Banner Corporation (BANR): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $70.50, Banner Corporation (BANR) is priced for 10.9% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.
Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BANR
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | BANR |
| Company | Banner Corporation |
| Sector / Industry | Financial Services |
| Current price | $70.50/sh |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 10.9% |
| Return on equity now | 10.0% |
| ROE gap | +0.9pp |
| Price-to-book | 1.22x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.7% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026).
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.81σ |
| cohort percentile (of 122 peers) | 37 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 73% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.02x | 3 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.10x | 1 | expensive |
| Relative | — | 0 | — |
| Growth | 1.11x | 1 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=5)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $56.92 | 1.24x | yes | TBVPS $46.91 × 1.21x (ROE (TTM) 10.4% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.39% allowance/loans → ×0.95) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.4x / 10.0x / 11.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $63.29 | 1.11x | yes | Stage 1: 17% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $65.23 | 1.08x | yes | BV/sh $57.90, ROE (TTM) 10.4%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $69.11 | 1.02x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | — | — | no | Rev $0.6B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.4x / 4.0x / 4.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | EPS $5.94, growth 17% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.70 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $87.97 | 0.80x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $5.94 × BVPS $57.90) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | EPS $5.94 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | EPS $5.94 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 16.7% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 25.0x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $64.22 | 1.10x | yes | EPS $5.94 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
The issuer is a funded financial business. Debt, interest, and cash flows are operating inputs, so industrial EV, net-debt, WACC, and free-cash-flow lenses do not apply; value the common-equity claim with book, earnings, capital, and payout economics.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Banner (consolidated bank) | financial | equity | 0.7B reported-currency | — | withheld | unresolved standalone equity facts required |
No unit-level total common-equity value is stated. Each financial unit requires supported standalone common equity, normalized earnings, capital adequacy, and payout capacity. Consolidated debt, interest, and cash are operating balances, not an enterprise-to-equity bridge; company-level book, earnings, capital, and payout lenses remain the coherent cross-checks.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.2% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- Margin is the whole story here: net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis reached 3.96 percent for 2025 against 3.75 percent in 2024, and the June 2026 quarter came in at 4.13 percent.
- At roughly 1.2 times book the price already assumes that improvement becomes permanent, requiring a sustained return on equity near 11.1 percent against the roughly 10 percent recently earned.
- Credit is the line that has been drifting: non-performing assets reached $51.2 million at the end of 2025 from $39.6 million a year earlier and $30.1 million the year before, which is 0.31 percent of total assets against 0.19 percent two years ago.
Bull Case
Follow the margin and most of Banner's recent history explains itself. Net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis was 3.96 percent for 2025, twenty-one basis points wider than the 3.75 percent of 2024, and the 10-K attributes the move to a thirteen basis point rise in the yield on average earning assets alongside a lower cost of funding. The June 2026 quarter ran at 4.13 percent against 3.92 percent in the same quarter a year earlier. For a lender this size, twenty basis points of margin is not a rounding difference. It is the gap between an unremarkable year and a good one.
What makes it durable rather than lucky sits on the funding side, and management has been explicit about the strategy: "One of our key strategies is to strengthen our franchise by emphasizing core deposit activity in non-interest-bearing and other transaction and savings accounts with less reliance on higher cost certificates of deposit." Money that arrives because a business runs its payroll through the bank reprices slowly and leaves slowly. Money that arrives because the bank posted the best rate reprices instantly and leaves the day somebody bids higher. A margin built on the first kind survives a rate cycle. The second kind is rented.
Returns have followed the same path. Return on average common equity, as the annual report labels it, ran 11.94 percent in 2023, fell to 9.91 percent in 2024, and recovered to 10.51 percent in 2025. It did that while the bank carried more capital rather than less: average common equity to average assets went 9.88 percent, then 10.80 percent, then 11.48 percent across those three years. Producing a similar return on a thicker equity base is the harder version of the same trick, and it is the version that survives a supervisor's stress scenario.
