Atmus Filtration Technologies Inc. (ATMU): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $47.73, Atmus Filtration Technologies Inc. (ATMU) is priced for +8.3% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ATMU

Headline

FieldValue
TickerATMU
CompanyAtmus Filtration Technologies Inc.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$47.73/sh
CompositionFuel 45% / Lube 20% / Air 17% / Other 18%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)10.7%
Operating margin today17.2%
Margin compression (value-band)-6.5pp
Implied growth8.3%
Multiple paid14x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.6% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.15σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)35

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.67x5expensive
Earnings1.86x5expensive
Relative1.04x5expensive
Growth0.70x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$100.760.47xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 13% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.5%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$68.500.70xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 11.5x / 13.5x / 15.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$52.690.91xyesP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.5x / 20.0x / 23.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$28.501.67xyesBV/sh $5.57, ROE (TTM) 47.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$76.540.62xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$45.011.06xyesRev $1.9B, growth 13% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.7x / 2.1x / 2.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$41.031.16xyesEPS $2.61, growth 16% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.15 (Fair)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$25.611.86xyesNormalized EBIT (4y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.28B × (1−23%) / WACC 7.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$45.891.04xyesBV $5.57 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 47.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$18.092.64xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.61 × BVPS $5.57) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$45.781.04xyesEBITDA $0.35B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$15.373.11xyesFCF $190.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$13.493.54xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.18B (FCF $0.19B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$84.220.57xyesEPS $2.61 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$4.4410.75xyesBV $5.57 × (ROIC 6.0% / WACC 7.5%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$34.921.37xyesRevenue $1.90B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$61.550.78xyesEPS $2.61 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 15.7% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 23.6x
Earnings YieldEarnings$28.221.69xyesEPS $2.61 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Filtration Productsoperatingenterprise1.8B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$743.3m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.96x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.28x
Interest coverage7.4x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.4%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Take the objection first, because it is the reason this company is cheap enough to argue about. Atmus makes filters for diesel engines. Diesel engines are the technology every regulator in the developed world has spent a decade trying to replace, and Atmus's largest customer has publicly committed to reducing the emissions of what it sells. The filing itself acknowledges that Cummins "may result in Cummins preferring products that reduce its direct and/or indirect GHG emissions". On the face of it, this is a business selling consumables into a shrinking installed base.

Now look at where the money actually comes from. The company estimates that "approximately 86% of our net sales in 2025 were generated in the aftermarket, where our" products are installed as replacement or repair parts, against roughly 14% sold as components on new vehicles. That ratio changes what the electrification question means. A truck built today runs for a decade or two and needs its fuel, lube and air filters changed on a schedule set by the engine maker, not by the fleet's environmental ambitions. Even in a world where every new truck sold from tomorrow ran on something else, the filters on the trucks already out there would keep being replaced for years. The first-fit line is the one exposed to the transition; it is the smaller line by a factor of six.

The second thing worth noticing is that Atmus makes its own filter media. It has the capability "to manufacture a large portion of its proprietary filtration media", and the technologies have names because they are engineered products rather than stamped metal: "StrataPore, NanoNet, NanoForce, NanoNet Plus and most recently, NanoNet N3 product families". That is why a filter specified onto an engine platform is difficult to substitute cheaply, and why the aftermarket revenue attaches to the equipment rather than to the distributor.

The profitability shows it. Atmus converts 17.0% of revenue into operating profit on a trailing basis. DCI, the largest listed filtration business and the natural comparison, earns 15.1% on $3.81 billion of revenue. Further out into the components cohort the numbers fall away: DORM earns 12.9%, MOD 10.8%, ALV 9.7% and PHIN 7.3%. The smaller, more focused business is out-earning almost everything around it, which is the signature of a product with real specification power rather than a commodity moving through a distribution network.

Growth has been steady rather than dramatic and has come from the right places. Fiscal 2025 net sales were "$1,764.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, an increase of $94.7 million compared to $1,669.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2024", and the filing attributes that to "higher volumes of $51.9 million and favorable pricing impacts of $50.0 million, partially offset by unfavorable impacts of currency". Volume and price contributed roughly equally. A business that can raise price without losing volume is describing its own competitive position more clearly than any strategy slide.

The concession the bull has to make is that the customer list is very short. Three names carry most of the revenue. What softens it is duration: these are relationships measured in decades, defined by supply agreements rather than by purchase orders, and switching a specified filter across a global service network is a project rather than a decision.

Bear Case

The competitive problem is not a newcomer with better technology. It is that Atmus is the small company in a business where the large one has scale in exactly the places scale matters. DCI runs $3.81 billion of revenue against Atmus at $1.83 billion, sells into industrial and aerospace filtration as well as engines, and can absorb distribution and R&D costs across a wider base. Atmus is roughly half its size and is competing for the same aftermarket shelf space through many of the same distributors.

Behind that sits the more specific structural risk, which is that the company's biggest customer is also its former parent and its most important competitor for the aftermarket dollar. The relationship is contractual and finite. The 10-K states that "our relationship with Cummins is defined by our first-fit supply agreement and aftermarket supply agreement, we may fail in the future to renew these contracts", and it lists among its principal business risks "Significant customer concentration among Cummins, PACCAR, and the Traton Group" and "The loss of a top OEM relationship or changes in the preferences of Atmus' aftermarket end-users". Those three names carry roughly 70% of sales. A filtration company whose route to the truck runs through three engine makers does not set its own terms.

