x | 1 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=11)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | Reference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.6B |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $61.83 | 1.91x | yes | P/E 25.53x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 34x), scenarios: 20.4x / 25.5x / 30.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 24.33x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $37.72 | 3.12x | yes | BV/sh $81.97, ROE (TTM) 4.3%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $24.50 | 4.81x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $170.96 | 0.69x | yes | Rev $80.5B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.2x / 0.3x / 0.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $150.15 | 0.78x | yes | EPS $4.29, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.96 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $20.68 | 5.70x | yes | BV $81.97 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 4.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $88.95 | 1.32x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $4.29 × BVPS $81.97) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.01 | 11782.00x | yes | EBITDA $0.82B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $138.42 | 0.85x | yes | EPS $4.29 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $823.03 | 0.14x | yes | Revenue $80.55B × sector P/S 2.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $160.88 | 0.73x | yes | EPS $4.29 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $46.38 | 2.54x | yes | EPS $4.29 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $14.5b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 16.54x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 13.07x |
| Interest coverage | 1.9x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 8.7% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Bunge is a global agribusiness that just doubled in size: the Viterra merger pushed first-quarter net sales to $21.9 billion from $11.6 billion a year earlier, reshaping it into one of the largest grain and oilseed processors and traders in the world.
- The earnings are cyclically thin, with a trailing operating margin near 1.4% and GAAP diluted EPS that fell to $0.35 as crush margins compress against record global oilseed supply.
- The integration is the swing factor: management raised full-year adjusted EPS guidance to $9.00 to $9.50 on Viterra synergies, even as the commodity cycle works against it.
Bull Case
The counterintuitive shape of Bunge's quarter is worth sitting with: net sales nearly doubled to $21.9 billion, yet GAAP net income fell to $68 million from $201 million and diluted EPS dropped to $0.35 from $1.48. A company that grows revenue and loses earnings in the same quarter looks broken, until you read the cause. The revenue jump is the Viterra merger adding scale; the earnings drop is integration costs, higher interest, and a $94 million foreign-exchange loss landing in one period. Strip those, and adjusted EPS was $1.83, narrowly ahead of expectations. The underlying processing business is performing; the GAAP line is absorbing the cost of becoming much larger.
The Viterra combination is the structural bull case, and the synergies are arriving ahead of schedule. The deal turns Bunge into a top-tier global handler of grains and oilseeds, with the scale and geographic reach that let a trader capture margin others cannot. Management reported just over $70 million of synergies realized in 2025 and expects around $190 million in 2026, targeting an annual run-rate near $220 million by year-end. The 10-K shows the merged scale already flowing through, noting the Grain Merchandising and Milling segment net sales rose 80%, to $18,128 million for 2025 primarily due to Net sales contributions from the Viterra Acquisition. Bunge is also adding capacity, completing the purchase of a port-based refinery located in Avondale, Louisiana with multi-oil refining capabilities.
The processing engine still works even in a tough market. Soybean processing net sales rose 43% year over year on strong crushing activity, and management raised full-year adjusted EPS guidance to $9.00 to $9.50 on execution in South American and North American markets. For a business whose value comes from scale, throughput, and trading skill across the agricultural supply chain, a larger Bunge with synergies still building is a more resilient earnings machine than the standalone company was, and the guidance raise in a down-cycle says management sees the integration outrunning the headwind.
Bear Case
Agribusiness is a cyclical processor, and the cycle is turning against Bunge right now. The core economics are crush margins, the spread between what Bunge pays for soybeans and softseeds and what it earns selling the meal and oil, and those margins are compressing. Record Brazilian soybean supply, around 180 million tonnes, and a shift in Argentine exports are creating a global oversupply that pushes down export prices and squeezes processing margins. The 10-K is explicit that results depend on the impact of industry conditions, including fluctuations in supply, demand, and that is precisely the variable moving the wrong way. A trailing operating margin near 1.4% leaves almost no cushion: in a thin-margin commodity business, a small move in the spread swings earnings hard, and right now the spread is moving down.