Volume has not stalled while this happened. Loan originations, including loans held for sale, exceeded repayments by $852.6 million during 2025 and by $984.7 million during 2024. That places Banner in the working middle of its cohort on growth rather than at either edge: BY expanded revenue 13.2 percent over the trailing year and CATY 11.4 percent, while FULT managed 4.2 percent and WSFS 4.3 percent. A bank that grows its earning assets while widening its spread is compounding on both terms of the same equation.
Capital and payout tie the case off. Common equity tier 1 stood at about 12.8 percent as filed at December 31, 2025, and roughly 50.7 percent of the latest fiscal year's earnings went back to shareholders as dividends and repurchases. The share count has been flat to slightly lower over four years, drifting down about 0.2 percent a year, which means the per-share improvement was earned in the operating business rather than manufactured in the denominator. The company describes what it is building this way: "We believe our branch network, broad product line and heightened brand awareness have created a franchise that is well positioned for growth and successful execution of our super community bank model." Nothing in that sentence is thrilling. That is rather the point of it.
Bear Case
The competition that threatens Banner is not the bank across the street. It is the growing set of firms that can hold customer balances without being a bank at all. The 10-K states the asymmetry directly: "Certain nonbank competitors are not subject to the same regulatory framework as banks", and it names what is arriving next: "As a result of recent regulations to provide a regulatory framework for stablecoins, increased competition may emerge from issuers of stablecoins and providers of related technology." The filing supplies its own word for the mechanism: "In addition, legislative or regulatory changes could accelerate disintermediation."
That word does more damage here than it would at most banks, because Banner's entire margin advantage rests on cheap operating deposits. Remove the checking balance that pays nothing and the same loans have to be funded with certificates that pay whatever the market asks. The company describes the mechanic as its own risk: funding costs rising faster than asset yields, "compressing our net interest margin". Essentially all of the margin expansion that made 2025 a good year came out of that spread, and the spread is precisely what a lower-cost, lightly regulated deposit substitute attacks first.
Set the price against that exposure. At $70.25, roughly 1.2 times book value, the market assumes this bank sustains a return on equity of about 11.1 percent. It has recently been earning about 10 percent. The gap is narrow, and the narrowness is the problem rather than the comfort: the price contains almost no allowance for the return going the other way. It is not paying for a recovery, it is paying for today's performance to become permanent and then improve a little. Among firms that have reached this level of return, roughly three in four were still there ten years on, which reads as reassurance until you notice the price already credits this one with being in that group.
Credit has been moving quietly against the thesis for two years. Non-performing assets reached $51.2 million at the end of 2025, against $39.6 million a year earlier and $30.1 million the year before, lifting them from 0.19 percent of total assets to 0.24 percent and then 0.31 percent. In absolute terms these are small numbers, and that is the fair way to state them. They are also numbers that rose in two consecutive years without a recession to explain them, and a return assumption this tight leaves no room for provisions to normalize upward from a level this low.
The peer set is not waiting either. BY grew revenue 13.2 percent over the trailing year, CATY 11.4 percent, ABCB 10.3 percent. In a business where the product is undifferentiated and the relationship is the moat, faster-growing lenders in adjacent markets are bidding for the same middle-market borrowers and the same operating accounts. The June quarter gave a small preview of what that costs: net interest income rose sequentially, but partly against higher interest expense on increased Federal Home Loan Bank borrowings. Wholesale funding is what a bank reaches for when the deposits do not show up on their own.
Valuation
The distance between what this bank earns and what its price assumes is unusually short. At $70.25 the shares trade at roughly 1.2 times book value, and inverted, that multiple asks for a sustained return on equity of about 11.1 percent. Recent performance has been about 10 percent. Most valuation sections at this point describe a gap. Here the more accurate word is a step.
