AvePoint, Inc. (AVPT): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $14.18, AvePoint, Inc. (AVPT) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~13.1 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AVPT

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAVPT
CompanyAvePoint, Inc.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$14.18/sh
CompositionSaaS 76% / Term license and support 10% / Services 13% / Maintenance 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)9.1%
Operating margin today9.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-0.7pp
Must persist for13.1y
Multiple paid57x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 5: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.3% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 188 peers)89

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.73x5expensive
Earnings2.46x4expensive
Relative1.22x5expensive
Growth0.78x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$22.450.63xyesFCF base $0.1B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.1%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$18.050.79xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 56.1x / 58.1x / 60.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelative$11.591.22xyesP/E 35x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 28.3x / 35.0x / 41.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 34.94x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$3.643.90xyesBV/sh $2.06, ROE (TTM) 16.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$4.762.98xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$18.170.78xyesRev $0.5B, growth 25% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.2x / 6.4x / 7.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$3.723.81xyesEPS $0.31, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=21.08 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$4.832.94xyesBV $2.06 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 16.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$3.803.73xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.31 × BVPS $2.06) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$7.042.01xyesEBITDA $0.05B × sector EV/EBITDA 25.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$6.812.08xyesFCF $101.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$5.002.84xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.07B (FCF $0.10B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$10.001.42xyesEPS $0.31 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$2.086.82xyesBV $2.06 × (ROIC 9.2% / WACC 9.1%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$17.630.80xyesRevenue $0.47B × sector P/S 8.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$11.631.22xyesEPS $0.31 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$3.354.23xyesEPS $0.31 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
SaaS Data Management Platformoperatingenterprise0.4B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$417.6m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-11.59x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-9.16x (net cash)
Share count CAGR (dilution)4.9%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

AvePoint has never borrowed a dollar. Not once, in a business that has been growing revenue at better than a quarter a year, in an industry where scaling usually means raising something. The company holds $444.5 million of net cash and carries no funded borrowings. Its only facility is a revolving line of credit of up to $30.0 million with an accordion feature that provides up to $20.0 million of additional borrowing capacity we may draw upon at our request, and it has never drawn on it. Whatever else is uncertain here, financing is not.

That matters more than it sounds, because it changes what a bad year looks like. A software company with debt and a decelerating renewal book has to make decisions on the lender's timetable. This one does not. The cash pile is close to a sixth of the market value, sitting on top of a business that already generates cash rather than consuming it.

The growth underneath it is the fastest in its listed cohort. Compared with the peers it is measured against, AVPT's revenue growth runs ahead of GWRE at 24.9%, APPF at 20.7%, CVLT at 18.9% and NTNX at 13.0%, with DBX going slightly backwards at 0.6%. And the mix is improving as it grows: subscription revenue is displacing the older term-license and maintenance lines, which is the transition every one of those peers has already had to survive.

The reason it is winning is unglamorous and durable. Organizations that moved into cloud collaboration platforms discovered afterwards that they could not answer basic questions about where their data was, who could reach it, and whether it could be restored. AvePoint sells the answer. Its own description of the platform is that it is Purpose-built for today's cloud-first environments, the platform addresses four pervasive and interconnected data challenges that directly impact enterprise risk, cost, and growth. Governance software is bought once and then renewed almost indefinitely, because ripping it out means re-classifying every document the company owns.

Distribution is the second structural advantage. Rather than hiring a direct salesforce into every mid-market segment, AvePoint sells through managed service providers and resellers who already own the customer relationship, and it says We expect that sales to partners will account for a substantial portion of our revenue for the foreseeable future. That keeps the cost of acquiring a customer low, which is why the operating margin has been rising while growth stayed high. The filing attributes the improvement to revenue growth, the continued scaling of the channel partner strategy, and expense management, which is the ordinary version of operating leverage rather than a one-off.

Bear Case

Look at where the money goes before looking at where it comes from. AvePoint holds $444.5 million of net cash, pays no dividend, and states that it currently intend to retain all available funds and any future earnings inside the business. It also runs a buyback. The 10-K records that During the year ended December 31, 2025, the Company repurchased and retired 3,409,119 shares. And despite that, the share count has compounded about 5.5% a year over the last four years. The buyback is not returning capital. It is mopping up a fraction of what equity compensation is issuing.

The scale of that charge is the part worth internalizing. Free cash flow was $105.6 million on the trailing basis, and roughly a quarter of it is consumed by the stock-based compensation charge before an outside holder sees anything. A company can run that way for a long time. What it cannot do is describe the resulting cash generation as if the shareholder receives all of it, and the gap compounds in the share count rather than showing up in a single line an investor watches.

