Brunswick Corporation (BC): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $80.44, Brunswick Corporation (BC) is priced for +1.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.
Generated: 2026-07-29 · Exported: 2026-08-01 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BC
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | BC |
| Company | Brunswick Corporation |
| Sector / Industry | Industrials |
| Current price | $80.44/sh |
| Composition | Propulsion 36% / Engine P&A 23% / Navico Group 13% / Boat 28% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 5.8% |
| Operating margin (mid-cycle) | 11.1% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -5.3pp |
| Trailing margin (depressed year) | -0.8% |
| Implied growth | 1.1% |
| Multiple paid | 13x mid-cycle operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~5.7pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.21σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.48x | 2 | expensive |
| Earnings | 3.49x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.38x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.74x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=11)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $208.96 | 0.38x | yes | FCF base $0.4B, growth 9% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.6%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $108.43 | 0.74x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 27.7x / 29.7x / 31.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $210.01 | 0.38x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.5x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $24.38 | 3.30x | yes | Reference only (book value floor): BV/sh $24.38, ROE negative |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $21.94 | 3.67x | yes | Reference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $24.38, ROE converges to ke |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $68.59 | 1.17x | yes | Rev $5.5B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.8x / 1.0x / 1.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $60.49 | 1.33x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.52B × (1−22%) / WACC 6.6% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $12.84 | 6.26x | yes | EBITDA $0.25B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $23.03 | 3.49x | yes | FCF $340.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $16.21 | 4.96x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.30B (FCF $0.34B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $3.87 | 20.79x | yes | BV $24.38 × (ROIC 1.0% / WACC 6.6%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $210.01 | 0.38x | yes | Revenue $5.52B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $2.5b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 5.26x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 4.10x |
| Interest coverage | 5.7x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -4.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 11.1%); the trailing year was depressed.
Bullet Takeaways
- The engines matter more than the boats: Propulsion and the Engine Parts & Accessories business together supply about 59% of revenue, and the FY2025 10-K describes Propulsion selling to over 900 boat builders and a network of more than 9,000 marine dealers, which means Brunswick collects on boats it did not build.
- The last twelve months produced an operating loss of roughly 32 million dollars against a through-the-cycle operating margin of about 11.1%, so every trailing figure here is a trough reading rather than a run rate, and the whole valuation rests on that gap closing.
- Second-quarter results land on July 30, 2026, the first check on whether the 13% sales increase posted in the March quarter was a genuine turn or a restocking blip.
Bull Case
There is a right way and a wrong way to read a mature cyclical near the bottom of its cycle, and the wrong way is to take the trailing income statement literally. Brunswick lost money on operations over the last twelve months. It also has a through-the-cycle operating margin near 11.1%, which is the margin its own history says the business earns when boats are selling normally. Both numbers are real. Only one of them describes the business. The whole bull case is the argument that the trough figure is the temporary one, and the March quarter, where sales rose 13% against the prior year, is the first hard evidence in a while pointing that way.
The reason the recovery leverage sits with Brunswick rather than with a boat builder is that the company sells the part everyone needs. The FY2025 10-K describes its engine business bluntly: "The Propulsion segment designs, manufactures, and sells engines, controls, rigging, and propellers globally to over 900 boat builders (both independent and Brunswick's Boat segment) and a network of more than 9,000 marine dealers and distributors". Mercury outboards hang off the transoms of boats built by competitors. When the marine market recovers, Brunswick participates in most of it regardless of which hull the buyer picks, and its own Boat segment is roughly a quarter of revenue rather than the whole story.
The second structural point is what happens after the boat is sold. The Engine Parts & Accessories distribution operation is described in the filing as "leading distributors of Brunswick and third party marine parts and accessories throughout North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific, offering same-day or next-day delivery service to a broad array of marine service facilities". Parts demand tracks boats in the water, not boats being bought. A boat sold four years ago still needs an impeller, an oil change and a propeller this summer, and the owner buying that propeller has no idea whether wholesale ordering is up or down. That is the segment that keeps working while the cyclical one does not. Extended service contracts add to the same effect: the filing notes that extended warranties typically run an additional one to three years, with payment collected up front and revenue recognized across the term.
