BALL CORPORATION (BALL): what the price requires
At today's price, BALL CORPORATION (BALL) is priced for +2.4% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/BALL
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | BALL |
| Company | BALL CORPORATION |
| Current price | $61.08/sh |
| Composition | Beverage Packaging, North and Central America 51% / Beverage Packaging, EMEA 32% / Beverage Packaging, South America 17% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Implied growth | 2.4% |
| Multiple paid | 21x operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~8.2pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~18.4%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.23σ |
| cohort percentile (of 225 peers) | 49 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.36x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.18x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.12x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.01x | 3 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=16)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $60.18 | 1.01x | yes | FCF base $0.6B, growth 14% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.0%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $72.57 | 0.84x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 24.6x / 26.6x / 28.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $54.52 | 1.12x | yes | P/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.8x / 18.0x / 21.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16.37x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $38.04 | 1.61x | yes | BV/sh $20.94, ROE (TTM) 16.8%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $50.61 | 1.21x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $57.66 | 1.06x | yes | Rev $13.7B, growth 14% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.0x / 1.2x / 1.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $41.28 | 1.48x | yes | EPS $3.44, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=8.68 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $22.19 | 2.75x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.73B × (1−21%) / WACC 9.0% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $51.02 | 1.20x | yes | BV $20.94 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 16.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $40.26 | 1.52x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $3.44 × BVPS $20.94) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $26.73 | 2.29x | yes | EBITDA $0.63B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $22.51 | 2.71x | yes | FCF $596.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $111.00 | 0.55x | yes | EPS $3.44 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $127.77 | 0.48x | yes | Revenue $13.67B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $129.00 | 0.47x | yes | EPS $3.44 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $37.19 | 1.64x | yes | EPS $3.44 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -4.8% |
| Burning cash | no |
Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.
Operating profit is negative or near zero and there is no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so interest coverage cannot be computed honestly.
Bullet Takeaways
- Ball makes aluminum beverage cans, and the one number that drives the business is volume: global shipments rose 5.5% for full-year 2025 and the company guides to 10%-plus comparable EPS growth and free cash flow above $900 million in 2026.
- The biggest structural risk is a narrow product range tied to one substrate: the filing warns the packaging business "ha[s] a narrow product range" and would suffer if can usage falls or customers shift to alternatives.
- What to watch next is regional volume divergence: North America and Europe are growing while South America softened in early 2026, so the segment mix and the pace of the $800 million shareholder-return plan are the near-term swing factors.
Bull Case
The single most decisive metric for Ball is volume, because almost everything else follows from it. The company is a converter: it buys aluminum, shapes it into cans, and sells them, earning a relatively fixed margin per can. When can volume grows, the high-fixed-cost plants run hotter, the per-unit cost drops, and operating profit grows faster than revenue. So the number that matters is shipments, and shipments are growing. Full-year 2025 segment volume rose 5.5%, fourth-quarter volume was up high-single digits, and global aluminum packaging shipments climbed 6% in the fourth quarter, faster than the prior quarter's pace, a sign volumes are re-accelerating rather than fading. On that base, management guides to 10%-plus comparable EPS growth and more than $900 million of free cash flow in 2026.
The reason volume grows is a slow, durable substrate shift. Aluminum cans are infinitely recyclable, lighter to ship than glass, and increasingly the package of choice as beverage brands chase sustainability and as new categories (sparkling water, energy drinks, canned cocktails) move into cans. Ball sells, in its own words, "mainly to large, multinational beverage, personal care and household products companies with which we have developed long-term relationships", relationships the filing says are "evidenced by our high customer retention". Those are the Coca-Colas and brewers of the world, and they sign multi-year supply agreements, which gives Ball visibility most industrials lack. The South American market underscores the structural advantage: the filing notes that "Four companies currently manufacture substantially all of the aluminum beverage containers" in the regions Ball serves there, an oligopoly that limits price wars.
The capital story sharpens the case. Ball generates strong free cash flow, carries modest leverage at roughly 0.6 times operating income, and earns a return on equity near 17%. It is returning a large share of that cash to holders, planning around $800 million of shareholder returns and shrinking its share count by nearly 5% a year. A converter with a growing, recurring volume base, an oligopoly structure, and aggressive buybacks is a compounding machine even at low single-digit organic growth, because the per-share math improves every year the float shrinks. The bet is simply that cans keep taking share from glass and plastic, which they have done for years.
Bear Case
Strip away the volume story and Ball is a single-substrate manufacturer with a narrow product line, and that concentration is the quiet vulnerability. The company makes one thing, the aluminum can, and the filing says so plainly: the packaging businesses "have a narrow product range, and our business would suffer if usage of our products decreased or if decrea"sed demand pushed customers toward "alternative products, which could result in a reduction in our profits or cash flows". A business with one product and a handful of giant customers has no second engine if the first one stalls, and the customer side is concentrated in the same multinational beverage companies that hold enormous purchasing leverage in their supply negotiations.