The most recent quarter is where the concern stops being theoretical. Sales of $477.5 million were up 14.6% year on year, but the increase came from the Koch Filter acquisition completed in January 2026, from currency and from pricing, with underlying volumes moving lower. Acquired revenue and price increases are real revenue. They are not the same thing as more filters going into more engines, and the market read the accompanying full-year guidance the same way, marking the shares down despite the beat.

That matters because of what the price is asking for. At about 17 times company-wide operating income, the quote embeds operating profit compounding at roughly 15.9% a year across a five-year run. Among comparable fast-growers, only around 43% managed that pace over such a stretch, and this is a company whose volume line is currently negative. The gap between what the price wants and what the volume line is delivering has to be closed by price increases, acquisitions, or margin, and only one of those compounds indefinitely.

The valuation methods split accordingly. Only the forward-growth family reaches today's price. The peer-multiple methods leave the price about 32% above where they land, and the methods that capitalise current earnings with no growth leave it about 94% above. Read plainly, everything except a durable-compounding assumption says the shares are dear, and the durable-compounding assumption is the one the volume trend is currently arguing with.

Finally there is a date on the calendar. The credit facilities from the separation, a term loan and a revolver totalling a billion dollars of capacity, "will mature on September 30, 2027". Net debt sits at about 2.6 times operating profit, which is comfortable today. Refinancing is a routine exercise in a calm market and a considerably less routine one otherwise, and the company will be doing it while it also funds acquisitions to keep the revenue line moving.

Valuation

What a buyer is paying for here is the shape of the revenue rather than its size. Roughly 86% of sales are replacement filters going into engines already in the field, which produces a stream of income that tracks the installed base and the maintenance calendar rather than the order book for new trucks. That is the durability the price is capitalising, and it is worth naming before any multiple appears.

The multiple is about 17 times company-wide operating income. Inverted, that embeds operating profit compounding at roughly 15.9% a year across a five-year stretch, settling afterwards into a long-run pace of 4%.

Profitability is not the thing being asked to change. The trailing operating margin is 17.0%, and the price does not require it to go anywhere in particular. What it requires is a rate of expansion running well ahead of what an aftermarket parts business normally produces from its own volume.

Only one family of valuation method reaches the price, and it is the forward-growth family. The peer-multiple lens leaves the price about 32% above where it lands. The methods that capitalise today's earnings with no growth assumption leave it about 94% above. That pattern is not a contradiction; it is the definition of a durability premium. Static frames value what the business earns now, and this price is a claim about how long it keeps earning it.

The model that does reach the price shows exactly what has to be believed. The perpetual-growth cash-flow build starts from the free cash flow the company generates today, grows it at 10% a year for six years, then applies a 4% long-run rate, discounted at 7.7%. That is not an aggressive construction by the standards of growth models, and it lands about where the shares trade. Nudge the growth input down and it stops landing there, which is the honest statement of how much room the price leaves.

The comparison that sharpens it is with the peers rather than with the sector. Atmus earns a 17.0% trailing operating margin. DCI, the closest and much larger listed filtration business, earns 15.1% on $3.81 billion of revenue. DORM earns 12.9%, MOD 10.8%, ALV 9.7%, PHIN 7.3%. Atmus is already at the top of that group on profitability, which cuts both ways: it is evidence the moat is real, and it means margin expansion is a smaller lever from here than it would be for a company starting lower.

Rarity gives the growth assumption a reference point that is neither dismissive nor comforting. Of companies that have grown at a comparable pace, roughly 43% sustained it across such a period. Better than a coin flip, and a long way from a given.

The read is also sensitive to the rate used to discount it. The calculation runs at a 9.9% cost of capital, and each additional percentage point of that rate moves the implied operating-profit growth by roughly 6.5 points. For a leveraged spin-off whose credit facilities mature in September 2027, that sensitivity is not academic.

On the balance sheet, net debt runs at about 2.6 times operating profit with interest covered 7.7 times over, the company is not consuming cash, and the share count has been roughly flat over the years since separation. That is enough to carry the business through a soft freight cycle. It is not enough to make the growth assumption optional, which is where the whole question sits.

Catalysts

The first quarter of 2026 was the sort of print that reads well until you decompose it. Net sales reached $477.5 million, up 14.6% from $417 million a year earlier, and GAAP net income was $48.4 million. The increase came mainly from the Koch Filter Corporation acquisition, which closed on January 7, 2026, together with favourable currency and price, while underlying volumes declined.

Guidance is where the market registered its reservation. The company reaffirmed full-year 2026 net sales of $1.95 billion to $2.02 billion and left its earnings outlook unchanged, with the midpoint of that range sitting slightly below where analysts had been. Shares fell on the day despite the quarterly beat, which is a fair summary of the tension in this name: the quarter is fine and the trajectory is the argument.

Two things are worth watching from here. The first is whether the Koch Filter integration lifts the industrial and commercial side of the mix enough to reduce the dependence on heavy-duty truck cycles, since that is the strategic case for buying it. The second is the September 2027 maturity on the separation-era term loan and revolver, which will need to be addressed well before the date itself and will tell you what the credit market makes of a filtration business with three customers and one former parent.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Filtration Products (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Atmus Q1 2026 results, May 2026 · Atmus Q1 2026 results and acquisition disclosure, 2026 · Atmus FY2026 guidance reaffirmed, May 2026

View the full interactive ATMU report on boothcheck