Brunswick's position in the marine supply chain shows up in other companies' filings too. LCII, a supplier of components across recreational vehicles and marine, lists its customer base in its own 10-K as "Major customers include Brunswick Corporation (symbol: BC), Polaris Inc. (symbol: PII), Blue Bird Corporation (symbol: BLBD), Skyline Champion Corporation (symbol: SKY), and Cavco Industries, Inc. (symbol: CVCO)." Being named first among the customers a components maker builds capacity around is a reasonable proxy for scale in a fragmented industry.
Navico Group is the piece the market probably discounts most and the one with the clearest comparison. It sells marine electronics, and its most obvious competitor is GRMN, which earns a 26.5% operating margin on a much larger revenue base spanning aviation, fitness and automotive. Navico does not earn anything close to that today. What the gap says is that marine electronics carries structurally attractive economics when it is run at scale, and that the distance between Navico's current contribution and what the category can produce is an internal execution problem rather than a market that cannot pay.
Management has behaved as though it believes the trough is temporary. Share count has come down about 4% a year across the four years to April 4, 2026, which is an unusual thing to do while carrying meaningful debt through a downturn. It is also the clearest available statement of where the board thinks the shares are relative to normalized earnings. The bear will say buying stock with borrowed money during a cyclical trough is exactly how balance sheets get damaged. That objection is fair, and the answer is that the company has been retiring its most expensive borrowings at the same time: during 2025 it repaid the remaining principal on its 6.625% Senior Notes due 2049 and its 6.5% Senior Notes due 2048. Buying back stock and retiring high-coupon debt in the same year is a company acting on a view, not drifting.
Bear Case
A boat is bought with borrowed money, on a Saturday, by someone who did not have to buy anything. That single sentence contains most of the bear case. Interest rates set the monthly payment on a purchase nobody needs, and they simultaneously set the cost dealers pay to hold inventory on the lot. When rates rise, both sides of Brunswick's channel tighten at once: the retail buyer walks, and the dealer stops reordering. The company's own risk disclosure describes the mechanism without embellishment: "These factors and recent economic headwinds could weaken demand for marine products and result in sustained lower dealer stocking levels." Sustained is the word that matters. A weak quarter is a quarter; sustained destocking is a repricing of the entire wholesale run rate.
Trade policy sits on top of that as a second external lever. The FY2025 10-K is direct about it: "In addition to having to pay the tariffs, the volatile trade policy environment may lead to declining consumer confidence, inflation, lower economic expectations, and ultimately reduced demand for our products and services." Note the structure of the argument the company itself makes. Tariffs hurt twice, once in the cost of goods and again through the confidence of the customer, and only the first one can be engineered around by moving a supply chain. Fuel is a third lever pulling the same direction, since the filing observes that "Higher energy and fuel costs increase operating expenses at our manufacturing facilities and the cost of shipping products to customers." Higher fuel prices also make a large outboard engine more expensive to actually use.
None of these variables is in Brunswick's control, and today's price does not appear to be charging much for them. The market is paying roughly 13 times a through-the-cycle operating income figure of about 599 million dollars, which asks for only about 1.7% annual growth in operating profit over five years. That looks undemanding until you notice what it assumes. The trailing twelve months produced an operating loss. Getting from a loss to a normalized figure near 600 million is not growth in any ordinary sense; it is a full cycle recovery treated as the starting line. If the recovery is slower than assumed, the price is not paying 13 times anything. It is paying an infinite multiple of what the business is currently earning.
