ASTRANA HEALTH, INC. (ASTH): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers ASTRANA HEALTH, INC. (ASTH) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-07-29 · Exported: 2026-08-01 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ASTH

Headline

FieldValue
TickerASTH
CompanyASTRANA HEALTH, INC.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$36.92/sh
CompositionCommercial 9% / Medicare 60% / Medicaid 27% / Other third parties 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.0%
Operating margin (mid-cycle)9.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-6.1pp
Trailing margin (depressed year)2.5%
Multiple paid8x mid-cycle operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 5: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.30σ
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset10.01x5expensive
Earnings3.17x5expensive
Relative1.73x5expensive
Growth1.01x2expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$42.530.87xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 22.9x / 25.9x / 28.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelative$20.271.82xyesP/E 33.01x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 68x), scenarios: 26.4x / 33.0x / 39.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16.18x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$5.876.29xyesBV/sh $14.36, ROE (TTM) 3.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$3.6910.01xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$32.291.14xyesRev $3.5B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.5x / 0.6x / 0.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$21.351.73xyesEPS $0.61, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.94 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$3.999.25xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.09B × (1−33%) / WACC 6.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$2.7913.23xyesBV $14.36 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 3.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.5%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$14.042.63xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.61 × BVPS $14.36) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$11.433.23xyesEBITDA $0.10B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$19.541.89xyesFCF $155.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$11.653.17xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.11B (FCF $0.15B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$19.681.88xyesEPS $0.61 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$3.0612.07xyesBV $14.36 × (ROIC 1.4% / WACC 6.4%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$158.230.23xyesRevenue $3.53B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$22.881.61xyesEPS $0.61 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$6.595.60xyesEPS $0.61 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$549.0m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.56x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.71x
Interest coverage5.5x
Share count CAGR (dilution)1.6%
Burning cashno

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 9.1%); the trailing year was depressed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

This is not a mature business, and reading its trailing accounts as though it were produces nonsense. The March quarter of 2026 saw revenue rise 56% against the same quarter a year earlier. A company expanding at that rate has, by construction, an income statement dominated by operations it has owned for a matter of months. The trailing operating margin near 2.8% is a photograph of a machine taken mid-assembly, and the useful question is what it earns once assembled, not what it earned during.

The economics themselves are simple enough to state in a sentence. A health plan pays a fixed sum each month for each enrolled patient, and Astrana keeps whatever it does not spend on that patient's care. The 10-K lists "• Capitation revenue; • Risk pool settlements and incentives; • Management fee income; • FFS revenue" as the streams, and capitation is now the dominant one: it reached $2,840.2 million in 2025 against $1,763.2 million in 2024, an increase of $1,077.1 million. Scale matters in that arrangement more than in almost any other business model, because a larger pool of patients makes the average cost per patient more predictable, and predictability is the whole product.

That is the logic behind the year's big transaction. Astrana "completed the previously announced Prospect acquisition for a purchase price of $674.9 million. Prospect is a physician-centric risk-bearing healthcare company that operates an integrated healthcare delivery platform enabling a network of over 11,000 providers". Eleven thousand providers is not a bolt-on. It is a step change in the number of lives across which a bad flu season gets averaged.

The demographic backdrop does the rest of the work without anyone having to be clever. The 10-K cites federal projections that "Medicare spending is expected to have the fastest growth (7.9% per year for 2024-2033), primarily due to projected enrollment growth." Astrana's revenue is 60% Medicare. It does not need to win share to expand; it needs only to keep the patients it has as they age into the program that is expanding fastest.

Compare the margin against the companies that take the same risk and the picture is less alarming than the raw number suggests. MOH converts 1.0% of its revenue to operating profit and ALHC 0.8%; PRVA, the closest structural analog, manages 1.6%; CNC is negative. Astrana's trailing conversion, earned in what was plainly a transition year, already sits above most of that group. Measured through the cycle rather than on the last twelve months, this business has turned closer to 9.1% of revenue into operating profit, and the distance between the two readings is what the bull case asks you to believe will close.

Cash has started to follow. Free cash flow reached $64.1 million in the March quarter of 2026, and management reaffirmed a full-year range of $105 million to $132.5 million. That is the sequence a roll-up needs: revenue first, then cash, then margin.

Bear Case

Strip away the vocabulary and Astrana takes insurance risk. A health plan hands over a fixed amount each month for each patient, and whatever that patient's care actually costs lands on Astrana. That is the trade an insurer makes, described in the language of care delivery. The company's own filing does not dress it up: Prospect, the largest acquisition in its history, is "a physician-centric risk-bearing healthcare company". Risk-bearing is the operative word, and it is why the market declines to pay a services multiple for these earnings.

The disagreement among the standard measures is unusually wide as a result. The price sits about 79% above where the peer-multiple methods land, and several times above the earnings-power methods, both of which start from what the company actually earned. Only the forward cash-flow approaches reach today's quote. That is not a mild dispute about the pace of improvement. It is the difference between valuing what a business earns and valuing what it might.

The cleanest test of whether the acquisitions are working is the Care Delivery segment, and it did not pass. Revenue there rose $114.1 million during 2025, of which $105.1 million came from consolidating Prospect, while the segment's operating income fell $2.1 million. Astrana bought revenue. Whether it bought profit is still an open question, and the answer arrives in segment results rather than in press releases.

