BancFirst Corporation (BANF): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $110.55, BancFirst Corporation (BANF) is priced for 13.6% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BANF

Headline

FieldValue
TickerBANF
CompanyBancFirst Corporation
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$110.55/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Return on equity needed13.6%
Return on equity now13.0%
ROE gap+0.6pp
Price-to-book1.90x

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026).

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history+1.01σ
cohort percentile (of 122 peers)81
sustained it ~10 years at this level65%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.17x3expensive
Earnings1.38x1expensive
Relative0
Growth0

Families that justify the price: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=4)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
Bank Fair Value (P/TBV)$89.311.24xyesTBVPS $52.21 × 1.71x (ROE (TTM) 12.9% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.26% allowance/loans → ×0.94, NPL 0.95% → ×0.98)
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.3x / 10.0x / 11.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$81.031.36xyesBV/sh $58.25, ROE (TTM) 12.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$94.811.17xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowthnoRev $0.5B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 6.0x / 7.2x / 8.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $7.41, growth 7% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.16 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAsset$98.551.12xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.41 × BVPS $58.25) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsnoEPS $7.41 × (8.5 + 2×6.8%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativeno
PEG Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $7.41 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 6.8% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 10.2x
Earnings YieldEarnings$80.111.38xyesEPS $7.41 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The issuer is a funded financial business. Debt, interest, and cash flows are operating inputs, so industrial EV, net-debt, WACC, and free-cash-flow lenses do not apply; value the common-equity claim with book, earnings, capital, and payout economics.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
BancFirst (consolidated bank)financialequity0.7B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required

No unit-level total common-equity value is stated. Each financial unit requires supported standalone common equity, normalized earnings, capital adequacy, and payout capacity. Consolidated debt, interest, and cash are operating balances, not an enterprise-to-equity bridge; company-level book, earnings, capital, and payout lenses remain the coherent cross-checks.

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.5%

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Banking has two sides, and the interesting one here gets less attention. Anyone with a charter can lend money. What separates one lender from the next over a full cycle is what the money cost before it went out the door, and on that measure BancFirst starts ahead. Noninterest-bearing accounts made up 30.8% of total deposits at the end of 2025, and core deposits made up 94.8% of the total, which the 10-K describes as "a stable, low-cost funding source". Nearly a third of the funding pays no interest at all.

That base is not something a competitor buys with a rate promotion. It comes from holding the operating accounts of local businesses, and the filing is explicit that this is the design. In the small Oklahoma communities where the company does much of its business, rival institutions "are much smaller and do not offer the range of products and services nor have the lending capacity of BancFirst". In Oklahoma City and Tulsa the posture flips: there the aim is "to focus on the needs of local businesses and seek to provide more responsive services than are available at larger institutions". Biggest option in the small towns, nimblest one in the cities. Two different competitive arguments running off a single funding base.

Credit has stayed clean while the book has grown. Nonaccrual loans were 0.72% of loans at December 31, 2025, and the reserve set aside against the portfolio covers more than a full percentage point of it. For a company that has been buying other banks, that matters more than usual, because acquired loan books are where credit surprises normally enter, and so far they have arrived without incident. The ABOK purchase added $329.5 million of deposits by the end of 2025.

The capital story is the quiet part. Stockholders' equity "totaled $1.9 billion at December 31, 2025, compared to $1.6 billion at December 31, 2024", and almost the whole difference came from earnings kept rather than shares sold. Roughly a quarter of what the bank earns goes out as dividends; the rest stays. Share count has risen about 0.5% a year over the four years to March 2026, which for a serial acquirer is unusual restraint. Management is funding expansion out of the business rather than asking the market to fund it, and affiliates of the company held about 35% of the shares as of January 31, 2026, so the people making that call carry the consequences of it.

Bear Case

Deposits that pay no interest are free to hold and worth precisely what short-term money pays. That rate is set in Washington, not in Oklahoma City. The 10-K records the yield on the company's balances at the Federal Reserve falling "during the last four months of 2025 from 4.40% to 3.65%", after a slide from 5.40% over the same stretch of 2024. A bank with nearly a third of its funding costing nothing captures the widest spread when short rates are high, and the same structure gives back the most when they come down. The funding advantage does not vanish in an easing cycle. The earnings it throws off simply shrink, and the shrinkage lands on exactly the line the price is counting on.

Which raises what the price is counting on. Return on equity has to reach about 14.6% and stay there for close to two decades. What the bank actually delivers on trailing figures is a return on equity of 13.0%. That is a good bank. It is not the bank in the quote. Stretch the window back across the whole published record, seventeen annual observations, and the average comes to 11.5%, which puts the demand embedded in today's quote in the top tenth of comparable banks. If returns drift back toward that long-run average, the multiple of book value the shares support falls with them, and the shares change hands at 2.06 times book today, with a wider multiple still against tangible book because the acquisitions have left goodwill behind.