The industry data does not yet say the cycle has turned everywhere. PII, which competes in both powersports and pontoon and deck boats, is running a negative operating margin of about 4.8% on roughly 7.3 billion dollars of revenue. HOG, another maker of expensive financed toys, saw revenue fall about 9.8% year over year. These are not company-specific stumbles; they are the shape of discretionary durables when consumer credit gets expensive. Brunswick's own Boat segment showed the same pattern in 2025, where the filing breaks the sales change into volume down 4.6% and product mix and price up 2.1%. Selling fewer units at higher prices works until it does not, and it is precisely the pattern that precedes a discounting cycle.
The dealer network is the pressure point where all of this lands. The filing states plainly that "Maintaining a reliable network of dealers is essential to our success." and warns that "In addition, dealers or distributors could decide to reduce their level of inventory of our products." Brunswick does not sell to boaters. It sells to dealers who bet their own borrowed working capital on what boaters will do next season. That is a demand signal filtered through someone else's balance sheet, and it turns down faster than end demand does.
Leverage is what converts a soft cycle into a serious problem. Net debt runs about 2.51 billion dollars, roughly 4.19x through-cycle operating profit, with interest covered about 5.4 times on that same normalized basis. Read against trailing operating profit, which is negative, neither ratio exists at all. The company is not burning cash and there is no near-term solvency question, but the honest framing is that the balance sheet is sized for the normalized business and is currently being carried by the trough one. Continuing to retire shares at about 4% a year in that condition is a decision that looks excellent if the cycle turns in 2026 and considerably less so if it does not.
The fair concession is that management has been more right than wrong when it commits to a number. Guidance has been raised on 10 separate occasions since 2011 against only 2 cuts. That is a real track record, and it argues the current normalized framing is not fantasy. It does not, however, change the arithmetic: the price is underwriting a return to through-cycle economics, and the timing of that return is set by interest rates and trade policy rather than by anything the company does in its factories.
Valuation
At $79.83, the market is paying about 13 times Brunswick's through-the-cycle operating income. Invert that arithmetic and the embedded requirement is about 1.7% annual growth in operating profit over five years, which sounds like almost nothing to ask. The catch is hidden in the word through-the-cycle. That normalized figure is close to 599 million dollars, built from the company's own historical margins applied to current revenue, while the last twelve months produced an operating loss of about 32 million. The price is not paying a low multiple of what Brunswick earns. It is paying a moderate multiple of what Brunswick has shown it can earn, and asking for very little on top of that once it gets back there.
That calculation carries a real sensitivity worth stating. It runs at a cost of capital near 9% with a 4% terminal growth rate, and each additional percentage point of cost of capital lifts the required operating-profit growth by roughly 5.8 points. For a company whose end demand is itself set by interest rates, that is a double exposure: rates move the customer's payment and the discount rate at the same time. Treat that implied pace as approximate and directional, not as a measurement.
The methods split cleanly along one line, and the line is whether a method looks at trailing earnings or through them. The approaches built on revenue and on a recovery in cash flow both land above today's price. The earnings-power and book-value approaches land far below it, with the price sitting roughly three and a half times above where the earnings-power methods reach. That is not a signal that the stock is expensive in the usual sense. It is what always happens when you capitalize a cyclical trough: a method that treats the last twelve months as permanent will value a company at a small fraction of what a normalized method does. The reader's job is to decide which of those two descriptions of Brunswick is closer to the truth, and that is genuinely the whole question here.
Two filing-sourced inputs are worth putting under the arithmetic. Navico Group posted net sales of 800.4 million dollars in 2025, which sizes the marine-electronics piece against the roughly 5.5 billion dollars the whole company turns over. And the Boat segment's 2025 sales change decomposes into volume down 4.6% offset by product mix and price up 2.1%, which is the composition of revenue that holds up on paper while unit demand is falling underneath it. Volume, not price, is the variable that has to turn for the normalized margin to come back.
The cohort makes the point about basis rather than about position. Comparing Brunswick's trailing operating margin to PATK at 7.0% or LCII at 7.0% is comparing a trough to a run rate, since those component suppliers serve recreational vehicles and housing alongside marine and their cycles are not synchronized with the outboard market. The more useful comparison is PII, whose marine and powersports mix is closest and which is also running a negative operating margin right now. When the closest comparable is in the same condition, the read is a sector cycle rather than a company problem.
