AXOS FINANCIAL, INC. (AX): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $97.95, AXOS FINANCIAL, INC. (AX) is priced for 18.1% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AX

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAX
CompanyAXOS FINANCIAL, INC.
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$97.95/sh
CompositionBanking Business Segment 89% / Securities Business Segment 11%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Elite ROE must persist for16.0y before normalizing (held at the 16% elite tier)
Perpetuity-equivalent ROE18.1%
Return on equity now15.5%
ROE gap+2.6pp
Price-to-book1.76x

Solve inputs: computed at a 12% cost of equity; ROE searched up to the 16% ROE ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.74σ
cohort percentile (of 121 peers)78
sustained it ~10 years at this level57%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.95x3justifies
Earnings1.07x1expensive
Relative0
Growth0

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=4)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
Bank Fair Value (P/TBV)$120.340.81xyesTBVPS $51.42 × 2.34x (ROE (TTM) 15.5% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.36% allowance/loans → ×0.95)
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.3x / 10.0x / 11.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$93.441.05xyesBV/sh $55.81, ROE (TTM) 15.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$119.410.82xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowthnoRev $1.2B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.7x / 4.5x / 5.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $8.48, growth 14% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.79 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAsset$103.190.95xyes√(22.5 × EPS $8.48 × BVPS $55.81) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsnoEPS $8.48 × (8.5 + 2×14.4%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativeno
PEG Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $8.48 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 14.4% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 21.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$91.681.07xyesEPS $8.48 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The issuer is a funded financial business. Debt, interest, and cash flows are operating inputs, so industrial EV, net-debt, WACC, and free-cash-flow lenses do not apply; value the common-equity claim with book, earnings, capital, and payout economics.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Banking Business Segmentfinancialequity$1.2bwithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required
Securities Business Segmentfinancialequity$147.6mwithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required

No unit-level total common-equity value is stated. Each financial unit requires supported standalone common equity, normalized earnings, capital adequacy, and payout capacity. Consolidated debt, interest, and cash are operating balances, not an enterprise-to-equity bridge; company-level book, earnings, capital, and payout lenses remain the coherent cross-checks.

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.2%

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Shareholders of Axos receive nothing in cash. There is no dividend. Every dollar of the 476.1 million dollars earned over the trailing year stayed inside the company, and the 10-K is explicit that repurchases compete for that money, made "subject to its assessment of alternative uses of capital, stock trading price, general market conditions and regulatory factors". The share count tells you which way the decision has gone: down about 1.2% a year since 2022. That is a modest retirement rate, and deliberately so. Most of the retained earnings went somewhere else.

They went into loans. Net loan balances reached $25.0 billion at March 31, 2026, an increase of $685.0 million in that quarter alone. For a bank, retaining earnings is not idle hoarding; regulatory capital is the binding input on how much a lender can hold, so retained profit is the raw material of loan growth. A bank that pays out half its earnings grows its book half as fast, all else equal. Axos has chosen the other end of that trade.

What makes the choice work is where the spread comes from. The company describes the banking side as "lending through online, low-cost distribution channels to serve the needs of consumers and small businesses nationally" and says "the Banking Business Segment focuses on providing deposit products nationwide to industry verticals". Deposits arrive through channels a branch bank does not use: the filing lists "We generate deposits through a variety of channels, including advertisements, sales teams, software company affiliates, financial advisory firms, affinity partnerships and our lending businesses." The result is that the gap between what Axos earns on its assets and pays on its funding ran 4.76% in the March 2026 quarter. That gap is the whole business. A bank earning it on a growing book compounds without needing anything clever to happen.

The cohort makes the point by contrast. EWBC grew revenue 13.4% over its most recent trailing year and WAL 11.6%, both on balance sheets several times larger; BOKF managed 9.7% and CBSH 7.8%. Those are respectable numbers for institutions with branch footprints and legacy cost structures. Axos is doing its growing without either, which is why the return on equity sits at 16.1% rather than in the low teens where most of this cohort lives. The securities and clearing arm has been the softer half lately, and it is roughly 11% of revenue, so the case rests on the bank. That is the honest shape of it: one very good engine and a small second one that has not been pulling.

Bear Case

Look at what secures the loans and the picture narrows quickly. The 10-K states that "Our commercial and industrial loan portfolio was approximately $6.8 billion at June 30, 2025, or 31.6% of our total loan portfolio." It also discloses that "approximately 35.8% of our real estate loan portfolio was secured by real estate located in California at June 30, 2025". On the office side the company names the mechanism itself, warning that "tenants may reduce the office space they lease as some portion of the workforce continues to work remotely on a hybrid or full-time basis". A national online lender turns out to have a distinctly regional collateral base, and commercial credit is the part of a loan book that fails in clusters rather than one borrower at a time.