The methods used to triangulate the price land in a configuration that is worth reading carefully. The earnings-power approaches and the peer-multiple approaches both center above today's price. The asset-value methods sit essentially on it. Only the forward cash-flow methods land lower, with the price about 15 percent above where they center, and they get there by taking the recent pace of balance-sheet growth and tapering it forward. As a pattern, that is not a stock priced on a story. It is priced close to what it already is, with the value-oriented lenses seeing somewhat more than the market currently pays for.
Against the cohort the multiple is ordinary, sitting below the middle of the peer group on book value. Sensitivity bounds the argument usefully: each additional percentage point of required return lifts the return on equity the price implies by only about 1.2 points. So this is not a bet with much exposure to what happens to discount rates. It has heavy exposure to exactly one operating variable, which is the margin.
That variable has been cooperating, and the composition of the improvement matters more than its size. Net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis was 3.96 percent for 2025 against 3.75 percent for 2024, with the yield on earning assets rising while the cost of funding fell. Those two moves together are the kind that persist; a margin lifted only by asset yields reverses when rates do. Underneath it the earning-asset base grew rather than merely repricing, with loan originations exceeding repayments by $852.6 million during the year.
Capital is what gives the assumption its room. Common equity tier 1 was about 12.8 percent as filed at December 31, 2025, and roughly 50.7 percent of the latest fiscal year's earnings left as dividends and repurchases, with the share count essentially unchanged across four years. A bank running that much capital while distributing half its earnings has already decided not to manufacture a higher return with leverage, and that decision is a large part of why the return sits near 10 percent rather than above it. What the price asks is for slightly more than that decision has so far produced.
Catalysts
The June quarter landed on July 22, 2026, and it was a mixed print rather than a clean one. Banner reported net income of $48.9 million, or $1.43 per diluted share, against $54.7 million and $1.60 per diluted share in the March quarter, and $45.5 million and $1.31 per diluted share in the June quarter of 2025. Year over year the direction is up. Sequentially it is down, and that sequential step is the number the next call has to explain.
The operating lines held up better than the bottom line did. Net interest income was $153.7 million for the quarter, above $150.2 million in the March quarter and $144.4 million a year earlier, and net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis reached 4.13 percent against 4.11 percent sequentially and 3.92 percent a year ago. Part of the sequential gain came from an extra calendar day and from growth in average earning assets, offset by higher interest expense on increased Federal Home Loan Bank borrowings, which is the detail worth tracking: funding growth through wholesale borrowings rather than deposits is the one development that would undo the margin story.
Capital return continued on schedule. The board declared a regular quarterly cash dividend of $0.52 per share, payable August 14, 2026. Against a payout of roughly 50.7 percent of the latest fiscal year's earnings and a common equity tier 1 ratio around 12.8 percent as filed at the end of 2025, the dividend is being paid out of comfortable rather than stretched capacity. The next real test is whether the margin holds above four percent into the September quarter while deposit balances, not borrowings, do the funding.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Banner (consolidated bank) (reported)
- TCBK (TriCo Bancshares)
- FY2025 10-K: . As a bank holding company, TriCo is subject to the supervision of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "FRB") under the BHC Act. The Bank is subject to the supervision of the California Department of Financial Protection & Innovation (the "DFPI") and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation…
- FY2025 10-K: …Litigation matters range from individual actions involving a single plaintiff to class action lawsuits and can involve claims for substantial or indeterminate alleged damages or for injunctive or other relief. See "Item 1A - Risk Factors" and "Item 1C - Cybersecurity" for a discussion of the Bank's cybersecurity…
- FRME (FIRST MERCHANTS CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: 1893. The Bank also operates First Merchants Private Wealth Advisors (a division of First Merchants Bank). The Bank includes 111 banking locations in Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. In addition to its branch network, the Corporation offers comprehensive electronic and mobile delivery channels to its customers. The…
