AVISTA CORP (AVA): what the price requires
At today's price, AVISTA CORP (AVA) is priced for -4.6% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AVA
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | AVA |
| Company | AVISTA CORP |
| Current price | $42.05/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 8.6% |
| Operating margin today | 18.8% |
| Margin compression implied | -10.2pp |
| Implied growth | -4.6% |
| Multiple paid | 10x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.4% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~4.9pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.67σ |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.74x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.55x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.75x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.89x | 4 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $53.20 | 0.79x | yes | Reference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.5B |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $56.44 | 0.75x | yes | P/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.9x / 20.0x / 23.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $116.94 | 0.36x | yes | DPS $1.99, g=7.4% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $42.36 | 0.99x | yes | Stage 1: 7% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $27.04 | 1.56x | yes | BV/sh $33.71, ROE (TTM) 7.4%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $24.12 | 1.74x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $22.99 | 1.83x | yes | Rev $1.9B, growth -1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.5x / 1.8x / 2.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $30.12 | 1.40x | yes | EPS $2.51, growth 7% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.27 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $24.76 | 1.70x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.27B × (1−12%) / WACC 8.7% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $23.68 | 1.78x | yes | BV $33.71 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 7.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 4.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $43.63 | 0.96x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.51 × BVPS $33.71) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $62.68 | 0.67x | yes | EBITDA $0.43B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $48.98 | 0.86x | yes | EPS $2.51 × (8.5 + 2×7.4%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $14.21 | 2.96x | yes | BV $33.71 × (ROIC 3.7% / WACC 8.7%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $58.19 | 0.72x | yes | Revenue $1.92B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $27.83 | 1.51x | yes | EPS $2.51 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 7.4% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 11.1x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $27.14 | 1.55x | yes | EPS $2.51 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $402.0m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 1.22x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 1.07x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 3.4% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Avista is a Pacific Northwest electric and gas utility whose appeal is income: it pays a dividend yielding roughly 5% with a long record of increases, funded from regulated earnings, and the stock trades at a low multiple of those earnings.
- The defining problem is that Avista earns less than it is allowed to: its return on equity of about 7.4% sits below its cost of equity, the symptom of regulatory lag the 10-K describes as the risk of "disallowance or delay in the recovery of capital investments, operating costs, commodity costs."
- Watch the rate-case outcomes and the data-center question: management confirmed 2026 utility earnings guidance of $2.52 to $2.72 per share and a $3.4 billion five-year capital plan, but recently paused negotiations on a large data-center load that had been an upside lever.
Bull Case
The capital-allocation picture for Avista is the simplest version of the utility bargain: spend capital on the system, earn a regulated return on it, and pass most of the resulting earnings back to shareholders as a dividend. Avista pays a dividend yielding close to 5%, near $1.97 a share for 2026, with a payout covered by earnings and a long history of annual increases. For an income-oriented holder, that is the core of the case: a cash return well above the market average, backed by the most predictable earnings stream in the economy, the regulated delivery of electricity and gas that customers buy regardless of the business cycle.
The valuation is where Avista stands apart from the typical premium utility. At $39.83 the stock trades at only about 14 times company-wide operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a modest decline in operating profit would warrant. The relative-multiple methods make the point directly: applied at a sector price-to-earnings near 20 times, they land well above the current price, and an EV-to-EBITDA comparison lands higher still. Unlike the richly valued names in the sector, Avista is priced as a value utility, which means an investor is paid the high yield without overpaying for the underlying earnings.
The reinvestment runway supports the dividend and modest growth. Avista plans roughly $615 million of capital expenditure in 2026 within a $3.4 billion five-year plan, the system investment that, once recovered in rates, grows the earnings base. Management targets long-term utility earnings growth of 4% to 6%, which combined with the near-5% yield is a respectable total-return profile for a defensive holding. First-quarter results moved the right way, with earnings of $1.11 a share up from $0.98 a year earlier and full-year guidance confirmed. The bull case is a cheaply priced, high-yield regulated utility with a clear capital plan: not a grower to get excited about, but a defensive income holding bought at a discount to where the methods say the earnings belong.
Bear Case
The structural problem with Avista is that it does not earn what regulators allow it to, and that gap is the bear case. Its return on equity of about 7.4% sits below its cost of equity, which means the utility is, in economic terms, not quite covering the cost of the capital it deploys. The cause is regulatory lag: a utility spends capital today but only recovers it, and earns a return on it, after a rate case concludes, often a year or more later, and frequently for less than it requested. The 10-K is explicit about the risk of "disallowance or delay in the recovery of capital investments, operating costs, commodity costs" and warns that if regulators "grant substantially lower rate increases than our requests," the earned return suffers. A utility that chronically under-earns its authorized return is one whose growth plan creates less shareholder value than the headline rate-base figures suggest, because each new dollar invested earns a sub-cost-of-capital return until the next rate case catches up.
