BLOOM ENERGY CORPORATION (BE): what the price assumes

Generated: 2026-07-29 · Exported: 2026-08-01 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BE

Headline

Field	Value
Ticker	BE
Company	BLOOM ENERGY CORPORATION
Sector / Industry	Industrials
Current price	$158.38/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

Field	Value
Inversion basis	revenue-multiple
EV / sales paid	18.5x
Steady-state operating margin assumed	11.6%
Must persist for	37.5y

Solve inputs: computed at a 14.8% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~4.7 years.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~18.4 years; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: elevated

Reference	Value
vs own history	+0.62σ
sustained it ~10 years at this level	15%
implied end-window share	6%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

Family	Median price/FV	Models	Reads
Asset	—	0	—
Earnings	—	0	—
Relative	8.27x	1	expensive
Growth	1.19x	3	expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=4)

Model	Family	FV	Price/FV	Applicable	Methodology
DCF Perpetual Growth	Growth	$40.96	3.87x	yes	FCF base $0.3B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.8%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit Multiple	Growth	$167.39	0.95x	yes	Exit EV/EBITDA: 283.9x / 286.9x / 289.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative Valuation	Relative	$7.73	20.49x	yes	P/E 39.6x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 5081x), scenarios: 31.7x / 39.6x / 47.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 26.4x (excluded from median)
Simple DDM	Growth	—	—	no	—
Two-Stage DDM	Growth	—	—	no	—
Simple Excess Return	Asset	$0.34	465.82x	yes	BV/sh $2.88, ROE (TTM) 1.1%, ke 9.3% (excluded from median)
Two-Stage Excess Return	Asset	$0.18	879.89x	yes	5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% (excluded from median)
Discounted Future Market Cap	Growth	$133.38	1.19x	yes	Rev $2.4B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 9.6x / 12.0x / 14.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair Value	Relative	$1.09	145.30x	yes	EPS $0.03, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=145.18 (Overvalued) (excluded from median)
Margin Trajectory	Growth	—	—	no	—
Earnings Power Value	Earnings	—	—	no	—
Residual Income	Asset	$0.13	1218.31x	yes	BV $2.88 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 1.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 0.7%/yr (excluded from median)
Graham Number	Asset	$1.42	111.54x	yes	√(22.5 × EPS $0.03 × BVPS $2.88) — Graham's conservative floor (excluded from median)
EV/EBITDA Relative	Relative	$5.89	26.89x	yes	EBITDA $0.18B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x (excluded from median)
FCF Yield	Earnings	$7.00	22.63x	yes	FCF $229.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF Yield	Earnings	—	—	no	—
Ben Graham Formula	Earnings	$1.01	156.81x	yes	EPS $0.03 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/B	Asset	$2.02	78.41x	yes	BV $2.88 × (ROIC 6.2% / WACC 8.8%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales Sector	Relative	$19.15	8.27x	yes	Revenue $2.45B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair Value	Relative	$1.17	135.37x	yes	EPS $0.03 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x (excluded from median)
Earnings Yield	Earnings	$0.34	465.82x	yes	EPS $0.03 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) (excluded from median)
Funds From Operations Multiple	Relative	—	—	no	—
Clinical Phase NPV	Growth	—	—	no	—
Merton	Asset	—	—	no	—
V5 Mechanical	—	—	—	no	—

Solvency

Field	Value
Net debt	$120.3m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)	0.74x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)	0.73x
Interest coverage	5.1x
Share count CAGR (dilution)	15.9%
Burning cash	no

Bullet Takeaways

• Oracle agreed on 13 April 2026 to procure up to 2.8 gigawatts of Bloom's fuel cell systems under a master services agreement, with an initial 1.2 gigawatts already contracted and deployment underway, which is the fact that changed what this company is understood to be selling.
• The reported economics have not caught up to that story: trailing operating margin runs at 2.9%, and the FY2025 10-K reported unsatisfied performance obligations of $394.4 million as of 31 December 2025, a contracted book worth a fraction of one year's sales.
• Second-quarter results are due on 28 July 2026 after the close, and the number worth isolating is how much of the contracted gigawatts converted into recognised product revenue rather than sitting in deferred balances.

Bull Case

Power equipment is usually an easy category to value. Count the megawatts shipped, apply a price, add the service attached to the installed base, and the answer falls out. Bloom breaks that pattern because the thing customers are actually buying is not electricity but a calendar. The FY2025 10-K says its systems can be deployed within approximately 90 days, helping customers address schedule constraints associated with traditional utility interconnection or large centralized generation assets. When the binding constraint on a data centre is a grid interconnection queue measured in years, ninety days is not a product feature. It is the entire proposition, and it is why the normal arithmetic of megawatts and margins undercounts what is being sold.

