Aveanna Healthcare Holdings Inc. (AVAH): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $13.55, Aveanna Healthcare Holdings Inc. (AVAH) is priced for +14.8% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AVAH

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAVAH
CompanyAveanna Healthcare Holdings Inc.
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$13.56/sh
CompositionPrivate Duty Services (PDS) 82% / Home Health & Hospice (HHH) 10% / Medical Solutions (MS) 8%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.3%
Operating margin today10.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-7.2pp
Implied growth14.8%
Multiple paid15x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 115 peers)25

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value, while earnings-power lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.00x5justifies
Earnings3.12x4expensive
Relative0.59x2justifies
Growth0.62x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$43.210.31xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 20% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.8%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$21.940.62xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 12.8x / 14.8x / 16.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.7x / 18.0x / 21.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$13.611.00xyesBV/sh $1.32, ROE (TTM) 95.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$88.150.15xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$15.170.89xyesRev $2.6B, growth 20% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.9x / 1.1x / 1.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$15.120.90xyesEPS $1.26, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=5.38 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.011355.50xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.12B × (1−29%) / WACC 6.8% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAsset$22.940.59xyesBV $1.32 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 95.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$6.112.22xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.26 × BVPS $1.32) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.29B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$2.585.25xyesFCF $168.2M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$1.727.88xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.15B (FCF $0.17B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$40.660.33xyesEPS $1.26 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.7218.83xyesBV $1.32 × (ROIC 3.7% / WACC 6.8%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.60B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$47.250.29xyesEPS $1.26 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$13.621.00xyesEPS $1.26 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Private Duty Servicesoperatingenterprise$2.0bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Home Health & Hospiceoperatingenterprise$248.6mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Medical Solutionsoperatingenterprise$183.5mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.2b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)6.24x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)4.45x
Interest coverage2.2x
Share count CAGR (dilution)5.0%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

One spread decides this business. On one side is what a payer will pay for an hour of skilled nursing delivered in a patient's home. On the other is what it costs to put a licensed practical nurse in that home for that hour. Widen the spread and the model compounds quietly; narrow it and extra volume rescues nothing, because every additional hour is bought with the same scarce nurse.

In the fiscal year ended January 3, 2026 the spread widened. Consolidated revenue reached $2.43 billion against $2.02 billion a year earlier, and private duty services carried 82% of the total. The smallest of the three lines shows the mechanic stripped of everything else: medical solutions grew 6.6%, and the 10-K attributes that to a 7.7% increase in revenue rate, offset by a decline in volume of 1.1%. Fewer patients served, more revenue collected. That is pricing, and pricing is the harder thing to win when the customer is ultimately a state government.

Winning it depends on being large enough that a payer would rather negotiate than replace you. Aveanna sells into an unusually fragmented payer base, and its own filing treats the fragmentation as protection rather than friction: Each contract we have with our payers is unique and specific to that payer, creating additional diversification. No single contract loss is existential, and the nursing panel that serves those contracts is the asset a rival cannot simply buy, because the constraint on the industry is nurses rather than capital.

The second lever is what else can travel down the same visit. Aveanna delivers enteral nutrition products into households its nurses already attend, and management's argument for that combination is operational rather than promotional: the bundling of these services provides families with not only a more convenient "one stop shop" but also a more responsive, tailored service experience due to the ability of Aveanna nurses to manage patients' enteral shipments from the home. A products line attached to a visit that was happening anyway carries almost no incremental cost of delivery.

The result shows up where it should. Against the listed home-care and post-acute cohort, Aveanna's roughly 10.5% operating margin compares well: ADUS earns 9.8%, ENSG 8.5%, OPCH 5.8% and BTSG 2.7%, with only CON higher at 15.6% on a very different occupational-health mix. And the commercial momentum is being negotiated, not bought. Four new preferred-payer agreements were signed in the March quarter, lifting preferred-payer volume inside private duty services to roughly 60%. Rate wins of that kind persist in a way that acquisition-driven revenue does not.

Bear Case

Almost every dollar this company collects is set by someone who is neither the patient nor the company. Rates come from state Medicaid programs, from the managed care organizations that administer them, and from Medicare. That is not a detail of the model, it is the model, which makes the variable with the most leverage over this equity a legislative one.

The 10-K is unusually specific about the direction of travel, listing among the changes it must absorb a reduction of funding for states choosing to expand the state's Medicaid program, and updated eligibility requirements for Medicaid beneficiaries, which include more onerous Medicaid eligibility verifications. Tighter eligibility checks do not cut the rate per hour. They cut the number of hours anyone is entitled to, which is the same thing arriving through a different door. The managed care channel carries its own version: the filing warns that results could be materially affected if these organizations terminate us as a provider and/or engage our competitors as a preferred or exclusive provider.

Now put that against what the price asks for. Today's quote works out to roughly 12.7 times trailing operating profit, and it implies operating profit compounding around 7.1% a year over a five-year stretch before settling into ordinary long-run growth. Taken alone that is a mild requirement, well inside what the last two years delivered. What makes it fragile is the structure underneath it. Net debt of $1.13 billion is 4.4 times operating profit, and operating profit covers the interest bill about 1.9 times. At that level of cover, the first several points of reimbursement pressure land on the residual claim rather than on the lenders, and the residual claim is the equity.

