Banner Corporation (BANR): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $70.50, Banner Corporation (BANR) is priced for 10.9% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BANR

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBANR
CompanyBanner Corporation
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$70.50/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Return on equity needed10.9%
Return on equity now10.0%
ROE gap+0.9pp
Price-to-book1.22x

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.7% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026).

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.81σ
cohort percentile (of 122 peers)37
sustained it ~10 years at this level73%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.02x3expensive
Earnings1.10x1expensive
Relative0
Growth1.11x1expensive

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=5)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
Bank Fair Value (P/TBV)$56.921.24xyesTBVPS $46.91 × 1.21x (ROE (TTM) 10.4% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.39% allowance/loans → ×0.95)
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.4x / 10.0x / 11.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$63.291.11xyesStage 1: 17% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$65.231.08xyesBV/sh $57.90, ROE (TTM) 10.4%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$69.111.02xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowthnoRev $0.6B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.4x / 4.0x / 4.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $5.94, growth 17% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.70 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAsset$87.970.80xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.94 × BVPS $57.90) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsnoEPS $5.94 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativeno
PEG Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $5.94 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 16.7% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 25.0x
Earnings YieldEarnings$64.221.10xyesEPS $5.94 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The issuer is a funded financial business. Debt, interest, and cash flows are operating inputs, so industrial EV, net-debt, WACC, and free-cash-flow lenses do not apply; value the common-equity claim with book, earnings, capital, and payout economics.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Banner (consolidated bank)financialequity0.7B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required

No unit-level total common-equity value is stated. Each financial unit requires supported standalone common equity, normalized earnings, capital adequacy, and payout capacity. Consolidated debt, interest, and cash are operating balances, not an enterprise-to-equity bridge; company-level book, earnings, capital, and payout lenses remain the coherent cross-checks.

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.2%

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Follow the margin and most of Banner's recent history explains itself. Net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis was 3.96 percent for 2025, twenty-one basis points wider than the 3.75 percent of 2024, and the 10-K attributes the move to a thirteen basis point rise in the yield on average earning assets alongside a lower cost of funding. The June 2026 quarter ran at 4.13 percent against 3.92 percent in the same quarter a year earlier. For a lender this size, twenty basis points of margin is not a rounding difference. It is the gap between an unremarkable year and a good one.

What makes it durable rather than lucky sits on the funding side, and management has been explicit about the strategy: "One of our key strategies is to strengthen our franchise by emphasizing core deposit activity in non-interest-bearing and other transaction and savings accounts with less reliance on higher cost certificates of deposit." Money that arrives because a business runs its payroll through the bank reprices slowly and leaves slowly. Money that arrives because the bank posted the best rate reprices instantly and leaves the day somebody bids higher. A margin built on the first kind survives a rate cycle. The second kind is rented.

Returns have followed the same path. Return on average common equity, as the annual report labels it, ran 11.94 percent in 2023, fell to 9.91 percent in 2024, and recovered to 10.51 percent in 2025. It did that while the bank carried more capital rather than less: average common equity to average assets went 9.88 percent, then 10.80 percent, then 11.48 percent across those three years. Producing a similar return on a thicker equity base is the harder version of the same trick, and it is the version that survives a supervisor's stress scenario.

Volume has not stalled while this happened. Loan originations, including loans held for sale, exceeded repayments by $852.6 million during 2025 and by $984.7 million during 2024. That places Banner in the working middle of its cohort on growth rather than at either edge: BY expanded revenue 13.2 percent over the trailing year and CATY 11.4 percent, while FULT managed 4.2 percent and WSFS 4.3 percent. A bank that grows its earning assets while widening its spread is compounding on both terms of the same equation.

Capital and payout tie the case off. Common equity tier 1 stood at about 12.8 percent as filed at December 31, 2025, and roughly 50.7 percent of the latest fiscal year's earnings went back to shareholders as dividends and repurchases. The share count has been flat to slightly lower over four years, drifting down about 0.2 percent a year, which means the per-share improvement was earned in the operating business rather than manufactured in the denominator. The company describes what it is building this way: "We believe our branch network, broad product line and heightened brand awareness have created a franchise that is well positioned for growth and successful execution of our super community bank model." Nothing in that sentence is thrilling. That is rather the point of it.

Bear Case

The competition that threatens Banner is not the bank across the street. It is the growing set of firms that can hold customer balances without being a bank at all. The 10-K states the asymmetry directly: "Certain nonbank competitors are not subject to the same regulatory framework as banks", and it names what is arriving next: "As a result of recent regulations to provide a regulatory framework for stablecoins, increased competition may emerge from issuers of stablecoins and providers of related technology." The filing supplies its own word for the mechanism: "In addition, legislative or regulatory changes could accelerate disintermediation."

That word does more damage here than it would at most banks, because Banner's entire margin advantage rests on cheap operating deposits. Remove the checking balance that pays nothing and the same loans have to be funded with certificates that pay whatever the market asks. The company describes the mechanic as its own risk: funding costs rising faster than asset yields, "compressing our net interest margin". Essentially all of the margin expansion that made 2025 a good year came out of that spread, and the spread is precisely what a lower-cost, lightly regulated deposit substitute attacks first.