- FY2025 10-K: …to significant change relate to the determination of the allowance for credit losses. The Corporation is a financial holding company whose principal activity is the ownership and management of the Bank and operates in a single significant business segment. The Bank provides full banking services under an Indiana…
- BY (BYLINE BANCORP, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Department of Agriculture ("USDA") (collectively referred to as "U.S. government guaranteed loans") lending programs and originates U.S. government guaranteed loans. The Bank engages in short‑term direct financing lease contracts through BFG Corporation, doing business as Byline Financial Group ("BFG"), a…
- FY2025 10-K: . Our chief operating decision makers evaluate our business and operations using consolidated information for purposes of allocating resources and assessing performance. Refer to Note 26-Segment Information of the notes to our audited Consolidated Financial Statements contained in Part II, Item 8 of this report for…
- FULT (FULTON FINANCIAL CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: 6 billion with no amount outstanding against that amount. As of December 31, 2025, the Corporation had $3.9 billion of collateralized borrowing capacity at the FRB discount window with no amount outstanding against this amount. A combination of commercial real estate loans, commercial loans, consumer loans and…
- FY2025 10-K: FRB and FHLB stock represent restricted investments and are carried at cost on the Consolidated Balance Sheets, which is a reasonable estimate of fair value. As of December 31, 2025, fair values for loans and time deposits were estimated by discounting future cash flows using the current rates, as adjusted for…
- CVBF (CVB FINANCIAL CORP.)
- FY2025 10-K: …offered by other providers to our customers, including mutual funds, a full array of fixed income vehicles and a program to diversify our customers' funds in federally insured time certificates of deposit of other institutions. In addition, we offer a wide range of financial services and trust services through our…
- FY2025 10-K: …cannot accept, renew or roll over any brokered deposit unless they have applied for and been granted a waiver by the FDIC. As of December 31, 2025, the Bank had $300 million of deposit liabilities categorized as brokered deposits. Bank Holding Company Regulation Bank holding companies and their subsidiaries are…
- WSFS (WSFS FINANCIAL CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …Although WSFS owns $2.0 million of the common securities of the Trust, the Trust is not consolidated into the Company's Consolidated Financial Statements as the Company is not deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the entity. • Royal Bancshares Capital Trust I (Trust I) and Royal Bancshares Capital Trust II (Trust…
- FY2025 10-K: 2025. The rate resets quarterly based on three-month term SOFR plus 2.41 %. These securities are treated as borrowings with interest included in Interest on trust preferred borrowings on the Consolidated Statements of Income and included in Trust preferred borrowings in the Consolidated Statements of Financial…
- ABCB (Ameris Bancorp)
- FY2025 10-K: …loan servicing expenses. F-62 NOTE 21. CONDENSED FINANCIAL INFORMATION OF AMERIS BANCORP (PARENT COMPANY ONLY) Condensed Balance Sheets December 31, 2025 and 2024 (dollars in thousands ) 2025 2024 Assets Cash and due from banks $ 82,821 $ 141,836 Investment in subsidiaries 4,135,785 3,857,797 Other assets 29,589…
- FY2025 10-K: …notes. The Company elected to redeem the remaining Bank subordinated notes in full on the September 1, 2025 interest payment date. These notes, which totaled $ 74.0 million outstanding, bore interest at 8.22 % and were redeemed at par. For regulatory capital adequacy purposes, the Bank subordinated notes qualified as…
- CATY (Cathay General Bancorp)
- FY2025 10-K: ) is a corporation that was organized in 1990 under the laws of the State of Delaware. The Bancorp is the holding company of Cathay Bank, a California state-chartered commercial bank ("Cathay Bank" or the "Bank"), and twelve limited partnerships investing in affordable housing investments in which the Bank is the sole…
- FY2025 10-K: …foreign currency spot and forward contracts, Internet banking, investment services, and other customary banking services to its clients. The Bank owns 100 % of the common securities of Cathay Holdings LLC. Use of Estimates. The preparation of the Consolidated Financial Statements in accordance with GAAP requires…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Banner Corporation Q2 2026 earnings release, July 22, 2026