Everforth, Inc. (ASGN): what the price requires

The current priced-in claim for Everforth, Inc. (ASGN) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.

Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ASGN

Headline

FieldValue
TickerASGN
CompanyEverforth, Inc.
Current price$19.40/sh
CompositionConsulting 62% / Assignment 38%

What The Price Requires (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin needed3.8%
Operating margin today5.1%
Margin compression implied-1.3pp
Multiple paid11x operating income

The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.1% sits below it).

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~-2.7%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.91σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)8
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.03x5expensive
Earnings0.74x5justifies
Relative0.59x3justifies
Growth0.41x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 3.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=16)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$179.950.11xyesFCF base $0.3B, growth -1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 3.6%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$47.070.41xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 7.7x / 9.7x / 11.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$32.150.60xyesP/E 14.08x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 8x), scenarios: 11.9x / 14.1x / 16.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$25.620.76xyesBV/sh $43.22, ROE (TTM) 5.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$18.861.03xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$12.031.61xyesRev $4.0B, growth -1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.2x / 0.2x / 0.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$93.910.21xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.32B × (1−40%) / WACC 3.6% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$18.041.08xyesBV $43.22 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 5.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 3.6%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$46.770.41xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.25 × BVPS $43.22) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$32.620.59xyesEBITDA $0.24B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$39.110.50xyesFCF $290.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$26.260.74xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.24B (FCF $0.29B − SBC $0.05B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$1.8910.26xyesEPS $2.25 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$6.073.20xyesBV $43.22 × (ROIC 0.5% / WACC 3.6%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$240.360.08xyesRevenue $3.98B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$24.320.80xyesEPS $2.25 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)12.42x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)6.45x
Interest coverage3.0x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-5.7%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The clearest signal of management's view sits in the capital-allocation record: the company is buying back its own stock steadily, shrinking the share count about 6% a year, and it is doing so while the price has fallen to roughly $19 from a 52-week high above $60. Retiring shares of a cash-generative business at a depressed valuation is the highest-return use of capital available when the market has overcorrected, because each repurchased share retires more earnings power than it would at a normal multiple. The buyback is the company betting on itself at a low price.

The business mix is shifting toward the more durable, higher-value side. Consulting now makes up about 62% of revenue, and within that the commercial consulting business grew, with the filing reporting commercial revenues "up 14.4 percent year-over-year" in the relevant period. Consulting is stickier than pure staffing because it is project-based and embedded in clients' technology roadmaps, and it carries a backlog: the filing cites a contract backlog of "$2.9 billion as of December 31, 2025", future revenue already awarded. To accelerate that shift, the company acquired Quinnox for $290 million to add digital-engineering and global-delivery capabilities, a deal it expects to contribute about $100 million of revenue at a low-20s EBITDA margin.

At about 11 times operating income, the methods anchored on what the business earns land above the price: the sector price-to-earnings comparison reaches the low $30s, the cash-flow exit-multiple method the mid-$30s, and the asset-based approaches the low-to-high $20s. Management guided second-quarter adjusted EBITDA of $85 million to $95 million, a margin of 8.8% to 9.5%, and analyst price targets sit well above the current price. The bull case is a cash-generative, consulting-led IT services business trading at a recession-style multiple, with management retiring shares and reshaping the mix toward higher-value work while it waits for the cycle to turn.

Bear Case

The advantage a staffing-and-consulting firm relies on, being the trusted intermediary that places skilled technologists, is eroding from two directions at once, and the stock's collapse is the market pricing that erosion. The first is the federal government. The Federal segment, which the filing notes is "all consulting revenues," fell, with revenues "down 3.3 percent year-over-year," and management attributed first-quarter federal weakness to government efficiency cuts. A large book of government consulting work is only as stable as federal spending priorities, and those have turned hostile. That is not a cyclical dip the company can wait out; it is a deliberate reduction in the demand for exactly what this segment sells.