The balance sheet carries the cyclical risk at an uncomfortable level. Net debt stands at about $14.5 billion, roughly thirteen times trailing operating income, with interest coverage near 1.6 times. Agribusinesses carry large inventories of readily marketable commodities that function as quasi-cash, which softens the headline leverage, but coverage of 1.6 times on depressed earnings is genuinely tight, and the Viterra deal added both scale and debt. The 10-K names the central execution risk directly: our ability to complete, integrate and benefit from acquisitions including the business combination with Viterra. A large debt load against thin, cyclical earnings is the combination that turns a soft cycle into a balance-sheet problem.
The valuation reflects depressed earnings, which makes the multiple misleading. At about 34 times trailing operating income, the price looks expensive, but that multiple is high because operating income is cyclically low; the relative-multiple and growth-DCF methods justify the price while the asset-based and earnings-power lenses say expensive. The honest read is that the price is paying for crush margins to normalize and synergies to land. If the oversupply persists into a prolonged margin trough, or if integration disappoints, the earnings the price assumes do not materialize, and the share count has already grown about 8.7% a year to fund the deal, so the per-share recovery has more dilution to overcome. The bear is that peak-cycle hopes are priced while the cycle is rolling over.
Valuation
Bunge's valuation has to be read through the cycle, because the headline multiple is distorted by where earnings sit. At about 34 times trailing operating income, the price looks rich, but operating margin is near 1.4%, cyclically depressed by compressing crush spreads, so the multiple is high for the same reason the earnings are low. The inversion frames it as roughly 5.3% annual operating-profit growth required, which is within the company's historical range; the real bet is that margins normalize off a trough, not that the business grows from a normal base.
The methods split along the cyclical line. The relative-multiple and growth-DCF families justify the price, valuing Bunge against peers and crediting a recovery in throughput economics. The asset-based and earnings-power lenses say expensive, with the asset read at nearly four times the static value, because they capitalize the currently depressed profitability. That disagreement is the signature of a cyclical at a low point in its margin cycle: cheap if you believe earnings normalize, expensive if you anchor on today's thin spread. The Viterra synergies, building toward a roughly $220 million annual run-rate, are the company-specific lever that could lift normalized earnings above the prior baseline.
Solvency is where the caution concentrates and where the close belongs. Net debt of about $14.5 billion at roughly thirteen times trailing operating income, with interest coverage near 1.6 times, is heavy, though the large readily-marketable-inventory position that agribusinesses carry functions as quasi-cash and softens the true leverage. Still, thin coverage on cyclically low earnings is the vulnerability, and the share count has grown about 8.7% a year to fund the merger. The downside boundary is the company's ability to service that debt through a margin trough; the bet a buyer accepts is that crush margins recover and Viterra synergies arrive fast enough to validate a price set against depressed trailing earnings.
Catalysts
Bunge's first quarter showed the scale of the Viterra-enlarged company and the strain of the commodity cycle at once. Net sales jumped to $21.9 billion from $11.6 billion a year earlier on the Viterra inclusion and stronger trading volumes, but GAAP net income fell to $68 million and diluted EPS to $0.35, weighed by higher SG&A, increased interest expense, and a $94 million foreign-exchange loss. On an adjusted basis, EPS was $1.83, narrowly beating expectations, and soybean processing net sales rose 43% year over year.
The integration is running ahead of plan. Bunge reported just over $70 million of Viterra synergies realized in 2025, expects around $190 million in 2026, and targets a roughly $220 million annual run-rate by year-end. On the strength of that execution, management raised full-year adjusted EPS guidance to $9.00 to $9.50.
The headwind to watch is the oilseed cycle. Record Brazilian soybean supply near 180 million tonnes and Argentina's export shift are creating global oversupply that compresses export prices and crush margins. The key variables from here are the trajectory of crush margins as that supply works through the market, the continued pace of Viterra synergy capture, and any further capacity additions like the recently acquired Avondale refinery, which together determine whether normalized earnings climb toward the level the price assumes.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Soybean Processing and Refining / Softseed Processing and Refining +2 more (reported)
- ADM (ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND CO)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- INGR (INGREDION INCORPORATED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TSN (TYSON FOODS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SFD (SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PPC (PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GIS (GENERAL MILLS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Bunge Q1 2026 results · Bunge Q1 2026 earnings call · Bunge Q1 2026 commentary