Bank First Corp (BFC): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $152.84, Bank First Corp (BFC) is priced for 12.6% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BFC

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBFC
CompanyBank First Corp
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$152.84/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Return on equity needed12.6%
Return on equity now11.1%
ROE gap+1.5pp
Price-to-book2.07x

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.2% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026).

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.62σ
cohort percentile (of 122 peers)86
sustained it ~10 years at this level68%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.87x3expensive
Earnings1.84x1expensive
Relative0
Growth0

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=4)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
Bank Fair Value (P/TBV)$51.862.95xyesTBVPS $47.90 × 1.08x (ROE (TTM) 9.9% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.25% allowance/loans → ×0.94)
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 13.27x (blended: static sector reference 10x + trailing (TTM) 21x), scenarios: 10.6x / 13.3x / 15.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$79.051.93xyesBV/sh $73.91, ROE (TTM) 9.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$81.681.87xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowthnoRev $0.2B, growth 29% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 7.3x / 9.1x / 10.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $7.69, growth 11% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.87 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAsset$113.081.35xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.69 × BVPS $73.91) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsnoEPS $7.69 × (8.5 + 2×11.2%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativeno
PEG Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $7.69 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 11.2% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 16.8x
Earnings YieldEarnings$83.141.84xyesEPS $7.69 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The issuer is a funded financial business. Debt, interest, and cash flows are operating inputs, so industrial EV, net-debt, WACC, and free-cash-flow lenses do not apply; value the common-equity claim with book, earnings, capital, and payout economics.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Bank First (consolidated bank)financialequity0.2B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required

No unit-level total common-equity value is stated. Each financial unit requires supported standalone common equity, normalized earnings, capital adequacy, and payout capacity. Consolidated debt, interest, and cash are operating balances, not an enterprise-to-equity bridge; company-level book, earnings, capital, and payout lenses remain the coherent cross-checks.

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (dilution)10.4%

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Three of the four ways to value a bank land in the same neighbourhood, and the share price is nowhere near it. Book value plus profitability puts the business at less than half the current quote. Peer multiples land far under it too, and so does capitalizing this year's earnings and stopping. Only one approach reaches the price, and it does so by projecting the revenue growth of recent years forward and applying a sales multiple to the result. Read that spread honestly and it tells you what the market believes: not that the bank is worth a lot today, but that it will be worth considerably more, and that the static frames have no way to represent the compounding in between.

There is real evidence for the compounding. Net interest income moved from $133.5 million in 2023 to $137.8 million in 2024 to $151.7 million in 2025. Total assets over the same stretch went from $4.50 billion to $4.51 billion. A bank that grows earning power by more than a tenth without growing the balance sheet is repricing assets, mixing into better ones, or funding them more cheaply, and none of those require the regulatory capital that balance-sheet growth consumes.

The fee side is quietly doing work as well. Income from the bank's stake in Ansay and Associates, an insurance agency carried on the balance sheet for 35.4 million dollars, rose from 2.9 million dollars in 2023 to 3.5 million in 2024 and 3.9 million in 2025. Service charges reached $8.4 million. Insurance commission income is not correlated with the credit cycle, does not consume capital, and does not reprice when the Federal Reserve moves. For a bank of this size, a growing non-credit earnings stream is worth more than the same dollars of spread income.

There is also a structural advantage most investors outside the state will never have heard of. Wisconsin legislation exempts "a significant portion of the Company's loans from taxation in Wisconsin", and the final rules published in early 2024 let the company reduce its estimated tax liability by $1.3 million. A permanently lower effective tax rate on a defined class of in-state lending is not a strategy anyone can copy from outside Wisconsin, and it flows straight to the return on equity that this price is asking about.

The growth is coming through acquisition, and the record on integration is clean so far. Goodwill of $64.9 million from an earlier merger has been tested and carried without writedown, the company having "evaluated goodwill and core deposit intangibles for impairment during 2025, 2024 and 2023, determining that there was no goodwill or core deposit intangible impairment". Regulators are comfortable: "The Bank was well capitalized at December 31, 2025, and brokered deposits are not restricted." On the growth line the bank sits with the faster half of its cohort, alongside Lakeland Financial (LKFN) at 11.3% and Ameris (ABCB) at 10.3%, and well ahead of WaFd (WAFD) at 3.0% and OFG Bancorp (OFG) at 3.3%.

Bear Case

The assumption baked into this price can be stated in one sentence, which is what makes it testable. At roughly 2.1 times book value, buyers are paying for a return on equity beyond the ceiling that marks the top tier of community banking, sustained not for a cycle but for something closer to four decades. The bank's recent trailing return on equity is about 11.1%, a shade under that ceiling. The gap between those two numbers is small in appearance and enormous in consequence, because the whole premium above book rests on the excess, and the excess is what fades first.

History is unsentimental about that fade. Of the banks that have earned a return at this level, only around 67% were still earning it a decade later. Against the peer group, the price-to-book here sits at the very top. So the fragile assumption is not credit, and it is not funding. It is duration: the market is underwriting a level of profitability that most institutions which reach it cannot hold, for a period longer than most management teams last.