The second erosion is structural and slower. IT staffing is a commoditizing business: clients increasingly want fewer contractors, offshore delivery undercuts domestic placement on price, and artificial intelligence is beginning to automate the kind of work that staffing once filled with human seats. The pivot to consulting and digital engineering is the response, but it is also an admission that the legacy assignment business, still 38% of revenue, faces secular pressure. Revenue was essentially flat in the latest quarter, and the company missed earnings expectations meaningfully, the profile of a business struggling to grow against these headwinds rather than one merely pausing.

The balance sheet narrows the room to maneuver. Net debt sits at roughly six times operating income with interest covered only about three times, which is elevated for a cyclical services business. Spending $290 million on the Quinnox acquisition while buying back stock and carrying that leverage is a lot of capital deployment for a company whose core demand is shrinking. If the federal cuts deepen, the commercial recovery stalls, or AI accelerates the commoditization of staffing, the low multiple is not a bargain waiting to be discovered; it is the market's accurate read on a business model under structural pressure, and the leverage would amplify the downside rather than cushion it.

Valuation

The price is making an unusually pessimistic bet. At about $19.40 (June 27, 2026) a share, ASGN trades near 11 times company-wide operating income, a multiple so low that the price sits below what even a roughly 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. That is a bound, not a target: the market is not pricing growth, it is pricing continued shrinkage, which after a fall from above $60 and a quarter of flat revenue and federal weakness is an understandable but severe stance.

The methods land mostly above the price, the pattern of a beaten-down value name. The relative-multiple family, using a sector price-to-earnings near 18 times blended down by the depressed trailing figure, lands near $32. The cash-flow exit-multiple method lands near $36. The asset-based excess-return approaches land in the high-teens to mid-$20s, anchored on a high book value of about $43 a share against a depressed trailing return on equity of 5.5%. Read together, the methods that value the business on normalized earnings power sit well above the price, while the ones that extrapolate the recent flat-to-declining revenue sit closer to it. The disagreement is the bet: pay 11 times and you are wagering that operating profit stabilizes rather than continuing to fall.

Solvency is the real constraint and deserves weight. Net debt is roughly six times operating income with interest coverage near three times, elevated for a cyclical services business, especially while the company is funding both buybacks and a $290 million acquisition. The decisive question the valuation poses is whether the consulting pivot and the commercial recovery can offset the federal contraction fast enough to stabilize earnings. If they do, the gap between the current price and the earnings-based methods in the $30s is the upside; if the federal and structural pressures keep compounding, the leverage means the downside from here is not small.

Catalysts

The first quarter of 2026 was a transition quarter in more ways than one. Revenue was flat year over year at $968.3 million, with the commercial segment up 0.5% to $675.5 million and the federal government segment down 1.1%, pressured by government efficiency cuts. Net income was $5.5 million, adjusted EBITDA was $83.6 million at an 8.6% margin, and non-GAAP earnings were $0.69 a share, below consensus; these are company-defined measures.

The forward catalysts are the rebrand, the acquisition, and the guidance. Management confirmed this was the final earnings call under the ASGN name, with the business now operating as Everforth and trading under the ticker EFOR as of April 2026. The company acquired Quinnox for $290 million to strengthen digital engineering and global delivery, expecting about $100 million of revenue contribution at a low-20s EBITDA margin. Second-quarter guidance calls for revenue of $970 million to $1.0 billion and adjusted EBITDA of $85 million to $95 million. The metrics to watch over the coming quarters are whether commercial consulting growth offsets the federal contraction, whether the Quinnox integration lifts the margin mix, and whether the buyback keeps shrinking the share count while the price is depressed.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Commercial (reported)

Federal Government (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 results, April 2026 · FY2025 10-K · FY2025 10-K; Q1 2026 results, April 2026 · company financials · Q1 2026 results, April 2026; company financials

View the full interactive ASGN report on boothcheck