The Pacific Northwest setting adds a specific tail risk: wildfire. Western utilities have learned that a single fire linked to their equipment can produce liabilities that dwarf their market value, and Avista operates in fire-prone territory. The company is spending on wildfire mitigation, which is prudent, but mitigation is a cost that pressures the already-thin earned return, and the residual liability risk is the kind that does not show in the numbers until a catastrophic event. It is the asymmetric risk a utility holder accepts in exchange for the steady dividend.
The near-term growth lever just got weaker. Avista had been pursuing a large data-center load, the kind of new demand that lets a utility grow its rate base faster, but it paused those negotiations to align with regulators and community stakeholders, removing a visible upside catalyst at least for now. Meanwhile the financing of the capital plan dilutes holders: the company expects up to $90 million of new stock issuance in 2026, on top of new debt, to fund the spend. On valuation, the picture is genuinely mixed: the relative-multiple methods say the stock is cheap, but the asset-based methods say it is expensive, because a utility earning below its cost of equity does not deserve a premium to its book value of about $33.71 a share, and the stock trades above that. The bear case is that Avista is cheap for a reason, a low-ROE utility with regulatory lag, wildfire exposure, and a faded near-term growth catalyst, and the near-5% yield is the compensation for owning a business that struggles to earn its keep.
Valuation
Avista is a value utility, and the methods agree it is inexpensive on its earnings while flagging why the cheapness is deserved. At $39.83 the stock trades at roughly 14 times company-wide operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. The relative-multiple methods reinforce that read: applied at a sector price-to-earnings near 20 times, they land well above the price, and an enterprise-value-to-EBITDA comparison lands higher still. On a pure multiple basis, Avista is cheap relative to the sector, and the framework reads the priced-in assumption as broadly within range, requiring no heroic growth.
The families of method split in a way that is itself the diagnosis. The relative-multiple methods say the stock is cheap. But the asset-based methods, which anchor on the book value near $33.71 a share and the actual return on equity, say the stock is expensive, because a utility earning a roughly 7.4% return on equity, below its cost of equity, does not deserve to trade at a premium to its book value, and the price sits above book. That tension is the whole story: Avista looks cheap on an earnings multiple and rich on an asset-return basis, and the reconciliation is that the market is discounting the earnings precisely because the utility under-earns its allowed return. The dividend-based methods, which capitalize the high payout, land well above the price, which is why the income case is the strongest version of the bull argument. The honest read is that Avista is cheap if you believe rate cases close the earned-versus-authorized gap, and fairly valued if the regulatory lag persists.
The balance-sheet frame for a utility is capital adequacy and the dividend, not leverage in the industrial sense. Avista funds its capital plan with a mix of new debt and equity, including up to $90 million of stock issuance in 2026, which dilutes per-share value modestly, and the dividend payout near 83% of earnings is high but covered. The relevant risks are not solvency but the earned return, the wildfire liability tail, and whether rate cases grant enough to lift the return on equity toward the authorized level. The buyer at today's price is paid a near-5% yield to own a discounted, defensive regulated utility, accepting low returns and Pacific Northwest wildfire exposure as the trade. Published analyst targets cluster right around the current price, with a median near $40 and a range into the high $40s, reflecting a market that sees the stock as roughly fairly valued, attractive for yield but capped by the low earned return.
Catalysts
The first quarter of 2026 confirmed the steady-as-it-goes story. Avista reported GAAP net income of $92 million, or $1.11 per diluted share, up from $0.98 a year earlier, and confirmed its full-year 2026 non-GAAP utility earnings guidance of $2.52 to $2.72 per share. The capital and financing plan behind it is set: roughly $615 million of capital expenditure in 2026 within a $3.4 billion five-year plan, funded with up to $90 million of stock issuance and $230 million of long-term debt, supporting a long-term earnings growth target of 4% to 6%. The catalysts that matter are the rate-case outcomes that determine whether Avista's earned return rises toward its authorized level, since the earned-versus-authorized gap is the central drag on the stock.