Both payers that matter set their own prices, and they have been rewriting the rules while Astrana was buying. The filing notes that the shared-savings benchmark was adjusted in 2024 to "address prior performance, incorporate a prospective administrative growth factor, and to attempt to reduce the cap on negative regional adjustments", changes that "affect how savings and losses are calculated under the model and may affect our ability to generate revenue". Under the ACO REACH Global Risk track the company is "responsible for 100% of shared savings or losses up to 25% of the total". Symmetrical, in other words. Worth saying plainly in an industry that tends to market only one half of that sentence.

The Prospect purchase was financed with a delayed-draw term loan of 745.0 million dollars, and the consequence sits on the balance sheet. Net borrowings run about 1.9 times operating profit measured through the cycle, with interest covered roughly six times on the same basis. Both figures are comfortable against normalized earnings and noticeably less so against the trailing year the company actually just reported. Meanwhile the share count has risen about 1.6% a year across the last four years, so dilution has been running alongside the borrowing rather than instead of it.

One structural feature deserves more attention than it gets. State law bars corporations from owning medical practices, so Astrana holds its physician entities through nominees: the 10-K explains that the company "has designated certain key personnel as the nominee shareholder of professional corporations that hold controlling and non-controlling ownership interests in several medical corporations." This is standard across the industry and entirely lawful. It also means the consolidated accounts rest on contractual control rather than on ownership, which is a thinner thing to hold than the balance sheet makes it look.

Valuation

Everything here turns on which earnings figure you decide to use. On the profit reported over the last twelve months, roughly 2.8% of revenue, the shares look expensive on most conventional measures. On the profit the business has converted through the cycle, closer to 9.1% of revenue, today's price capitalizes operating income at about ten times, which is below what even a company shrinking its operating profit by five percent every year would warrant. Same company, same quote, opposite verdicts.

Read the price forward and it asks for remarkably little. It needs an operating margin of roughly 3%, against the 2.8% the trailing twelve months delivered. It is not asking for the through-cycle figure at all. When the requirement embedded in a price amounts to the status quo, the question stops being whether the company can improve and becomes whether it can avoid deteriorating.

The methods split along exactly that seam. The price sits about 79% above where the peer-multiple methods land, and several times above the earnings-power methods, both of which work from trailing profit. The forward cash-flow methods land essentially on today's quote. That spread is not really a disagreement about the future. It is the entire argument over whether the last twelve months were representative of anything.

Set against the companies carrying the same kind of risk, the trailing margin is less of an outlier than it appears. MOH converts 1.0% of $45.1 billion of revenue into operating profit, and ALHC 0.8% of $4.3 billion. PRVA, the nearest analog by business model, manages 1.6%. UNH, the most profitable of that group, reaches 4.2%. Astrana's 2.8%, earned in a year of heavy integration, sits in the upper half of that distribution.

The inputs behind those margins are worth naming, because capitation is what makes them move. Capitation revenue reached $2,840.2 million in 2025 against $1,763.2 million in 2024, and the Prospect transaction closed "for a purchase price of $674.9 million", bringing "a network of over 11,000 providers". Capitation is fixed money against variable cost. It now dominates the revenue mix, which means the margin is decided less by pricing than by medical utilization, and utilization is not something any operator forecasts with confidence.

Borrowings set the clock on how long the answer is allowed to stay ambiguous. Term loans and the revolver together run to a little over one billion dollars, against liquid assets of 479.6 million dollars, leaving net borrowings of 549.0 million dollars, or about 1.9 times operating profit measured through the cycle. Interest is covered around six times on that basis and materially less on trailing earnings. The facilities mature on February 26, 2030. That is the outside date by which the through-cycle margin has to turn up in the trailing one.

Catalysts

The March quarter was the first clean look at the enlarged company. Revenue reached $965.1 million, 56% higher than the same quarter a year earlier, and free cash flow came in at $64.1 million against a far smaller figure the year before. For a business that spent 2025 absorbing an acquisition, cash conversion was the number that mattered most, and it moved in the right direction.

The strategic shift underneath the quarter is toward taking more of the risk rather than less. Astrana launched a delegated full-risk arrangement with a payer partner in Texas, lifting Medicare Advantage membership in that market above 14,000, and full-risk contracts now cover roughly 80% of Care Partners capitation revenue and about 40% of consolidated membership. Taking more risk raises both the reward for managing care well and the damage from managing it badly, which is the trade the next several quarters will settle.

Guidance was left unchanged: full-year 2026 revenue of $3.8 billion to $4.1 billion and free cash flow of $105 million to $132.5 million. On regulation, management pointed to the 2027 Medicare Advantage rate notice as a help rather than a hindrance, arguing that its historically conservative approach to documenting patient diagnoses leaves it less exposed than peers if the rules on which diagnosis sources count are tightened. That is a testable claim, and the test is the 2027 bid cycle.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Care Partners (reported)

Care Delivery (reported)

Care Enablement (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2025 10-K · Astrana Q1 2026 results, May 2026 · Astrana Q1 2026 earnings call, May 2026

View the full interactive ASTH report on boothcheck