With that qualitative picture set, the price-to-fundamentals gap becomes the issue. At today's level the market pays about 20 times Ball's operating income, which embeds only about 1% annual operating growth, so on its face the price is not demanding much. But the static valuation methods tell a harsher story: the earnings-power lens, which capitalizes Ball's normalized operating earnings, and the zero-growth free-cash-flow lens both land well below the price, because Ball's reported operating income and free cash flow are smaller than its market value implies once you strip out the growth assumption. The price leans on the forward-growth and exit-multiple methods, which credit the volume re-acceleration. In other words, the price needs the volume growth to continue; the methods that ignore growth value the company at a meaningful discount to where it trades.
The regional split is the near-term crack in the volume thesis. Global shipments grew just 0.8% in the first quarter of 2026, with North and Central America and Europe carrying the growth while South America declined. South America had been a high-growth region, and a slowdown there pulls down the consolidated rate that the price is counting on. Aluminum is also a commodity input, and while Ball passes most metal cost through to customers, the timing lags and tariff exposure can squeeze margins in any given quarter. The bear case is not that cans are going away. It is that a one-product manufacturer priced for steady volume growth has little room to disappoint, and the first quarter's near-flat global volume is exactly the kind of stumble the price does not leave space for.
Valuation
Ball trades at about 20 times operating income, and inverting that price implies only about 1% annual operating growth over five years. That is a modest bar, well within what a converter with a re-accelerating volume base can clear, so the price is not asking for heroics. The catch is that the modest implied growth is measured against operating income that the static methods consider thin relative to the market value.
The method disagreement is the real signal here. The peer-multiple read at an 18 times earnings sector multiple lands close to the price, and the forward-growth and exit-multiple cash-flow methods land near or just below it. But the earnings-power lens and the zero-growth free-cash-flow lens land far below, because Ball's normalized operating earnings and current free cash flow, capitalized without growth, support a much lower value than today's price. The split says this cleanly: pay 20 times operating income for Ball and you are paying for the volume growth to continue, because the methods that strip growth out value the company at a discount. The asset-and-return lenses sit in between, reflecting a respectable 17% return on equity on a modest book value. This is not a deep-value setup and it is not a stretched growth bet; it is a quality converter priced for its growth to keep showing up.
Solvency is a genuine strength and bounds the downside. Net debt of roughly $710 million is only about 0.6 times operating income, interest coverage runs around 3.4 times, and the company holds roughly $730 million of liquid assets. The low leverage and strong free cash flow are what fund the buyback that shrinks the share count nearly 5% a year, and that per-share compounding is a real part of the return even at low organic growth. The most decisive point for the valuation is the dependence on volume: the price sits above where the no-growth methods land, so the buyer is underwriting continued can-volume growth, and the early-2026 global shipment slowdown is the variable that most directly tests whether that underwriting holds.
Catalysts
Ball entered 2026 with volume momentum and used it to set an upbeat guide. Full-year 2025 segment volume rose 5.5%, the fourth quarter accelerated to high-single-digit volume growth with global aluminum shipments up 6%, and the company guided 2026 to 10%-plus comparable diluted EPS growth and free cash flow above $900 million. The first quarter of 2026 confirmed the earnings direction: net earnings of $205 million, or $0.77 per diluted share, on sales of $3.60 billion, up from $179 million and $0.63 a year earlier.
The variable to watch is regional volume divergence. Global shipments grew only 0.8% in the first quarter, with North and Central America and Europe carrying the growth while South America declined. Because the consolidated growth rate is what the valuation leans on, the trajectory of South American volume against continued strength in North America is the cleanest read on whether the full-year volume guide holds.
Two strategic moves frame the forward story. Ball completed the acquisition of a majority stake in European can manufacturer Benepack, adding facilities in Belgium and Hungary, which expands its EMEA footprint where volumes are growing. And the company is returning roughly $800 million to shareholders this year through buybacks and dividends, the per-share lever that compounds the volume story. The next quarterly prints, with the volume line and the EPS guidance progression, are the events that confirm or challenge the 10%-plus growth target.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Beverage Packaging, North and Central America / Beverage Packaging, EMEA / Beverage Packaging, South America (reported)
- AMCR (AMCOR PLC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CCK (CROWN HOLDINGS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GPK (Graphic Packaging Holding Co)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PKG (PACKAGING CORP OF AMERICA)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- IP (INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SLGN (SILGAN HOLDINGS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- OI (O-I GLASS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Ball Q4 2025 / 2026 guidance · Ball Q1 2026 results · Ball Q4 2025 results · Ball 2026 guidance · Ball 2026 capital return plan · company financial data · Ball Q4 2025 results and 2026 guidance · Ball corporate announcement, January 2026