There is a related wrinkle further down the income statement. Trailing operating income is $31.2 million, but trailing net income is $46.5 million. When the bottom line exceeds the operating line, the difference is coming from somewhere other than the business of selling software, and items of that kind are not the ones a fourteen-year growth assumption should be built on.

Which brings the argument to the price. The market is paying about 70 times trailing operating income, and the arithmetic behind that requires operating profit to compound at the fastest rate the company can fund from its own returns and to keep doing so for about 14.5 years. Of comparable fast growers, only around 15% sustained a pace like that for a decade. Fourteen and a half years is longer than the entire post-IPO life of most software companies, and longer than the useful life of most enterprise software categories.

The revenue itself is also one step removed from the customer. Selling through managed service providers keeps acquisition costs down, which is the bull case, and it also means the relationship, the renewal conversation and the pricing power sit partly with an intermediary. When a large partner changes platform allegiance, the customers move with the partner. The bull answer is that the switching cost of a governance layer is enormous, and that is genuinely true at the individual customer level. It is less true at the channel level, and the channel is where the growth is being sourced.

Valuation

Nothing on the income statement explains this price, and it is more useful to say so than to hunt for a multiple that does. The market is paying roughly 70 times trailing operating income. Behind that sits a specific and testable requirement: operating profit compounding at the fastest rate the business can finance from its own returns, held there for about 14.5 years. Two reference points size the ask. Only about 15% of comparable fast growers sustained such a pace for even a decade, and the multiple being paid sits at the very top of its sector distribution, well beyond the upper quartile.

The methods line up almost unanimously against the quote, with one exception that matters. The price sits at about 5.1 times what the asset value methods reach, roughly 2.18 times what the earnings power methods reach, and about 1.63 times where the peer multiple methods land. Only the forward growth family gets above it, with the price at about 0.74 times where that family lands. That is a specific pattern rather than a general verdict: it says the entire case rests on durable compounding that static frames cannot represent, and it says the static frames are not close.

It is worth knowing how the growth methods get there. They project revenue compounding in the mid twenties, taper it, and then value the business at the end of a seven-year projection on the same enterprise-to-EBITDA basis it carries today. The bear leg of that projection compresses the exit valuation, the bull leg expands it, and the base case holds it flat at today's level. Holding a very high exit valuation flat across a seven-year span is the assumption doing most of the work, and it is an assumption rather than a finding.

What has to be true, then, is about duration rather than about profitability. AvePoint earns roughly a 7.4% operating margin today, which is at the modest end of its cohort: among the same peers APPF runs 17.1%, DBX 26.8% and SPSC 15.3%, while CVLT sits nearer at 6.3%. The bet is not that AvePoint becomes more profitable than that group. It is that it keeps growing far faster than that group for well over a decade while the margin follows. The revenue base it is compounding from is real and disclosed: the 10-K reports SaaS revenue increased 38% year-over-year to $319.2 million and represented 76% of total revenue, compared to 70% of revenue in 2024.

Solvency does not constrain any of this, and that is the point worth ending on. Net cash of $444.5 million, no funded borrowings, and a facility the company has never drawn mean there is no lender who can force an outcome and no refinancing date that concentrates risk. The 10-K also shows the company retiring stock, with During the year ended December 31, 2025, the Company repurchased and retired 3,409,119 shares, even as the count rose on issuance. A balance sheet like this removes the mechanism by which a growth stock is usually forced to a bad outcome. It does nothing at all to shorten the horizon the price is already paying for.

Catalysts

The March quarter kept the growth rate intact. AvePoint reported first-quarter 2026 SaaS revenue of $93.4 million, up 35% on the prior-year quarter, total revenue of $117.2 million, up 26%, and annual recurring revenue of $435.2 million, up 26%, with a dollar-based net retention rate of 111%. A net retention rate above one hundred means the existing customer base alone grows the revenue line, before a single new logo is added, which is the single most useful number in a subscription business.

Guidance moved in two directions at once, and the direction that matters is worth separating from the one that does not. The company raised its full-year annual recurring revenue outlook, while its updated revenue and operating income guidance absorbed an expected headwind from currency movements that offset part of the raise. Currency changes what the reported dollars look like; it does not change how many customers renewed or how much more they bought. The recurring-revenue raise is the signal in that pair.

The next scheduled information event is the second-quarter report after the close on August 6, 2026. Three things in it carry more weight than the headline: whether recurring revenue growth stays in the mid twenties once currency is stripped out, whether net retention holds above one hundred, and whether the operating margin continues to widen as the channel scales. The valuation is underwriting more than a decade of that combination, so each quarter is a small update to a very long assumption.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

SaaS Data Management Platform (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

AvePoint earnings date announcement, July 13, 2026 · AvePoint first quarter 2026 results announcement, May 7, 2026 · same release

View the full interactive AVPT report on boothcheck