The funding side has its own shape. Axos did not win most of its deposits through a branch relationship; it won them by paying for them and by plugging into verticals. The filing describes the asymmetry plainly: "A portion of the Bank's deposits are based on administrative rates controlled by management and the remaining portion are directly tied to Fed Funds." Money gathered on price is money that can be re-priced away, and a lender in that position defends its funding with rate rather than with inertia. That is not fragility today. It is the reason the spread has to be watched rather than assumed.

Which brings the argument to what the price requires. At roughly 1.8 times book, the market is assuming Axos holds a return on equity of about 16% for something like 17 years before it settles toward ordinary, which is the same as assuming about 18.6% held indefinitely. It earns 16.1% today. The assumption therefore runs ahead of its own record rather than merely matching it, and the multiple of book it trades on is the richest in its cohort. Of the firms that have reached this level of return, only about 53% were still earning it a decade later. If the return drifts back toward the cost of the equity funding it, the multiple that return supports compresses, and a bank paying no dividend offers the holder nothing to collect while waiting.

The second segment is not currently helping. The 10-K reports that "our Securities Business Segment had income before taxes of $32.9 million compared to income before taxes of $40.1 million" in the prior fiscal year. Clearing and securities financing are cyclical, capital-consuming, and competitive against firms with far more scale: SCHW carries revenue of $24.8 billion and IBKR $6.4 billion, against a segment that is about 11% of the Axos revenue line. The diversification argument for owning both is real, but on the current numbers the smaller business is a drag on the return the price is underwriting, not a support for it.

Valuation

A bank is not valued the way an operating company is. What matters is not the multiple of profit you pay but the return the equity produces and how long it lasts, because the two together determine what a dollar of book is worth. On that reading, today's price near $95.83 is paying roughly 1.8 times book, which embeds an assumption that Axos holds a return on equity of about 16% for something on the order of 17 years before it normalizes. Held forever instead of fading, that is equivalent to about 18.6%. The company earns 16.1% now.

The distance between those two figures is the entire question. The assumed return runs above what Axos has actually delivered across its own record, and its price-to-book sits at the very top of the peer set, above EWBC, WAL and CBSH. History is not encouraging on persistence either: only about 53% of firms that reached this level of return were still earning it ten years on. Elite bank returns are not a stable state; they are a position that competition, credit cycles and deposit pricing steadily erode.

Then the methods disagree with that read, and the disagreement is informative rather than embarrassing. Value the equity on its book plus the excess return it generates, or on the earnings stream against a static sector reference multiple, or on the conservative earnings-and-book floor, and all of those land at or above today's price. Only the forward approach, the one that projects the revenue line and applies a terminal sales multiple to it, sits under the price, and by a wide gap. Read against the trailing evidence, in other words, Axos does not look expensive. Read against the durability the price needs, it looks demanding. Both statements are true, because they are answering different questions: what the current earnings power is worth, versus how long that earnings power stays this good.

Solvency here is not a leverage question. Deposits are the raw material of a bank, not borrowings, so the frame is regulatory capital and what the company can return from it. Axos pays out nothing, retains everything, and has shrunk its share count about 1.2% a year since 2022 while growing loans at a double-digit pace. The filing is candid that this is the real constraint, noting that "From time to time, we may need to raise additional capital to support the Company's and Bank's further growth". Growth of the kind Axos is doing eats the capital that a slower bank would hand back, and a share issued to fund it is a share that dilutes the return the price is counting on. That, rather than credit or liquidity, is where the assumption gets tested first.

Catalysts

The March 2026 quarter set the bar. Axos reported net income of $124.7 million and diluted EPS of $2.15 for the quarter ended March 31, 2026, with diluted EPS up 19% from the year-earlier quarter and net loan balances of $25.0 billion, a net increase of $685.0 million over the three months. The spread between asset yields and funding costs came in at 4.76% for that quarter, and management attributed the result to loan expansion paired with expense discipline. For a lender whose whole case rests on originating at wide spreads without a branch cost structure, those are the two lines that carry the story.

The next print lands soon. The company will report fourth-quarter and full fiscal-year 2026 results on July 30, 2026, covering the year ended June 30, 2026, with a call the same afternoon. Three things in that release do more work than the headline: whether the loan book kept expanding at the March quarter's pace, whether the funding spread held as deposit competition and rate policy moved, and what the securities and clearing segment contributed after a fiscal 2025 in which its pre-tax income fell.

Because Axos closes its fiscal year in June, the July report is also the annual one, which means the 10-K and its updated credit disclosures follow within weeks. Loan-loss provisioning, the commercial and industrial concentration, and the California real-estate exposure all get restated there on fresh numbers. Those pages, more than the quarterly earnings line, are where the durability of the return actually gets evidenced.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Banking Business Segment (reported)

Securities Business Segment (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Axos company announcement, June 23, 2026 · Axos Q3 FY2026 earnings release, April 30, 2026

View the full interactive AX report on boothcheck