The Oracle agreement is that argument written as a contract. On 13 April 2026 the two companies expanded their partnership into a master services agreement under which Oracle intends to procure up to 2.8 gigawatts of Bloom fuel cell systems, with an initial 1.2 gigawatts contracted and deployment already underway. Set that against a company whose entire trailing revenue is $2.45 billion and the scale of the commitment is the point. A hyperscaler does not sign for gigawatts of onsite generation as an experiment.

The revenue line had already turned before that. Total revenue rose $550.1 million, or 37.3%, in 2025, and the 10-K breaks the increase into $446.1 million from product, $81.8 million from installation, $14.8 million from service and $7.5 million from electricity. Product carried the great majority of it, which matters more than the headline: product revenue is where manufacturing leverage lives, and Bloom builds from a common set of core technology components, materials and supplier relationships across a cell-printing facility in Fremont, California and assembly operations in Delaware. One process feeding several products is how a hardware company earns operating leverage rather than just adding volume.

Held against the wider industrial-power comparable set, the growth is genuinely top-tier. NVT grew revenue 40.3% at a 15.8% operating margin; PSIX grew 38.6% at 13.5%; GEV, by far the largest of the group at $39.38 billion of revenue, grew 10.3% at a 3.9% operating margin. Bloom's own trailing operating margin of 2.9% sits close to where GEV sits at forty times the revenue, which is the bull case in miniature: the margin available to this equipment category at scale looks more like NVT and PSIX than like the current print, and Bloom has not yet reached the volume where that shows up.

None of this needs a rescue financing to play out. The company holds roughly 2.5 billion dollars of liquid assets, and the 10-K states that the company and all of its subsidiaries were in compliance with all financial covenants as of both 31 December 2025 and 2024. Part of the funding sits in zero-coupon convertible notes, which cost nothing in cash interest while they remain outstanding. That combination buys the one thing a manufacturer scaling into a demand shock actually needs, which is the ability to build ahead of the order without asking permission first.

Bear Case

The variable with the most leverage over this thesis is not demand. It is a paragraph in the tax code. The 10-K is explicit that the federal government provides businesses with the Investment Tax Credit under Section 48 of the Internal Revenue Code, and that the economics customers see depend on incentives that can come in the form of tax incentives, cash grants, performance incentives, environmental attribute credits, permitting regimes, interconnection policies and/or applicable gas or electric tariffs. It then warns about failure to accurately interpret the new requirements under the IRA and the OBBBA regarding prevailing wage, apprenticeship, domestic content, siting in an energy community, prohibited foreign entities or material assistance from prohibited foreign entities. Those are not abstractions. They are eligibility tests that a single supply-chain decision can fail, and failing one moves the credit, which moves the customer's payback period, which moves the order.

Compounding it, many sales do not go to the end user at all. The 10-K describes arrangements where the sale of the Energy Server is made to a financier or other strategic partner who owns the system and uses it to produce power for the end customer, and separately warns that conditions in the general economy and financial and credit markets may result in the contraction of available tax equity financing. So the model needs the credit to exist and needs a functioning market of people willing to buy the credit. Two policy-adjacent dependencies stacked on one another, in a business the market is pricing as though neither could bind. The filing also flags that uncertainty regarding requirements for service under tariffs could negatively impact the perceived value of, or risks associated with, its products.

What today's price does not appear to discount is any of that. At $187.26 the market is paying roughly 27 times the company's revenue. For that to make sense the business has to eventually earn an operating margin near 11.6%, against the 2.9% it earns on a trailing basis, while growing revenue beyond 25% a year sustained across a span of four decades. The arithmetic does not resolve that into a finite path, which is the honest way of saying the price is above what the calculation can reach at all. Historically only about 34% of comparable fast growers held a pace like that for even half a decade.

Then there is who pays for the growth. Share count has risen about 15.9% a year over the four years to March 2026. That is not incidental financing; that is the primary funding mechanism, and the 10-K's discussion of induced conversions describes offers giving noteholders consideration worth more than the original conversion terms would have delivered, with the excess booked as an expense to the company. Every conversion moves value from existing holders to noteholders. An investor who is right about Bloom's technology and its market can still be wrong about their own return, simply because the slice they own keeps getting cut thinner.

