BRIGHT HORIZONS FAMILY SOLUTIONS INC. (BFAM): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $74.81, BRIGHT HORIZONS FAMILY SOLUTIONS INC. (BFAM) is priced for -3.9% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BFAM

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBFAM
CompanyBRIGHT HORIZONS FAMILY SOLUTIONS INC.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$74.81/sh
CompositionFull service center-based child care 71% / Back-up care 25% / Educational advisory services 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.3%
Operating margin today10.3%
Margin compression (value-band)-9.0pp
Implied growth-3.9%
Multiple paid17x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 11: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.9% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-2.04σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)49

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.92x5expensive
Earnings4.21x5expensive
Relative0
Growth0.86x2justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=12)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$113.430.66xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 11.1x / 13.1x / 15.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.0x / 18.0x / 21.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$38.911.92xyesBV/sh $19.40, ROE (TTM) 18.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$54.431.37xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$70.681.06xyesRev $3.0B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.0x / 1.2x / 1.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$11.926.28xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.22B × (1−38%) / WACC 6.3% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$53.711.39xyesBV $19.40 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 18.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$37.142.01xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.16 × BVPS $19.40) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.41B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$17.794.21xyesFCF $235.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$11.116.73xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.21B (FCF $0.24B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$20.983.57xyesEPS $3.16 × (8.5 + 2×-0.3%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$5.7812.94xyesBV $19.40 × (ROIC 1.9% / WACC 6.3%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $3.03B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$34.162.19xyesEPS $3.16 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Full service center-based child careoperatingenterprise$2.1b$66.1m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Back-up careoperatingenterprise$728.0m$221.6m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Educational advisory servicesoperatingenterprise$124.5m$27.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$902.3m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.70x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.90x
Interest coverage6.2x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-3.3%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The label on the file says mature. The revenue mix says something else is going on underneath it. Total revenue "increased by $247.6 million, or 9%, to $2.9 billion for the year ended December 31, 2025", and almost none of that came from the part of the business people picture when they hear the name. Back-up care, a quarter of revenue, grew 19% for the year. Educational advisory grew 9%. The centres, still 71% of the mix, grew 6%. Read the company as one thing and the growth looks unremarkable. Read it as three, and one of the three is compounding fast enough to change the shape of the whole in a few years.

What makes back-up care interesting is that it does not require buildings. An employer buys the benefit, employees use it when their regular arrangement falls through, and the care gets delivered through the existing centre network or through contracted providers. The economics show up on the cost line rather than the balance sheet: cost of services rose 16% to $373.7 million in 2025, "primarily associated with provider fees to serve the increase in utilization levels of center-based care, in-home care, and school-age programs over the prior year". Provider fees scale with use and stop when use stops. That is a fundamentally different risk profile from signing a twenty-year lease on a building in a suburban office park.

Meanwhile the part that does require buildings has started to work again. Income from the full service centre segment "increased $12.4 million, or 23%, for the year ended December 31, 2025, when compared to the same period in 2024, primarily due to increases in tuition revenue from tuition rate increases and enrollment growth". Net enrollment added a single percentage point, so most of the improvement came from price and from cost discipline rather than from filling seats. The seats are the option value. A centre that is 55% full has almost all of its costs already committed, which means the next child through the door arrives at a margin very few businesses ever see.

The competitive structure helps. The annual report describes a market that "is highly fragmented, and includes both retail and employer-sponsored centers", with principal competitors in the sponsored channel limited to KinderCare in the United States and Busy Bees in the United Kingdom. Corporate procurement departments do not enjoy switching a child care provider; the contracts are long, the counterparty is the employer rather than the parent, and the reputational cost of a bad handover falls on the employer. That is a stickier customer relationship than the tuition-paying parent relationship it superficially resembles.

Growth against the wider cohort is the last piece. Nine percent revenue growth in 2025 compares with 7.4% at Grand Canyon Education (LOPE), 3.0% at Strategic Education (STRA) and 2.5% at Graham Holdings (GHC) on their own reported figures. And the share count has come down about 2% a year over the four years to March 2026, so per-share growth has been running ahead of the headline. The board's authorization is exactly as unbinding as these things always are, the filing noting it "does not obligate us to repurchase any specific dollar amount or to acquire any specific number of shares and may be suspended or terminated at any time", but the shares have in fact been retired.

Bear Case

Strip the branding away and the largest piece of this company is a property operator that happens to employ teachers. It signs leases, fits out buildings, staffs them to regulated ratios, and then hopes enough parents show up. The first-quarter filing is candid about how that is going: "48% of these centers were more than 70% enrolled, 44% were between 40-70% enrolled and 8% were less than 40% enrolled". Occupancy is improving, and it is still the case that a majority of the estate is not full. The company has been managing the tail directly, noting that "we may seek to further downsize, consolidate, reconfigure or close some of our locations, which in some cases requires the termination of or a modification to an existing center lease". Closing a centre is expensive, slow, and visible to the corporate client who sponsored it.

The consequence lands on the margin line. Trailing revenue of roughly $2.98 billion produced $334 million of operating profit, an operating margin of 11.5%. Set that beside the cohort the market groups it with: Grand Canyon Education (LOPE) reports a 24.3% operating margin, Perdoceo (PRDO) 24.3%, Laureate (LAUR) 24.0%, Stride (LRN) 15.8%. Those businesses deliver instruction without operating a leased physical estate at this scale, which is precisely the point. The comparison is not unfair, it is diagnostic: physical child care is a structurally thinner business, and no amount of back-up care growth changes the arithmetic on the 71% of revenue that comes with a landlord attached.