The lending mix has been drifting toward the part of the book that historically cracks first. Of the growth in loans during 2025, "commercial real estate loans made up the largest increase with $242.0 million, or 47.7%". Some friction is already visible: net expense from other real estate owned rose $7.4 million during the year, including a $4.1 million increase in write-downs of foreclosed property. Those are small figures for a bank this size, which is the point of citing them. They mark a direction, not yet damage.

Two structural items round out the case. The deposit franchise sits in one state, so a single regional economy sets the credit cycle for the whole company and there is no geographic offset when that economy turns. And the filing's own forward-looking list names "Technological changes, fintech competition and disruption to the traditional banking systems" among the risks, which for an institution whose edge is the local checking account is not boilerplate. The cheap funding is the thesis. Anything that makes an operating account easier to move somewhere else attacks it at the root.

Valuation

The price is asking for a better bank than the one in the filings. Not a wildly better one, which is what makes it worth working through. On trailing figures the return on equity is 13.0%; to support $116.66 a share the business has to earn about 14.6% and keep earning it ahead of a cost of equity near 9.2% for close to two decades. The seventeen-year average of its own returns is 11.5%. Among comparable banks a requirement that high lands near the top tenth of the group. Demanding, then, but inside the range of things banks actually do.

The methods used to triangulate what a bank is worth do not disagree violently here, and the agreement is itself the finding. The price sits about 26% above where book value plus profitability lands, about 23% above what peer multiples support, and about 20% above the forward-projection approach. The price sits only about 5% above the earnings power methods, and those get there by averaging two results that point opposite ways: capitalizing trailing earnings at the required return lands well beneath today's quote, while a growth-adjusted earnings formula lands well over it. Splitting that difference produces a number close to what the shares fetch, which is arithmetic rather than insight. The useful read is the first one, a modest premium turning up consistently across every approach rather than one method screaming while the others shrug.

The bank-specific calculation translates that most directly. It starts from tangible book value of $49.90 a share, asks what multiple a 13.0% return on equity earns against the return shareholders demand for the risk, then trims the answer for credit using a reserve covering 1.24% of loans and nonperformers at 0.73%. The multiple it settles on is meaningfully below the one the shares actually change hands at, and that difference is the compounding the market expects retained earnings to produce.

Cohort position adds a scale note rather than a valuation one. CULLEN/FROST (CFR) carries roughly four times BancFirst's revenue base, and BOKF and FNB roughly triple it, while LAKELAND FINANCIAL (LKFN) and BANK FIRST (BFC) are smaller. On pace, BOKF added about 9.7% to revenue over the trailing year and CFR about 8.0%, with WAFD at about 3.0%. BancFirst's own top line has been compounding around 10% a year, helped by fees: "Total noninterest income increased by $15.6 million, or 8.4% for 2025 compared to 2024", although a $4.5 million gain on the sale of Visa B-1 stock flattered that figure.

For a bank the balance-sheet question is not borrowing capacity, since deposits are the raw material rather than an obligation to fret over. It is whether the capital base can fund the growth and still pay shareholders. Roughly a quarter of earnings goes out; equity climbed from "$1.6 billion at December 31, 2024" to $1.9 billion a year later; and at the end of 2025 the Federal Reserve classified all four bank charters, BancFirst, Pegasus, Worthington and ABOK, as well capitalized. Share count has moved about 0.5% a year over four years. Everything the price assumes about future returns therefore has to be manufactured inside the loan book, because none of it is arriving from financial engineering.

Catalysts

BancFirst reported second-quarter results on July 23, 2026. Net income for the quarter came to $66.7 million and quarterly earnings per share to $1.96, ahead of the $1.80 analysts had modeled for the quarter, on quarterly revenue of $187.48 million against a $178.53 million estimate. The beat came off both sides of the income statement rather than one line, which in a bank usually means the spread held up better than the models allowed for.

The board declared a quarterly cash dividend of $0.49 a share, paid July 15, 2026 to holders of record on June 30, 2026. At roughly a quarter of earnings, the payout leaves most of the profit inside the company, which is where the acquisition budget comes from.

What matters next is the path of short-term rates and how fast deposit costs follow them down. An institution funded this heavily by accounts paying nothing has its earnings tied to the front end of the curve more directly than most peers, and the next quarterly print is the first place that shows.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

BancFirst (consolidated bank) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

BancFirst Q2 2026 earnings release, July 2026 · BancFirst dividend declaration 8-K, 2026

View the full interactive BANF report on boothcheck