The cost side offers no natural offset, because the labor market Aveanna buys in is not its own. The filing states plainly that The majority of our HHH and PDN caregivers are licensed practical nurses ("LPN") and we compete for this labor pool both with competitors in our private duty services industry as well as other healthcare organizations outside our industry, including hospitals. Hospitals set wages against acute-care economics; a home-nursing provider paid on a Medicaid schedule has to match those wages out of a fixed rate. When the two move at different speeds, the spread that drives the whole thesis closes from the wrong side.

Nor has the equity been left undisturbed while this plays out. The share count has risen about 4.6% a year across the last four years, so holders have been carrying leverage and dilution at once. The company's own indebtedness disclosure names the consequence: borrowings limit our flexibility in planning for, or reacting to, changes in our business and the industries in which we operate; and place us at a competitive disadvantage compared to competitors that have less indebtedness. The bull answer is that rates have been rising and the preferred-payer strategy is winning them, and that is fair. It is also worth remembering when those wins were negotiated, and what the filing itself says about where state budgets are heading.

Valuation

Begin with what is actually being paid. At $9.45 the market values the enterprise at roughly 12.7 times trailing operating profit, and that multiple implies operating profit compounding near 7.1% a year over a five-year stretch before fading to ordinary long-run growth. Set against the multiples the other listed home-care and post-acute filers carry, that sits in the lower half of the range. The bet embedded here is not heroic growth.

The methods used to triangulate the business disagree, and the shape of the disagreement is the useful part. Peer multiple approaches land above today's quote. So do the cash flow approaches, and so do most of the book value and profitability approaches. The exception is earnings power measured with no growth at all: take the average operating profit of the last five fiscal years, assume the business never expands again, and today's price is about 5 times what that earnings power method reaches. That is a coherent story rather than a contradiction. A levered enterprise whose operating profit is assumed frozen forever cannot support much equity, and freezing operating profit is exactly what the company is not doing.

What has to be true, then, is modest on the income statement and demanding on the balance sheet. Aveanna earns roughly a 10.5% operating margin today, which is respectable inside its cohort: ADUS runs at 9.8%, ENSG at 8.5%, OPCH at 5.8% and BTSG at 2.7%. Holding that margin while growing mid single digits is the whole requirement. The complication is that the requirement has to be met while servicing debt priced off a floating benchmark. The 10-K discloses that the 2025 Term Loan and borrowings under the 2025 Refinancing Revolving Credit Facility each accrued interest at a rate of 7.47%, and that the 2025 term loans bear interest at a rate equal to, at the election of the Borrower, Term SOFR (as defined in the Amended Credit Agreement) plus an applicable margin equal to 3.75 % per annum.

That is where the read tightens. Net debt of $1.13 billion sits at 4.4 times operating profit against gross debt of $1.32 billion and liquid assets of $189 million, and operating profit covers interest about 1.9 times. The company is not burning cash, which matters, but the share count has drifted up about 4.6% a year over the last four years, so the equity has been absorbing dilution alongside the leverage. Cheap against most of the methods and thinly covered against its own interest bill is an unusual pairing. It puts the weight of the decision not on the multiple, which is undemanding, but on whether the reimbursement rates that produced this year's operating profit hold at these levels.

Catalysts

The March quarter was the strongest print the company has posted since it listed. Revenue came in at $647.9 million, up 15.9% on the prior-year quarter, and net income was $41.7 million against $5.2 million a year earlier. The scale of that swing in reported profit says more about how much of the cost base is fixed than about any single quarter's demand: on 16% more revenue, an operating structure built for hourly nursing converts incremental rate almost straight through.

The second development is structural rather than seasonal. Aveanna completed the purchase of Family First Homecare for $175.5 million in cash on June 2, 2026, adding 27 pediatric home-nursing locations, and lifted full-year 2026 revenue guidance to a range of $2.63 billion to $2.65 billion from $2.56 billion to $2.58 billion, of which about $70.0 million is attributed to the acquired business. Paying cash rather than issuing stock is the relevant detail for holders who have watched the share count climb; it also means the deal was funded from a balance sheet that was already carrying meaningful debt.

What follows is a test of integration rather than of demand. The acquired locations sit in states where Aveanna already negotiates, so the question is how quickly they move onto the parent's contracted rates and staffing model. The 10-K flagged the transaction while it was still pending, noting that The purchase price for the acquisition is $175.5 million in cash, subject to customary adjustments. The next scheduled read on both the rate trajectory and the integration is the second-quarter report.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Private Duty Services (reported)

Home Health & Hospice (reported)

Medical Solutions (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company press release, June 2, 2026 · Q1 FY2026 earnings call, May 2026 · Aveanna Q1 FY2026 results announcement, May 14, 2026

View the full interactive AVAH report on boothcheck