That is where the price-to-fundamentals problem sits, and it is not the usual one. Nobody is paying a nosebleed multiple of forecast profit here. What they are paying is a large multiple of profit that already exists. The methods that capitalize this year's cash generation and credit no growth at all land far under the price, with the price standing roughly 190% above where the earnings-power family of methods centres, and the book-value-plus-profitability methods sit well below it too. The forward cash-flow methods do reach it, by projecting the historical revenue pace across the entire forecast period without letting it fade. So the reconciliation is straightforward and slightly uncomfortable: the price is undemanding against a future in which back-up care keeps compounding, and demanding against everything the business has actually banked.

Two external pressures could make that future arrive slower. The filing warns that state and local universal pre-K programs could reduce "demand for early care services at our existing early education and child care centers due to the availability of lower cost care alternatives, or could place downward pressure on the tuition and fees we charge". It also concedes a structural cost disadvantage, noting that "certain competitors may be able to operate with little or no rental expense and sometimes do not comply or are not required to comply with the same health, safety, and operational regulations". A regulated operator competing against subsidized and unregulated ones is not a fight that pricing power wins.

The balance sheet is where the leases finally show up. Funded debt net of cash runs about 749 million dollars, which is a little over 2.24 times operating profit and covered 7.4 times at the interest line, and on that basis the company looks conservatively financed. Add the obligations on the buildings themselves and the net figure is closer to 1.55 billion dollars. For a business whose core asset is several hundred rented locations, the second number is the one that describes the actual commitment, and it does not flex downward in a year when enrollment softens.

Valuation

Today's price values the whole company at about 16.6 times a year of company-wide operating income. Invert that and the price implies company-wide operating profit shrinking roughly 3.1% a year over the next five years. The figure is a single solve rather than a measurement, and it moves a lot: each additional percentage point of cost of capital shifts the implied pace by roughly 7.1 percentage points, so treat it as a direction rather than a decimal. The direction is still worth sitting with. Against a company whose own recent record is one of double-digit operating-profit growth, a price that embeds decline is a low bar.

The methods used to triangulate the business split cleanly, and the split is the whole story. Peer multiples put the price about 16% above where that family of methods centres, close enough to call it fairly priced against the cohort. The forward cash-flow methods reach past the price entirely. The methods built on today's earnings power do not come close, with the price standing roughly 190% above where that family lands, and the book-value-plus-profitability methods sit below the price as well. When the growth methods are the only ones that reach, the premium being paid is for durability rather than for assets or for current profit, and the durability in question has a name: back-up care.

That segment is doing what the price needs it to do. Revenue there grew 19% in 2025 and "increased by $16.1 million, or 12%, when compared to the" prior-year quarter in the three months to March 2026. The deceleration from 19% to 12% is not alarming on its own, since the comparison base has grown, but it is the series that decides whether the cash-flow methods or the earnings-power methods turn out to have been right. The centre business, 71% of revenue, grew 6% with net enrollment up 1%, which is a rate that cannot carry a growth valuation by itself.

Solvency is comfortable read one way and less so read another, and the difference is worth understanding. On funded borrowings net of cash, debt is about 749 million dollars, roughly 2.24 times operating profit, with interest covered 7.4 times over and no cash being consumed. Include the lease obligations that come with operating several hundred centres and the net figure runs to about 1.55 billion dollars. Neither number threatens the company. The lease-inclusive one simply explains why occupancy matters so much: the costs are fixed for years, and the revenue is not.

Worth noting where the market has put this relative to the cohort it screens with. Strategic Education (STRA) trades within pennies of the same share price on a 13.8% operating margin and 3.0% revenue growth. The same money buys a thinner-margin business growing three times as fast, with the growth concentrated in the one segment that does not need capital to expand. That, rather than any single multiple, is the trade on offer.

Catalysts

The next scheduled event is close. Bright Horizons reports second-quarter 2026 results on July 30, 2026, after the close. That print lands against a first quarter in which revenue reached $712 million, up 7%, and income from operations came to $65 million, up 4%.

Guidance has been held rather than revised. With the first-quarter results the company reaffirmed full-year 2026 revenue guidance of $3.075 billion to $3.125 billion, the range originally issued on February 12, 2026. Reaffirming after one quarter is a low-information act, but it does establish the bar the July print will be measured against: the midpoint requires the remaining three quarters to grow at roughly the pace the first one did.

Inside the quarter, the segment lines moved in different directions, and the divergence is the thing to track rather than the headline. Back-up care revenue "increased by $16.1 million, or 12%" in the three months to March 2026, while income from operations for the educational advisory segment "decreased $0.2 million, or 6%, in the three months ended March 31, 2026 when compared to the same period in 2025, due to increased overhead costs". Educational advisory is small enough that its direction barely matters to the consolidated result. Back-up care is not, and its rate of growth is the single input the market is currently paying for.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Full service center-based child care (reported)

Back-up care (reported)

Educational advisory services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company earnings-date announcement for Q2 2026 · Q1 2026 results release, May 5, 2026

View the full interactive BFAM report on boothcheck