Two developments frame the upside and the risk. On the upside, Avista had been negotiating to serve a large data-center load, the kind of new demand that accelerates rate-base growth, but it paused those talks to align with regulators and community stakeholders, deferring a visible catalyst. On the income side, the dividend yields close to 5% and has a long record of increases, the core attraction for the stock's holders. Analyst sentiment is neutral, with most ratings at hold and price targets clustered around the current level, reflecting a market that values the yield while waiting for evidence the earned return improves. The next earnings report and the progress of pending rate cases are the events that will determine whether the value-utility discount narrows.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- NWE (NORTHWESTERN ENERGY GROUP, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …us to operate our utility and reliably serve current customers and future customers. As a result of current macroeconomic conditions, both nationally and globally, we have recently experienced issues with our supply chain for materials and components used in our operations and capital project construction activities.…
- FY2025 10-K: …discount rate and estimated future cash flows. In estimating cash F-19 flows, we incorporate expected long-term growth rates in our service territory, regulatory stability, and commodity prices (where appropriate), as well as other factors that affect our revenue, expense and capital expenditure projections. For the…
- POR (PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: …and natural gas in an effort to meet the needs of, and obtain reasonably-priced power for its retail customers, manage risk, and administer its long-term wholesale contracts. The Company generates revenues and cash flows primarily from the sale and distribution of electricity to retail customers in its service…
- FY2025 10-K: …bi-lateral agreements, within the region to serve retail demand. PGE's engagement in the wholesale electricity marketplace depends upon numerous factors, including: 1) the relative price and availability of power, whether purchased, generated, or from storage facilities; 2) hydro, wind, and solar conditions; and 3)…
- OTTR (OTTER TAIL CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …business operates as a regulated monopoly. Our retail customers reside within our assigned service territories, and most retail customers do not have the ability to choose their electric supplier. However, we are subject to extensive regulation, as further described below, along with certain public policies that…
- FY2025 10-K: …on equity in comparison to internal thresholds or peer entities. The operations of our three reportable segments are further described below. We have aggregated two operating segments within our Manufacturing reportable segment based on the similarity between these businesses and their economic characteristics.…
- LNT (ALLIANT ENERGY CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …and result in higher electricity costs that would need to be recovered from customers. We may not be able to pass on all of the changes in costs to our customers, especially at WPL where we do not have an automatic retail electric fuel cost adjustment clause to timely recover such costs and where electric fuel cost…
- FY2025 10-K: …and indirectly increase customer costs, which may decrease demand for energy or impact our customers' ability to pay their bills, which could adversely impact our financial condition and results of operations. We may incur material post-closing adjustments related to past asset and business divestitures - We have…
- OGE (OGE ENERGY CORP.)
- FY2025 10-K: …financial and load growth impact on us and consequently impact our revenue and affordability of services. We have been and will continue to be affected by competitive changes to the utility and energy industries. Significant changes have occurred and additional changes have been proposed to the wholesale electric…
- FY2025 10-K: …of competition between suppliers may vary depending on relative costs and supplies of other forms of energy. It is possible that changes in regulatory policies or advances in technologies such as fuel cells, microturbines, windmills and photovoltaic solar cells will reduce costs of new technology to levels that are…
- BKH (BLACK HILLS CORP /SD/)
- FY2025 10-K: …to revenue-producing activities, depreciation and amortization expenses, and taxes other than income taxes from the measure. We believe that Electric and Gas Utility margin provides a useful basis for evaluating our segment operating results since our Utilities have regulatory mechanisms that allow them to pass…
- FY2025 10-K: …maintenance expenses not directly attributable to revenue-producing activities of $100.9 million, $96.1 million, and $83.0 million for the years ended 2025, 2024, and 2023, respectively, for the Electric Utilities and $157.4 million, $148.7 million, and $154.7 million for the years ended 2025, 2024, and 2023,…
- WEC (WEC ENERGY GROUP, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …compete with other utilities for sales to municipalities and cooperatives as well as with other utilities and marketers for wholesale electric business. Natural Gas Utility Operations - Wisconsin, Illinois, and Other States Segments Our natural gas utilities also face varying degrees of competition from other…
- FY2025 10-K: …service territories. 2025 Form 10-K 59 WEC Energy Group, Inc. Table of Contents Gross Margin GAAP and Utility Margin Non-GAAP The following table summarizes our other states segment gross margin (GAAP) and reconciles gross margin (GAAP) to utility margin (non-GAAP). See Non-GAAP Financial Measures above for…
- CMS (CMS ENERGY CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …retail services. Michigan law allows electric customers in Consumers' service territory to buy electric generation service from alternative electric suppliers in an aggregate amount capped at 10 percent of Consumers' sales, with certain exceptions. At December 31, 2025, electric deliveries under the ROA program were…
- FY2025 10-K: …included ROA demand of 449 MW. As required by MISO reserve margin requirements, Consumers owns or controls, through long‑term PPAs, short-term capacity purchases, and auction capacity purchases, all of the capacity required to supply its projected firm peak load and necessary reserve margin for summer 2026. Electric…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 FY2026 results, May 2026 · company disclosures, 2026 · analyst consensus, TipRanks / Simply Wall St, 2026