On the balance sheet, net debt of about 2.51 billion dollars sits against a revolving facility of 1.0 billion dollars maturing October 11, 2029, plus a commercial paper program that had 290.0 million dollars outstanding at a 4.27% weighted average rate as of December 31, 2025. Leverage runs about 4.19x through-cycle operating profit and interest is covered about 5.4 times on the same normalized basis. Neither ratio is computable against trailing operating profit, which is negative, and that is the honest boundary on the downside here: the company is not burning cash, the maturities are termed out, and the share count has fallen about 4% a year over four years, but the debt was sized for the business at 11.1% margins and is currently being serviced by a business at a loss.
Catalysts
The next hard data point is five days out. Brunswick reports second-quarter 2026 results on July 30, 2026 before the market opens, with a call that morning hosted by chairman and chief executive David Foulkes and chief financial officer Ryan Gwillim. That print matters more than a typical quarter because the previous one broke the pattern: first-quarter 2026 net sales came in at 1,378.1 million dollars, up 13% against the same quarter of 2025, and GAAP diluted earnings were $0.32 a share.
What made that quarter interesting was the mix underneath it. Mercury reported retail unit growth of about 11% against a U.S. outboard engine industry up about 6% in the quarter, which is share gain rather than a rising tide. Share gains in the engine business are the mechanism by which the normalized margin gets rebuilt, because propulsion carries the segment economics and it reaches boats built by other companies. One quarter is not a trend, and the July print is the first opportunity to see whether the same mix held through the spring selling season, which is when boats are actually bought.
Two variables sit outside the company's reporting calendar and will do more to set the outcome than any single quarter. The first is the rate path, which determines both the retail buyer's payment and the carrying cost of dealer inventory. The second is trade policy, which the FY2025 10-K identifies as a cost and a confidence problem at the same time. Neither resolves on a schedule, which is why the useful thing to track in the July report is not the headline but the dealer stocking commentary: wholesale orders turn before retail does, in both directions.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Propulsion (reported)
- PII (POLARIS INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: We make available and advertise discount or rebate programs, retail financing or other incentives for our dealers and distributors to remain price competitive to accelerate retail sales to consumers. We advertise our brands directly to consumers via digital, television, print, out of home, radio, events and…
- FY2025 10-K: Inc. Deferred Compensation Plan for Directors, as amended and restated, effective October 24, 2019, incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.c to the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2019.* .d Polaris Industries Inc. Senior Executive Annual Incentive Plan, as amended and restated…
- THO (THOR INDUSTRIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …a second-source supplier base for certain component parts; however, engineering requirements associated with an alternate component part, particularly the chassis on which our various units are built, could limit the impact of these alternative suppliers on reducing any near-term supply constraints. In addition to…
- FY2025 10-K: 947 , coming from the June 24, 2022 authorization. Since the inception of the initial December 21, 2021 authorization, the Company has repurchased 3,801,330 shares of its common stock, at various times in the open market, at a weighted-average price of $ 86.32 per share and held them as treasury shares at an aggregate…
- HOG (Harley-Davidson, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …us-gaap:VariableInterestEntityPrimaryBeneficiaryMember hog:AssetBackedU.S.CommercialPaperConduitFacilityVIEMember us-gaap:SecuredDebtMember 2025-10-01 2025-10-31 0000793952 us-gaap:ForeignLineOfCreditMember us-gaap:VariableInterestEntityNotPrimaryBeneficiaryMember…