The two hard numbers that bound the downside point the same way. As of 31 December 2025 the contracted book stood at 394.4 million dollars of unsatisfied performance obligations, a small fraction of what the price assumes about the decades ahead. And trailing operating profit covers interest expense only about 1.6 times, so profit does not have to fall very far before the coverage question becomes a real one. Every standard family of valuation method lands below today's price. The single cash-flow approach that comes closest reaches the price only because it assumes the earnings multiple the market pays now never compresses, which builds in the conclusion rather than testing it.

Valuation

Begin with the disagreement, because in this case there is not much of one. Every family of standard method lands beneath today's price, and not narrowly. The forward-growth methods land nearest, and even against them the price stands roughly 40% above where that family sits. The peer-multiple comparison sits an order of magnitude lower still. When no family reaches the price, the price is not expensive relative to one lens and cheap relative to another; it is outside the range the standard frames can express, and reading it requires a different question than which method is right.

That question is what the price would have to assume. At $187.26 the market pays roughly 27 times revenue. Working backwards from there, the business would need to settle at an operating margin near 11.6%, against a trailing 2.9%, while compounding revenue faster than the business could fund out of its own operations, sustained over a span measured in decades. That last part does not resolve into a finite answer, so it should be read as a boundary rather than a forecast: the price sits past what this calculation can reach, not at a particular point inside it. Only around 34% of comparable fast growers sustained a pace like that for even half a decade. Treat all of it as a direction of travel; the inputs behind it carry real uncertainty, and precision here would be false.

The comparable set gives the margin question some texture. Among the whole-company industrial-power comparables, NVT earns a 15.8% operating margin while growing 40.3%, PSIX earns 13.5% while growing 38.6%, POWL earns 19.8%, and GEV, the largest in the group at $39.38 billion of revenue, earns 3.9%. So the roughly 11.6% margin the price implies is not an impossible destination for this kind of equipment business. It is a destination several of these companies have already reached. The distance between Bloom's 2.9% and that level is real, and the group shows it is bridgeable at scale. What the group cannot tell you is how many years the bridge takes.

The evidence on how far along the journey is stands at 394.4 million dollars of unsatisfied performance obligations as of 31 December 2025, per the FY2025 10-K, set against total revenue that grew $550.1 million, or 37.3%, that year. Growth is real and it is accelerating. The contracted forward book, at the last annual filing, was still small relative to the revenue already being recognised, which is why the Oracle master services agreement signed in April 2026 mattered so much to how the market reads the name.

Solvency sets the boundary on how patient an investor can afford to be. Roughly 2.5 billion dollars of liquid assets is a meaningful buffer, and the business is generating cash rather than consuming it, but trailing operating profit covers interest expense only about 1.6 times. The more consequential number for a shareholder is the share count, which has risen about 15.9% a year over the four years to March 2026. In a company funded substantially through convertible instruments, dilution is not a risk that shows up if things go badly. It is the standing cost of the current strategy, charged against the same shareholders who are paying 27 times revenue for the outcome.

Catalysts

The near-term event is fixed. Bloom reports second-quarter 2026 results on 28 July 2026 after the market closes. Consensus has Q2 2026 revenue at roughly $767 million, which would represent a very large step up on the year-ago quarter. The useful test in that release is not whether the revenue number clears, but the split between product revenue and everything else, because product is where the manufacturing economics either appear or do not.

The event that reset expectations came earlier in the quarter. On 13 April 2026 Bloom and Oracle expanded their partnership into a master services agreement under which Oracle intends to procure up to 2.8 gigawatts of fuel cell systems, with an initial 1.2 gigawatts contracted and deployments under way and continuing into next year. Two things worth watching as that unfolds: how much of the 2.8 gigawatt ceiling converts into firm contract, and how quickly the contracted portion moves through installation into recognised revenue. The gap between an intention to procure and a delivered system is where this kind of announcement either earns its re-rating or does not.

The slower-moving catalyst is policy. The FY2025 10-K sets out the eligibility architecture the customer economics depend on, including the Investment Tax Credit under Section 48 and the newer conditions attached under the IRA and the OBBBA covering prevailing wage, apprenticeship, domestic content, energy-community siting and restrictions tied to prohibited foreign entities. Any tightening or clarification of those tests changes the payback maths for a buyer before it changes anything on Bloom's own income statement, which means the policy calendar tends to move the order book a quarter or two ahead of the reported results.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Bloom Energy (consolidated) (reported)