Set the price against that exposure. At $70.25, roughly 1.2 times book value, the market assumes this bank sustains a return on equity of about 11.1 percent. It has recently been earning about 10 percent. The gap is narrow, and the narrowness is the problem rather than the comfort: the price contains almost no allowance for the return going the other way. It is not paying for a recovery, it is paying for today's performance to become permanent and then improve a little. Among firms that have reached this level of return, roughly three in four were still there ten years on, which reads as reassurance until you notice the price already credits this one with being in that group.

Credit has been moving quietly against the thesis for two years. Non-performing assets reached $51.2 million at the end of 2025, against $39.6 million a year earlier and $30.1 million the year before, lifting them from 0.19 percent of total assets to 0.24 percent and then 0.31 percent. In absolute terms these are small numbers, and that is the fair way to state them. They are also numbers that rose in two consecutive years without a recession to explain them, and a return assumption this tight leaves no room for provisions to normalize upward from a level this low.

The peer set is not waiting either. BY grew revenue 13.2 percent over the trailing year, CATY 11.4 percent, ABCB 10.3 percent. In a business where the product is undifferentiated and the relationship is the moat, faster-growing lenders in adjacent markets are bidding for the same middle-market borrowers and the same operating accounts. The June quarter gave a small preview of what that costs: net interest income rose sequentially, but partly against higher interest expense on increased Federal Home Loan Bank borrowings. Wholesale funding is what a bank reaches for when the deposits do not show up on their own.

Valuation

The distance between what this bank earns and what its price assumes is unusually short. At $70.25 the shares trade at roughly 1.2 times book value, and inverted, that multiple asks for a sustained return on equity of about 11.1 percent. Recent performance has been about 10 percent. Most valuation sections at this point describe a gap. Here the more accurate word is a step.

The methods used to triangulate the price land in a configuration that is worth reading carefully. The earnings-power approaches and the peer-multiple approaches both center above today's price. The asset-value methods sit essentially on it. Only the forward cash-flow methods land lower, with the price about 15 percent above where they center, and they get there by taking the recent pace of balance-sheet growth and tapering it forward. As a pattern, that is not a stock priced on a story. It is priced close to what it already is, with the value-oriented lenses seeing somewhat more than the market currently pays for.

Against the cohort the multiple is ordinary, sitting below the middle of the peer group on book value. Sensitivity bounds the argument usefully: each additional percentage point of required return lifts the return on equity the price implies by only about 1.2 points. So this is not a bet with much exposure to what happens to discount rates. It has heavy exposure to exactly one operating variable, which is the margin.

That variable has been cooperating, and the composition of the improvement matters more than its size. Net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis was 3.96 percent for 2025 against 3.75 percent for 2024, with the yield on earning assets rising while the cost of funding fell. Those two moves together are the kind that persist; a margin lifted only by asset yields reverses when rates do. Underneath it the earning-asset base grew rather than merely repricing, with loan originations exceeding repayments by $852.6 million during the year.

Capital is what gives the assumption its room. Common equity tier 1 was about 12.8 percent as filed at December 31, 2025, and roughly 50.7 percent of the latest fiscal year's earnings left as dividends and repurchases, with the share count essentially unchanged across four years. A bank running that much capital while distributing half its earnings has already decided not to manufacture a higher return with leverage, and that decision is a large part of why the return sits near 10 percent rather than above it. What the price asks is for slightly more than that decision has so far produced.

Catalysts

The June quarter landed on July 22, 2026, and it was a mixed print rather than a clean one. Banner reported net income of $48.9 million, or $1.43 per diluted share, against $54.7 million and $1.60 per diluted share in the March quarter, and $45.5 million and $1.31 per diluted share in the June quarter of 2025. Year over year the direction is up. Sequentially it is down, and that sequential step is the number the next call has to explain.

The operating lines held up better than the bottom line did. Net interest income was $153.7 million for the quarter, above $150.2 million in the March quarter and $144.4 million a year earlier, and net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis reached 4.13 percent against 4.11 percent sequentially and 3.92 percent a year ago. Part of the sequential gain came from an extra calendar day and from growth in average earning assets, offset by higher interest expense on increased Federal Home Loan Bank borrowings, which is the detail worth tracking: funding growth through wholesale borrowings rather than deposits is the one development that would undo the margin story.

Capital return continued on schedule. The board declared a regular quarterly cash dividend of $0.52 per share, payable August 14, 2026. Against a payout of roughly 50.7 percent of the latest fiscal year's earnings and a common equity tier 1 ratio around 12.8 percent as filed at the end of 2025, the dividend is being paid out of comfortable rather than stretched capacity. The next real test is whether the margin holds above four percent into the September quarter while deposit balances, not borrowings, do the funding.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Banner (consolidated bank) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Banner Corporation Q2 2026 earnings release, July 22, 2026

View the full interactive BANR report on boothcheck