- FY2025 10-K: …the use of media and other means. During 2025, 2024 and 2023, the Company incurred $ 184.7 million, $ 136.7 million and $ 131.0 million in advertising costs, respectively. Shipping and Handling Costs - The Company classifies shipping and handling costs as a component of Motorcycles and related products cost of goods…
- PATK (PATRICK INDUSTRIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: . Mr. Roeder has 20 years of experience in the RV industry and co-founded Indiana Transport in December 2009. Hugo E. Gonzalez was appointed President - Powersports and Housing in December 2025, Executive Vice President - Operations in January 2024 and Chief Operating Officer in May 2024. Prior to that, Mr. Gonzalez…
- FY2025 10-K: …expense, net 74,507 1.9 % 79,470 2.1 % (4,963) (6) % Other expenses 24,420 0.6 % - - % 24,420 N/A Income taxes 42,006 1.1 % 40,169 1.1 % 1,837 5 % Net income $ 135,056 3.4 % $ 138,401 3.7 % $ (3,345) (2) % Year Ended December 31, 2025 Compared to 2024 Net Sales. Net sales in 2025 increased approximately $235.1…
- LCII (LCI INDUSTRIES)
- FY2025 10-K: …Program for the period between June 13, 2025 and August 1, 2025 to repurchase up to $ 100.0 million of common stock (excluding excise tax), subject to certain parameters. Under this Rule 10b5-1 trading plan, the Company purchased 1,057,667 shares at a weighted average price of $ 94.55 per share totaling $ 101.0…
- FY2025 10-K: …in the Registrant's Form 10-Q filed August 2, 2022). 10.31 † Form of Executive Employment Agreement (Revised 2022) (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.3 included in the Registrant's Form 10-Q filed August 2, 2022). 10.32 † Offer Letter between LCI Industries and Lillian Etzkorn, accepted on March 30, 2023…
Engine P&A (reported)
- PATK (PATRICK INDUSTRIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: . Mr. Roeder has 20 years of experience in the RV industry and co-founded Indiana Transport in December 2009. Hugo E. Gonzalez was appointed President - Powersports and Housing in December 2025, Executive Vice President - Operations in January 2024 and Chief Operating Officer in May 2024. Prior to that, Mr. Gonzalez…
- FY2025 10-K: …Officer of the Company since January 2020 and served as President of the Company from January 2016 to July 2021. Mr. Nemeth was Executive Vice President of Finance and Chief Financial Officer from May 2004 to December 2015, and Secretary-Treasurer from 2002 to 2015. Prior to that, Mr. Nemeth was Vice President of…
- LCII (LCI INDUSTRIES)
- FY2025 10-K: …wholesale distributors, and service centers, as well as direct-to-consumer sales through online platforms. The Aftermarket Segment also includes biminis, covers, buoys, and fenders to the marine industry, towing products, truck accessories, appliances, air conditioners, televisions, sound systems, tankless water…
- FY2025 10-K: …Program for the period between June 13, 2025 and August 1, 2025 to repurchase up to $ 100.0 million of common stock (excluding excise tax), subject to certain parameters. Under this Rule 10b5-1 trading plan, the Company purchased 1,057,667 shares at a weighted average price of $ 94.55 per share totaling $ 101.0…
- DORM (Dorman Products, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …powersports products built for the cool factor and designed with an edge. Gboost - Clutching products for specialty vehicles. GDP - Premium quality transmission, portals, differentials and more for UTVs and ATVs. We offer bumper-to-bumper aftermarket solutions covering everything from engine, undercar, steering and…
- FY2025 10-K: …limited warranties for our heavy-duty and specialty vehicle products. Our standard warranties provide for the repair or replacement of the non-performing part. Product Development We are committed to product development and innovation with a customer-first approach, keeping owners and installers in mind. Our…
Navico Group (reported)
- GRMN (GARMIN LTD)
- FY2025 10-K: Uneekor, Vista Outdoor, and Zoleo. Garmin considers its principal aviation competitors to be Aspen Avionics, Avidyne, Dynon Avionics, Jeppesen ForeFlight, Genesys Aerosystems, Honeywell Aerospace & Defense, Innovative Aerosystems, Collins Aerospace (RTX), Safran, Thales, and Universal Avionics Systems Corporation. For…
