Avantor, Inc. (AVTR): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $14.58, Avantor, Inc. (AVTR) is priced for +14.5% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AVTR

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAVTR
CompanyAvantor, Inc.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$14.58/sh
CompositionProprietary 53% / Third-party 47%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)2.9%
Operating margin (mid-cycle)10.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-7.1pp
Trailing margin (depressed year)-4.5%
Implied growth14.5%
Multiple paid21x mid-cycle operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.18σ

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.98x3expensive
Earnings8.53x3expensive
Relative0
Growth1.67x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=9)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$4.003.65xyesFCF base $0.4B, growth -2% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 6.9%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$12.791.14xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 109.4x / 111.4x / 113.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.5x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$8.191.78xyesReference only (book value floor): BV/sh $8.19, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$7.371.98xyesReference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $8.19, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$8.721.67xyesRev $6.6B, growth -2% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.3x / 1.5x / 1.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$12.251.19xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.06B × (1−22%) / WACC 6.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.12B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$1.718.53xyesFCF $438.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$1.0414.02xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.40B (FCF $0.44B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$1.0014.58xyesBV $8.19 × (ROIC 0.8% / WACC 6.9%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $6.55B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Laboratory Solutionsoperatingenterprise$4.4bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Bioscience Productionoperatingenterprise$2.2bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$3.6b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)6.97x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)5.44x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.2%
Burning cashno

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 10.0%); the trailing year was depressed.

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The accounting year was ugly. The cash year was not, and that distinction carries most of the bull case. The fiscal 2025 books absorbed a goodwill impairment charge of $ 785.0 million related to our Distribution reporting unit, and the annual report is candid about the trigger: the charge followed sustained decreases in our publicly quoted share price and market capitalization alongside weaker results in that unit. The share price helped produce the loss. Using the loss to explain the share price runs the causation backwards.

Underneath the write-off the machinery still turns. Amortization expense was $ 301.1 million in 2025, a non-cash charge against acquisitions completed years ago, and trailing free cash flow came to roughly 439 million dollars. Interest is covered 3.7 times. The share count has moved about 0.2% a year over the four years to March 2026, which in a stretch this difficult means management financed itself without asking holders to fund it at these prices.

What the manufactured half actually sells is worth understanding, because it is the reason the business is not a commodity reseller. The filing describes The high-purity materials and customized solutions we offer are highly exacting and complex due to demanding customer specifications and stringent regulatory and industry requirements. Read that as a description of switching costs. A biologics manufacturer that has validated a buffer, a resin or a single-use component into a regulated production process does not re-qualify a substitute to save a few points on price, because the re-qualification costs more than the saving and puts a filing at risk. Avantor says it is engaging with our customers early in their product development cycles to advance their programs from research and discovery through development and commercialization, which is precisely where that lock-in is set.

The distance between Avantor and its larger comparables is structural rather than managerial, and the bull case does not require closing it. WST converts about 20.3% of sales into operating profit, DHR 19.2%, TMO 17.5%, RVTY 12.4%. Avantor's through-the-cycle economics sit near a tenth of every sales dollar, for the unremarkable reason that roughly 47% of its revenue is third-party product it distributes rather than makes, and distribution does not earn manufacturing economics anywhere on earth. The claim is not that the gap closes. It is that the mix tilts toward the half that earns more, and that today's price pays as though it never will.

Management is rebuilding the cost base rather than waiting for demand to rescue it. Effective January 1, 2024 the company transitioned to a new operating model consisting of two complementary business segments and, in its own words, launched a multi-year cost transformation initiative. The arithmetic on that is not glamorous but it is large: on revenue near 6.6 billion dollars, one point of operating improvement is worth something close to 66 million a year against a market value of 7.7 billion. Cost programmes are the one lever a leveraged company can pull without permission from anybody.

Bear Case

The demand problem here is not only the cycle. Organic sales fell 4.1% in the first quarter of 2026, and over a comparable stretch the larger companies selling into the same laboratories grew: TMO by 5.4% year over year, DHR by 4.0%, WST by 11.2%, and RGEN by 17.4% on a far smaller base. When the market expands and one participant contracts, the usual explanation is share. Share lost in a business built on catalogue breadth and renewal cycles does not come back in a quarter, because it leaves through hundreds of individual purchasing decisions rather than one contract.

The contractual position offers little protection against that drift. The annual report states plainly that our customers are generally not obligated to purchase any fixed quantities of products, and they may stop placing orders, and warns separately that results could be negatively affected by the loss of revenue from a significant number of our customers, including direct distributors and end users. Revenue of this kind is renewable, not contracted. It is also concentrated in the half of the company that is easiest to move, since a resold third-party product is by definition available from somebody else.

Debt converts that demand problem into a structural one. Net debt runs near 3.56 billion dollars against a market value of 7.7 billion, or 5.51 times operating profit measured through the cycle. Against the trailing year there is no ratio at all, because the trailing year produced an operating loss. The credit agreement has tightened around this position: following the refinancing, the leverage-based financial covenant in the credit facility agreement became a full-time financial maintenance covenant, and the company owes additional prepayments if we generate excess cash flows at levels tied to its net leverage. The filing lists among the consequences of its indebtedness placing us at a competitive disadvantage compared to any of our less leveraged competitors. The less leveraged competitors are the ones named two paragraphs up.