The mechanism most likely to break it is the one that has been producing the growth. Shares outstanding have risen roughly 10.3% a year over the four years to March 2026, because this bank buys other banks and pays in its own stock. That works beautifully while the acquirer's shares are expensive and the targets are cheap, and it is precisely the arrangement that unwinds when the multiple compresses. It also changes what book value means: tangible book value per share is $47.19 against a stated book value of $73.28, so more than a third of the equity buyers are paying 2.1 times for is goodwill and intangibles created by past deals rather than capital that can absorb a loan loss. Core deposit intangibles alone amortize down every year, from $21.2 million to $16.2 million in the most recent one, and that amortization is a real charge against the returns being extrapolated.

Then there is the single method that does reach this price, and it is worth looking at how. It gets there by carrying recent revenue growth forward and applying a sales multiple to the outcome. Applying a revenue multiple to a bank is a defensible arithmetic exercise and a poor description of what a bank is, because bank revenue is a spread that can be widened by taking more credit risk or more duration risk without anyone noticing for several years. The methods that instead ask what the equity earns and what similar banks fetch all land far below. When the only approach that justifies the price is the one that does not look at the balance sheet, that is worth noticing.

Finally, the concession the bear should make. Nothing in the disclosures suggests distress: the bank was well capitalized at the last annual report, brokered deposits are unrestricted, and the credit reserving process is conventional. The bear case is not that this bank breaks. It is that a very good community bank has been priced as an exceptional one for the next several decades, and that when the excess return converges toward the cost of equity, the multiple converges with it. A bank that earns its cost of equity is worth its book. That is a long way down from here.

Valuation

A bank is worth what it earns on the capital it holds, so the price is read against book value rather than against an operating multiple. At $150.47 the shares change hands for about 2.1 times book. Solving that backwards for the return on equity it requires does not produce a clean answer, which is itself the finding: the required return runs past the 11.7% ceiling that marks elite community-bank profitability, and it has to stay there for a period the model can only describe as forty years. Recent trailing return on equity has been about 11.1%. The price does not need a transformation. It needs permanence, which is harder.

That the assumption sits within reach of what the bank has actually earned is genuinely important, and it separates this from the usual demanding valuation. This is not a story stock. It is a profitable, conservatively supervised lender whose recent performance is roughly the level the price requires. The difficulty is entirely in the word sustained. Among institutions that have reached this level of return, only about two thirds were still earning it ten years later.

The methods spread accordingly. Book value plus profitability lands with the price standing more than twice that family's central estimate. Peer multiples put the price about 74% above where they centre, and capitalizing current earnings with no growth credited puts it about 59% above that family. Only a forward projection reaches the price at all. That configuration has a specific meaning: the premium being paid is for durability rather than for assets, earnings, or comparables, and none of the static frames has a way to price durability. They are not wrong. They simply answer a different question than the one the buyer is asking.

Two features of the balance sheet bear on how far that durability can be trusted. The first is that book value is increasingly acquired rather than accumulated: tangible book value per share of $47.19 sits well below stated book value per share of $73.28, and the difference is goodwill and core deposit intangibles from prior mergers. The second is capital and payout capacity, which is the right solvency lens for a lender rather than net debt or coverage. The bank was well capitalized at the last annual report with brokered deposits unrestricted, and it has been raising the dividend while issuing shares for acquisitions, so capital returned and capital raised are running in opposite directions at the same time.

Set against the cohort, the price-to-book is at the very top of the peer group, and the growth that justifies it is running only modestly ahead of names like Lakeland Financial (LKFN) at 11.3% revenue growth and Ameris (ABCB) at 10.3%. The premium is not being paid for a growth rate nobody else has. It is being paid for the belief that this particular bank keeps its return where it is while the others give theirs back.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results were reported in July 2026 and they were a step up. Net income came to $24.7 million, or $2.21 a share, against $16.9 million, or $1.71 a share, in the same quarter of 2025. For the first six months, net income reached $44.7 million, or $3.99 a share, up from $35.1 million and $3.53. The per-share gain is smaller than the dollar gain, which is the arithmetic of paying for growth with stock.

The reason for the step up closed on the first day of the year. Bank First completed its acquisition of Centre 1 Bancorp, parent of The First National Bank and Trust Company, on January 1, 2026, in an all-stock transaction valued at approximately $174.3 million, taking the combined organization to 38 branches across Wisconsin and the Illinois Stateline area and roughly $6 billion in assets. Systems conversion for the acquired bank was scheduled for May 2026. Integration risk on a deal this size relative to the acquirer is the near-term operational question, and conversion is where it shows up.

Capital return moved with the earnings. The board approved a quarterly dividend of $0.60 a share payable October 7, 2026 to holders of record on September 23, 2026, an increase of 9.1% on the prior quarter and 33.3% on the prior-year second quarter. A dividend rising a third year-over-year while the share count is also rising is a specific signal about how management reads its own earning power. The next test of that read is the third-quarter print, the first full period in which the acquired bank runs on the acquirer's systems.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Bank First (consolidated bank) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Bank First Q2 2026 earnings release, July 2026 · Bank First completion announcement, January 2, 2026 · Bank First dividend declaration, July 2026

View the full interactive BFC report on boothcheck