- FY2025 10-K: …motorcycle-specific features. The RV series of PNDs offers features specific to the RV enthusiast. Tread® is a line of rugged, all-terrain navigators with mapping specific for off-road guidance for overlanding, off-roading, and Baja racing, as well as live team tracking through integrated inReach technology in…
- PATK (PATRICK INDUSTRIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …vehicles, watercraft, and residential and manufactured homes; • the availability and costs of labor; • the ability to manage our inventory levels effectively, as well as inventory levels of retailers and manufacturers; • the financial condition of our customers; • retention and concentration of material customers; •…
- FY2025 10-K: 0 square foot facility includes a showroom that displays the Company's marine products as well as the marine design and engineering capabilities and services offered by our marine businesses. Operating Brands Through its operating brands, the Company provides customers with specific product knowledge, expertise and…
- LCII (LCI INDUSTRIES)
- FY2025 10-K: …these markets. Major customers include Brunswick Corporation (symbol: BC), Polaris Inc. (symbol: PII), Blue Bird Corporation (symbol: BLBD), Skyline Champion Corporation (symbol: SKY), and Cavco Industries, Inc. (symbol: CVCO). We serve our adjacent industries customers by delivering high-quality components such as…
- FY2025 10-K: …continuing to expand in adjacent industries and aftermarket channels. OEM Segment: Our OEM Segment services leading OEMs in the RV, transportation, marine, and housing markets. Our strategically located manufacturing and distribution facilities across North America and Europe provide efficient service to OEMs. In…
Boat (reported)
- PII (POLARIS INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …several dealers and distributors for markets outside such countries. Marine: Our Marine segment designs and manufactures boats that are designed to compete in key segments of the recreational marine industry, specifically pontoon and deck boats. Inclusive of the segments in which we compete, we estimate total U.S.…
- FY2025 10-K: …is discussed in the contract liabilities section of Note 3. For the majority of wholegood vehicles, boats, and PG&A, the Company transfers control and recognizes a sale when it ships the product from its manufacturing facility, distribution center, or vehicle holding center to the customer. The amount of…
- THO (THOR INDUSTRIES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …of providing the promised goods (recreational vehicles or component parts, as applicable), which is satisfied when control of the goods is transferred to the customer. For recreational vehicle sales, the Company recognizes revenue when its performance obligation has been satisfied and control of the product is…
- FY2025 10-K: 947 , coming from the June 24, 2022 authorization. Since the inception of the initial December 21, 2021 authorization, the Company has repurchased 3,801,330 shares of its common stock, at various times in the open market, at a weighted-average price of $ 86.32 per share and held them as treasury shares at an aggregate…
- HOG (Harley-Davidson, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …us-gaap:DesignatedAsHedgingInstrumentMember us-gaap:CashFlowHedgingMember us-gaap:SellingGeneralAndAdministrativeExpensesMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0000793952 us-gaap:TreasuryLockMember us-gaap:DesignatedAsHedgingInstrumentMember us-gaap:CashFlowHedgingMember us-gaap:InterestExpenseMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31…
- FY2025 10-K: …2025-01-01 2025-12-31 0000793952 us-gaap:CommodityContractMember us-gaap:DesignatedAsHedgingInstrumentMember us-gaap:CashFlowHedgingMember 2024-01-01 2024-12-31 0000793952 us-gaap:CommodityContractMember us-gaap:DesignatedAsHedgingInstrumentMember us-gaap:CashFlowHedgingMember 2023-01-01 2023-12-31 0000793952…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 results, reported April 30, 2026, and Q2 2026 earnings call scheduled for July 30, 2026 · Q1 2026 results, reported April 30, 2026 · FY2025 10-K · Brunswick Q2 2026 earnings call announcement, July 9, 2026 · Brunswick first quarter 2026 results, reported April 30, 2026 · Brunswick first quarter 2026 earnings call, April 30, 2026