ASTRONICS CORPORATION (ATRO): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $76.43, ASTRONICS CORPORATION (ATRO) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~8.5 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ATRO

Headline

FieldValue
TickerATRO
CompanyASTRONICS CORPORATION
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$76.43/sh
CompositionAerospace - Electrical Power & Motion 48% / Aerospace - Lighting & Safety 24% / Aerospace - Avionics 14% / Aerospace - Systems Certification 3% / Aerospace - Structures 2% / Aerospace - Other 1% / Test Systems 8%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)7.5%
Operating margin today13.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-5.9pp
Must persist for8.5y
Multiple paid31x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 10: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.5% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.21σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)81

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.37x4expensive
Earnings7.53x4expensive
Relative2.22x2expensive
Growth1.03x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$45.001.70xyesFCF base $0.1B, growth 14% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.8%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$87.820.87xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 24.0x / 26.0x / 28.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 28.8x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 45x), scenarios: 23.6x / 28.8x / 34.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 17.59x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$18.514.13xyesBV/sh $4.29, ROE (TTM) 39.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$42.701.79xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$74.481.03xyesRev $0.9B, growth 14% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.1x / 3.7x / 4.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$22.683.37xyesEPS $1.89, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=22.32 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.017643.00xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.03B × (1−7%) / WACC 8.8% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAsset$29.292.61xyesBV $4.29 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 39.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$13.505.66xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.89 × BVPS $4.29) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.15B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$6.7511.32xyesFCF $60.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$4.9515.44xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.05B (FCF $0.06B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$60.981.25xyesEPS $1.89 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$3.3622.75xyesBV $4.29 × (ROIC 6.9% / WACC 8.8%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $0.94B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$70.881.08xyesEPS $1.89 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$20.433.74xyesEPS $1.89 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Aerospaceoperatingenterprise$797.3mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Test Systemsoperatingenterprise$64.8mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$301.3m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.58x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.39x
Share count CAGR (dilution)9.7%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

One number decides this entire argument, and it is not the growth rate. Astronics converts 7.7% of trailing sales into operating profit. Its cohort converts far more: HEI runs a 23.5% operating margin, TDY 19.0%, CW 18.4%, MOG-A 12.3%. Move Astronics halfway to the middle of that group and everything else about the company reads differently, because the revenue is already there and the customers are already committed. The bull case is entirely a case about conversion.

There is now evidence that conversion is happening. First-quarter 2026 sales rose 12.0% to $230.6 million and net income reached $25.5 million, with the quarter's operating margin roughly doubling from the prior year on higher aerospace volume, productivity gains and lower litigation costs. One quarter proves nothing on its own. The mix behind it is more persuasive than the number: this is a business where incremental volume flows over a fixed engineering and certification base, which is precisely the cost structure that produces sudden margin steps rather than gradual ones.

What sits underneath is a portfolio of small monopolies inside the cabin. The 10-K describes Aerospace customers as "the airframe manufacturers ("OEM") that build aircraft for the commercial transport, military and general aviation markets, suppliers to those OEMs, aircraft operators such as airlines", and the products as power distribution, seat motion, lighting, avionics, structures and systems certification. Those parts are qualified onto a specific airframe. Once a seat-power module is certified into a cabin layout, the replacement decision belongs to a certification schedule rather than a procurement calendar. The 2025 segment result shows what that looks like when the airlines are spending: "Aerospace segment sales of $797.3 million were up $90.6 million, or 12.8%. Sales in the Commercial Transport market grew $74.7 million, or 14.2%."

Demand visibility improved through 2025 and again into 2026. Test Systems, the smaller of the two reportable segments at 8% of revenue, carried "Backlog in the Test Systems segment was $73.7 million at December 31, 2025, compared to $61.7 million at December 31, 2024", and management has flagged a United States Army radio test programme expected to contribute roughly $40 million to $50 million a year once running. A defence test contract is not a large business by itself. It is a business with almost no customer-acquisition cost attached to it.

The last point is the simplest. Company-wide bookings ran ahead of shipments in the first quarter of 2026 at a book-to-bill of 1.26, and backlog set a record. Order books can turn. But a supplier whose orders exceed deliveries is a supplier with pricing conversations available to it, and pricing is the cheapest possible route to the margin the bull case needs.

Bear Case

The disruption Astronics faces is not coming from another cabin-electronics supplier. It is coming from orbit. The 10-K states that "The satellite communications industry is experiencing significant ongoing disruption, as customers evaluate the benefits of lower-cost, low Earth orbit ("LEO") solutions, challenging the traditional geosynchronous satellite-based systems", and the company describes this transition as both a risk and an opportunity for parts of its business. When the connectivity architecture inside an aircraft changes, the antennas, power draws and equipment bays change with it, and a supplier qualified into the old architecture has to re-qualify into the new one at its own expense.

Behind that sits an ordinary but unforgiving competitive fact. The filing acknowledges that "Our competitors include larger, more diversified corporations and vertically integrated companies that may have greater financial, marketing, production and research and development resources than we do", and the numbers make the point sharper than the language does. TDG earns a 46.5% operating margin, HEI 23.5%, TDY 19.0% and CW 18.4%. Astronics earns 7.7%. In a downturn, the companies with three times the margin can fund a design win by pricing through it; Astronics cannot.