Set all of that against what the price requires. Today's quote embeds operating profit compounding roughly 8.7% a year over a five-year stretch, measured from through-the-cycle earning power rather than from the reported loss. The demonstrated direction is the opposite one, and the revenue trend the cash-flow methods take as their starting point is negative. If the compounding does not arrive, there is not much underneath the price to catch it: it sits about 1.5 times above where the asset-value methods land and roughly 1.7 times above the forward-growth methods.

The concession is genuine and should be stated. The impairment was non-cash, free cash flow is positive, and a supplier of validated consumables into regulated production does not disappear. But the bear thesis does not require disappearance. It requires only that the resold half keeps leaking share while the borrowings sit there earning nothing for an equity holder. Capitalize the free cash flow this business actually produced at the return an equity investor would demand, subtract what the company owes, and most of the answer is the debt.

Valuation

One accounting event distorts both sides of this picture, so it belongs at the front. Fiscal 2025 carries a goodwill impairment charge of $ 785.0 million related to our Distribution reporting unit and, separately, Amortization expense was $ 301.1 million in 2025. Between them they convert a cash-generative year into a reported operating loss. The market is not pricing that loss. It is paying about 18 times what the business earns across a full cycle, and that multiple embeds operating profit compounding roughly 8.7% a year over a five-year stretch. Whether that cycle-average base is the honest one, or a memory of trading conditions that are not coming back, is the argument sitting underneath everything else in this report.

Only one family of method lands above today's price, and how it gets there matters. Because the trailing year shows negative earnings, the peer-multiple comparison falls back to a sector sales multiple applied to the entire revenue line. A company that resells roughly 47% of what it ships does not carry a sales multiple built for software-like economics, and never has. Set that read aside and nothing reaches the price. It sits about 1.5 times above where the asset-value methods land, roughly 1.7 times above the forward-growth methods, and more than six times above the midpoint of the earnings-power methods.

That last spread is the most informative thing on the page, and it is worth taking apart rather than reciting. Capitalize a normalized operating profit, averaged over several years with one-time charges added back, and the answer lands slightly above today's price. Capitalize the free cash flow the business actually produced, at the return an equity holder would require, then subtract the 3.56 billion dollars owed, and the answer lands at a small fraction of it. The gap between those two readings is the debt, plus one unresolved question: is normalization a forecast or a memory?

The requirement itself is unusually easy to state. Operating profit has to compound about 8.7% a year over a five-year stretch from through-the-cycle earning power. Measured against Avantor's own record that pace is not extreme. Measured against what is happening now it is: organic sales fell 4.1% in the first quarter of 2026. The price asks for compounding and the business is delivering contraction, and no amount of patience reconciles those two without something changing first.

The comparable set frames the position without needing commentary. TMO converts about 17.5% of sales into operating profit on $45.2 billion of revenue; DHR 19.2% on $24.8 billion; WST 20.3% on $3.2 billion; RVTY 12.4% on $2.9 billion, and all four are growing. Avantor earns near a tenth of a sales dollar through the cycle and its recent growth is negative. The market is not overlooking that difference. It is charging for it.

The balance sheet then sets how much time the thesis has to work. Net debt near 3.56 billion dollars sits against liquid assets of roughly 279 million, interest is covered 3.7 times, and the company is not burning cash. The share count has barely moved in four years, so nothing here has been funded by diluting holders. What the borrowing removes is optionality. A company at 5.51 times operating profit, with a full-time maintenance covenant and a clause that sweeps surplus cash toward lenders, does not get to buy or build its way out of a share-loss problem on its own schedule.

Catalysts

The next scheduled disclosure is close. Avantor reports second-quarter 2026 results before the market opens on July 29, 2026, with a call at 8:00 a.m. Eastern the same morning.

The first quarter set the terms of that print. Net sales came to $1,581.4 million, flat against the prior year on a reported basis but down 4.1% organically once currency is removed, with net income of $43.3 million and diluted GAAP earnings of $0.06 a share. The split by segment matters more than the total: VWR Distribution and Services sold $1,150.0 million, down 4.8% organically, while Bioscience and Medtech Products sold $431.4 million, down 2.0% organically. Chief executive Emmanuel Ligner said first-quarter results exceeded the company's expectations on improved execution in Bioscience and Medtech Products, with stabilization in VWR. Management reaffirmed the full-year 2026 guidance it first gave on the February 11, 2026 fourth-quarter call.

Two things in the July release will move the argument more than the headline. The first is whether the organic decline narrows in the distribution segment, since that is where the share question lives and where four fifths of the volume sits. The second is cash timing. First-quarter operating cash flow was 58.7 million dollars and free cash flow 25.2 million, a small fraction of the trailing-year total, which tells you this company's cash conversion is heavily weighted to the back half. With a covenant tested continuously and a sweep that routes surplus cash to lenders, the shape of that conversion through the rest of 2026 is not a detail.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Laboratory Solutions (reported)

Bioscience Production (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Avantor press release, July 1, 2026 · Avantor Q1 2026 earnings release, April 29, 2026

View the full interactive AVTR report on boothcheck