• FCEL (FUELCELL ENERGY, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: Energy, collectively, "PE Group"), only have the right (i) to provide maintenance and repair services to PE Group's then existing customers on then existing molten carbonate power generation and thermal projects under long-term service agreements then in force as well as long-term service agreements that had expired…
• FY2025 10-K: …Bank, and Connecticut Green Bank (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.10 to the Company's Current Report on Form 8-K filed August 24, 2023). ​ ​ ​ 10.75 ​ Limited Guaranty and Subordination Agreement, dated August 18, 2023, by FuelCell Energy, Inc. for the benefit of Liberty Bank (incorporated by reference to…
• PSIX (POWER SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONAL, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …Agreement, dated as of March 22, 2023, by and between the Company and Weichai Power. 8-K 10.1 03/27/2023 001-35944 10.41 †† Employment Agreement, dated as of April 24, 2023, between the Company and Constantine Xykis. 8-K 10.1 04/25/2023 001-35944 10.42 Second Amended and Restated Shareholder's Loan Agreement, dated…
• FY2025 10-K: …asset information is not reviewed by the CODM. The accounting policies of the Company's single reportable segment are the same as those described in the Note 1. Summary of Significant Accounting Policies and Other Information . The measure of segment assets is consolidated total assets presented in the Company's…
• WWD (WOODWARD, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …depots, third-party repair shops, and other end users. 2 Industrial Our Industrial segment designs, produces, and services systems and products for the management of energy in the form of fuel, air, fluids, gases, motion, combustion, and electricity. These products include actuators, valves, pumps, fuel injection…
• FY2025 10-K: …us-gaap:CashFlowHedgingMember 2024-10-01 2025-09-30 0000108312 country:JP wwd:OtherInvestmentAssetMember srt:MinimumMember wwd:DefinedBenefitPensionPlanMember 2025-09-30 0000108312 us-gaap:DebtSecuritiesMember country:GB srt:MinimumMember wwd:DefinedBenefitPensionPlanMember 2025-09-30 0000108312…
• GEV (GE Vernova Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: …of onshore and offshore wind turbines and blades. • Our Electrification segment includes grid solutions, power conversion, electrification software, and solar and storage solutions technologies required for the transmission, distribution, conversion, storage, and orchestration of electricity from point of generation…
• FY2025 10-K: …portion of our U.S. federal and state deferred tax assets. The effective tax rate for year ended December 31, 2024 was impacted primarily by an increase in valuation allowances in the U.S . and in certain foreign jurisdictions with losses providing no tax benefit, partially offset by a pre-tax gain with an…
• GNRC (GENERAC HOLDINGS INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …to vigorously defend against the claims and contends that PHS cannot recover certain damages on behalf of its customers upon final approval of the settlement in the Multidistrict Litigation noted herein below to the extent the claims relate to the performance of a certain solar system component. On October 28, 2022 ,…
• FY2025 10-K: …Under the new guidance, the Company must consistently categorize and provide greater disaggregation of information in the rate reconciliation. It must also further disaggregate income taxes paid. The update is effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2024. The Company adopted this ASU as of December…
• GE (GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY)
• FY2025 10-K: …method investments related to onshore renewable energy projects, at December 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024, respectively. In addition, $ 7,660 million and $ 6,665 million were in our run-off insurance operations, primarily comprised of equity method investments at December 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024,…
• FY2025 10-K: …General Electric Capital Corporation's Registration Statement on Form S-3, File No. 333-59707). 4(c) First Supplemental Indenture dated as of May 3, 1999, supplemental to Third Amended and Restated Indenture dated as of February 27, 1997 (Incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4(dd) to General Electric Capital…
• POWL (Powell Industries, Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: $ 1,664 The weighted average discount rates as of September 30, 2025 and 2024 were 7.13 % and 5.44 %, respectively. The weighted average remaining lease term was 2.06 years and 2.47 years, respectively, at September 30, 2025 and 2024. N. Segment Information We manage our business as one reportable, operating segment…
• FY2025 10-K: …control and automation in generation, transmission and distribution, for a total consideration of £13.6 million Pounds Sterling, or $18.4 million, including cash acquired. The acquisition advances our key strategic initiative to expand our automation platform capabilities. We believe the combination of Powell's…
• NVT (nVent Electric plc)
• FY2025 10-K: …rate and customer attrition rate selected by management. /s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP Minneapolis, Minnesota February 17, 2026 We have served as the Company's auditor since 2017. 40 nVent Electric plc Consolidated Statements of Operations and Comprehensive Income Years ended December 31 In millions, except per share…
• FY2025 10-K: …solutions help protect operating environments for mission critical applications in infrastructure, industrial and commercial verticals. 22 • Electrical Connections -The Electrical Connections segment provides innovative solutions that connect power and data infrastructure. Our offerings enhance end-user safety,…

Methodology Note

• Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
• Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
• Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
• Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Bloom Energy press release, 13 April 2026 · Bloom Energy earnings schedule, July 2026 · Zacks consensus estimate, July 2026