Now the price. Today's quote pays about 45 times company-wide operating income, and the assumption that makes that arithmetic close is not a heroic growth rate but a heroic run of ordinary ones: profit growth roughly at the pace the company has recently managed, sustained for something like eleven years. That is the demanding part. Only about 14% of comparable fast growers held such a pace across a full decade, and the multiple already sits at the very top of its peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. The company does not need a miracle. It needs an absence of interruptions for longer than most industrial suppliers get.

Interruptions are exactly what this end market supplies. Boeing accounts for roughly a tenth of sales in each of the last three reported years, and the 10-K warns that "an increasing supply of used aircraft on the market would likely result in reduced demand for our products, which will result in lower profits" and that reduced defence spending would narrow the opportunity set. Input costs are the other exposure: the company describes paying "costs to secure available inventory" and placing non-cancellable purchase commitments, which introduces inventory risk if its own forecasts prove wrong.

The balance sheet leaves less room than the growth story implies. Net debt runs about 323 million dollars, which is 4.74 times operating profit, and liquid assets are thin at under 12 million. The revolving credit facility carries covenants the 10-K discusses at length, including the observation that if borrowings were accelerated the company "cannot assure you that our assets would be sufficient to repay in full our debt". Meanwhile the share count has grown about 4.6% a year over the four years to April 2026. Dilution at that pace quietly consumes a meaningful share of whatever margin expansion arrives, which is the part of the bull case least likely to be modelled by the people repeating it.

Valuation

Forty-five times operating income is a multiple normally reserved for software, and Astronics makes seat-power modules. That gap is the whole valuation question, and unpacking it produces something more specific than "expensive." Working backwards from the quote, what the price needs is not an extraordinary growth rate. It needs profit growth near the pace already delivered, held without interruption for roughly eleven years. The rate is ordinary. The duration is not.

How rare that is has a countable answer. Only about 14% of comparable fast growers sustained such a pace across a full decade, and against its own sector the multiple sits at the very top of the peer distribution, beyond the upper quartile. Neither of those is a prediction. They are the odds attached to the assumption a buyer is accepting.

The methods split cleanly, and only one of them reaches. The forward-growth approaches land about 18% under today's quote. Peer-multiple approaches sit about 63% under. The earnings-power approaches, which capitalize a normalized operating profit with no growth at all, sit about 265% under. The asset-based approaches sit about 352% under, though that reading needs context: book value is $4.23 per share, and an electronics designer whose value lives in certifications and engineering staff was never going to be described well by its balance sheet. The pattern is what matters. Everything anchored on what the business earns today lands far beneath, and only the method that extends the current trajectory forward gets close.

The concrete version of "what has to be true" is a margin sentence. Astronics turns 7.7% of sales into operating profit on a trailing basis, and the 2025 segment disclosure shows the volume that produced it: "Aerospace segment sales of $797.3 million were up $90.6 million, or 12.8%", with Test Systems adding the remainder. For a 45 times multiple on today's profit to look sensible in hindsight, that conversion has to move a long way toward where the cohort already operates, with HEI at a 23.5% operating margin, CW at 18.4% and MOG-A at 12.3%. The first quarter of 2026 delivered a step in that direction. Nine more quarters like it would settle the argument; two soft ones would reopen it.

Solvency sets the boundary on how much patience the situation allows. Net debt of about 323 million dollars amounts to 4.74 times operating profit, or 6.0 times after tax, against liquid assets of under 12 million, and the share count has risen about 4.6% a year over the four years to April 2026. The company is not burning cash and the covenants are not currently the issue. But a business carrying that much leverage against a thin cash position has limited ability to absorb a bad year without either the multiple or the share count paying for it.

Catalysts

The next scheduled event is the second-quarter report on July 30, 2026, and it arrives with an unusually specific bar to clear. Management guided second-quarter sales of $245 million to $250 million, which would be a quarterly record, and raised full-year 2026 revenue guidance to a range of $970 million to $1.0 billion from a prior range of $950 million to $990 million. Guidance raised mid-year is a different signal from guidance issued in January, because it is made with two quarters of order flow already visible.

The first quarter set the tone. Sales grew 12.0% to $230.6 million, net income rose to $25.5 million, and the operating margin roughly doubled year over year on higher aerospace volume and productivity gains, with lower litigation costs helping. Orders ran ahead of shipments at a book-to-bill of 1.26, bookings reached a record $290.4 million and backlog closed at a record $734.3 million. Backlog of that size is roughly three quarters of a year of shipments, which is what turns a guidance raise from optimism into arithmetic.

One programme is worth tracking separately. Management expects the United States Army radio test contract to contribute roughly $40 million to $50 million annually once it is running, with a partial contribution in the second half of 2026. That flows through Test Systems, the segment carrying 8% of revenue, whose own backlog the 10-K puts at "$73.7 million at December 31, 2025, compared to $61.7 million at December 31, 2024". A defence programme of that scale meaningfully changes the shape of the smaller segment without changing the company's story, which is why the aerospace margin trajectory, not this contract, remains the thing that decides the outcome.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Aerospace (reported)

Test Systems (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Astronics Q1 2026 results, May 12, 2026 · Astronics 2026 outlook commentary, May 2026 · Astronics Q1 2026 results and updated 2026 outlook, May 12, 2026

View the full interactive ATRO report on boothcheck